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PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

234

August to October 1912.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part I.

[35381] No. 1.

Note communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires, August 15, 1912.

DÉMARCHE du chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie à Paris.

Le Comte Berchtold s'inquiète de l'agitation propagée en Bulgarie, en Serbie et en Grèce par la perspective de privilèges donnés aux Albanais; et il propose aux Grandes Puissances d'entrer en pourparlers avec le Cabinet de Vienne en vue:

1. De conseiller à la Sublime Porte l'adoption d'une politique de décentralisation progressive, qui procurerait aux nationalités chrétiennes les garanties que ces nationalités peuvent légitimement réclamer.

2. D'agir auprès des États balkaniques pour qu'ils attendent pacifiquement les résultats de cette politique.

M. Briand a répondu que la France avait comme principal but politique en Orient le maintien de la paix générale et du *statu quo;* qu'il était heureux de se trouver sur ce point en conformité de vues avec le Cabinet de Vienne, et qu'il étudierait la suggestion du Comte Berchtold.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 15 août, 1912.

[34555] No. 2.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, August* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 27 of the 18th July and No. 38 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note received from the Montenegrin Government referring to the recent incidents on the Turco-Montenegrin frontier.

The Montenegrin Government urge that the frontier established by the Treaty of Berlin was traced by an international commission which did not take sufficiently into account the nature of the ground and the agricultural needs of the population. Outrages have accordingly been committed (the Montenegrin note alludes only to the aggressions of the Turks under cover of their blockhouses), and in order to prevent their recurrence attempts have been made to arrive at an amicable arrangement by means of mixed commissions. But in 1908, when an exchange of territory was agreed to, the Turkish Government failed to ratify the settlements accepted by their commissioners, while the negotiations conducted by another commission in 1911 were abortive. The agreement arrived at this year has not been sanctioned. In these circumstances the Montenegrin Government appeal to the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to find radical means of putting a stop to the existing state of things.

In my despatches No. 53 of the 8th December, 1911, and No. 27 of the 19th July, I have reported to you communications to the same effect made to me by the Montenegrin Government.

The Russian Minister, M. de Giers, whom I consulted on the subject, told me that he would recommend the note to the earnest consideration of his Government. It was desirable, in the interests of humanity, to put a stop to these incidents, and to remove at the same time the danger that either party might be tempted at a given moment to create them for its own purposes.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 2.

General Martinovitch to Count de Salis.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 28 juillet* (10 *août*), 1912.

A LA suite des tristes événements qui se sont déroulés tout dernièrement dans la Zéta, ainsi qu'à la suite du grave incident de Prjichté (Polia), le Gouvernement Royal ne voit pas d'autre moyen d'éviter des conséquences fâcheuses entre le Monténégro et la Turquie que de s'adresser aux Puissances signataires du Traité de Berlin pour ce qui suit :—

La ligne frontière turco-monténégrine a été tracée par la commission internationale réunie après le Traité de Berlin sans tenir suffisamment compte sur certains points de la nature et des accidents du terrain et des besoins matériels de la population en rapport de l'exercice du droit de propriété rurale et de sa jouissance.

Sur certains endroits de la frontière et en violation du territoire du Monténégro les Turcs ont construit des fortins et des retranchements, d'où les soldats ont tiré trop souvent—pas pour rétablir l'ordre, mais pour provocation. Impressionné de cet état de choses, le Gouvernement Royal proposa à la Sublime Porte un arrangement à l'amiable ; on nomma des commissions, on se réunit sur les lieux, on discuta, mais on ne réussit malheureusement pas à s'entendre. Du côté ottoman on a toujours porté sur chaque point de minime importance une intransigeance si absolue que la meilleure volonté du côté monténégrin d'arriver à un accord a constamment échoué.

En 1908 une commission mixte réunie à Constantinople a dû reconnaître la nécessité d'un échange de territoire (Rjanitza contre Djanin et Yózéro), et les deux Gouvernements s'étaient engagés à présenter aux Chambres des projets de loi relatifs à cet échange. Le Gouvernement Royal s'empressa de faire ratifier par la Skoupchtina cet arrangement, mais le Gouvernement ottoman ne le présenta même pas devant son Parlement et l'accord resta lettre morte.

L'été dernier, soit 1911, une autre commission turco-monténégrine nommée dans le même but a dû se séparer sans rien conclure.

En attendant, les incidents se sont répétés avec une fréquence alarmante et dans des circonstances qui ont mis à une dure épreuve la patience du Gouvernement monténégrin. Des soldats turcs n'ont pas hésité à tirer plus souvent qu'auparavant du côté de Velika sur des paisibles agriculteurs et bergers, ou les tuant et blessant à l'intérieur même de leurs propres maisons.

Le Monténégro a supporté tout cela, en cherchant cependant par tous les moyens de s'entendre avec la Turquie. Mû par ce désir le Gouvernement Royal a obtenu, en insistant, une nouvelle commission, qui cette fois tomba d'accord sur presque tous les points en litige.

Contre toute attente la Sublime Porte, cette fois encore, s'est abstenue de sanctionner les conclusions de ses propres délégués.

En vous exposant ce qui précède, je tiens à faire connaître à votre Excellence qu'au Gouvernement Royal, se trouvant à bout de ressources pour arriver à une entente directe et amiable avec la Turquie, il ne reste qu'à faire appel aux Grandes Puissances signataires du Traité de Berlin, les suppliant de prendre en bienveillante considération la situation intolérable dans laquelle il se trouve par suite des circonstances brièvement exposées ci-haut, pour trouver un moyen radical qui mettrait fin à l'état de choses existant, qui n'a que trop duré au détriment de son progrès économique et pacifique.

Le Monténégro, appréciant hautement les bienfaits de la paix dont il a besoin pour se consacrer entièrement à son développement et à son progrès, est toujours animé de même sentiment.

Il en donne avec empressement une nouvelle preuve en s'adressant à la bienveillance et à l'équité des Puissances pour leur demander, dans leur haute sagesse, le concours le plus urgent et puissant, afin de pouvoir continuer à vivre en bon et loyal voisin avec la Turquie et demeurer un élément de paix et d'ordre sur les Balkans, pour répondre ainsi aux conseils constants et amicaux des Grandes Puissances.

Dans le cas peu probable que le désir légitime de Monténégro—de voir les Puissances intervenir efficacement dans cette affaire—ne vînait pas à être réalisé sans retard, il se verrait contraint par la force des choses de défendre sa cause, quelques sacrifices que cela puisse lui coûter.

Je vous prie, &c.
Général MITAR MARTINOVITCH.

[34661] No. 3.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 16, 1912.*

I GATHER from the language held to me this afternoon by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Excellency is not very pleased at initiative now being taken by Austria.

He said that he would have no objection to entering into an exchange of views with the Powers, though he doubted whether anything would come of it. It would not, however, be agreeable to Russia were Austria to try to "patronise" Balkan States.

Anything, moreover, in the shape of collective representations would be resented at Constantinople. Much, also, would depend on what was meant by decentralisation, and on whether it was to apply to Macedonia as well as to Albania. Austrian Ambassador, whom he was expecting, would no doubt be able to explain this, and if the explanations were satisfactory, and if Austrian proposal contained nothing objectionable, he would be prepared to instruct Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to give friendly counsels in the name of his Government, but not to take collective action.

[34665] No. 4.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, August 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 111 of 15th August : Near East.

Lord Granville informed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day of instructions sent to His Majesty's representatives at Constantinople and Sophia. Under-Secretary of State said that they had received no reports regarding Kochana incident from Constantinople and only one very optimistic one from Sophia. He continued to give moderating counsels to Turkish and Bulgarian representatives here.

Austrian proposal as reported in newspapers was made to German Government on 14th August. Under-Secretary of State declared his conviction that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was moved by honest desire to secure peace and *status quo* in the Balkans and had no *arrière-pensée* ; there was nothing new in the proposed exchange of views, as Cabinets had been doing so for weeks, but the present proposal had been made with rather a flourish of trumpets. He said that German Government would merely reply that they would be glad to exchange views and would not commit themselves further. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

French chargé d'affaires was told by Turkish Councillor of Embassy in conversation the other day that Turks were convinced of the good intentions of all the Great Powers except Austria, as to whose plans they were rather nervous.

[34659] No. 5.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August 16, 1912.*

KING OF BULGARIA yesterday assured French and Russian Ministers of his pacific intentions, expressing his unwillingness to act in any way contrary to the desires of the Powers.

[34662] No. 6.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, August 16, 1912.*

MONTENEGRIN Government inform me that, according to information just received, twenty people, including women and children, have been massacred on the Montenegrin side of the frontier near Treptshi and some thirty more made prisoners.

[35380] No. 7.

Note communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires, August 17, 1912.

PROPOSITION du Comte Berchtold.

Les Gouvernements français et russe sont d'accord pour penser qu'il est possible d'accepter la suggestion autrichienne et de donner, séparément, et non collectivement, des conseils conformes à cette suggestion au Gouvernement ottoman en même temps que l'on recommanderait le calme aux États balkaniques.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 août, 1912.

[35609] No. 8.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, August 17, 1912.

LE Gouvernement monténégrin s'est adressé aux Puissances signataires du Traité de Berlin pour demander leur intervention en vue de faire rectifier la frontière turco-monténégrine et résoudre quelques questions connexes étudiées par la Commission mixte de Délimitation. Il a demandé également la ratification d'un protocole signé *ad referendum* en 1908, mais que la Sublime Porte n'a pas cru pouvoir ratifier jusqu'ici en raison de l'opposition de ces mêmes habitants de la région de Goussigné et Plava, dont on avait déjà un exemple lors de l'application du Traité de Berlin. L'insistance du Monténégro à vouloir faire exécuter ledit protocole au moment même où une grande agitation règne en Albanie paraît avoir comme but celui de détourner la responsabilité qu'il a encourue dernièrement en envahissant à l'improviste le territoire ottoman du côté de Moycovatz et en brûlant un des corps de garde ottomans y établis. Or, l'enquête mixte décidée aurait certainement fait ressortir en sa défaveur les conséquences de la situation. D'après les derniers renseignements, les troupes monténégrines se dirigent et se concentrent vers la région de Bérana, où l'élément serbe domine et où le Monténégro espère trouver quelque accueil. Deux batteries de canons y ont été déjà envoyées et les garnisons renforcées. Par cette mobilisation le Roi de Monténégro cherche sans doute à intimider, et il déguise sa pensée quand il déclare aux représentants étrangers à Cettigné que c'est dans un but défensif que la décision en a été prise, et que, si l'Europe ne parvient à mettre fin à la question de frontière, le Monténégro agirait par ses propres moyens. Cependant, cette attitude n'est aucunement justifiée, puisque le Gouvernement ottoman était encore en négociations sur les affaires de frontière et qu'il avait même désapprouvé son Ministre à Cettigné pour avoir risqué une rupture des relations à ce propos. Le langage du Roi est également incompréhensible et tendancieux, et il n'y a pas eu de la part de la Turquie de concentration pouvant faire présager une attaque et justifier ces mesures prétendument défensives.

De ce qui précède on voit combien la conduite du Gouvernement ottoman a été conciliante en la circonstance et combien le Gouvernement monténégrin se met dans son tort en dénaturant les faits et en provoquant un conflit inattendu et injuste à un moment où toutes les Puissances travaillent au maintien de la paix dans les Balkans.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 17 août, 1912.

[34815] No. 9.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 17, 1912.*

KOCHANA.

Yesterday afternoon Bulgarian Minister left at embassy report from Bulgarian vicar at Kochana to bishop giving an account of the ill-treatment and insults to which he and two schoolmasters had been subjected by soldiers. I was out at the time, and Minister left a message calling attention to pressure exerted on Bulgarian Government by recent demonstration.

(Sent to Foreign Office; repeated to Sophia.)

[34819] No. 10.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 17, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 291 of 16th August.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has been instructed by Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has left St. Petersburgh, to draft a telegram to Russian representatives in London and Paris giving views of Russian Government in regard to Austrian proposal, and inviting the opinion of the two Governments on the subject.

His Excellency told me that Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed to the Austrian Ambassador his satisfaction that the proposal was based on the principles laid down in the exchange of views which took place between the two Governments in March 1910. His Excellency confirmed what Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday in regard to any collective action, and added that we ought to try and limit as much as possible the concessions to be made to Albanians if we were not in a position to secure anything for Macedonia. He also expressed opinion that representations which it was suggested should be made to Balkan States would do more harm than good, as they would infallibly expose us to the answer that only those who, like the Albanians, resorted to violence obtained any redress of their grievances. Russia, he added, was constantly giving counsels of moderation at Belgrade and Sophia.

[34823] No. 11.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, August 17, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 16th August.

Incidents in question took place to the south-east of Berana on Turkish side of the frontier. Facts, as far as known here at present, are as follows:

Moslem Albanian dignitary of the Rongova tribe destroyed crops of the Orthodox Slavs, who revenged themselves by a counter-attack, destroying Turkish frontier post and driving the soldiers into Montenegro. Garrison of Berana, regulars and bashi-bazouks, proceeded to punish Slavs, of whom several were massacred. Fighting continued yesterday, Turks having destroyed Orthodox village, and Slavs in any case two frontier posts.

[34844] No. 12.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 678.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 8, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 352 of the 31st July last, I have the honour to report that in the course of conversation with the Russian Ambassador on the recent Montenegrin frontier incidents I adverted to the joint frontier commission, and asked his Excellency if he knew how the question stood now. M. de Giers said that it was true that the commissioners had come to an agreement which seemed to be an equitable one as long ago as April last, and that the Montenegrin Government had ratified it shortly afterwards. The Porte, on the other hand, had declined to do so, as the agreement provided *inter alia* for the cession by Turkey of a small tongue of territory near Veliké projecting into Montenegro northwards, in return for an adjacent strip of land of about equal area lying along the frontier to the eastwards, to be ceded at Montenegro. The few families inhabiting this tongue of land had for years been toofend with the Montenegrins on three sides of them, and, if the proposed cession took place, would make desperate resistance to being placed under Montenegrin rule and would be joined by the neighbouring Turkish clans. The Montenegrin Government had suggested that the Porte should ratify the agreement, but with the reserve that it should not be put into force until the state of the surrounding country had improved; but the Porte had declined on the ground that the ratification could not be kept secret, and that the knowledge of it would create as much excitement among the mountaineers affected by it, as if the agreement were put into immediate execution. He, M. de Giers, had urged this solution on the Porte.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has made no representations on the subject.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

[34965] No. 13.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, August 12, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 28 of the 9th August I had the honour to transmit to you copies of the official correspondence between the Montenegrin Government and Rustem Bey, the Turkish Minister, respecting the recent frontier incident at Mojkovac or Prziště. Herewith I now beg to enclose copy of a private letter addressed at the same time by Rustem Bey to the Montenegrin Prime Minister, threatening various reprisals in the event of his failing to obtain the satisfaction he required.

Rustem Bey Bilinski, who is, I understand, a grandson of the late Sir A. Sandison, and was at one time editor of the "Bourse égyptienne" newspaper at Cairo, arrived here last January in succession to Sadr-ed-Din Bey, who had fallen into disfavour at Constantinople for his want of success in dealing with the Malissor question. He seems more than once to have betrayed the intention of taking the first opportunity of restoring the lost prestige of the Turkish Legation by inflicting a diplomatic defeat on the Montenegrin Government. The enclosed letter would seem to show that he was inclined to employ every means for attaining his object. The action of the Porte in promptly disavowing him and in proposing at once as his successor the Turkish consul-general at Budapest, Fahr-ed-Din Bey, has removed the danger that any grievance can legitimately be felt here on the subject. Rustem Bey's short stay here has been marked by various incidents, too small in themselves to bring to your notice, and in view of the spirit in which he seemed inclined to carry out his functions his departure must be considered as conducive to peace and tranquillity.

I should add that, in accordance with your instructions, I took the earliest opportunity of expressing to the Prime Minister your earnest hope that the Montenegrins would abstain from any aggressive action and would on no account cross the frontier.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

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Enclosure in No. 13.

Rustem Bey to General Martinovitch.

M. le Ministre, *Légation de Turquie, Cettigné, le 5 août, 1912.*

J'ENVOIE à votre Excellence en même temps que cette lettre privée une lettre officielle, où je lui annonce que si le Gouvernement Royal ne donne pas satisfaction à la Turquie d'ici à demain, 6 août, à 8 heures du soir, pour son attitude dans l'affaire de Prziché, je quitterai Cettigné, ce qui entraînera le départ de M. Plamenatz de Constantinople.

J'ajouterai à ce que je dis dans ma note officielle que la conséquence d'une rupture entre la Turquie et le Monténégro sera, entre autres, que tous les ouvriers actuellement employés par l'État dans le vilayet de Scutari et dans les autres parties de l'Empire seront congédiés; que dans l'avenir aussi le travail sera systématiquement refusé aux Monténégrins dans toutes les nombreuses entreprises de travaux publics faisant partie du programme du Gouvernement ottoman; que l'esprit accommodant et généreux dont la Sublime Porte a fait preuve jusqu'à présent à l'égard des Monténégrins résidant dans l'Empire en matière de taxes fera place à une politique économique des plus rigoureuses.

Veuillez, &c.

ALFRED RUSTEM

[34882] No. 14.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Belgrade, August 15, 1912.*

RUMOURS concerning a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance have during the last few months been so constant, only to be as constantly denied, that the announcement recently telegraphed by the St. Petersburgh correspondent of the "Times" that the existence of such an alliance is now admitted in St. Petersburgh has caused comparatively little stir in Belgrade.

Only two newspapers, the "Piedmont" and the "Srpska Zastava," have as yet written at any length upon the subject. I have the honour to enclose a summary of the views which they express, and which may be interesting, as undoubtedly representing the prevailing feeling in Belgrade.

M. Yovanovitch, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday, again categorically denied to me that any treaty of alliance is in existence, but he admitted there had been pourparlers, and that the bases for a treaty were more or less settled, but the old difficulty of rival claims in Macedonia was very difficult to get over.

I then said that besides the rumours of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, one often heard mention of an alliance between Bulgaria and Austria, supposed to have been concluded some twelve years ago, and I should be glad to know what he thought of this report, as, of course, the existence of an Austro-Bulgarian alliance would scarcely be compatible with a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance concerning which he had just told me there had been pourparlers. M. Yovanovitch replied, that very possibly an arrangement between Bulgaria and Austria may have been in existence up to the time of Bulgaria's declaration of independence, but he scarcely thought since that time. He pointed out that the object of both Bulgaria and Austria is Salonica, and the former would be far more likely to attain her object by an alliance with Servia than by any arrangement with Austria. It had been stated that the basis of such an arrangement was the partition of Servia, but this seemed altogether too cold-blooded and preposterous to be believed.

As will be seen from the summary I enclose, everyone is not, however, as confident as M. Yovanovitch, and there appears to be an uncomfortable feeling that if a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance has been concluded Servia has in some way or another been "done." The reason for this feeling is that the advantages of such an alliance to Bulgaria are not clear, and—as the "Neue Freie Presse" remarks—Bulgaria and Servia must have been influenced rather by desire for the goodwill of Russia than regard for their own interests. It looks as though through this alliance Bulgaria would merely succeed in unnecessarily attracting Austrian hostility.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 14.

Summary of Articles from the "Piedmont" and the "Srpska Zastava."

THE whole of the European press has of late been occupying itself with a supposed Bulgaro-Servian alliance, and now even the "Times," a paper whose informations are generally well-founded, writes that such an alliance exists. This news can only be agreeable to Servia, as such an alliance has been for a long time desired by both sides of the Timok.

There are many reasons however for doubting the truth of the present report, the principal one being that if such an alliance exists, the report of the much talked of Bulgaro-Austrian alliance seems inexplicable—an alliance which is supposed to be directed against Servia, and to provide for Servia's partition.

Is it possible that Bulgaria on the one hand concludes an alliance with us, and at the same time concludes one with Austria? It would be too great a perfidy. Those who know, however, Jesuitic Austria, and her pupil, King Ferdinand, would not be surprised if this were the case. If a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance exists then it is certain that King Ferdinand did not take any part in its conclusion, and that it is not signed by him. It might be the work of his Ministers, encouraged by him in order to throw dust in our eyes, and draw away our attention from his doings in Vienna in his secret meetings with his Emperor.

It must not be forgotten that King Ferdinand himself asked for the revision of the Bulgarian constitution, and that the revised article 17 empowers him to conclude secret treaties with foreign States without informing not only the Sobranjé, but not even his Government. It appears that the constitution was revised for the special purpose of concluding an alliance with Austria.

Therefore, the foreign policy of Bulgaria is not in the hands of either the Sobranjé, or of the Bulgarian Government, but in the hands of King Ferdinand himself. We know that King Ferdinand, naturally, has no Slav sentiments, nor any feelings for Slav solidarity, and that after twenty-five years' rule over a Slav nation he has remained a great Catholic and a great Austrian.

This is the only explanation why up to this a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance has not been concluded, and why now it is doubtful whether any such understanding has been come to between the two brother nations, or if such an alliance would have any real value.

[34894] No. 15.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 151.)

Sir, *Marienbad, August 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Neue Freie Presse" and certain other Vienna papers publish to-day a piece of information, which has the appearance of being inspired, concerning a proposal of Count Berchtold for an exchange of views between the Powers with regard to the situation in Turkey.

The statement in question runs as follows:—

"The situation in Turkey has visibly improved during the last few days. The new Turkish Cabinet, as well as public opinion in Turkey, has realised that the policy of centralisation has ended in a complete fiasco, and that the salvation of Turkey is to be sought on other lines. It is characteristic of the situation that it was the army, the most national part of the population, which pointed out the necessity for an understanding with the Albanians.

"This is a cause of lively satisfaction to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, because it proves the soundness of the advice which it has given to Turkey for years past, and Austria-Hungary's attitude is further justified by the fact that the demands formulated at the meeting of Albanians at Prischtina were conceived in a very moderate tone. It appears also that the Turkish Government have already agreed to them in principle. The immediate future of Turkey could be regarded with a feeling of the greatest security were it not that there is always a certain danger, proved by past experience, that a Turkish Government which has started in the right direction may later become unstable, and give ground to the assertion that the lack of unity among the different races of the Empire and the mistrust which the success of one causes in the others

make it impossible for a Turkish Government to continue on the path on which it has entered.

"It therefore seems important at the present juncture that all those who take an interest in the welfare of Turkey and in the maintenance of peace in the Balkan Peninsula should join together to exercise special activity, firstly in strengthening the Porte in its well-meant efforts, and secondly in exercising influence on the Balkan nations in order that they may not stand in one another's way in realising their demands, which are for the most part reconcilable with the authority of the Turkish Empire, and may thereby render possible for the Porte a policy of adaptation to actual racial conditions in Turkey.

"We have reason to believe that Count Berchtold, following this train of thought, intends to take the initiative and suggest an exchange of views between the Powers in the hope of attaining the objects above described, which are in the interests of Turkey herself and of the Balkan States, as well as of the other Powers.

"It is clear that, in order to bring about peace between Italy and Turkey, the position of the Turkish Government in its own country must be strengthened so that it may be able to restore order at home. It would then be able, in full possession of its authority, to carry out its intentions with regard to the conclusion of peace without fearing that the opposition would make its pacific tendencies the object of fresh agitations."

The "Neue Freie Presse" publishes a leading article on the subject of the above information, in which it points out that Austria-Hungary is the only Power which wants nothing from Turkey. Russia desires the opening of the Dardanelles to her war-ships; Italy the sovereignty over Tripoli. France is largely bound to support Russia. England contests the rights of Turkey to the control of the terminus on the Persian Gulf of the Bagdad Railway, and Germany's policy feels the weight of her great interests in that undertaking. And yet, in spite of her political disinterestedness, by her geographical position Austria-Hungary is the Power most nearly affected by the internal troubles of Turkey, and for that reason Count Berchtold invites the European Powers to support Turkey by mutual understanding in her present difficulties, and at the same time to assist the races in her Empire who are struggling for proper conditions of existence. Austria-Hungary desires to raise the credit of Turkey and to prolong the existence of a State which is only in appearance so near dissolution. The meetings of the Emperors at Baltic Port, says the "Neue Freie Presse," and M. Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburgh have given fresh strength to the policy of the existing state of affairs in Europe, and Count Berchtold's proposal is the fruit of that policy. The internal affairs of Turkey have the peculiarity of becoming external affairs for the rest of Europe, and a crisis in that country cannot be allowed to threaten the general tranquillity. The "Neue Freie Presse" concludes by saying that Italy will be asked to join the other Powers in discussing the means for the preservation of Turkey, and that if the Powers take counsel as to Albania and Macedonia they will not be able to ignore the question of Tripoli. For this reason it is probable that the proposed exchange of views will lead to direct peace negotiations.

It is too early as yet to form an opinion as to the scope of Count Berchtold's proposal, or as to the exact form which it will assume, but it is interesting to note that he has to-day gone to Ischl to see the Emperor, probably for the purpose of discussing the projected step which the Austro-Hungarian Government is supposed to be about to take.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[34958] No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 359.)

Sir, *Paris, August 17, 1912.*

THE comments of the French press in regard to the proposals which the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is understood to have made for an exchange of views between the Powers in regard to Near Eastern questions, have been hitherto of a guarded nature, as the significance of Count Berchtold's step was not fully understood.

The exact nature of the representation, made verbally on the 14th instant to the French Government by the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires, has now become

known, and a leading article in yesterday evening's issue of the "Temps," copy of which is transmitted to you herewith, subjects both the proposal itself and the manner in which it was made to a close examination, without, however, pretending to forecast what will be the attitude of the French Government towards it.

As regards the manner of the proposal, the return of Austria-Hungary to the system of collective action by all the Great Powers is cordially welcomed. As far as the substance of the proposals is concerned, namely, that Turkey should be advised to proceed with measures of progressive decentralisation in favour of all the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, and that counsels of moderation should be urged on the Balkan States, general approval is expressed.

An article, somewhat similar in tone, copy of which I have the honour also to enclose herein, is contributed to to-day's issue of the "Figaro" by its foreign editor. In the view of M. Recouly, the word "décentralisation" is the pith of the Austrian proposal, and he sees in it a blow to the policy which the Committee of Union and Progress have hitherto pursued with such unsatisfactory results, and also, perhaps, a new name for the old "Macedonian reforms." He recalls all the grave problems with which these reforms were associated in the past, and in particular the difficulty of securing any effective reform without impairing Turkish sovereignty.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

Extract from the "Temps" of August 17, 1912.

LA PROPOSITION BERCHTOLD.

LE "Neues Wiener Tagblatt" a annoncé il y a deux jours que le Comte Berchtold, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie, se proposait de suggérer aux Puissances un échange de vues sur les conseils qui pourrait être opportun de donner à la Turquie et aux États balkaniques afin de consolider la paix de l'Orient. L'information du grand journal viennois était de tous points exacte. C'est mercredi en effet que les représentants de l'Autriche-Hongrie ont fait aux diverses chancelleries la communication dont il avait le premier publié la nouvelle.

On trouvera plus loin des détails sur la façon dont la suggestion austro-hongroise a été portée à la connaissance du Gouvernement français. Le Comte Somssich, chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie pendant le congé du Comte Szecsen, n'a point remis de note à M. Paléologue, directeur des affaires politiques. Tout s'est borné à Paris comme dans les autres capitales à une simple conversation. Mais cette conversation a été fort intéressante. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, préoccupé à juste titre de la situation troublée de la Péninsule balkanique, recherche les moyens d'apaiser ce trouble et il arrive à une triple conclusion. En premier lieu, il estime que cet apaisement désirable ne peut être que l'œuvre collective de toutes les Puissances. En second lieu, il propose de conseiller à la Turquie de prendre en faveur de toutes les nationalités de l'Empire ottoman des mesures de "décentralisation progressive." Enfin, il juge utile d'agir sur les États balkaniques pour le faire sentir la nécessité du calme. Nous ne savons quelle sera la réponse du Gouvernement français à cette communication. Il devra non seulement l'examiner seul, mais encore s'en entretenir avec ses alliés et ses amis. En outre, le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, ne sera de retour que le 20. C'est dire que quelques jours passeront avant qu'on puisse fournir aucun renseignement précis sur l'attitude de la France.

Cela posé, l'opinion et la presse ne peuvent manquer d'être frappées du caractère que présente la proposition austro-hongroise. Le Comte Berchtold se place résolument sur le terrain européen, et c'est là, dans la politique balkanique de la Monarchie dualiste, un fait nouvelle de réelle importance. Depuis 1897, l'Autriche-Hongrie a fui systématiquement ce terrain. Elle l'a fui d'abord en entraînant la Russie dans cette entente à deux nouée en 1897, précisée en 1903, qui réservait en fait aux Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Pétersbourg un rôle privilégié et prépondérant dans les Balkans. Elle l'a fui plus nettement encore en 1908 et 1909, et l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine une fois proclamée, le but du Comte d'Ahrenthal a été de se soustraire à tout prix à l'intervention des tiers, fût-ce sous la forme anodine d'une conférence d'enregistrement. Le Comte Berchtold procède aujourd'hui par la méthode inverse.

Nul doute qu'il ne pense ainsi fournir un gage de la droiture de ses intentions et établir par un acte que son pays ne souhaite présentement ni profit personnel ni action indépendante dans les affaires balkaniques. C'est en ce qui touche la "manière" de l'initiative austro-hongroise, un trait à retenir. Car le retour de l'Autriche-Hongrie au concert européen peut modifier sensiblement les conditions générales de la politique orientale.

Quant au fond, la proposition du Comte Berchtold demandera à être serrée de près. La décentralisation nationale est évidemment une des formules les plus séduisantes qui puissent s'appliquer aux problèmes intérieurs ottomans. On a fait de la décentralisation en Égypte, au Liban, en Macédoine. Le programme de réformes de 1903 était, au premier chef, un programme de décentralisation. Ce programme, le "Times" le rappelle justement, n'a pas été d'une application aisée. Car pour fortifier leurs titres, les diverses nationalités se sont livrées en Macédoine à d'abominables violences. Aujourd'hui c'est encore de la décentralisation que le Cabinet Moukhtar Pacha promet à l'Albanie, et il éprouve, semble-t-il, quelque difficulté à concilier les exigences locales avec les besoins du pouvoir central. C'est donc une question de savoir si la formule deviendra plus maniable en se généralisant. Mais c'est une question qui, à coup sûr, vaut la peine d'être étudiée.

Sur les conseils de calme à donner aux États balkaniques, l'accord de toutes les Puissances est virtuellement acquis. La Russie, dont certains ont si injustement suspecté la politique, a la première donné l'exemple de cette action pacifiante; et si, depuis des mois, aucun des États chrétiens n'a troublé la paix, c'est à elle qu'on le doit pour la plus large part. La seconde suggestion du Comte Berchtold ne saurait donc rencontre de contradictions. Il convient de noter toutefois qu'elle se lie manifestement dans son esprit à la suggestion précédente. Si, à son gré, des conseils de calme peuvent être adressés aux États balkaniques, c'est parce qu'en contre-partie les Puissances s'engageraient à obtenir pour les nationalités de l'Empire ottoman des avantages. Le programme autrichien constitue donc un bloc, et c'est un bloc que le Comte Berchtold souhaite qu'il soit examiné par les différents Gouvernements.

Quelles seront les conclusions de cet examen? Il est trop tôt pour le préjuger. Les commentaires de presse qu'on lira plus loin sont peu significatifs. Car ils témoignent tous d'une connaissance accidentellement ou volontairement incomplète de la proposition austro-hongroise. Les journaux allemands, avec la mauvaise humeur qu'ils témoignent d'ordinaire à toute initiative autrichienne, affectent, sauf de rares exceptions, de ne retenir que la seconde partie de cette proposition—conseils à donner aux États balkaniques. La presse anglaise est hésitante et déclare ne rien savoir de positif. Les précisions, que le "Temps" se trouve à même de fournir sur la démarche faite mercredi au Quai d'Orsay par le Comte Somssich, autorisent une appréciation plus motivée. Nous la résumerons en disant que la suggestion austro-hongroise, intéressante par sa substance et digne d'une étude attentive, l'est plus encore peut-être par sa forme et par l'esprit européen, très nouveau au Ballplatz, qu'elle entend appliquer aux affaires orientales. On ne peut prévoir quelle sera l'issue de cette suggestion. Mais on doit jusqu'à nouvel ordre être satisfait de la méthode qui la caractérise. Cette méthode permet en effet une discussion de sang-froid et de bonne foi.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

Extract from the "Figaro" of August 17, 1912.

LES AFFAIRES BALKANIQUES.—LA PROPOSITION DU COMTE BERCHTOLD.

DÈS qu'il s'agit des affaires balkaniques qui le touchent de si près, nous sommes déjà accoutumés à voir le Cabinet de Vienne prendre résolument l'initiative et s'apprêter à mener le chœur. Nul n'a perdu le souvenir de certaine communication subite faite durant l'été de 1908, par laquelle le Gouvernement autrichien notifiait à l'Europe l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. L'initiative d'aujourd'hui est, nous n'avons pas besoin de le dire, beaucoup moins sensationnelle. Au lieu de l'émotion qui se manifestait il y a quatre ans, elle ne peut provoquer qu'une curiosité des plus sympathiques et beaucoup d'intérêt.

De quoi s'agit-il au juste? Car il est essentiel de ne point se méprendre sur la véritable portée de la proposition autrichienne.

Dans la journée de mercredi, le Comte Somssich, chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie à Paris, a transmis à M. Paléologue, directeur des affaires politiques, la

communication du Comte Berchtold. Celui-ci estime désirable un échange de vues entre les différents Cabinets européens sur les deux points suivants :—

1. Conseils à donner à la Turquie dans le sens d'une décentralisation progressive en faveur de toutes les nationalités de l'Empire.

2. Conseils de tranquillité à donner à tous les États balkaniques.

Ce programme, comme on voit, et c'est là son premier mérite, est parfaitement balancé. L'Europe, se haussant au rôle d'un mentor plein de sagesse, chapitrerait tour à tour les uns et les autres, en leur faisant entendre la voix de la raison. Et il faudrait aux uns et aux autres un bien mauvais esprit, s'ils ne s'empressaient pas de suivre une recommandation aussi sensée.

Le mot de "décentralisation" qui est, sans aucun doute, le plus important de la communication, vise directement la politique des Jeunes-Turcs, telle qu'elle fut appliquée ces dernières années, avec beaucoup d'intransigeance et de maladresse, par les dirigeants du comité. Ce qu'ils poursuivirent obstinément, ce fut une centralisation excessive qui ne tenait aucun compte des traditions historiques, des oppositions et des nécessités géographiques. Tout au plus pourrait-on dire pour leur décharge qu'une telle politique était dans la logique de leur système. Issus de la révolution que l'on sait, ils étaient fatalement centralisateurs et nationalistes; en France, militaristes et jacobins.

Mais c'est à peine là une explication; ce n'est, à aucun degré, une excuse. Et pour les races chrétiennes des Balkans, cette excuse n'aurait rien valu: ayant accueilli avec joie l'avènement du nouveau régime, pour l'amélioration notable qu'elles en attendaient, leur désillusion fut rapide et profonde. L'Albanie, notamment, l'enfant gâtée de l'ancien régime, fut traitée par les Jeunes-Turcs sans aucune espèce de ménagement. Elle a bien pris sa revanche: c'est, au fond, la révolte albanaise qui a causé la chute de Mahmoud Chevket et du comité.

Le nouveau Ministère ottoman est obligé de faire aux Albanais de très importantes concessions. Mais pourquoi donc ne les ferait-il qu'à eux seuls? Pourquoi les Bulgares et les Grecs de Macédoine, les Serbes de la Vieille-Serbie seraient-ils moins dignes d'intérêt que les Albanais? N'ont-il pas souffert, ne souffrent-ils pas, eux aussi, de cette centralisation excessive que le Comte Berchtold, dans un sentiment de bonté et de justice, auquel chacun rend hommage, désire voir se relâcher à leur profit?

La suggestion autrichienne a donc pour elle non seulement la logique mais encore l'actualité. La politique du comité ayant complètement échoué et le nouveau Gouvernement turc étant animé d'un esprit tout nouveau, rien de plus naturel que d'inviter courtoisement ledit Gouvernement à abandonner des méthodes qui ont donné d'aussi mauvais résultats.

En pareille affaire on ne saurait se montrer trop prudents; car nous sommes sur un terrain éminemment dangereux.

Derrière ce mot de "décentralisation" qui, appliqué aux questions balkaniques, ne manque pas d'une certaine nouveauté, on retrouverait sans effort les réformes macédoniennes. Et c'est là, par contre, une vieille, très vieille connaissance. En avons nous assez entendu parler de ces fameuses réformes! Et il n'est point nécessaire de creuser beaucoup nos souvenirs pour nous rappeler toutes les terribles difficultés que ce problème soulevait.

Comment concilier les intérêts bulgares avec les intérêts grecs, qui sont partout opposés? Le correspondant viennois du "Times" rappelle, non sans beaucoup d'à-propos, qu'une des clauses de la Convention de Mürsteg eut pour effet immédiat de pousser Bulgares et Grecs à s'entre-massacrer avec allégresse. Et cependant cette convention était, elle aussi, pavée des meilleures intentions.

Mais ce qui est beaucoup plus difficile encore, c'est de réclamer un programme sérieux de réformes, sans trop porter atteinte à la souveraineté du Gouvernement ottoman. La presse officieuse de Vienne qui sait où se trouve en cette affaire le point véritablement délicat, prend grand soin de faire remarquer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne cherche d'aucune manière à intervenir dans la politique intérieure de la Turquie.

Seulement, il est parfois assez difficile de déterminer où commence et où finit l'intervention.

Il faut se garder aussi d'exciter, sous prétexte de réformes, voire de décentralisation, les furieux appétits des petits États balkaniques. Tel de ces États n'est que trop porté déjà à chercher les occasions d'un conflit.

On voit combien tout cela est compliqué et embrouillé.

Ce n'est pas une raison pour empêcher les Grandes Puissances d'accorder leur attention aux affaires balkaniques et d'étudier, avec tout le soin qu'elle mérite, la très intéressante proposition du Comte Berchtold.

Il est à noter, et la remarque mérite d'être faite, que cette proposition ne dit rien, absolument rien, de la guerre italo-turque. Elle ignore purement et simplement cette guerre. Le fait est d'autant plus curieux que le Cabinet de Vienne cherche avant tout, d'après ce qu'il déclare, à ramener la paix dans la Péninsule balkanique. Cela étant, comment se désintéresse-t-il à un tel degré de l'état de guerre, qui n'est pourtant pas sans influer grandement sur la situation intérieure de la Turquie?—RAYMOND RECOULY.

[34815] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1912.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 296 of 17th August: Demonstration at Sophia against Turkey.

Is there any importance in the demonstration referred to in this telegram?

[34794] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1912.

THE Bulgarian Minister called at this Office on the 12th instant and asked Sir L. Mallet to draw my attention to the Kotchana incident, and to beg me to use my influence at Constantinople to induce Turkey to adopt a reasonable attitude.

Sir L. Mallet said that His Majesty's chargé d'affaires there had already made representations to the Porte, and added that I hoped that the Bulgarian Government would maintain an attitude of calm and moderation.

M. Majaroff expressed his thanks for Mr. Marling's action, and said that his Government were sincerely desirous of a peaceful termination of the affair.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35637] No. 19.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, August 20, 1912.

LE chargé d'affaires du Monténégro à Constantinople avait déclaré au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ottoman: 1. Que Monténégro ne mobilise pas; 2. Que la commission d'enquête chargée d'établir les responsabilités de l'incident de Moycovitz est dissoute faute d'accord; 3. Qu'il y a eu un contact sanglant dans le caza de Bérana, où musulmans, aidés par les soldats, assaillirent les chrétiens.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères lui répondit: 1. Ses déclarations sur la mobilisation ne concordent pas avec celles faites à Cettigné par son Gouvernement; 2. Qu'il serait préférable attendre les rapports respectifs des commissaires pour aviser ensuite au nécessaire; 3. Les renseignements du Gouvernement ottoman sur les rixes de Bérana montrent que des milliers d'agresseurs, parmi lesquels un nombre considérable de Monténégrins, se sont rués sur des villages musulmans. Le Ministre a ajouté que l'amélioration des relations turco-monténégrines et le retour de la tranquillité dépendent du retrait des troupes monténégrines sur la frontière.

Le Gouvernement ottoman reçut successivement de très graves informations des autorités de frontière. Les Monténégrins ont brûlé deux corps de garde du côté de Bérana et cerné plusieurs autres. Les habitants chrétiens de ces régions, encouragés par ces faits, ont attaqué les troupes ottomanes. Plusieurs soldats ottomans sont morts et cinquante-quatre faits prisonniers par les Monténégrins. Le Gouvernement monténégrin cherche, à Constantinople et à l'étranger, à excuser son agression par une version différente. Le Gouvernement ottoman a dépêché en cette région le Général Djavid Pacha avec des forces suffisantes et la mission de faire une enquête pour punir les coupables, quels qu'ils soient. L'état de siège sera proclamé et toutes les mesures

nécessaires seront prises. Le Gouvernement Impérial a donné l'ordre au chargé d'affaires ottoman à Cettigné de déclarer au Gouvernement monténégrin que la Sublime Porte ne saurait admettre cette nouvelle violation de frontière, qu'elle réclame le retrait des Monténégrins du territoire ottoman, l'évacuation immédiate des corps de garde ottomans ainsi que la restitution des prisonniers; la prolongation de cet état de choses amènera inévitablement des conflits graves dont le Gouvernement Impérial décline toute responsabilité.

Le Général Djavid Pacha ci-haut mentionné n'est pas celui qui a commandé la première expédition contre les Albanais.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 20 août, 1912.

[36138] No. 20.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, August 20, 1912.

LE Sous-Secrétaire d'État austro-hongrois a expliqué à l'Ambassadeur ottoman à Vienne que, dans un esprit amical envers la Turquie et pour faciliter son œuvre réformatrice, le Comte Berchtold avait pensé ouvrir une conversation avec les autres Grandes Puissances en vue de les amener à déclarer, d'une part, que les petits États balkaniques devaient rester pacifiques et que, d'autre part, l'Europe entière est heureuse d'assister le Gouvernement ottoman actuel dans l'application de son plan de décentralisation et de réformes en Turquie.

Le Gouvernement Impérial apprécie l'intention amicale dont le Gouvernement austro-hongrois veut lui donner une nouvelle preuve; mais il craint, à bon droit, que sa démarche mal comprise et interprétée en sens divers, et par les États balkaniques et par les populations musulmanes et chrétiennes de l'Empire ottoman, ne dénature à leurs yeux les réformes libérales projetées par le Gouvernement constitutionnel ottoman. Il ne pourrait les appliquer efficacement que si elles sont présentées aux uns et aux autres entièrement libres et exemptes de toute suggestion étrangère. La Sublime Porte ajoute au surplus qu'aucune des dispositions prises par elle à l'égard des Albanais ne peut être taxée de "décentralisation"; ce terme a été donc impropre-ment employé dans la communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 20 août, 1912.

[35142] No. 21.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, August* 19, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 15th August.

As far as I can ascertain none of my colleagues have received special instructions to give counsels of moderation now. In view of reiterated pacific assurances given by Government, such counsels would be untimely. But I took an opportunity to-day to say to Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was sure that His Majesty's Government would have learnt with gratification the pacific assurances given by the King of the Bulgarians to Russian and French Ministers, for he must know how ardently His Majesty's Government desired peace in the Balkans.

[35143] No. 22.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, August* 19, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs to-day said to me that Austrian proposal as stated in press was too vague for him to express an opinion on its merits. If, however, the execution of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin should be evolved from it, the Macedonians would be doubtless quite satisfied, consequently Bulgaria also.

His Excellency showed anxiety with regard to threatened movement of Albanians in the direction of Salonica.

[35112] No. 23.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic). *Constantinople, August* 19, 1912.

KOCHANA.

MY telegram No. 284 of 12th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that excitement in Bulgaria is calming down, and fully admits that continuance of this favourable turn will depend on Sublime Porte giving proof of their determination to do impartial justice. Report of Ghalib Pasha, president of the commission of enquiry, is expected immediately.

[35198] No. 24.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 19, 1912.

CETTINJÉ telegram No. 11 of 16th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts very positively that, as at Maikovatz, incident near Berana was deliberately provoked by Montenegrin Government, whom he accuses of bad faith throughout. While General Vonkotich had been holding the joint enquiry about the Maikovatz affair, King had secretly mobilised and sent a considerable force with artillery to neighbourhood of Berana under another general of less conciliatory disposition. It was then pretended that Christians had been attacked by Moslems, and Montenegrins crossed the frontier to protect them. This pretext was *primâ facie* most improbable, as the Moslems formed a very [? group omitted: small] minority in that district. Montenegrin troops had attacked and captured four Turkish blockhouses, and were still besieging four others; the Turks had lost over fifty soldiers killed. Turkey had every desire to be conciliatory, but, in face of this aggression, Government thought that moderation could be carried too far. Accordingly, Djavid had been dispatched to Berana with a sufficient force to guard the frontier, but he had strict orders not to encroach on Montenegrin territory. I said that if guarding the frontier meant retaking the blockhouses, a very dangerous situation would be created, as it would involve a combat on a comparatively large scale between the troops of the two countries, and that a state of war would be brought perilously near. His Majesty's Government were very apprehensive of the possible consequences which might result for Turkey elsewhere, and I urged that it would be wiser to instruct Djavid Pasha to content himself with containing the Montenegrin forces in their present position. His Excellency seemed impressed with this considera-tion, but hoped that similar counsels of moderation would be given at Cettinjé. I said that His Majesty's representative had similar instructions to my own.

Djavid Pasha is not the officer who conducted the operations in the Lluma valley in 1910.

[35235] No. 25.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 19, 1912.

ALBANIA: Austrian proposals.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it was not clear what was intended by decentralisation. If it was to be political, the Porte could not entertain a suggestion tending towards a separate régime of Albania; but if it was merely administrative, it was in so far unobjectionable that administrative decentralisation was compatible with and provided for by the constitution of Turkey.

His Excellency showed no sign of resenting Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' step, but appeared to regard it as well-meant officiousness that would not lead to anything.

[35254] No. 26.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, August 20, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 12 of 17th August: Berana.

Fighting has continued during last three days, but most recent news yesterday was that things were quieter. Slav insurgents attacked garrison in revenge for the destruction of their villages, but were beaten off. Several wounded have been brought across the frontier to Andrievitza.

Montenegrins have mobilised the brigade in the Vasoijapatch country, numbering about 5,000 infantry with twelve batteries. Turks have about 2,000 men at Berana, and reinforcements are said to be on the way.

[35198] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 304 of 19th August: Montenegro frontier.

I approve your language.

You may say that I trust that orders will be sent to the Turkish troops on no account to cross the frontier, and to withdraw from its neighbourhood.

I am giving similar advice at Cettinjé.

[35198] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 20, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 304 of 19th August: Montenegro frontier.

You should, in conjunction with your colleagues, strongly urge upon the Montenegrin Government that Montenegrin troops should at once be withdrawn from Turkish territory and from the neighbourhood of the frontier, and use all your influence in favour of moderation.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 456.)

[35142] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 19th August: Kochana incident.

I approve.

[35075] No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 20, 1912.*

THE Austrian chargé d'affaires called on the 14th instant and made to Sir L. Mallet an oral communication from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which is also being made to the other Great Powers, in regard to the Balkans.

Count Berchtold is of opinion that the crisis is not so acute as it was. The excitement in Bulgaria owing to the Kochana massacre, and the recrudescence of the Greek bands, though very disquieting are perhaps natural in all the circumstances, and are possibly partly due to the impression that the Porte is considering the question of granting autonomy to Albania. Now the Porte does not, it appears, contemplate

anything so drastic, but, so far as can be seen, proposes merely to accord certain necessary reforms to those provinces which are not asking for autonomy.

Count Berchtold is of opinion that the Porte should be encouraged by the Powers in this course, which he considers wise and prudent and more calculated to preserve peace in the Balkans than a more forward policy.

He asked for an expression of my views, and whether I thought that anything should be said at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35408] No. 31.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Sophia, August 9, 1912.*

THE Russian Minister told me to-day that he had yesterday informed the Bulgarian Government that Russia did not consider the collisions which had lately taken place between Turkish and Montenegrin troops as other than incidents to be settled by diplomatic means; that Russia felt convinced that it was neither Montenegro's intention to cause international disturbances in the Balkans nor Turkey's desire to increase her already considerable difficulties; that the Russian Government had told King Nicholas that he must keep quiet, and that, unless he did so, he must not count upon Russian sympathy.

M. de Nekludof gathered from the wording of the telegram which he had received from St. Petersburgh that similar instructions had been sent to Belgrade and Athens.

The fact that such a communication should have been made to those Governments would indicate that its contents were intended to serve as a reminder to them also to keep quiet.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[35409] No. 32.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Sophia, August 10, 1912.*

ON the 6th instant vague rumours reached Sophia that a bomb outrage had been committed at Kochana, some 35 miles from the Bulgarian frontier, to the north of Istib. According to accounts which have subsequently transpired from Bulgarian sources, it would seem that the facts were as follows: At 9 o'clock in the morning of the 1st instant, when the market of Kochana was at its height, a bomb exploded, killing 9 men, 1 woman, and 2 children, and wounding a few others, and occasioning a general stampede. Quiet had barely been resumed when a second bomb exploded at some distance from the first, causing a general evacuation of the market-place. About twenty minutes later, when the peasants gradually reassembled and comparative calm was restored, Turkish soldiers, evidently summoned in the meantime, suddenly rushed upon the scene, driving the crowd before them at the point of their bayonets. Simultaneously the police invaded the market-place from another quarter, the combined attack causing a general mêlée, during which men, women, and children indiscriminately were shot or trampled under foot, and shops were rifled. According to the latest information, the deaths amount to 112 and the wounded to over 200. It is significant to note that of the former number, with the exception of five Turks and two Jews, all were Bulgars.

On learning the news, M. Gueshof instructed the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople to make representations to the Porte, asking—

1. For an impartial enquiry.
2. For the prompt and exemplary punishment of the culprits—even for the shooting of some of those responsible.
3. For the adoption of adequate measures to prevent any recurrence of such outrages.

The Turkish Government have sent a commission of enquiry to the spot. It includes two Bulgars: M. Liaptchef, of the Appeal Court of Salonica, and M. Kintinchef, member of the Uskub council.

M. Gueshof has also instructed the Bulgarian representatives abroad to call the attention of the Governments to which they are accredited to the massacre, and to point out the very strong feeling caused in Bulgaria, and the necessity of measures being taken by the Turkish Government to avoid the recurrence of such atrocities in future, the consequences of which might prove very dangerous.

I have just seen M. Gueshof. He was evidently much concerned by the disastrous event, and his agitation was very marked. He considered the situation serious, but he hoped that the Bulgarian Government would be able to curb the public ferment, which was daily growing in intensity. He laid particular stress on the difference of attitude adopted by the Turkish troops, who, by their energetic measures some fortnight ago, when a bomb exploded at Ochrida, at once checked an incipient attack of the Turks on the Bulgarian population. It was clear proof, his Excellency said, that the Turkish authorities could keep order if they chose.

The entire press is filled with indignation at the massacre, and urges the Government to take more energetic action. Even the semi-official "Mir," which has hitherto carefully abstained from disparaging comments on recent events in Turkey, yesterday had a leading article showing change of mood in Government circles. The article points out that, whilst the Albanians are allowed to dictate their own terms, the Christians are brutally murdered, and that the extreme anarchy which prevails in the Turkish Empire can alone explain such barbarity. The article continues: "The inaction of those who, in the name of peace in the Balkans, condemn the people of the peninsula to such a situation for the maintenance of the *status quo* would constitute an international crime should its continuation be tolerated. It is time for Europe to intervene to secure order and tranquillity in the Empire. If European control is not imposed upon the Turks in time no advice or pressure will be able to ensure peace in the Balkans any longer. If by maintenance of *status quo* is meant tolerance of anarchy in Turkey until the complete extermination of Christians, all Balkan States who have fellow-countrymen in the Empire must protest, and if not listened to must themselves take their own measures."

The various Macedonian charitable institutions, eighteen in number, have elected an executive committee of five, with Colonel Protogeroff, who has resigned from the army, as president, to organise meetings of protestation throughout the country.

The bomb outrage itself is only similar to others that have taken place at the instigation of the Macedonian organisation, and the subsequent savage butchery that ensued completed their plan, which was, as usual, calculated to stir up the inevitable indignation of Bulgaria, and to force the hand of the Government, if possible, into taking some definite active steps against Turkey.

It is indeed fortunate that the Bulgarian Government should have as its head at this moment a man who so thoroughly understands the value of peace in such a critical time as the present, and it is to be hoped that they will continue to withstand popular pressure.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY

[34876] No. 33.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Sophia, August 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 74 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to state that M. Gueshof told me the day before yesterday that he was still without precise details of the massacre at Kotchana, and that it would probably take some considerable time to ascertain the exact number of victims, as many peasants had gone to Kotchana for the market-day, and their disappearance could only be established by the investigation which the commission of enquiry would doubtless make in the neighbouring localities. M. Gueshof went on to say that he had received assurances from the Porte that they would endeavour to give satisfaction to all the demands of the Bulgarian Government, as stated in my above-mentioned despatch. It was to be hoped, however, that such satisfaction would not long be delayed. It would be quite useless for them to act on this occasion as in the case of the Istib massacres, when

only two tzigans were condemned to a ridiculously inadequate term of imprisonment. The punishment should be exemplary, and a few soldiers and gendarmes ought to be shot as a warning to others. His Excellency had also subsequently asked for an indemnity to be paid to the families of the victims.

M. Gueshof continued that, although public feeling still ran high, he sincerely hoped that he would be able to keep it within bounds. There was to be a meeting the following day (yesterday), but he was of opinion that it would act as a safety valve to the popular excitement. What preoccupied the Government most, his Excellency said, was the solution of the Albanian question, for, with all his love for peace and his desire to continue the friendly attitude he had adopted towards Turkey since coming into power, there was one circumstance which, should it follow this massacre, would compel him to a diametrical change of policy, namely, if the Porte accorded to the Albanians any political concessions whatever tending to autonomy—*e.g.*, the appointment of a Governor-General, the delimitation of frontiers, &c. The Albanians were very grasping; they claimed the greater part of the four vilayets of Janina, Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonica. If any such concessions were granted to the Albanians and similar ones were withheld from the Macedonians there would be such an uproar among the latter, followed by acts of violence on the part of various organisations to provoke massacres, and the consequent indignation of the people in the country, that no Bulgarian Government would be able to resist the pressure. It was not that he did not wish the Albanians to obtain reforms and privileges, but what they got the Macedonians ought to have also; otherwise the danger to the peace could not be overestimated. M. Gueshof expressed gratification at the news that had been communicated to him by the Russian Minister that the representatives of the Triple *Entente* were to make strong representations to the Porte on the subject of the massacre.

To revert to the fears of the Bulgarian Government respecting the grant of privileges to the Albanians tending to autonomy, it appears that the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople had already spoken on the subject to M. Bompard and to the Marquis of Pallavicini, and that the latter's answers had appeared to him evasive and suspicious. M. Gueshof has also been informed that 300 Albanians from the south are in Corfu, and that they propose holding a congress at Argyrokastro, where they intend to formulate their claims. His Excellency has called the attention of the Greek Minister here to the Corfu meeting. It is hardly necessary to point out the anxiety caused in Bulgaria as well, doubtless, as in Servia and Greece by the success of the Albanian revolt; these three States would view the autonomy of Albania as a fatal blow to their aspirations. They wish to see Albania remain a thorn in the side of Turkey—a source of weakness—and not become a semi-independent Mahommedan State, a strong pillar of the Empire.

I hear from a reliable source that M. Gueshof was considerably put out at being forced to allow the publication of the inflammatory leading article in the semi-official "Mir," extracts of which I quoted in my despatch No. 74 of the 10th instant, and also at being obliged to make an appeal to the Powers lest these two facts should be interpreted as indicating a change of policy on the part of the Bulgarian Government, but he was compelled to do something to satisfy public opinion. As it is, feeling is still running high. M. Gueshof and General Nikyphorof, Minister of War, have received threatening anonymous letters, and it is said that King Ferdinand has also received similar missives.

To conclude, M. Gueshof's love for peace is easily explained; he understands the risk and danger to Bulgaria should she attempt any action against Turkey, and he fully realises the earnestness of the Great Powers, and especially that of Russia, in their reiterated counsels of peace.

A copy of this despatch will be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[34877] No. 34.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Sophia, August 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch I have the honour to report that the first mass meeting of protestation, arranged by an influential committee

composed of members of all parties with the exception of the Socialists, took place in Sophia yesterday afternoon.

Placards had been put up in the morning with war-like devices, as "War!" "On to Adrianople!" "Russia freed Bulgaria. Bulgaria must deliver her own fellow-countrymen." At 5 o'clock many thousands had assembled in the old cathedral square, from whence they proceeded through the town until they reached the large square opposite the Sobranjé, in which stands the statue of the Czar liberator. Here speeches were made by representatives of all parties. The first speaker was M. Karastoyanof, till quite recently mayor of Sophia and a partisan of M. Guechof. Then followed a Democrat, Nationalist, Stamboulovist, Radoslavist, and a Danelist read out the final resolution, to the effect that "the meeting calls upon the Bulgarian Government to undertake any and every measure to secure the liberation of Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople from the Turkish yoke, with the full knowledge that they have the unanimous support of the Bulgarian people." It was also decided to hand copies of the resolution to King Ferdinand and to the Government. The arguments prefatory to the resolution are enclosed herewith.

The crowd then returned to their starting point, and as they passed the Officers' Club there was spontaneous cheering, which was heartily returned. The Royal palace also came in for a good share of royal acclamation.

This meeting appears to have been by far the largest ever held in Sophia, the largest estimate being 30,000 persons. The proceedings throughout were most orderly. Similar meetings are being organised in the provinces for to-morrow, although a public holiday in honour of the twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand's accession, and for Sunday next. It is to be hoped, as I am inclined to think, that these meetings will relieve the overwrought nerves of the people.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 34.

List of Arguments read to the Meeting.

THE following is the list of the points read out to the meeting previously to the resolution being put:—

1. That in view of continual acts of provocation on the frontier and of the fact that those responsible, instead of being punished, are rewarded;

2. That to all steps hitherto taken by Bulgaria the Ottoman Government have responded in a dilatory manner with falsehoods and insults;

3. That since the establishment of the constitution in Turkey, former insurrectionaries and chiefs of bands, who had laid down their arms and returned to their loyalty to the Turkish Government, have been treacherously exterminated;

4. That while the Bulgarian population was cruelly disarmed, the Ottoman Government distributed arms to the Turkish inhabitants and encouraged the formation of Turkish bands;

5. That Bulgarian military service in Turkey has been made the occasion of unheard-of excesses, with a view to forcing Bulgarians to fly the country;

6. That the Turks have provoked wholesale massacres;

7. That whole villages and towns in Macedonia and in the Adrianople vilayet have been wiped out or repeopled with Mahommedans;

8. That the Ottoman Government, while killing off Bulgarians, gives every encouragement to Mahommedans and Albanians, in the hope of effacing the Bulgarian character of Macedonia and the Adrianople vilayet;

9. That the civilised world is horrified at the present reign of terror and anarchy in Turkey;

10. That the Bulgarian people feels itself touched to the quick, and is of the opinion that inaction on the part of the Bulgarian Government in the circumstances constitutes a menace to the internal tranquillity of the country.

[35276] **No. 35.**

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 377.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 19, 1912.*

THE reception by the German press of the announcement of Count Berchtold's invitation to the Powers to exchange views on the situation in Turkey and the Balkans has been distinctly favourable, though one noticed at first the usual hesitation of the German journalist to commit himself before he can get a lead from his semi-officially inspired colleagues. However, it was announced that Germany had given her assent to Count Berchtold's proposal on the 16th instant, and the "Norddeutsche" declared yesterday that the proposal had been received in Germany with friendly welcome, so we may now expect it to be discussed with more enthusiasm. Up till now the line taken by most of the papers is that Count Berchtold's suggestion that the Powers should exchange views on the subject is obviously an excellent one, and one that no Power can well do otherwise than gladly accept; but that it is to be presumed that Count Berchtold has some more or less definite programme in view on the lines indicated in the Austrian and Hungarian semi-official press, and that any such programme must be most carefully considered, and that Germany must not allow herself to be led into any sort of intervention, which has been attempted before with such unsuccessful results.

The "Cologne Gazette," in an article of some length on the 17th instant, points out that there have been times when the Bulgarian statesmen could safely count on the support at Constantinople of some at least of the Great Powers, but that now things are different. There is so much inflammable material in the Balkan Peninsula which any stray spark may kindle into a conflagration, the limits of which are incalculable, that all the Great Powers without exception are sincerely and anxiously determined to do all in their power to prevent such a conflagration. Austria-Hungary, by her geographical position, is the first to feel this, and it is for this reason that Count Berchtold has taken the lead in an attempt to find a programme which can satisfy Turkey herself, the various mixed nationalities in her European dominions, and the independent Balkan States. Count Berchtold, the writer remarks, has expressly stated that he is not thinking of intervention, and everyone will agree with him there; but the proposal he has sketched of encouraging Turkey in the policy of decentralisation, which her present negotiations with the Albanians seem to indicate, is one which bears in it hopeful seeds of success.

Lord Granville saw the Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office on the 16th instant, who had, however, very little to say on the subject. He said that the communication on the 14th of the Austrian proposal had come as a complete surprise to them. There did not seem to be anything very new in the suggestion that the Powers should exchange views, as they had been doing so for months past; but Germany would of course reply that she would gladly join in such an exchange of views. Herr Zimmermann did not discuss the programme as sketched in the papers, but expressed his sincere hope that there would be no talk of intervention—"We do not want to begin that business again." He said he was absolutely convinced that Count Berchtold was induced to take this step by the sole and sincere desire to maintain peace and the *status quo* in the Balkans, and that he had no *arrière-pensée* whatever in the direction of material gains for Austria.

On the 17th the Bulgarian Minister called on Lord Granville, evidently in the hopes of hearing something of the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject. Lord Granville was of course unable to give him any information, but M. Gueshof discussed the situation very frankly. He too remarked that there was nothing new or interesting in the mere invitation to the Powers to exchange views—the point was to know the programme on which the views were to be exchanged. If the Powers decided to give good and restraining advice at Sophia, Belgrade, &c., "Eh bien, nous en savons quelque chose"—they received good advice every day. Lord Granville asked whether a policy of decentralisation might not approach very nearly to grants of autonomy, and whether in that case the temptation to Bulgaria would not be very great to enter into closer relations with an autonomous Macedonia than would seem desirable from the Turkish point of view. M. Gueshof said there was decentralisation and decentralisation, and a great deal depended on what was meant by the word. As far as temptation to Bulgaria was concerned, that always existed. The ideal which all Bulgarians cherished was a great homogeneous Bulgarian State; but, though of course there were many more fiery spirits, the saner statesmen hoped to attain that

ideal eventually by the peaceful and natural development of events. Returning to the question of decentralisation, M. Gueshof thought that with care and prudence it ought not to be very difficult so to arrange things as to secure the rights of all the minorities. For instance, he would suggest that in every town or district the election of the local council, or whatever it was, should not be left to chance, but that it should be laid down what proportion of members each nationality should elect according to their respective numbers in that particular locality. M. Gueshof hopes to go on leave in a few days, which shows that he does not look upon the situation as very threatening, though he said that he only hoped to go and could not be sure that events would allow his departure.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
GRANVILLE.

[35320] No. 36.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 20, 1912.*

ALBANIA.

My telegram No. 306 of 19th August.

Since I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday morning his Excellency has expressed himself to the Russian and French Ambassadors in terms of decided condemnation of Austrian proposals.

Russian Ambassador agrees that any scheme whatever of decentralisation involves delimitation of area, which, while in itself a very thorny problem, would, by creating a political Albania, result eventually in fostering aspirations for autonomy, which at present scarcely exist. The Austrian suggestion of holding out hopes that similar decentralisation may be extended to other parts of European Turkey he considers as unwise and impracticable, as the conditions are quite different from those in Albania.

But if a privileged situation is created for Albania, demands for similar treatment will be made by other races, and a dangerous situation will be created. He expressed these views to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is reporting in this sense to St. Petersburgh.

French Ambassador also condemns Austrian proposals as ill-considered and ill-timed.

Austrian Ambassador was not consulted by his Government as to the proposals, and has received no instructions to mention them at the Porte.

(Confidential.)

Both Russian and French Ambassadors agree in believing that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' proposals were made with the object of creating an autonomous Albania.

[35255] No. 37.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, August 20, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I venture to think that the situation is getting rather serious owing to danger on account of military measures taken on both sides. The position is by no means the same as it was last year. This time the insurgents are united by the close ties to this country.

[35418] No. 38.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 21, 1912.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me confidentially that the Balkan States addressed an appeal to Russia not to forget claims of Christians in Macedonia when the opportune moment arrived.

This step he said was significant.

His Excellency gathers from the Turkish Ambassador that the projected reforms will apply to Albanians in four vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Kossovo, Monastir, which, according to the latter, are comprised in the term Albania. His Excellency is of opinion that we shall have to do something for the Macedonians, who will not be satisfied with vague promises for the future. He spoke pessimistically of the probable outcome of the Austrian proposals, which he evidently thinks will do more harm than good.

His Excellency said that reports which he had received as to an agreement having been arrived at between the Turks and Albanians were very conflicting. If the report was true there would be no need for the Powers to take action at Constantinople, but the recent doings of the Albanians, as well as the Turco-Montenegrin conflict, were causing him much preoccupation.

I told him of the instructions sent in your telegram No. 21 of 20th August to Cettinjé.

[35255] No. 39.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 327.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

INFORM Government that I am urging cessation of hostilities at Cettinjé and moderation at Constantinople. As far as can be ascertained the Montenegrins are the aggressors. I hope that the Government to which you are accredited will send similar instructions and use all their influence in a pacific sense.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 461; Cettinjé, No. 27; and Rome, No. 256.)

[35380] No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 407.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires left with Sir L. Mallet on the 17th instant a paper, of which a copy is enclosed.†

It does not seem to me to be necessary to take any action on this communication, and I propose to await a reply to my telegram No. 309 of the 17th August to your Excellency in which I deprecate direct and formal representations to the Porte.

In my view, it should be impressed on Turkey that if she will establish good government and not repeat the errors of the previous administration the Powers will use all their influence to secure peace in the Balkans. If the Powers will agree to some communication of this kind to be made separately at Constantinople, I should be prepared to instruct His Majesty's representative to join in such action.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 697); Sir E. Goschen (No. 121); and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 112)
† No. 7.

[35381] No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 408.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires communicated to Sir L. Mallet on the 15th instant a paper, of which a copy is enclosed.*

It is a résumé of a communication made in Paris by the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires, identical with that made here by his colleague on the 15th instant.

Count Trauttmansdorff, however, in the latter communication did not speak of "progressive decentralisation," but of "reforms," only mentioning "decentralisation" quite incidentally.

The reply of the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is non-committal.

The communication will probably excite the apprehensions of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as it is universally interpreted as intended to favour the idea of autonomy for the Christian provinces of Turkey.

Before reaching a definite conclusion on the subject I propose to await the result of M. Sazonof's conferences with the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it appears at first sight that, though the policy is one with which His Majesty's Government have sympathised, to press "decentralisation" on the Porte at this juncture might seriously affect the stability of the Turkish Government, excite the chauvinism of the Turkish army, and encourage aspirations in the Balkans which would probably lead to war.

It ought not, however, in my opinion, to be difficult to frame a satisfactory reply when His Majesty's Government have exchanged views and come to an understanding with France and Russia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35376] No. 42.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 382.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador enquired of Sir L. Mallet on the 16th instant whether the Austro-Hungarian Government had made any proposals for an exchange of views with the Powers in respect of autonomy for Albania, as stated in the press.

Sir L. Mallet replied that the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in the communication which he had made had certainly not gone so far as that. He had been instructed to say that the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs viewed with satisfaction the intention of the Porte to grant extensive reforms in the direction of decentralisation to Albania, and thought that the Porte should be encouraged in this policy.

His Highness said that reforms were all very well and that he was heartily in favour of them, but any talk of autonomy would be very dangerous, as it would encourage similar aspirations all over the Balkans.

Sir L. Mallet said that as autonomy had not been mentioned by either Albanians or Austrians, there seemed no need for the newspapers to raise the point, and that real reform for Albania, which everyone wanted, seemed a sufficiently large programme for the present.

In my view, what is wanted is good government with special arrangements suited to different districts, such as Albania, which is in effect what the Albanians ask for, and there need be no talk of autonomy.

Tewfik Pasha has been informed that I approve what Sir L. Mallet said to him on this question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 1.

[35379] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 383.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador informed Sir L. Mallet on the 16th instant that he had heard from his Government that the Government of Montenegro had appealed to the Powers to intervene with a view to rectify the disputed portion of the frontier with Turkey and to settle certain questions connected with it, and to press the Porte to ratify the protocol of 1908 on the subject of the frontier in the Plava district.

Tewfik Pasha said that the Montenegrin troops were mobilising near Berana, but his Highness apparently did not attach great importance to that fact.

The Montenegrins were, Tewfik Pasha said, the aggressors, but the critical stage of the incident was over, and negotiations were proceeding with the Turks. The only reason for the appeal was the wish of the Montenegrins to put themselves right with the Powers—in fact, it was a bit of stage business, and his Highness hopes that the Powers will advise the King to continue negotiations with the Porte.

Tewfik Pasha said that he had little doubt that the King had been bought off. He spoke with the greatest contempt of His Majesty, who, he said, was still in receipt of a subvention from the Turkish Exchequer.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35431] No. 44.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 118. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, August 15, 1912.*

FROM a conversation which I had yesterday with Moukhtar Bey, the new Turkish Minister here, it appears that the relations between Turkey and Greece, though correct, are not at present very cordial. While speaking in high terms of M. Venizelos, he was the reverse of enthusiastic with regard to M. Coromilas, now acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as Minister of Finance, whom he accuses of intriguing both in Macedonia and in the islands. He said that he had overwhelming proof that the recent Patmos demonstration was organised from here.

With regard to the war, he said that the present Turkish Ministry, no less than their predecessors, would never consent to peace on terms which upheld the Italian decree of annexation of the Tripolitaine in its entirety, and he seemed to think that it was on this point rather than on that of the islands that the pourparlers at Lausanne had broken down. While admitting the difficulty of finding a formula which would allow the Italians to make some concession to sentiment in Turkey, he said that unless this could be done the war must drag on indefinitely. The Turco-Arab forces had arms and munitions to last for two years, and would not stop fighting even if the Porte submitted to the Italian demands.

Speaking of the alleged understanding between Greece and Bulgaria he expressed some anxiety, stating that if it existed and was only defensive it was useless, as the Porte had no designs against either country.

The idea of sending a Cretan delegation to the Powers to plead their cause, he told me, originated with M. Venizelos, who hoped by this means to distract their attention and prevent a third attempt to send deputies to Athens when the Chamber met in October. Unfortunately, they had not fallen into the trap. M. Venizelos now evidently thinks that the difficulties of last June will begin again when the Chamber meets in October, and that he will find himself obliged to choose between war and all the complications and loss of popularity which a firm attitude towards Cretan aspirations would entail.

It is, however, at least open to doubt whether to keep the Cretans out of the Chamber, by force even if necessary, will endanger the popularity of M. Venizelos as much as he thinks or pretends, provided it could be done without bloodshed.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[35466] No. 45.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 26 of 19th August.

So far there have been no results of any importance to the Sophia demonstration of 13th August, and, in my opinion, none are likely to follow. Meetings are daily reported from the provinces, but, on the whole, public feeling can be considered as calming down.

Owing to mutilations and uncertainty as to corruption of Mr. Marling's telegram No. 296 of 17th August, I had to refer to Constantinople.

[35416] No. 46.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 317.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from vice-consul at Dardanelles, dated 20th August :—

"I am informed that the Ismidt reserve division has left Gallipoli for the Bulgarian frontier."

[35532] No. 47.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, August 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 112 of 21st August : Montenegro and Turkey.

Instructions have been sent already to the Austrian Minister at Cettinjé to urge cessation of hostilities and peaceful attitude. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expects improvement in the situation in Albania will exercise an additional pressure on Montenegro, who must realise that as soon as insurrection is over Turkey will have her hands more free.

[35531] No. 48.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, August 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 121 of 21st August to Paris.

Lord Granville spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day as instructed. His Excellency expressed his thanks for the communication, and said that, in consequence of representations by Turkish Ambassador, he had telegraphed to the German representative at Cettinjé on 20th August to urge on Montenegrin Government cessation of hostilities and restraint if most of his colleagues received similar instructions, and he therefore did not think it necessary to send further instructions.

His Excellency had insisted to the Turkish Ambassador on moderation on the part of Turkey, but had not sent any instructions to Constantinople, as he had heard from the German representative at Cettinjé that the Turkish representative there had given urgent advice in this sense to the Turkish authorities on the frontier.

[35616] No. 49.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received August 23.)

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 19 août, 1912.

Cher Sir Louis,

VOUS m'avez parlé aujourd'hui d'une démarche de Tevfik Pacha au sujet des agressions des Monténégrins sur la frontière ottomane.

Pareille démarche vient d'être faite à Paris, sauf cette différence que Rifaat Pacha s'est plaint à Paris de la mobilisation des troupes monténégrines le long de la frontière. Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a télégraphié au Ministre de France à Cettigné de s'entendre avec son collègue russe afin de conseiller aux Monténégrins de retirer leurs troupes de la frontière.

Ne vous donnez pas la peine de me répondre—je sais combien vous êtes occupé en ce moment.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
A. DE FLEURIAU.

P.S.—J'apprends aussi que les pourparlers officieux de Lausanne viennent d'être repris entre Italiens et Turcs.

A. DE F.

[35539] No. 50.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 365.)
Sir, *Paris, August 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Temps" of to-day's date, containing a letter from the correspondent of that paper in Vienna on the subject of Count Berchtold's policy, which is presumably the communication alluded to in Sir Fairfax Cartwright's telegram (unnumbered) of the 17th August.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Extract from the "Temps" of August 20, 1912.

L'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE : LA PROPOSITION DU COMTE BERCHTOLD.—UNE NOTE EXPLICATIVE AUTRICHIENNE.

NOTRE correspondant de Vienne nous télégraphie :—

"Le Comte Berchtold fera suivre sa suggestion d'une note qui contiendra un programme détaillé sur la décentralisation turque. Il ne songe nullement à se poser en leader européen. Effrayé seulement par le cours que les événements prennent en Turquie, le Comte Berchtold a cru devoir faire la démarche qu'il vient d'accomplir, rien de plus, rien de moins.

"Il faudrait d'abord fortifier la Turquie en lui démontrant que toute l'Europe est décidée à faire le possible pour maintenir le *statu quo*. Il faudrait ensuite encourager le Gouvernement actuel dans la voie qu'il a prise, c'est-à-dire dans la voie des concessions aux nationalités de l'Empire ottoman.

"Le Gouvernement turc actuel pourrait, avec l'appui de l'Europe, résister plus facilement à l'opposition des Jeunes-Turcs. Le Gouvernement bulgare, qui ne veut pas faire la guerre à la Turquie et doit lutter contre un très fort courant de l'opinion publique, verrait sa tâche facilitée, si les Puissances engageaient des conversations ayant pour but d'améliorer le sort des nationalités en Turquie. Le Gouvernement bulgare pourrait, dans ce cas, calmer l'opinion publique et résister au courant belliqueux.

"On ne songe nullement à un retour à la politique d'intervention, qui n'a pas donné de bons résultats. On ne pense pas à la réunion d'un congrès ou d'une conférence qui pourrait éveiller les susceptibilités turques. On ne pense pas à une autonomie de l'Albanie et de la Macédoine, et on ne veut pas préparer un nouveau démembrement de l'Empire ottoman.

"Il faut trouver des mesures qui rendent possible la satisfaction des aspirations légitimes des nationalités non turques dans l'Empire ottoman pour que les États balkaniques ne pensent plus à menacer la Turquie de la guerre.

"En somme, il s'agit de fortifier la Turquie par une décentralisation mesurée qui n'impliquerait pas le danger de la formation de nouveaux États balkaniques.

"'Nul ne prétendra,'" dit-il, "'que l'initiative de l'Autriche soit également agréable

à toutes les Puissances. Elle marque, dans un certain sens, l'influence de l'Autriche dans le Levant et doit considérablement y renforcer son prestige. Mais précisément pour cette raison les autres Puissances et particulièrement la Russie ne sauraient se tenir à l'écart. L'Autriche n'a jamais occupé une situation plus forte vis-à-vis des Balkans et de la Turquie. Avec l'Italie absorbée et immobilisée en Tripolitaine, avec la Russie encore tout occupée de sa réorganisation, militaire et navale, et d'ailleurs hypnotisée par le problème de la Perse et de la Chine, l'Autriche est, pour le moment, l'arbitre du Levant. Ou les Puissances devront la suivre, ou bien elles devront lui laisser faire à peu près ce qui lui plaira dans la question d'Orient. Il est peu probable qu'elles hésitent dans cette alternative.'"

[35654] No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 23, 1912*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that instructions which he has sent to French Ambassador at Constantinople are not to put pressure on the Porte, but that if it is spontaneously disposed to grant concessions to Albanians the French Government advise the Porte in a friendly way to consider whether it could not make similar concessions to other nationalities in Turkish Balkan provinces. French Minister for Foreign Affairs does not know precisely what are demands of the Albanians and what are the concessions to be made to them by Porte.

[35655] No. 52.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 23, 1912.*

MONTENEGRO.

In reply to a memorandum of your views, as recorded in your telegram No. 327 of 21st August, which was communicated to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that French Government had urged at Cettinjé cessation of hostilities, and at Constantinople moderation, and would continue to do so, but he feared that King of Montenegro was inclined to make himself awkward.

[35648] No. 53.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 607 of 21st August.

Russian representatives at Constantinople and Cettinjé have received similar instructions to those given to His Majesty's representative. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs adds that, as regards responsibility of Montenegro, it would seem premature to attribute to her the rôle of aggressor, seeing that frontier incidents are frequently provoked by Mussulman attacks on Christians, and Montenegrins are thus compelled to act in self-defence.

[35652] No. 54.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, August 23, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 304 of 19th August: Berana.

I am unable to confirm account given by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Marling. As far as I can ascertain up to the present no Montenegrin troops have in this instance crossed the frontier, nor have any attacks been made by them on Turkish blockhouses. I am not relying only on Montenegrin information, since the Russian Minister is confident that no such operations could have taken place without

the Russian officers employed here knowing it by this time. I note that Turkish Legation here do not confirm account that the frontier has been crossed by troops.

It is of course possible (not to say very probable) that individual Montenegrins have been fighting with the insurgents.

I venture to think that King is much to be blamed in the circumstances for making a demonstration of military action by mobilising a brigade near the frontier, and furnishing the Turks with some justification for dispatch of force under Djavid Pasha. His Majesty's action is all the more imprudent as public feeling is violently excited by accounts of outrages committed in Berana country. I cannot vouch for truth of these stories, but Miss Durham telegraphs to me from Andriejevitza that eleven Christian villages on Turkish territory have been destroyed, and thirty-one women and children carried off and kept at Berana.

[35691] No. 55.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 326.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 23, 1912.*

MONTENEGRO.

Your telegram No. 463 of 21st August.

Russian Ambassador's suggestion was made more than a fortnight ago, and he agrees that it is now too late.

A favourable moment for urging ratification of frontier arrangement might, however, be found in the course of work of Ibrahim Pasha's commission at Scutari mentioned in my telegram No. 324 of 23rd August.

[35702] No. 56.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, August 23, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 23rd August.

I think the King is thoroughly alarmed at the awkward position into which he has got himself. He is having difficulties with his Government, who, even more than the King, find retreat difficult after warlike attitude and language. In carrying out instructions in your telegram No. 21 of 20th August it is a help to me, basing myself on your telegram No. 463 of 21st August to Mr. Marling, to be able to say that His Majesty's Government have at least taken into consideration his grievance with regard to frontier. Russian Minister is recommending the point strongly to his Government. Austrian and German Ministers will do the same.

I would venture to add that any action you could take at Constantinople to stop outrages at Berana, and especially to obtain early release of captive women and children, would be of help here.

[35811] No. 57.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 105. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 24, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 408 of 21st August received last night.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers Austrian proposal as a political move towards autonomy for Albania, and apprehends that it will encourage aspirations for autonomy amongst the other Balkan nationalities.

[35691] No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 725.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 24, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 326 of 22rd August: Montenegrin frontier.

The suggestion in last paragraph seems a good one, and might be recommended to the Porte. If Russian Government concur, I will instruct Mr. Marling to take this course.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 482; Cettinjé, No. 38; Paris, No. 340; Vienna, No. 126; and Berlin, No. 125.)

[35702] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 484.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 24, 1912.*

COUNT DE SALIS'S telegrams No. 15 of 23rd August and No. 16 of 23rd August.

You should make urgent representations to the Turkish Government in the sense of last paragraph.

You may add that we are urging restraint at Cettinjé.

(Repeated to Cettinjé, No. 40; Paris, No. 341; Vienna, No. 127; Berlin, No. 126; and St. Petersburgh, No. 728.)

[35702] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 23rd August.

You should continue to counsel moderation and restraint, and you may intimate that we are urging a full enquiry into the facts, and feel assured that justice will be done if Montenegrin Government avoid all precipitate action.

[35805] No. 61.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, August 24, 1912.*

AFTER consultation with Russian Minister and other representatives, who are taking similar action, I spoke to the King this morning respecting grave responsibility he would incur by maintaining an aggressive attitude and danger of finding himself face to face with Turkey without the least support from anyone. His reply is to the following effect:—

Stories of the taking of Berana by the Montenegrins and their presence on Turkish territory are absolutely untrue. It is difficult for him to calm agitation in his country unless the Powers will give favourable consideration to his appeal for settlement of frontier question. Nothing is further from his intentions than to provoke Turkey or to trouble peace of Europe. He has given strict orders to avoid conflict with Turkish troops. He trusts that Powers will recommend Porte to take precautions against conflicts, which are difficult to avoid as long as there are Turkish posts and entrenchments on Montenegrin territory.

In company with Austrian Minister, I have joined in similar representations to Prime Minister, who, after earnestly recommending frontier question, urged intervention of Powers at Constantinople to induce the Turks to cease attacks on Christians at Berana. The latter were fighting to defend their houses from destruction, but would submit if their property were assured. If desired, General Vukotitch would co-operate with Turkish commander in settling the conflict by peaceful methods.

[35812] No. 62.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 327 of 21st August: Turkey and Montenegro.

French representatives have taken similar action at Constantinople and Cettinjé.

[35826] No. 63.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1912.*

MONTENEGRO.

My telegram No. 304 of 19th August.

Ottoman Government are demanding demobilisation of Montenegrin troops, but have agreed to a suggestion of Montenegrin chargé d'affaires that Djavid Pasha and General Vukotitch should meet and concert to prevent fighting of the tribesmen on either side.

(Repeated to Cettinjé.)

[35854] No. 64.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 697.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 296 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of the memorandum, left at His Majesty's Embassy by the Bulgarian Minister, in regard to the ill-treatment to which the Bulgarian Vicar of Kochana and two Bulgarian schoolmasters were subjected on the occasion of the recent massacre there.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Extract from Report of Bulgarian Vicar of Kochana, dated July 20 (August 1), 1912, addressed to the Bishop of Uskub.

HIER, le 19 juillet (v.s.), j'étais dans ma chancellerie en compagnie du maître d'école Mikhail Dionissief, lorsque vers 5 heures à la turque nous entendîmes une forte détonation et dix minutes plus tard une seconde plus faible . . . .

. . . . Plus d'une demi-heure après ces détonations nous croyions que toutes les mesures étaient prises, les coupables arrêtés et l'ordre rétabli; mon compagnon, Mikhail Dionissief, sortit pour rentrer chez lui, quartier Doklevetz. Dix ou quinze minutes après son départ six soldats se présentèrent à la porte de la cour, qu'ils occupèrent: deux à la porte, deux ou trois à la cour, tandis que l'un arriva dans l'entrée de la chancellerie, baïonnette au fusil, et se mit à crier: "Sors, sors, sors, vous voulez la liberté"; puis il entra dans mon bureau. Je lui demandai ce qu'il voulait, mais il parut ne pas comprendre et, me donnant deux coups du crosse, il me poussa devant lui. Au sortir du bureau mon chapeau tomba; le soldat ne me permit pas de le ramasser et m'emmena nu-tête, ainsi que l'instituteur Nahoum Yakovof et le domestique de l'école. Le pauvre maître d'école était venu en ville pour toucher ses appointements. Les soldats restés à la cour nous reçurent à coups de crosse, ainsi que ceux postés à la porte. J'avançais tête nue, dans une soutane d'intérieur, tiré par les cheveux, comme une bélier au sacrifice, battu à coups de crosse sur tout le parcours. A la suite d'un coup reçu à la joue gauche le sang en jaillit, tandis que chez le maître d'école Nahoum Yakovof c'est l'oreille gauche qui saignait. On nous conduisit au poste de police ("karakol"), où nous nous crûmes presque sauvés. Nous rencontrâmes dans la cour du poste deux médecins militaires, Rifaat et Nusret, qui donnaient les

premiers soins aux blessés. Ils nous examinèrent également. J'ai retrouvé là Mikhaïl Dionissief, un peu tranquillisé, portant des bandes blanches tachées de sang, ainsi que quelques malheureux paysans couchés dans la cour, la tête fendue. Peu de temps après on amena le prêtre Arseni pope Gheorghief, âgé de 60 ans, battu à un tel point qu'il ne put revenir à lui qu'au bout d'une demi-heure ; il n'en a pas pour longtemps. On amena après lui des habitants de la ville et des villageois la tête fendue. Les médecins quittèrent le poste, probablement pour aller dans un autre coin où la situation était plus grave. On amena aussi le vieillard Hadji Doné, âgé de 60 ans, membre du conseil municipal, puis le prêtre Grégoire, pope Mikhaïlof. Plus de quatre-vingts personnes étaient déjà dans la cour, battues, ensanglantées, se lamentant. Il faut relever que chaque fois qu'on amenait quelqu'un la sentinelle qui restait à la porte administrait un ou deux coups de crosse. Vers 9 heures parut le cafmacan. Il m'interrogea le premier et me demanda pourquoi je n'avais pas mon chapeau ; je lui expliquai, après quoi il me rendit la liberté ainsi qu'au domestique. Il m'ordonna d'ouvrir l'église pour que les cadavres y fussent transportés, ce que j'ai fait immédiatement . . . . . Rentré au bureau, je cherchai l'argent qui se trouvait dans une boîte sur ma table, environ £T. 12, dont £T. 10 en or et £T. 2 en medjidiés. J'ai trouvé tout en grand désordre, les armoires ouvertes, les papiers dispersés et de l'argent pas de traces. J'ai appris alors que la soldatesque s'était livrée au pillage . . . . Les femmes qui habitent dans le local du vicariat disent qu'après le départ des premiers soldats il en est venu d'autres, qui cherchaient le pope. Les soldats ont pris au domestique Mito 89 sous, à la nommée Yordana 8 medjidiés. Le soir, vers 11 heures à la turque, j'invitai le médecin Nusret pour m'examiner et me donner les premiers soins ; il arriva avec le juge d'instruction, à qui j'ai exposé tout ce qui précède. Le lendemain il vint de nouveau et examina la chancellerie.

[35874] No. 65.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 259.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August* 21, 1912.

THE announcement that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is inviting an exchange of views between the Powers on the situation in the Balkans, with a view to inducing the Porte to adopt a policy of decentralisation, has not been welcomed by the Russian press with enthusiasm.

A general suspicion appears to prevail that Austria's real object in taking this step is to usurp the historic rôle of Russia as the protectress of the Balkan Slavs, and this view is expressed by such widely different organs as the Liberal "Bourse Gazette" and the Nationalist "Sviet." The former journal remarks that, although at first glance Count Berchtold's aim would appear to differ little from that of the Triple *Entente*—namely, to restore tranquillity in South-Eastern Europe—a different conclusion is reached on going deeper into the matter and on observing the attitude of the press which is in close touch with the Ballplatz. In endeavouring to play an independent rôle, and possibly to lower the prestige of Russia in the eyes of the Balkan Slavs, Austria has gone too far ; and she is not likely to increase the confidence of Europe in her pacific intentions by this unexpected move, coinciding as it does with the unusual concentration of Austrian troops on the frontiers of Montenegro, Servia, and the sanjak. To recognise any "exclusive" position for Austria in the Balkans would be tantamount to conceding her the dominant rôle and admitting that Russia is relegated to the second place. The "Bourse Gazette" does not go so far as to oppose the Austrian proposal, saying that nobody can contest the great value of its ostensible objects—the preservation of peace and the blessing of autonomy for Albania and Macedonia ; but it insists that Russian diplomacy must take every precaution to ensure that Russian prestige is not undermined. The paper even suggests that the Austrian proposal is only a masked move, designed to test the strength of the Triple *Entente* and to discover the precise results of M. Poincaré's visit to Russia. The "Sviet" develops similar arguments in a more violent strain, observing that a most critical moment has arrived. The Balkans are in a ferment ; Bulgaria clamours to help her brothers in Macedonia ; Montenegro, after long years of enforced inaction, is burning to show Turkey that she still can fight ; the former foes, Bulgaria and Servia, are entering on a military alliance ; Albania has risen *en masse* ; in Macedonia there are daily collisions between Christians and Moslems. In such a crisis the Austrians must know that counsels of moderation will fall on deaf ears, and their proposal can only

be designed to mask an attempt to assume control of the interests of the Balkan Slavs. The present move is all the more significant as since 1897 Austria has categorically declined the co-operation of her neighbours in discussing her Balkan policy ; she now invites that co-operation, with the evident intention of widening the circle of her interests. If Russia, through excessive caution, lets slip out of her hands the initiative in the sacred task of uniting and strengthening Slavdom, the wishes of Peter the Great and the Tsar Liberator will be betrayed, and the blood of thousands of Russians will have been shed on the Balkans in vain.

The "Novoe Vremya" also views the Austrian proposals with some misgivings. It observes that European diplomacy always stands on the perfectly correct ground that violence should not lead to lasting political results ; it was therefore most unexpected and disconcerting when, in order to remove the impression created by the concessions recently made to the Albanians, autonomy for Macedonia was suggested. The other nationalities could not, however, be rewarded for remaining quiet by receiving nothing, and so the Austrian proposal would seem in principle both opportune and acceptable. But how is it to be realised in practice? Why are the Great Powers only invited to the discussion, leaving out the four Balkan States, to whom the peoples of Turkey in Europe look for the defence of their interests? Written counsels of moderation from the Great Powers only cannot possibly have a quietening effect on the masses who have been suffering in Macedonia for the last twenty years. Though by no means wishing to oppose Count Berchtold's proposal merely because it emanates from Vienna, the "Novoe Vremya" insists that it cannot be regarded as serious unless the Balkan States are to take part in the pourparlers.

Two somewhat colourless interviews with a "Russian diplomat" appeared in the "Novoe Vremya" and the "Vechernee Vremya," saying, in general terms, that any proposal to reach a peaceful settlement of the Balkan crisis can only meet with sympathy ; that Russian official circles have come to the conclusion that an exchange of views may lead to desirable results ; and that the latest information from Constantinople and Sophia is somewhat less alarming.

The further explanations of the Austrian press, to the effect that Count Berchtold's proposal is at present a mere suggestion, are characterised by the "Novoe Vremya" as ridiculous. The journal declines to discuss the motives attributed to Count Berchtold by the Austrian press, for fear of irritating wounds which are not yet healed, but asks one question : Why, if Austria is so disinterested, did she not begin with a categorical promise never under any circumstances to occupy the sanjak of Novi-Bazar?

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[35875] No. 66.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 260.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August* 22, 1912.

THE first impression made on the Russian Government by Count Berchtold's proposal was one of annoyance at the initiative having been taken by Austria ; and M. Sazonof evidently feared that her intention was to pose as the patron of the Balkan States. When, however, the Austrian Ambassador made his official communication his Excellency betrayed no signs of annoyance, and begged him to express to Count Berchtold his satisfaction at hearing that his proposals were based on the principles of the maintenance of the *status quo* and of the pacific development of the Balkan States, as on that basis he would be ready to enter into an exchange of views with the Powers. As he was to leave St. Petersburgh on the following day his Excellency requested M. Nératof to instruct the Russian representatives at Paris and London to discuss the question with the French and British Governments.

From the language since held to me by M. Nératof I gather that the Russian Government consider that the step which Count Berchtold has taken is both unwise and inopportune, and that, far from allaying the threatening storm, it will only serve to provoke fresh disturbances. The Russian Government, his Excellency remarked, had been consistent in giving restraining counsels at Sophia and Belgrade ; and there was no reason why they, as well as the other Powers, should not continue to do so. But while the Albanians were to be appeased with far-reaching concessions, the

Bulgarians and Serbs were to be kept quiet with vague promises of something being done for Macedonia in a dim and distant future. Under these circumstances they would not fail to draw the moral that nothing was to be gained by observing a correct attitude, and that it was only those who had recourse to violent methods who ever obtained redress of their grievances. It appeared, moreover, from what the Turkish Ambassador had told him that the concessions which the Turks contemplated making to the Albanians would not be confined to what was commonly known as Albania, but would be extended to all the Albanian inhabitants of the four vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Cossovo, and Monastir, which, according to Turkhan Pasha, were all comprised in the term Albania. Were this to be done, and were the claims of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars in those vilayets to be entirely overlooked, a very serious situation might ensue, and his Excellency therefore thought that, in spite of the difficulties which such a course presented, we must endeavour to obtain some satisfaction for the Macedonians. He mentioned as a significative fact that the Russian Government had already been appealed to by the Balkan States not to forget Macedonia when the opportune moment arrived.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[35840] No. 67.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 381.)
Sir, *Berlin, August 23, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 92 of yesterday, Lord Granville called on the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office yesterday to inform his Excellency that you had instructed His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé to urge the Montenegrin Government to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities, and His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to give counsels of moderation to the Turkish Government, and he expressed to his Excellency your hope that he would send similar instructions to the two German representatives. Herr von Kiderlen replied that the Turkish Ambassador had complained to him on the 20th instant of the behaviour of the Montenegrins, and he had consequently telegraphed at once to authorise the German representative at Cettinjé to make representations to the Montenegrin Government if most (not necessarily all) of his colleagues received similar instructions. His Excellency said that that authorisation would be sufficient to cause the German representative to act in concert with his British colleague if, as was probable, one or two other Ministers had received the necessary authorisation. Herr von Kiderlen had also urged on the Turkish Ambassador here the necessity for moderation on the part of Turkey; he had not sent any instructions to Constantinople, as he was satisfied with the news he had received to the effect that the Turkish representative at Cettinjé was using all his influence with the Turkish frontier authorities in favour of all possible moderation.

The "Cologne Gazette" of the 21st instant published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, pointing out that from all reports Montenegro seemed to be the aggressor on this occasion; that all the Powers, including Russia, were strongly urging Montenegro to keep the peace; that not one single Great Power had any interest in allowing the Eastern question to be raised at present, and that they all had, on the contrary, every interest in preventing that event; and that it was impossible for them to permit quite a secondary State like Montenegro to attempt to play the part of Providence; so that, if necessary, energetic steps would have to be taken to keep Montenegro quiet. The telegram was not very happily drafted, as, besides repeating itself once or twice, it expressed two quite contradictory views; at the beginning it said that there could be no possible doubt that Turkey had absolutely no interest in entering into conflicts with Montenegro, and that this was the best proof that the present troubles were initiated by the Montenegrins; later on it said, as a warning to the Montenegrins, that Turkey could not be expected to continue to bear these perpetual provocations with the praiseworthy patience she had displayed up to the present, more especially as a war with Montenegro, far from adding to Turkey's internal difficulties, would almost certainly be a godsend to her by giving the turbulent Albanians something thoroughly congenial to do.

Lord Granville asked Herr von Kiderlen if he would give him his views on Count Berchtold's proposals. His Excellency, who seemed much more whole-hearted

in their favour than Lord Granville had gathered Herr Zimmermann to be a week earlier, and who in speaking of them had almost the manner of explaining something for which he was jointly responsible, though he was presumably merely playing the part of a "good second," declared that the idea which some of the papers seemed to have that the proposals aimed at autonomy either for Albania or Macedonia was entirely false; what Count Berchtold wished was that the Powers should say to the Balkan States: "The present Turkish Government is moving in the right direction, it is preparing to give back to the Albanians the old rights and privileges, the old system of decentralisation which they used to enjoy; no doubt when it has finished with Albania it will apply the same principles to Macedonia, in the meanwhile your best policy from every point of view is to keep quiet, to avoid adding to the difficulties of the Turkish Government, and to watch with patience the development of events which will almost certainly be satisfactory to you"; to the Turkish Government he would propose merely to say that the Powers are glad to see the principle on which it seems to be acting, and that they trust it will continue in the same course. Herr von Kiderlen thought that there could be nothing objectionable in this from any point of view. Lord Granville asked whether he had heard any expressions of views on the part of other Governments or Ambassadors, and Herr von Kiderlen merely replied that he believed they had now all accepted the proposal to exchange views on the subject.

This morning's "Lokal-Anzeiger" published a leading article, which had every appearance of being inspired by the Foreign Office, stating that the conversations brought about by Count Berchtold's action were now in full swing, and it was to be hoped that they would lead to good results. Nobody outside the higher positions in the various Foreign Offices probably realised the difficulties and delays which interfered with every attempt to obtain united European action, owing to the division into two camps of the European concert. Even when the interests and object in view were identic, those two camps advanced separately, and it was especially in one camp that this principle of separate action was clung to with extraordinary obstinacy. The results were deplorable, as had lately been shown in the attempts at mediation between Italy and Turkey, and it was to be feared they might again appear in the present negotiations. It was not as if there were any real difference of opinion, but the determination to act separately caused most unnecessary delays. "Perhaps this time France, satisfied with the successes which, according to the Paris press, have lately been won on the Neva, will consent to use her influence in common with the other Powers, without striving for separate laurels of her own."

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
GRANVILLE.

[35967] No. 68.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)
Sir, *Munich, August 24, 1912.*

ALTHOUGH the proposals put forward by Count Berchtold for a more or less direct intervention by the Powers with the object of appeasing the present unrest in the Balkans, have been discussed by all the South German papers, it is a little difficult to gather what view they take of them. The vagueness of the proposals, as at present known here, and the absence hitherto of any authoritative lead from Berlin, have made the provincial papers as a rule chary of expressing any decided opinion.

Taken as a whole I should say that the press is generally favourable to Count Berchtold, and to the idea of the possible exertion of pressure on the Turkish Government to induce them to adopt the so-called "policy of decentralisation." There are indications, however, that an attempt to resuscitate the defunct European concert and, above all, to convoke a European conference, would meet with little sympathy, and that pressure, if such there should be, must be exerted by Austria, loyally backed by Germany, with the acquiescence of the other Powers. The deduction is, I think, not unwarranted that German public opinion would welcome Austrian intervention in Constantinople, but only as long as such intervention was inspired and directed by Berlin, and relied for its efficacy on German support.

Munich is at present deserted except by tourists, so that I have had no opportunity of conversing with anyone likely to give me useful information.

The following are translations of the more important newspaper articles :—

The "Frankfurter Zeitung," which as usual weighs its remarks with some care, says in its leading article of the 22nd :—

"The suggestion of the Foreign Office in Vienna that the questions pending in the Balkans should be submitted to a consultation of the European Powers continues, as is natural, to occupy the press of the various Great Powers concerned, the more so, too, as the general form of the proposal permits all possible interpretations and gives the widest field imaginable for discussion. The real meaning of Count Berchtold's proposal, which in its indefinite shape no one could attack, may, perhaps, be deduced with some plausibility from the hints of wholly or semi-official Viennese papers. Here it is declared that the Ballplatz only in fact desires to strengthen the inclination which already exists in the Turkish Government towards a more decentralising policy which would make advances to meet the wishes of the nationalities. These papers further claim that Turkey can find no cause for suspicion therein, as such an intention is to be found in the direction of the present Turkish system. Put in this way, the proposal may seem tolerable; but politicians in Constantinople may with good reason differentiate between a probably healthy policy of decentralisation adopted by the Turkish Government of their own free will and one in which their course of action will be supported by the European Powers, and the danger easily arises that the latter might step in between Government and nationalities as a kind of more or less unselfish mediators. Statesmen on the Bosphorus have not had any particularly encouraging experiences with European conferences which occupied themselves with the welfare of Turkey; and even if Austria-Hungary, who is instigating these discussions for the end suggested, can, perhaps, prove that she has a particularly rich collection of experiences in the field of politics concerning nationalities, these experiences, however indisputable, have not been particularly agreeable on either side of the Leitha. Under any circumstances the initiative taken by Austria is of a nature to emphasise again the great interest which she as a neighbouring State has in the development of affairs in the Balkans. It is obvious that that development must touch Austrian politicians and statesmen almost as closely as their own domestic cares. Four years ago, when the Habsburg monarchy, by the annexation of Bosnia, violently and arbitrarily changed an undecided into a permanently settled state of affairs and thereby destroyed many romantic dreams of fantastic Balkan politicians, she inspired the small Slav States there, namely, Servia and Montenegro, with a violent antipathy for her; and this antipathy must be most unwelcome to the leading statesmen in Vienna, not only on account of the reaction of the nationalist sentiment on the southern Slav races within the Empire-Kingdom, but also because the south-east is the natural hinterland of Austria and Hungary, and it is therefore not desirable to appear there as the least popular Power. This alone would render Count Berchtold's action intelligible, not to mention the influence exerted by the military politicians grouped round the heir presumptive who are urging a more active policy. Austria wished to show that, in spite of all her confusion at home, she was still in a position not only to speak in the council of the European Powers, but even to take the lead. Perhaps, too, the idea co-operated that the events in Turkey might possibly induce another closely interested Great Power, who claims on the ground of a certainly not undisputed tradition the position of protector of the Balkan Christians, to propose an European discussion of the questions of the Orient. If the statesmen in St. Petersburgh receive the Viennese proposal with a friendly mien, their action is certainly politic, all the more so as they might with some justification have pointed out that four years ago Russia demanded an European conference on the subject of the Balkans and Austria at that time resisted the proposal.

"It is really a pity," the writer concludes, "that it did not come to a conference. But after the Bosnian question was settled, the Triple *Entente* had no interest in a conference that would by opening up the problem of the Dardanelles have perhaps produced a remarkable change in the grouping of the individual Powers. The discussion which has now been proposed and will probably take place between the Powers interested in the Balkan question will presumably have no programme of the kind which was to have been submitted to the then proposed conference. Whether it will have any programme at all is as yet uncertain. Count Berchtold will perhaps in the immediate future make some proposals as to the subject of the conversations which are

to be conducted. We shall then have some months' material for a game of diplomatic question and reply. There is at present no imperative ground for a formal conference. The difficulties which will result when the individual questions are more closely examined will presumably secure no advance being made beyond a preparatory exchange of views. That will probably also satisfy the Foreign Office in Vienna; the only doubtful point is whether the latter may not be overtrumped by the other Powers who will take part in the debate in its proposals for the welfare of Turkey and the Balkan races. This might certainly lead to unintended results."

The Vienna correspondent of the "Allgemeine Zeitung" (Liberal), which is a weekly paper pretending to much the same position as our own "Spectator," writes as follows in to-day's issue :—

"Count Berchtold has created a sensation. We do not really know why or how. What has he done that is so great and sensational? He has given an incentive to the Powers to express their views on the Balkan question. *Voilà tout!* Examined in the light of day that is really not much, indeed it is extremely little, for it is very questionable whether the incentive will be of the least use, whether it will even check, let alone quench, the conflagration in the Balkans. And when we think of the most recent examples of these 'conversations' of the Powers, namely the notorious Algeciras Conference, we feel strongly tempted to fear that in this case it will lead to very unpleasant and dangerous differences among the participants. Common actions of the Powers have rarely had any useful results—let the reader only call to mind the Cretan question—that endless tapeworm in the bowels of Europe which in spite of all remedies and cures has not yet been purged away, but rather continues to flourish, as it proves from time to time by more or less energetic movements. And what is the importance of the trifling Cretan problem compared to the Albanian and Macedonian questions which now stand on the programme of the day? That precisely Austria-Hungary should have urged the holding of such a conference is all the more surprising as three and a half years ago, at the time of the annexation crisis, she emphatically resisted such a proposal. Count Berchtold seems to have different ideas concerning conferences from his predecessor, or else he thinks that Turkey is not Austria-Hungary, which surmise indeed would not be incorrect. It almost seems to us that he yielded to necessity and not to his own inclinations, since for some time past complaints have been raised against him in those Austrian circles which champion an energetic policy on the part of the monarchy. He has heard himself with growing frequency and distinctness accused of following a policy of passivity unworthy of a Great Power and of having let slip the best opportunity of strengthening his country's position in the Balkans. In time he has clearly found these hints and attacks too uncomfortable and has felt himself obliged to take some action of the sort—*ut aliquid fiat*, like the doctors when they prescribe a medicine merely to preserve appearances. The latter are in such cases accustomed to order some harmless draught. The remedy recommended by Count Berchtold does not belong to this category. Well, we shall see. However the 'conversation' may turn out, Count Berchtold has already received his reward in advance as though he had really reached his aim—the pacification of the Balkans. He has been decorated by the Emperor with the Order of the Golden Fleece, a distinction which, excluding the archdukes, usually only falls to the lot of a few select individuals. Windisch-Grätz and Radetzky, for instance, received it in their day for saving Austria from the enemy at home and abroad. But what has Count Berchtold achieved to render him worthy of this most exalted distinction? This is surely the first time that the services expected of a statesman have been paid for in advance. The Emperor must have been in an unusually generous mood—perhaps his eighty-second birthday, which was then impending, may have contributed—to distinguish his Minister for Foreign Affairs in such an uncommonly gracious manner."

The "Schwäbischer Merkur" (National Liberal) of the 20th, after observing that Count Berchtold's proposal indicates an entire reversal of the policy of the Powers towards Turkey and the final failure of the Young Turk party, writes as follows :—

"Such being the condition of affairs Count Berchtold desires to come to the help of Turkey with a step which will offer the present Government the support of all Europe and at the same time deprive Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece of the excuse for directly interfering in order to obtain the desired reforms for their own nationalities in Turkey. That common action by the Great Powers might attain this

find can hardly be doubted. And since all the Powers declare that they wish to see the *status quo* preserved in European Turkey, we must consider it obvious that they will at least meet Count Berchtold's proposals with sympathy. But whether that will lead to any common action and, supposing it does, what form that action will take, are at present open questions. The motives of their interest in the *status quo* are very different in the case of the various Powers, and this circumstance will certainly not make it easier to find a formula agreeable to all parties. We may, however, expect as a result of Count Berchtold's initiative a clearing up of the position of the Powers which would anyhow make a most welcome improvement on the twilight existing up to now. And if in this question there were again to be re-established that harmony of the Powers which would bring once more into honour the European concert—a phrase formerly so frequent in the language of politics—a fruitful beginning might perhaps be made which would lead to the settlement of other international antagonisms as well. Perhaps it would be possible, but perhaps it would not. We cannot, however, hide from ourselves that Count Berchtold's proposal has brought the whole Eastern question into the programme of the day, and much goodwill will be wanted on all sides if the discussion is to be confined to the limits intended by its originator. Germany will certainly do her best, hand in hand with her ally, to bring the matter to an issue which will help to mend affairs in Turkey and to preserve the general peace. But we have no ground merely for that reason to indulge in premature optimism."

The "Bayerischer Kurier" (Centre), which is in all but name the official organ of the Bavarian Government, in its issue of the 22nd writes most enthusiastically of Count Berchtold's proposal, which "will show the whole world that the destinies of Europe are decided at least as much in the Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz as in Paris, St. Petersburgh, and London." Turkey will, in this writer's opinion, hardly be able to reject the proposal even if it is only presented by Germany and Austria—Italy being at present unable to approach the Turkish Government. "The controlling Powers (*i.e.*, Germany and Austria) are in the agreeable position of being able to nullify any arbitrary act of transgression on the part of an individual Power or combination of Powers. It must not be forgotten that the Austrian bayonets are much nearer the scene of action than those of any other Power. In the Balkans nothing can or will be arranged without the consent of Germany and Austria. Statesmen in Paris and London ought to recognise this fact: in St. Petersburgh it has long been realised." The writer goes on to say that all the Powers have always, officially at least, demanded toleration and recognition for the different races and creeds in Turkey, although secretly they may perhaps have hoped that these claims would not be satisfied, and that they would themselves in consequence gain an increase of influence in the Balkans. "Count Berchtold's definite proposal," he concludes, "compels them to confess their colours: it is a test of the sincerity of English and French diplomacy."

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[35814] No. 69.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August 25, 1912.*

TURKEY and Montenegro.

Italian Minister at Cettinje has been instructed to associate himself with his colleagues and strongly press Montenegrin Government to put an end to frontier fighting.

[36085] No. 70.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, August 26, 1912.*

A REPORT has reached Belgrade that the Kaimakam of Berana, a Serb, fled to Sienitza, where he was caught by Turks and butchered, also that a massacre on a large scale has taken place in those parts, and that the Christian population are crossing the frontier to seek refuge in Servia; the news, however, lacks confirmation as yet.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday, appeared somewhat agitated. He says that if reports are confirmed situation will be serious; that the Christians in Old Servia are unarmed, whilst Moslem population is armed; that the Servian Government is constantly receiving appeals for protection, and will be forced to take some step to help Serbs unless Porte gives satisfactory guarantees that they shall not be molested. They have kept absolutely quiet, and the attacks upon them are entirely unprovoked.

I expressed hopes that the Servian Government would exercise patience and manifest their intention of remaining quiet so as not to encourage any excitement already existing in Bulgaria over former massacre. Minister for Foreign Affairs' manner was not very reassuring, but I think that this was more to impress me with the gravity of the situation and the difficulties of the Servian Government than anything else.

There was a demonstration here last night against Turkey, but it was sparsely attended and feeble.

[36086] No. 71.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 26, 1912.*

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 102 of 23rd August: Balkans.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had received same information from Paris, and asked whether you proposed sending similar instructions to Mr. Marling. If you did so he would be ready to instruct Russian Ambassador to give same friendly advice as the French Ambassador, as it could not possibly do any harm.

Bulgarian Minister had, his Excellency said, told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as Bulgarians in Macedonia had already been granted concession now to be accorded to the Albanians, they would gain nothing by having application of latter concession extended to them. They wanted something more far-reaching.

I remarked that in that case Ottoman Government would probably reply to any friendly representations which we might make by saying that they were but placing the Albanians on the same footing as the Bulgarians.

His Excellency agreed, and evidently thinks that we shall do no good by saying anything at Constantinople.

[35606] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 387.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called at this Office on the 19th instant, and informed Sir L. Mallet that he had received a telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople had called upon him, but had not said a word about the communiqué on the subject of the Balkans.

The reports respecting this communiqué were causing the Turkish Government great anxiety. The concessions to the Albanians were not in the direction of autonomy or of political decentralisation, and the discussions with the Albanians do not in any way justify foreign intervention.

His Highness was instructed most strongly to deprecate such intervention, and to express the earnest hope that I would not allow it to take shape.

Sir L. Mallet replied that he did not think for a moment that Count Berchtold contemplated any intervention, and that he felt sure that none of the Powers wished to disturb the present situation, adding that I should certainly be averse from taking any step which would render the task of the Porte more difficult at a moment when they were in the act of granting reforms to the Albanians.

He also said that I advocated the establishment of good government in the Albanian vilayets and reforms adapted to the different provinces, but that there was no necessity to talk of political autonomy, as it had been mentioned neither by the Albanians nor by anyone else.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35609] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 388.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 383 of the 21st instant, relative to the question of the rectification of the Turco-Montenegrin frontier, I transmit to you herewith copy of a communication left at this Office on the 17th instant by the Turkish Ambassador at this Court.*

I should be glad to receive any observations which you may wish to offer on this paper.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35615] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 389.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

THE Turkish Ambassador called to draw my serious attention to the action of the Montenegrin Government, whose troops had violated the Turkish frontier at Berana and were engaged in fighting the Turkish troops, whose action was purely defensive.

His Highness feared that at this moment the Montenegrin action will have a bad effect amongst the Albanians, and expressed the hope of his Government that I would instruct his Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé to give restraining advice, and counsel the Montenegrin Government to withdraw their troops from the frontier.

Sir L. Mallet said that if I did so the Turkish troops must also be withdrawn.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35637] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 391.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

THE Turkish Ambassador communicated to Sir L. Mallet on the 20th instant a *pro-memoriâ*, copy of which is enclosed,† on the subject of Montenegro.

Sir L. Mallet told his Highness that I had telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé counselling moderation, and strongly urging the Montenegrin Government to withdraw their troops from Turkish territory and from the neighbourhood of the frontier, and that I had also instructed you to recommend the Turkish Government to issue orders to their troops not to cross the frontier, but to withdraw from its neighbourhood, in order that all danger of conflict might be avoided.

Sir L. Mallet said that the dispatch of General Djavid Pasha might be attended with risk, and expressed a strong hope that the Turkish Government would follow my advice as indicated in the preceding paragraph. He impressed upon Tewfik Pasha the importance which I attached to the avoidance of a serious conflict, especially at this critical juncture.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35607] No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.‡

(No. 417.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

SIR L. MALLET informed the French chargé d'affaires on the 19th instant that I sympathised with the motives of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in

* No. 8. † Not reproduced
‡ Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 283), *mutatis mutandis*.

making his recent communiqué, namely, the establishment of good government and the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, and that I should be ready to instruct His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to adopt an encouraging attitude towards the Porte in the prosecution of reforms, but that I feared that any formal representation might render the task of the Turkish Government more difficult by exciting the chauvinism of the reactionary party.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5612] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

o. 284. Very Confidential.)
(r, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

THE Russian chargé d'affaires called on the 19th instant to say that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that he would agree to give advice at Constantinople, but not collectively.

As to the Balkan States, it did not seem necessary to give them advice, as so much had already been given.

M. de Etter was instructed to inform me very confidentially that the Russian Government had been approached by the Bulgarian and Greek Governments in the sense that, if reforms were given to the Albanians, their own nationalities could not be expected to go without similar concessions, and that they hoped that Russia would take the initiative at Constantinople.

The Russian Government think that they cannot ignore this request, and that they should perhaps try to diminish the reforms to be granted to Albania and then ask Turkey to give a similar dose to Macedonia, but that there should be no pressure. The Russians were anxious to know my views.

Sir L. Mallet said that he would ask me, but that he did not think that two European Powers could possibly ask the Porte to diminish the reforms which they were voluntarily giving to the Albanians, which he believed had already been granted.

He added that he was personally much afraid of giving so much advice to Turkey just now, and that whatever was done should be done quite unofficially and privately.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35614] No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

THE Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires told Sir L. Mallet on the 19th instant that Count Berchtold had instructed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople to give a friendly admonition to the Porte to deal with the Montenegrin question in a conciliatory spirit.

He added that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had taken similar action.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35613] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

SIR L. MALLET informed the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires on the 19th instant that I was in sympathy with the motives of the Austro-Hungarian

Minister for Foreign Affairs in making his communiqué, namely, the maintenance of peace and the establishment of good government in the Balkans, and that I should be very happy to exchange views with him on the subject.

Count Trauttmansdorff expressed himself as much pleased, and said he felt sure that Count Berchtold would be gratified at my friendly reception of his communication.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35622] No. 80.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called at this Office on the 20th instant to ask whether Sir L. Mallet could give him any information respecting the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir L. Mallet replied that the Bulgarian Government were doubtless aware of the main outlines of the proposal, which had not taken any very definite shape. Count Berchtold was anxious to encourage the Turkish Government in administrative reforms, and everyone must sympathise with that object. I had replied that I should be very happy to enter upon an exchange of views with his Excellency.

M. Madjarof remarked that if reforms were given to Albania it would be very unfair on Macedonia. Bulgaria and Greece would resent partiality being shown to the Albanians if they were left out in the cold.

Sir L. Mallet said that His Majesty's Government did not yet know accurately what sort of reforms had been given to the Albanians, and that, as far as he could see, the demands were identical with those which had been put forward by the Albanians for years past, and there was nothing very new in the situation.

It was unnecessary to say that I was strongly in sympathy with administrative reforms, but precipitation might throw things back and lead to a recrudescence of chauvinism in Turkey.

The Minister quite understood this point of view.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36159] No. 81.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 334.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 26, 1912.*

KOCHANA.

My telegram No. 300 of 19th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that preliminary report of commission has been received. It shows that about forty persons were killed and 120 wounded, and that soldiers and gendarmes and officials had taken part in the massacre. Government sent orders last night for trial by court-martial so as to avoid delay of civil procedure. He said that full report had not yet been received.

This appears to be untrue, as Russian Ambassador has seen a copy in possession of Bulgarian Minister, furnished to him presumably by Liaptchef, Bulgarian member of commission, who refused to sign it. Liaptchef is now at Sophia.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[36202] No. 82.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 336.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 484 of 24th August, and Cettinjé telegrams Nos. 15 and 16 of 23rd August: Berana.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning that information in the possession

of His Majesty's Government showed fairly conclusively that Montenegrin troops had not crossed frontier; that great excesses had been committed by Turkish troops; and that several villages had been destroyed. His Excellency's reply was shuffling and evasive; while he abandoned his previous assertion that Montenegrin troops had entered Turkish territory, he adhered to statement that Montenegrin officers had assisted Christians. As to the destruction of villages, he pretended that it had been done by the rebel leaders in order to force inhabitants to join them. I told his Excellency that he must not expect me to believe it.

He denied all knowledge of any women or children being detained at Berana, and asked where they could be sent to if their villages were destroyed? I said that the prisoners would settle that for themselves, and that great thing was that they should be allowed to go, as their detention kept up the resentment and excitement in Montenegro. But I could extract no promise from his Excellency that orders would be sent.

His Excellency said that a strict enquiry was being made into the origin of the incident, and observed that if it was shown that the responsibility lay with the Turkish troops, there would at all events be this advantage, that the Porte could punish guilty. From this and from his other language I am convinced that Turkish Government are well aware that their troops have committed grave excesses, but they believe and hope to be able to establish that they were provoked by the Montenegrins, against whom they are much incensed. I urged very strongly on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity for terminating incident.

(Sent to Cettinjé.)

[36223] No. 83.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, August 27, 1912.*

MONTENEGRO.

Lord Granville saw Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this evening, and found his Excellency on the whole very optimistic. He has given counsels of moderation to both Cettinjé and Constantinople which have been well received. His Excellency said that the Turks were willing to settle the frontier question, but argued that the present moment of excitement was unfavourable, as the population of the districts to be ceded were unwilling to acquiesce. On the other hand, Montenegrins might reply that that was a perpetual excuse.

(Very Confidential.)

His Excellency said that he had gathered unofficially that present Turkish Government were inclined to recommence paying King Nicholas a subvention, which would have an excellent effect. He begged Lord Granville not to mention this to his colleagues here for fear of its reaching the ears of small States.

[36228] No. 84.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August 27, 1912.*

ALTHOUGH there are no striking new facts, and relative calm still prevails owing to public's hope that the Government will obtain satisfaction from the Porte, situation here is becoming gradually more strained and uneasy. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that it is "difficilement tenable."

I hear on good authority that, should the Turks make any concentration of troops on the frontier, the Bulgarian Government would give immediate instructions for a general mobilisation. Russian Minister is of opinion that Russia should pose as the champion of all Orthodox Christians in the peninsula with a view to gaining time. He has suggested this to his Government.

French Minister considers that the only practical solution of the situation would be for a Turkish Government to give a complete and prompt satisfaction with regard to Kochana incident. I share his views.

The general opinion here is that the most critical stage will be the moment when peace is proclaimed between Turkey and Italy.

King of the Bulgarians and Minister for Foreign Affairs have both for the present abandoned their journeys abroad.

[36085] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 512.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 27, 1912.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 3 of 26th August: Sienitza massacre.

Have you any confirmation of Belgrade reports?

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 3; Paris, No. 354; St. Petersburgh, No. 757; Vienna, No. 138; and Cettinjé, No. 45.)

[36202] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 520.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 336 of 26th August: Bosnia.

I approve your language.

[36086] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 758.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 27, 1912.*

I WAS proposing to await a more definite proposal from Count Berchtold before saying anything to the Turkish Government.

I would rather deprecate representations from each of the Powers at Constantinople, but should be prepared to speak to the Turkish Ambassador here expressing approval of reforms granted to the Albanians, and the hope that policy of reform in Macedonia would also be adopted.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 355; Constantinople, No. 513; Berlin, No. 135; Vienna, No. 139; and Sophia, No. 45.)

[36222] No. 88.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 27, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN proposal.

My telegram No. 337 of 26th August.

Grand Vizier has intimated to the Austrian Ambassador that representations would be regarded as unwelcome.

[36358] No. 89.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 341.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 512 of 27th August: Alleged massacre at Sienitza.

I have no confirmation of reports mentioned in Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 3 of 26th August. Official explanation is that Serbs took to flight in alarm at the demonstrative return of armed Albanian tribesmen.

[36356] No. 90.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, August 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 3 of 26th August: Alleged massacre at Sienitza.

There has been no confirmation, and everything points to incidents, if any occurred, having been grossly exaggerated. Servian Government have sent an official to investigate. No excitement here.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[36363] No. 91.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, August 28, 1912.*

I AM informed very confidentially that Count Berchtold's recent visit to the Roumanian Court, though chiefly one of courtesy, also served the purpose of confirming an agreement with Roumania. It appears to have been arranged that, should complications arise in the Balkans, Roumania will allow her policy to be directed from Vienna, and that, should such complications lead to the outbreak of war between Russia and Austria, Roumania will stand firm with the latter. I am to see Count Berchtold to-morrow. He returned to Vienna last night.

[36228] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

MR. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 28 of 27th August.

You should impress upon Minister for Foreign Affairs the extreme importance of acting promptly and decisively in punishing severely all officials found guilty in Kochana incident.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 48; St. Petersburgh, No. 771; Paris, No. 363; Vienna, No. 144; and Berlin, No. 141.)

[36424] No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

No. 533.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires asked, on instructions from M. Sazonof, that you should be instructed to advise the Porte to accept an offer made by Montenegro to demobilise, and themselves to withdraw Turkish troops from the frontier and make no further concentration in that neighbourhood. They should also be urged to ratify the protocol of 1908.

You may act as desired, if your colleagues have similar instructions, but there should be no collective representation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, Paris, Vienna, and Cettinjé.)

[36328] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 426.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires told Sir L. Mallet on the 24th instant that the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the communication of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs a reply to the effect that he would be happy to exchange views on the Balkan question, but that if Count Berchtold had

anything more concrete to propose he would have to consult the Cabinets of London and of St. Petersburgh before replying.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36324] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 401.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador told Sir L. Mallet on the 23rd instant that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that they regretted that I had informed the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should be happy to enter upon an exchange of views with him on the subject of decentralisation in the Balkan provinces.

Sir L. Mallet explained to his Highness the actual wording of my reply to Count Berchtold's communication, and said that it would have been impossible for me to refuse to discuss the proposal, but that I was in no way committed to any course which might embarass the Turkish Government at a moment when they were granting reforms to the Albanians. Sir L. Mallet enquired whether these reforms would apply to all nationalities alike in the Albanian vilayets, and his Highness replied in the affirmative.

He called Tewfik Pasha's attention to an article in the "Morning Post" of the 23rd August, pointing out that the best way of avoiding any suggestions from the Powers for an extension of reforms to other provinces would be to anticipate them. His Highness replied that that was exactly what the Turkish Government were considering at this moment, and added that the Government now in power were in favour of reforms in Macedonia, and meant to introduce them, but that the intervention of the Powers would not help matters.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36330] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr Marling.

(No. 402.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador again called attention on the 23rd instant to the serious nature of the Montenegrin preparations. The action of Montenegro had encouraged the Malissors to attack Scutari, and there was danger of the hostilities spreading.

Sir L. Mallet informed his Highness of the representation which I had made at Cettinjé on this question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35532] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

BARON GAUTSCH, a secretary of the Austrian Embassy, communicated to Sir L. Mallet on the 23rd instant a telegram from his Government, stating that the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Ministers at Cettinjé had reported to their Governments that the Montenegrin Cabinet were urging the King to declare war, and that both Ministers had asked for authority to urge His Majesty to keep the peace.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had given their Minister his instructions, and had also made emphatic representations at Constantinople.

Baron Gautsch said that these instructions were evidently those referred to in your Excellency's telegram No. 67 of the 22nd August. Sir L. Mallet explained that I had sent instructions on the 20th, and that there did not appear to be any need to send more.

I am, &c,
E. GREY.

[36424] No. 98.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 758 of the 27th August.

In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, his Excellency told me that he approved of your suggestion, and informed me that he had already spoken to the Turkish Ambassador without, he feared, producing any effect, urging the necessity of making some appearance of concessions to the Christian races.

The conversation then turned to news from Bulgaria, and M. Sazonof said that what he heard both from Sophia and from the Bulgarian Minister here made him very anxious. Bulgarian public opinion appeared to resent the fact that the Mahommedan Albanians were getting the concessions they wanted, while nothing was being done by the Powers for the Christians in Macedonia. It was incensed with the Government for not taking action, and his Excellency feared for the fate of the present pacific Ministry, and though not naturally pessimistic, he felt seriously alarmed. He had also heard from the Bulgarian Minister that his news from Monastir was to the effect that the Bulgarian Government was to be forced into war by means of terroristic methods, which would provoke reprisals.

His Excellency knew that it was impossible for us to ask the Turks to grant the Organic Statute, which was what the Bulgarians really wanted, nor could we intervene as we had done in the days of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Even if there was little prospect of obtaining any real concessions, something must be done to show that we had not forgotten the Macedonians. With the coming of winter it would be too late for the Balkan States to move, and the important thing was to keep them quiet till then. This could be accomplished by leading them to believe that the Powers were actively engaged on their behalf. He would instruct the Russian representatives to talk over the matter with the French Government and with His Majesty's Government.

I asked if his Excellency proposed, in accordance with the terms of Count Berchtold's proposal, to extend his discussion to the Governments of the other Powers.

The Austrian proposal was, M. Sazonof said, purely academic, and he insinuated that he saw no necessity for Austria to take the whole matter into her hands. His Excellency was of opinion that the time had come when some definite course of action should be decided on in the event of war breaking out in the Balkans, and he thought that England, France, and Russia should enter into an exchange of views before approaching the other Powers.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that his news from Belgrade was disquieting. It was similar to that contained in Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 3 of the 26th August, though, except for the fact that he had heard of the murder of the kaimakam, he had no confirmation of the reported massacre.

Turning to Montenegro, M. Sazonof said that he had been informed by the Austrian Ambassador yesterday that Turkey was insisting on Montenegro's first demobilising as a condition to the meeting of the two leaders. In reply to a question from Count Thurn, he had said that in his opinion such a demand was unreasonable unless Turkey did the same. He suggested that the Powers might urgently advise Turkey to come to a settlement of the frontier question, and might invite both Turkey and Montenegro to recall their troops from the frontier region.

[36463] No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 29, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to give me the information which I report in this and my two subsequent telegrams of to-day.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious in regard to relations between Montenegro and Turkey. Porte requires that Montenegro shall demobilise. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Montenegro cannot be said to have mobilised her troops, but he is prepared to advise King of Montenegro to withdraw his troops from frontier and to recommend Porte to similarly withdraw Turkish troops.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs is quite ready to give like advice on this matter at Cettinjé and Constantinople, but he does not concur in a further proposal by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that representations should be made to Porte for the carrying out of the frontier delimitation protocol of 1908, for the French Ambassador has reported that Turkish Government would refuse to do so, for the Albanians would resist it, and if the concession to the Albanians were to be made conditional on their accepting the frontier delimitation, as suggested by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whole of Albanian question would be raised anew.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs your telegram No. 533 of yesterday to Constantinople.

[36483] No. 100.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 110 of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the French and Russian Governments have received disquieting information in regard to the agitation in Bulgaria against Turkey, and they fear the effect of public opinion on the peaceful inclinations of the King and present Government of Bulgaria.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a means of exercising pressure in favour of peace, has intimated to the Bulgarian Government, through a channel at his command, that unless calmness be restored and maintained the French Government will refuse quotation on the Paris Bourse to the Bulgarian loan which was arranged for about three months ago at the request of the Russian Government for railway and such like purposes.

An intimation to that effect has been made to the French banks concerned in the loan. A public announcement of the action of the French Government will, the Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes, have a calming effect in Bulgaria, but unfortunately the Bulgarian Government have, he believes, a reserve war fund of about 2,800,000*l.*

[36484] No. 101.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 112. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 29, 1912.*

MY telegrams Nos. 110 and 111 of to-day.

M. Sazonof has informed the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Austrian chargé d'affaires has intimated to him that he will shortly communicate to the Russian Government a programme founded on the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' decentralisation proposal. M. Sazonof suspects that the programme may include a suggestion for a conference. M. Sazonof is of opinion, and French Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs, that if a conference seems inevitable it would be advisable that it should be proposed by Russia, France, and England, with a programme drawn up by those Powers rather than by those of the Triple Alliance, so as to give the former the advantage of the choice of the place of meeting, and limit to the subjects to be discussed, and that with these objects there should be an immediate discussion between the Russian, French, and British Governments of a programme. French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that the Russian Government, who were opposed to the idea of a conference, appeared to be now in favour of one.

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, as the Porte would dislike a conference on the Balkan question, a proposal for one made by Russia, France, and England might not be used to their detriment at Constantinople by the Triple Alliance Powers. His Excellency seemed to think that any such disadvantage would be more than counterbalanced by the advantages to be secured by taking the initiative.

I asked what in the French Minister for Foreign Affairs' opinion would be suitable subjects for discussion in conference. He said that they should be strictly limited to the Italo-Turkish war, Ægean Islands, and Balkan provinces of Turkey. When I expressed doubt as to the Porte accepting such a conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that pressure would no doubt have to be exercised at Constantinople.

Evidently Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires to put forward Russia as the protector of the Christians of Turkey in Europe and not Austria.

French Government are ready to join in Russia's idea on account of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and we are to be taken in tow to our detriment at Constantinople.

[36473] No. 102.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, August 29, 1912.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 4 of 28th August.

Report of murder of kaïmakam is confirmed, but it is not believed that other incidents have occurred.

Kaïmakam is understood to have been killed by soldiers out of resentment for his action in connection with Mojkovac affair.

[36486] No. 103.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 29, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN proposal.

I have seen Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and discussed with him his proposal with regard to European action towards Turkey. He informed me that he was sending a note to the Powers on the subject to-night by messenger. This note will explain more fully the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views with regard to Turkey. His Excellency assured me that he never contemplated annexations or intervention in European Turkey. His idea is that if the European Powers can be got to work in concert with regard to the Near East, where they all desire to maintain the *status quo*, it will be easy for them to give similar general instructions to their respresentatives at Constantinople, so that when any crisis arises there they may seize the opportunity in their conversations with the Government of giving independent and identical advice. In this way the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs believes much good may be achieved through weight of moral pressure of Europe on the Porte. His Excellency told me that his proposal had already had some effect on the Turkish Government, who, it appears, had just informed Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople that they were disposed to extend the concessions just accorded to the Albanians also to other Christian nationalities in European Turkey.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me the hope that, through the influence of the Powers acting in common at Constantinople, Turkish Government might be persuaded to allow fair parliamentary representation to Christian nationalities at the coming elections.

[36487] No. 104.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 29, 1912.*

BULGARIA.

Sophia telegram No. 28 of 27th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had also received information a few days ago that Bulgarian Prime Minister had shown some signs of discouragement at the present political situation in Bulgaria and the anti-Turkish agitation. He told

me, however, that he had just received somewhat reassuring information from Sophia, and that he felt hopeful that the King was still in a position to impose a peaceful policy on his country. His Excellency, however, recognised that any new massacre of Bulgarians in Turkey, or the massing of Turkish troops near the frontier, might alter the situation in Bulgaria for the worst.

[36424] No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 537.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 533 of 28th August: Turkey and Montenegro.

It appears from a telegram from St. Petersburgh that the Russian communication was not made to Vienna or Berlin, so that you should not mention the proposal to your German or Austrian colleagues.

[36424] No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 533 of 28th August to Constantinople: Turkey and Montenegro.

You should carefully avoid mentioning Russian request to Austro-Hungarian Government.

[37158] No. 107.

Note communicated by M. de Fleuriau, August 30, 1912.

Il paraît désirable à M. Poincaré qu'une entente intervienne entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Russie pour que les conseils tout à fait amicaux soient donnés à la Sublime Porte en vue de l'extension aux chrétiens des Balkans des avantages faits aux Albanais. Ces conseils seraient formulés, non point collectivement, mais à peu près en même temps et dans des termes tels que le Gouvernement ottoman n'aurait aucune raison d'y voir, de la part des trois Puissances, la moindre idée d'une intervention, dont il est essentiel d'éviter même l'apparence. M. Poincaré propose de faire donner des instructions aux représentants des trois Puissances à Constantinople.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 août, 1912.

[36475] No. 108.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 29, 1912.*

SERVIA and Turkey.

My telegram No. 341 of 28th August.

Grand Vizier denies the existence of any disorders.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[36518] No. 109.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 344.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 29, 1912.*

TURKEY and Bulgaria.

Your telegram No. 529 of 28th August.

I spoke to Grand Vizier to-day in the sense desired. He said most categorical

orders had been telegraphed last night to court-martial to hasten completion of its work; he said that similar orders sent previously had been delayed in transmission by telegraph clerks belonging to Committee of Union and Progress. Government messages to Cettinjé had been similarly tampered with.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[36489] No. 110.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, August 29, 1912.*

SERVIAN Minister has just gone to Belgrade; on the other hand, the Bulgarian representative at Cettinjé is now in Sophia. It is possible that some plan of joint action on the part of the Balkan States may, in view of the prevailing unrest, be connected with these sudden journeys.

[36499] No. 111.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, August 29, 1912.*

THIS evening Russian Minister called to tell me that in reply to a request made by the Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburgh, he had to-day informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that in Russia's opinion any step by the Powers in the sense of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin would be doomed in advance to certain failure, and would therefore be quite useless.

M. Nekludof informed me also that he had warned M. Gueshof that, should the Balkan States commit any aggression, the consequences for the aggressors would be fatal; moreover, that means would be found by Europe to check any disturbance of the peace at its outbreak.

M. Gueshof, who it appears was much perturbed by this communication, and spoke of resignation, hinted that Russia could not well speak otherwise; but M. Nekludof firmly replied to his Excellency that the above declarations were quite categorical and absolutely final.

[36600] No. 112.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, August 30, 1912.*

THE Russian suggestion, as stated in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 315 of the 28th instant, of inspiring mere belief that the Powers are interesting themselves actively on behalf of the Balkan States, appears to be inadequate to meet the state of tension here at present. It would seem that things have gone too far, and that something more definite will be required by Bulgaria, probably that the autonomy of Macedonia should be insisted upon by the Great Powers.

Apart from the daily danger of a serious collision on the frontier involving the army, or of another massacre of Bulgarians in Turkey, provoked by terrorists which would result almost inevitably in war, there is also the question of the extent to which the Balkan States are at present engaged in working together for common action.

By fostering under her ægis a system of *ententes* between the Balkan States, Russia has been playing with a fire which she may now find difficult to extinguish.

[36602] No. 113.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, August 30, 1912.*

I MENTIONED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day the instructions you had sent to Mr. Marling in your telegram No. 529 of the 28th instant, and gave him the

gist of his telegram No. 344 of the following day. M. Gueshof expressed gratitude for the interest you were showing in the Kochana massacre, but seemed very doubtful concerning the Porte's sincerity.

His Excellency then turned to the present situation in Bulgaria, which, he declared, had never before been so serious. With Turkey at war with a Great Power, and all the Balkan States on her side, Bulgaria had a feeling that it was a unique opportunity for her to act. King Ferdinand had been greatly impressed by the personal attacks made upon him, as well as by the disparaging comparisons drawn between him and Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Considerable annoyance had also been caused by the visit of Count Berchtold to Roumania at the present moment.

An article published in the "Daily News" of the 20th August, and headed "The Impossible Turk," which is being reproduced in the Bulgarian press, was alluded to by M. Gueshof. King Ferdinand himself, it appears, was much struck by its disparaging comments on the Turkish army, which are not conducive to encourage peace. The army, according to his Excellency, is quite loyal, but a very warlike feeling prevails among the officers and men.

As to the proposals of Count Berchtold, M. Gueshof said that, in view of the rebuff they had met with at the hands of the Porte, the Great Powers must do something. Although I gathered that his Excellency may in a few days appeal to the Powers, I could not obtain from him any statement of Bulgaria's demands.

Upon M. Gueshof's remarking that he might have to resign, I said that I was quite certain that His Majesty's Government, who had much reliance in his pacific policy, would greatly regret should he be forced from office by the pressure of events. I emphasised the fact that Great Britain does not want any disturbance of the peace in the Balkans.

In conclusion, M. Gueshof said that he was placed in a dilemma between the weight of public opinion and the will of the Powers. The categorical declarations made to him by the Russian Minister yesterday had greatly impressed him.

[36588] No. 114.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, August 30, 1912.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires tells me both his and the Russian Governments have disquieting information from Bulgaria, where popular excitement respecting Macedonia is increasing. Both French and Russian Governments have addressed serious warning at Sophia and at Constantinople similar to those they made to Montenegrin Government.

Bulgarian Minister here has just seen his brother, who comes from Macedonia, and reports that people of all classes there are in ferment. He states that officers of the Bulgarian army are in favour of a rupture with Turkey, believing that, after first success of Bulgarian arms, Russia would support them.

French chargé d'affaires commented on unpopularity of the King in Bulgaria, and doubted whether he and his present Government would be strong enough to maintain peace. In any case French and Russian Ministers for Foreign Affairs were seriously anxious at the turn affairs were taking in Bulgaria.

[36595] No. 115.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 319.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August 30, 1912.*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in reply to [group omitted: ? my communication] embodying your telegram No. 725 of 24th August, states that Russian Ambassador has been instructed to urge Porte to ratify Montenegrin frontier arrangement.

[36665] No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 553.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 30, 1912.*

THE French Government inform me that, as the result of the Russian communication referred to in my telegram No. 533 of 28th August, they are instructing M. Bompard to recommend the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Montenegrin frontier, and that the Turkish commander-in-chief should be authorised to confer with the Montenegrin commander with a view to a settlement.

You may make a similar communication, and it will be better not to mention the protocol of 1908 unless you have already done so. His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé is receiving similar instructions.

[36665] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 30, 1912.*

YOUR French colleague being instructed to urge the withdrawal of Montenegrin troops from the frontier, and to suggest that orders be given to the commander-in-chief to confer with the Turkish commanders with a view to a settlement.

You may make a similar representation.

His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople has instructions to make representation of an analogous nature to the Porte.

[35654] No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 407.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 30, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador told Sir L. Mallet on the 22nd instant that the Turkish Cabinet were considering Macedonian reforms.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36733] No. 119.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 353.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 31, 1912.*

KOCHANA.

My telegram No. 344 of 29th August.

I learn that, as the vali, Ghalib Pasha, has reported that the court-martial has been unable to identify individual soldiers guilty of attack, the Government has sent Colonel Shukri Bey, said to be an officer of great energy and determination, to preside over the court and hasten a summary termination of the trial.

The Grand Vizier has assured me that, to prevent further incidents such as that at Kochana, the most minute and categorical instructions have been issued to all civil and military authorities, from the highest to the lowest, as to their action in case of bomb outrages.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[36734] No. 120.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 354.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 31, 1912.*

TURKEY and Montenegro.

Your telegram No. 553 of 30th August.

Grand Vizier mentioned the protocol of 1908, and said that he was very anxious to ratify, but for the reasons given in my despatch No. 600 of 1908 the Government was afraid to do so. He spoke of the possibility of buying out the inhabitants of the districts to be ceded. I urged the advisability of retreat on his Highness.

According to Turkish information, Montenegro has consented to disband her troops.

I will urge on the Government the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the vicinity of the frontier, but I understand that the Government had had reason to apprehend an Albanian attack on Montenegro, and desires to maintain a sufficient force to prevent it.

Turkish and Montenegrin commanders have been in friendly communication for last three days.

(Sent to Cettinjé.)

[36738] No. 121.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 31, 1912.*

IN conversation to-day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that the idea of a conference was very distasteful to him on general grounds; conferences were always dangerous, and often lead to the very war they were intended to prevent. He particularly dislikes the prospect of Austria taking the lead, and thinks that if a conference is inevitable France would be the most suitable Power to propose it as being least directly interested in the Balkans. He said that the French Government, on the other hand, favoured the idea, especially as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that conference would meet in Paris.

No reference was made to exchange of views with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in Paris telegram No. 112 of 29th August, and his Excellency has not yet received Austrian note (see Vienna telegram No. 70 of 29th August).

[36739] No. 122.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 31, 1912.*

VIENNA telegram No. 71 of 29th August.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs also has received to-day somewhat reassuring news from Sophia, and does not anticipate that the present pacific Government will be overruled unless a further incident like that of Kochana occurred. He had, however, intimated in categorical terms to Bulgarian Minister here, and also through the Russian Minister at Sophia, that the Bulgarian Government would alienate all sympathy and would be held responsible if bomb outrages increased in frequency and became organised into a regular system.

[36743] No. 123.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, August 31, 1912.*

MR. AUBREY HERBERT, M.P., has just passed through Sophia coming from the sanjak. He arrived at Sienitza the day after the Kaimakam of Berana was murdered, but heard of no other massacres, though attemps were made, but frustrated

by the Albanians. He reports panic among the Christians, but thinks that if the frontier fighting ceases there is no danger of massacres, as Albanian chiefs are opposed to them. It appears that the authorities, though holding Mitrovitza, are under the thumb of the Albanians. There is much nervousness round Novi-Bazar, and Ipek is in semi-revolt. But no more troubles are expected till the 5th day of Bairam, but Mr. Herbert thinks situation most obscure. He spoke with Isa Boletinatz on 27th August, who repudiated all idea of wanting autonomy, but was awaiting Turkish decision with regard to giving arms before deciding upon future action.

Rumour current in Mitrovitza that Albanian disturbances are being fostered by Albanian chiefs in the pay of Young Turks, with a view to discrediting present Government.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[36602] No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 31, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 32, Confidential, of 30th August: Turkey and Bulgaria.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am fully alive to the difficulty of the position, and appreciate his efforts to calm the agitation caused by the Kochana incident.

I am convinced that the best hope for the future of Macedonia lies in the maintenance of peace, and that Bulgaria would forfeit the sympathy of Europe by abandoning, at this moment, pacific policy.

The Porte have given the most categorical assurances that they intend to punish those guilty of the Kochana outrage. They have initiated an era of reforms which they will be encouraged by the Powers to extend to the other Christian population.

Continuance of warlike agitation on the part of Bulgaria will, it is to be feared, have the effect of encouraging the reactionary party in Turkey.

You should earnestly impress on the Minister for Foreign Affairs the unfavourable effect which would be produced here by any precipitate act on the part of Bulgaria, and do all in your power to encourage his Excellency to resist the pressure of the warlike party.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 377; St. Petersburgh, No. 795; Vienna, No. 157; and Berlin, No. 153.)

[36602] No. 125.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 31, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 55 to Sophia of 31st August: Turkey and Bulgaria.

Inform Government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government are urging pacific counsels at Sophia.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 556.)

[36683] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bering.

(No. 206.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 31, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador asked me about Count Berchtold's proposal. What did I think was his motive? I said the proposal was at present very vague, and I doubted whether Count Berchtold had such a definite motive as the desire for an autonomous Albania under Austrian influence that had been attributed to him. We had expressed our willingness to exchange views, but were waiting for some further communication to explain what Count Berchtold had in his mind.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 154), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 158), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 796).

[36744] No. 127.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, August* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 484 of 24th August to Constantinople.

Captives at Berana have now been released, but there are still several at a place called Rozhaj.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[36745] No. 128.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, August* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 52 of 30th August.

I have made a representation to the Prime Minister, who assures me in reply that the troops on the frontier are in course of being reduced to normal state. One battalion of infantry is still under arms, but will be dismissed shortly, while two battalions of local troops, who have been sent to their homes, are still under orders to be ready to concentrate if necessary. Artillery have been dismissed, except one mountain battery and four field guns retained for instructional purposes.

Montenegrin Minister of the Interior has seen Djavid Pasha, who has agreed that insurgents shall return to their homes with their arms, and shall be compensated for the destruction of their houses.

Prime Minister has strongly urged a settlement of the frontier question. Only difficulty as regards the Albanians is the cession of enclave of Arzhenitza against compensation given elsewhere. District only comprises forty-two houses, of which the minority are Christians. Moslems were ready to come to terms.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[36746] No. 129.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 378 of to-day.

Verbal communication in the desired sense made to the political director this evening. (End of R.)

(K.) (Confidential.)

Political director said that the French Government saw signs of great uneasiness in St. Petersburgh in regard to the situation in the Balkans, and mentioned as an indication of this the proposal made yesterday by the Russian Embassy here urging an exchange of views between the three Governments and the advisability of holding out some hope to the Christian population of a betterment of their lot. Telegram acquainting the French chargé d'affaires with the views of the French Government has been sent for communication to you. Political director was inclined to suspect the Russian Government know something of which the French Government and His Majesty's Government are not aware, and hinted that it might be the Serbo-Bulgarian Convention.

He regards this convention as brought about by Russian policy, which was now alarmed at the prospect of being powerless to check the movement to which it had given the impulse. He felt pretty sure that the Austrian proposals, supplemented by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to Roumania, were given effect as a counter-stroke to the policy represented by the Serbo-Bulgarian convention. It was essential to avoid a crisis, and England and France would have to help Russia out of her difficulty.

[36750] No. 130.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September* 1, 1912.

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 70 of 29th August.

Secretary-general, who had just seen Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me this morning that he had received from Austrian chargé d'affaires yesterday the note explaining proposals of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting European action towards Turkey. After reading the note secretary-general had come to the conclusion that its intentions were excellent, but the proposals amounted to nothing and would lead to nothing practical.

[36737] No. 131.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 358.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 1, 1912.

BALKANS.

Turkish Government would certainly reject proposal for a conference (see Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 112 of the 29th August). The idea would be more repugnant to them, and the Powers who proposed it, or forced it on them, would incur their strong resentment.

Certain of the conclusions of the Conference of Berlin, following on a war which ended disastrously for Turkey, have never been carried out. This being so, the enforcement on Turkey of the decisions of a conference on Balkan affairs at the present moment would seem to present grave difficulties.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion as to the subjects to be discussed at such conference would meet with a reply from the Turkish Cabinet to the effect that they have adopted, and are determined to pursue, a conciliatory policy in Albania and other Balkan provinces, and that they are endeavouring directly to come to terms with Italy for conclusion of peace and on question of Ægean islands.

The present Cabinet has already been attacked in consequence of Austrian proposals, and it is almost certain that the indignation of army, chamber, and press would drive the Ministry from office, if they agreed to a conference the object of which was to discuss the internal affairs of Turkish Balkan provinces. The present situation would hardly be remedied by a conference which would arouse expectations that may not be realised, not only among native non-Turkish races, but perhaps also among Balkan States.

I would further point out that, if the rivalry between the two groups of Powers is to be considered, the suggestion of a conference by one of the members of the Triple Alliance would locally have a damaging effect on that group.

[36894] No. 132.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sinaia, August* 21, 1912.

I ASKED M. Maioresco, at his weekly reception yesterday, whether he had formed any opinion of Count Berchtold's proposal to the Powers.

His Excellency told me that he considered it clever and astute. Since the death of Count Aehrenthal Austria-Hungary had not figured largely on the stage of European politics, and Count Berchtold's name was little heard. Germany and Russia had been in evidence at the meeting of the Emperors at Baltic Port, and France and again Russia owing to M. Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburgh. Austria-Hungary doubtless felt that her influence in the Balkans was being absorbed by Russia. By his proposal to the Powers for an exchange of views, Austria had once more come into the forefront, and Count Berchtold's name was on everyone's lips.

Whatever the ultimate result might be, M. Maioresco welcomed the proposal, as he considered it would tend to the maintenance of peace. It would act as a stimulus to Turkey to come to terms with Italy, and would exercise a restraining effect on the

more excitable Balkan States. His Excellency assured me that the proposal was in no way connected with Count Berchtold's impending visit.

I asked the Greek Minister for his private opinion on the proposal, and he said he thought it all depended on the attitude of Russia. She would no doubt agree, but would not be likely to assist in furthering it. It also depended on whether Austria had any scheme underlying it. Both Austria and Russia had already made proposals which had come to nothing. He was very pessimistic as to its ultimately resulting in any practical good. Decentralisation was a very vague expression, and to his mind was very near akin to autonomy, which might mean paving the way for eventual absorption.

The American Minister told me that, from what he had heard, he gathered that Count Berchtold had made the proposal with a genuine desire to obtain information, and he himself thought it was at any rate an ingenious device for keeping the Balkan States—especially Bulgaria, where the war-feeling was very strong—quiet during the next two months, until the snow came and rendered hostilities impossible.

I have, &c.
J. C. T. VAUGHAN.

P.S., *August* 26, 1912.—The story is being told that Count Berchtold during his stay here, when questioned by someone as to what he meant by "decentralisation," replied that he really did not know himself!

J. C. T. V.

[36789] No. 133.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Sophia, August 26, 1912.*

AT his weekly reception on the 19th instant, I asked M. Gueshof what he thought of the Austrian proposal of "conversations" amongst the Powers respecting the Macedonian situation.

His Excellency said that Count Berchtold's "proposals," in the form which he had seen them in the press, were too "nebulous" for him to express an opinion on their merits, but that it would be most interesting to know what precisely was meant by the word "decentralisation," and that if it connoted fulfilment of the provisions of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Macedonians would have every reason to congratulate themselves and Bulgaria to be satisfied. He went on to allude to the projet de loi for the vilayets, which was elaborated by a special European commission in August 1880, as a possible basis for the Powers to work upon.

M. Gueshof again showed considerable anxiety at the threatening attitude of the Albanians, whose presence in districts purely Macedonian, *i.e.*, non-Albanian, suggested that they were endeavouring to acquire an entirely new sphere of influence. Such a development, he said, could hardly fail to produce the gravest results, for the Macedonian peoples would never allow their national claims to be overriden by the Albanians in this way. His Excellency added, however, that the ethnographical limits of Albania and Macedonia were so vague that their definition would present the greatest difficulties, when, and if, "decentralisation" came to be applied.

Speculating upon the grounds which might conceivably have prompted Count Berchtold to put forward his "proposals" at the present moment, M. Gueshof hinted to me that just a week before, on the 12th August, he had observed to the Austrian Minister here that, were any political concessions tending towards autonomy accorded to the Albanians, the Bulgarian Government might find themselves compelled by the pressure of public feeling to abandon the pacific policy which they had hitherto pursued. It is at least an interesting coincidence that Count Berchtold's proposals became known two days later at Berlin.

I should add, though M. Gueshof made no allusion to the subject, that the recent forward movement of the Albanians, which has occasioned so much anxiety, is believed in certain quarters to have been directly instigated by Austria with the object of driving a wedge between "Old Servia" and Servia proper; and that the Albanians, while apparently pegging out claims for themselves, are but the cat's-paw in Austria's schemes of aggrandisement in Macedonia. The two principal leaders of the Internal Organisation are said to have declared their distrust of Count Berchtold's proposals, and to have

stated that their present policy of outrages will be continued so long as Europe declines to apply serious methods to the situation.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY

[36790] No. 134.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Sophia, August 26, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 80 of the 14th instant, reporting an indignation meeting which had been held at Sophia on the previous day as a protest against the Kotchana massacre, I have the honour to report that similar meetings have since taken place in the provinces almost daily, the most noticeable having been at Philippopolis, Varna, and Rustchuk. The tone of these gatherings appears to have been uniformly warlike, and the resolutions carried, all pointed to the same conclusion: "Autonomy for Macedonia," or as the only alternative, "War with Turkey." Yesterday, a culminating demonstration, styling itself the "National Congress," and attended by delegates from the provincial committees and from the Macedonian "Benevolent Institutions" from all parts of the country was held at Sophia. In all, some 500 delegates took part in the proceedings. The customary denunciation of Turkish methods was indulged in, and King Ferdinand was bitterly criticised for the "wasted opportunities of the past twenty-five years," his cautious conduct of affairs being sharply contrasted with the chivalrous initiative displayed by Prince Alexander of Battenberg in bringing about the union of his people, and in leading Bulgaria to success in the Servian campaign. It was even plainly suggested that, if King Ferdinand were not prepared to allow the Bulgarian army to invade Turkey, he "had better get on his locomotive and drive back to his estates in Hungary"—a crude allusion to His Majesty's fondness for driving trains and his pursuit of other interests than those of his adopted country. The meeting was animated and prolonged, and its sense appears to have been that Count Berchtold's proposals tended to do no more than defer the solution of the Macedonian question. The following resolution was finally put and carried with enthusiastic acclamation:—

"That the Government be urged to order a general mobilisation of the army, and to claim simultaneously from the Powers the grant of an autonomous Government for Macedonia and the Adrianople Vilayet, with a local assembly and a national militia, the Governor-General to be a Christian, elected by the people and confirmed by the Powers. It was further resolved in the event of satisfaction of these demands being withheld, that the Government be urged to declare a war of liberation as being the only means of saving the country from internal developments, the consequences of which it is impossible to calculate or to foresee."

At the close of the meeting the usual processions marched with banners to the statue of the Czar Liberator, where more speeches of an inflammatory kind were delivered, as on all previous occasions perfect order prevailed.

The semi-official "Mir" of last night, commenting upon the situation, declares that day by day it becomes more evident that the maintenance of peace is possible only on condition of the European provinces of Turkey being allowed to benefit by the provisions of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin and by the programme drawn up at Reval. Count Berchtold's initiative in bringing forward his proposals at the present juncture is, it is urged, but an admission of the crisis that is at hand. While the Government cannot afford to submit to the indignity of being dictated to by the mob, for in doing so it would reduce itself to the level of Turkish methods, yet it cannot ignore the fact that the manifestations above alluded to are a genuine indication of the strong feeling which prevails throughout the country. The "Mir" concludes "we are resolutely opposed to war, not only on account of the enormous sacrifices involved, but especially in view of the risk of the dismemberment of the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire which might follow, and which must, if possible, be avoided. Nevertheless, if by pacific means we cannot obtain an equitable form of Government for European Turkey, partition by war will become inevitable."

I should add that rumours reach me of a project to hold an indignation meeting at

Kustendil, within some 15 miles of the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Confirmation is lacking, but it is easy to foresee the danger of such a demonstration at the present moment in the neighbourhood suggested.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[36848] No. 135.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Belgrade, August 26, 1912.*

COMMENTS in Belgrade upon Count Berchtold's proposal to aid Turkey in a policy of "decentralisation" have been many and various, but as the proposal itself seems as yet vague and indefinite, they are of course more or less based upon surmise. Some of the views expressed may nevertheless appear worth notice.

The aspects of the proposal which at once strike a Servian are, in the first place, that it emanates from Austria, and is for that reason alone an object of suspicion; and, secondly, that it may jeopardise Servian aspirations in old Servia, which lies within the vilayet of Kossovo and the sanjak of Novibazar. To the Servian view the proposition presents itself as follows: If "decentralisation" means the granting of autonomy to an Albania which will include the vilayet of Kossovo, probably also the sanjak of Novibazar, Servia's worst fears will be realised, whilst if "decentralisation" means less than autonomy it will mean practically nothing, and merely result in a continuance of the present state of affairs. It is an impossibility, Servians contend, to satisfy the various nationalities in Albania and Macedonia and yet maintain the integrity of Turkey, and as Austria disclaims all intention of weakening Turkey, it is not apparent how Serb interests there are going to be benefited. On the whole, therefore, public opinion in Servia views the proposal with uneasiness and disfavour.

M. Yovanovitch, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me that the only scheme of "decentralisation" in Albania which Servia could endorse would be one whereby autonomy, or at any rate a considerable measure of autonomy, would be accorded to each separate nationality. This he did not think was an idea which at all entered into Austria's programme; it was more likely Count Berchtold contemplated an autonomous Albania as understood by the Albanians, quite regardless of the claims of the other nationalities. He said he had at first felt much worried, but was beginning to think now that the proposal would come to nothing. The Austrian press was already saying that the meaning of "decentralisation" had been misunderstood, and that the only intention was to assist the Porte in successfully carrying into effect those concessions to the Albanians which are already in contemplation.

Incidentally, I may perhaps mention that when M. Yovanovitch discussed the question of giving autonomy to each separate nationality, I pointed out that this might lead to rival claims, dissension, and fighting, as had been the case before. He replied that this would not be so now, but when I enquired whether this meant that Servia and Bulgaria had an agreement and had settled their differences in Macedonia, he denied the existence of any actual agreement, and only admitted that the subject had been very thoroughly discussed between the two Governments.

The Servian press, which at first seemed puzzled and uncertain as to the bearing of the Austrian proposal, has now, with the exception of the Government organ the "Samouprava," which is very reserved, adopted a tone of hostility towards it.

Count Berchtold is accused of Jesuitism and hiding his real motives behind apparent benevolence towards Turkey. He has not had the courage to pronounce the word "autonomy," but that is in effect his idea. An autonomous Albania as understood by the Albanians, embracing the vilayets of Kossovo and Monastir, would of course absolutely conflict with Serb and Bulgarian interests, and an autonomous Macedonia as understood by Bulgaria would necessarily make bad blood between Servia and Bulgaria. As a result there would be constant friction between Servia and Turkey, Servia and Bulgaria, and Bulgaria and Turkey, and Austria would fish in troubled waters, all the while preparing her own advance to Salonica. This is Austria's countermove to the rumoured Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of alliance.

The press also sees in Count Berchtold's action a reply to the recent meeting of the German Emperor and the Czar at Baltischport and M. Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburgh, on both of which occasions Balkan affairs were discussed. Austria, it is said, has hereby reminded Germany as well as the Triple *Entente* that in such

discussions she cannot be left out in the cold, and has to be reckoned with. But it is hoped that the Triple *Entente* will see through the game, and satisfaction is expressed that Great Britain, France, and Russia are showing some reserve, as Count Berchtold's proposal merely has the furtherance of Austrian designs in view.

It is perhaps noticeable that although Count Berchtold's move is said to be a check to the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, and also to be directed against the Triple *Entente*, one or two relatively not unimportant newspapers show distrust of both Bulgaria and Russia. King Ferdinand is supposed to have been informed of Count Berchtold's proposal some time ago, and, for reasons best known to himself, to be supporting it in defiance of Bulgarian public opinion, whilst Russia, it is maintained, has secret arrangements with Austria, and these two Powers have long ago parcelled out the Balkan States between them. Austria is to take Servia, Montenegro, and Albania, whilst Russia takes Bulgaria.

The interest which Count Berchtold's project at first excited in the press is gradually subsiding, and the opinion expressed to me by M. Yovanovitch is gaining ground that it will result in nothing.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[36773] No. 136.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 724.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 334 of the 26th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica giving further information concerning the Kotchana massacre.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Salonica, August 22, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 6th instant, concerning the bomb-explosion and subsequent massacre at Kotchana on the 1st, I have the honour to report that the members of the medical mission who proceeded from here, together with the representative of the "Pravo," have returned and the result of their investigations has been published in a series of articles in that paper.

After describing the explosion of the two bombs which, as previously reported, occurred at an interval of about five minutes about 10 o'clock in the morning, the correspondent relates that immediately after the second explosion the streets began to fill with soldiers, accompanied by a few armed civilians, who began to hit right and left at the flying Bulgars with rifles, revolvers, bayonets, knives, clubs, and every sort of weapon. They were accompanied and encouraged by their officers, some of whom themselves used their swords upon the defenceless crowd of peasants. Amongst this number were specially recognised Ketif (?), Faik, and Hamid Effendis, whilst the commandant of the garrison, Major Behdjet Effendi, looked quietly on from the slope in front of the barracks, and the Redif commandant was a closer spectator from a chemist's shop in the town. The soldiers also took an active part in the pillage of the bazaar, one group under the leadership of a certain Ashdji Riza having been particularly remarked for its activity in breaking open the doors of shops, khans, and private houses, the inmates of which were beaten and their goods subjected to pillage. Another group of soldiers was seen to break open and pillage the shop of the watchmaker, Yordan Dzhidroff, from which even an officer was seen to help himself to a watch.

The kaimakam, Hakki Bey, is said to have appeared on the scene at a fairly early stage and to have exerted himself to put a stop to the massacre and pillage, but the soldiers paid no attention to his remonstrances. It is even stated that on seeing some Redif soldiers take his purse from the pocket of a Bulgarian tradesman, whom they had seized, Hakki Bey rushed up and snatched the purse out of their hands, but the soldiers

abused him and forcibly repossessed themselves of it. It was nearly four hours before the disorders could be put a stop to.

A party of soldiers entered the residence of the Bulgarian Episcopal vicar and beat him, together with a schoolmaster and a servant who were present with him, with their rifles and fists, and in addition broke open the drawers of his desk and stole some 13 lire.

The participation of soldiers and their officers in the pogrom, as well as the particularly savage nature of the latter, are testified to by both the Servian and the Vlach inhabitants of the town, neither of whom were living on such terms with their Bulgarian fellow-citizens as to expose them to the suspicion of partiality in their favour.

It appears that the estimate originally given of the number of slain, as also of the extent to which rifle-fire was responsible for the slaughter, was somewhat exaggerated. The medical mission exhumed and subjected to post-mortem examination thirty-six corpses, such examination being regarded as superfluous in ten other cases, as to which there existed positive evidence establishing the manner of death. The result of this examination was to establish that eighteen Bulgars, four Mussulmans, and two Israelites may have been killed by the bombs, whilst twenty-two Bulgarians clearly owed their death to the violence of the mob. Of these only two appear to have been killed by bullet wounds and three by swords, bayonets, or daggers, the rest were all clubbed or otherwise pounded to death by blunt weapons, the medical details in many cases forming very painful reading. A few corpses appear to have been interred elsewhere and no doubt some deaths may have occurred amongst wounded peasants who succeeded in reaching their villages.

Nothing has yet been made public concerning the results of the official enquiry conducted by the Government commission, but I understand that a difference of opinion arose between the Mussulman and the Christian members, the former of whom were unwilling to accept the evidence incriminating the officers and men of the regular army and endeavoured to represent that only civilians took part in the pogrom. Most of the commission have returned to Uskub, but M. Liaptcheff, the Bulgarian member of the criminal court of Salonica, who was sent from here to take part in the enquiry, appears to have proceeded to Sophia in virtue of a short leave of absence previously accorded.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[36849] No. 137.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 52.)

Belgrade, August 27, 1912.

Sir,

NEWS reached Belgrade on the evening of the 24th instant that the kaimakam of Berane, a Serb named Popovitch, who had been forced to fly from Berane, had been caught by Turks at Sienitza, and had there been cruelly butchered; that there had subsequently been a massacre of the Serb population, who were now crossing the frontier to seek refuge in Servia in large numbers.

This news was given me by M. Yovanovitch, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I happened to have an appointment on the morning of the 25th.

Although, as I discovered after some conversation, the reports had not been confirmed, I found M. Yovanovitch evidently much disturbed in his mind, and inclined to treat the situation as serious. I therefore considered it advisable to inform you of the reported occurrences by telegraph.

It must, of course, be remembered that M. Yovanovitch, who was previously Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found himself suddenly and unexpectedly promoted to be Minister for Foreign Affairs on the death of M. Milovanovitch. He is scarcely of the calibre to fill his present position, and is hence likely to take an exaggerated view of his responsibilities. He complained bitterly of the state of affairs in Albania, and said the constant outrages perpetrated against serbs made the position of the Servian Government impossible. Circumstances in Old Servia were very different from those in Macedonia; there massacres of Christians were the result of bomb outrages and attacks by Bulgarian bands and agents provocateurs, and sometimes it was not surprising that the Turks ran riot; but in Old Servia the serbs had kept absolutely quiet, and the outrages upon them were entirely unprovoked. The Christians were unarmed, whilst the Moslems were armed and ill-treated the former. The Servian Government was constantly receiving appeals for

protection, and if the present reports proved true Servia would have to take energetic steps to come to the aid of the Serbs unless the Porte could give absolutely satisfactory guarantees that they should no longer be molested; I could see for myself from the tone of the press that the Government would be forced to take a very decided line.

I asked M. Yovanovitch what he meant to imply by "energetic steps," and said I hoped the Servian Government would not allow themselves to be led into any rash adventure, but would, on the contrary, have patience and show in every way possible that they meant to remain quiet. Their attitude at present was of great importance on account of the excitement in Bulgaria over the Kotchane massacre, and they should bear in mind the consequences not only to themselves but also to other Powers that any unconsidered action on their part might precipitate.

M. Yovanovitch replied that Servia was eternally being advised to remain quiet; he fully realised the danger of attacking Turkey, both from the fact that Turkey is still very strong and also that Austria would probably fall upon Servia: but either the Turks would not or could not keep order in their country, and there was a limit to patience. In saying this, M. Yovanovitch betrayed some petulance, but I think this came more from a desire to impress me with the difficulties of the Servian Government than from any real feeling on his part.

I subsequently heard from my Russian colleague that M. Yovanovitch went the same day to see M. Pashitch, who, though out of office, is still the directing hand in Servia, and had emerged from his interview altogether calm and reasonable.

On the evening of the 25th an attempt was made at a demonstration in Belgrade which, however, proved a complete fiasco. A crowd of a few hundred youths and loafers assembled in front of the palace, but, after some cries of "Down with Turkey!" "Down with Austria!" and "Down with the Government!" again dispersed. Another demonstration was announced for this morning, but I am informed that it has been regretfully abandoned as no confirmatory news has come. In any case demonstrations in these countries are of very little importance. As a Belgrade paper remarked on the occasion of the big demonstration in Sophia after the Kotchane massacre: "We in Servia know very well what these sort of demonstrations are worth: they are engineered by the police and play the game of the Government. A few cries of 'Down with the Government!' interspersed make them look natural."

Meanwhile no confirmation of the news of a massacre, said at first to be of thousands of people, later of a few hundred, later still of thirty or forty, has come, and it is daily becoming more apparent that the whole story was either a fabrication or, at any rate, a gross exaggeration. The Servian Government yesterday issued an official communiqué to the following effect:—

"In consequence of the telegram received from Yavor concerning the murder of Ilia Popovitch and the massacre of the Serb population at Bicko Polie, the commissioner of customs of Yavor was sent to the spot to investigate and report. Up to the present the commissioner has only confirmed the news of the murder of Ilia Popovitch, the kaimakam of Berane, and the precarious position of the population in those regions on account of the excitement of the Turks over the Berane incidents. The Servian Government has ordered its representative at Constantinople to make energetic representations to the Porte to ensure the protection of the Serb population in those regions against all aggression. In the meanwhile, the Servian Government trusts that the detailed report of their commissioner and the result of the representations made at Constantinople will be awaited with more reserve."

This, I think, clearly indicates that there is no proof of any very egregious incidents having taken place, and that the Government, after rather "letting itself go" on the subject of the "massacres" in the "Samouprava," the Government organ is not feeling altogether proud of the attitude it had adopted. It is said, however, that the bellicose tone of the "Samouprava" was dictated by party purposes.

From M. Yovanovitch's remark to me, that "I would see from the tone of the press that the Government would be forced to energetic action," I had been led to expect that the Belgrade press would unanimously be in favour of strong measures against Turkey, but I do not find this to be the case. Some of the newspapers give most exaggerated accounts of the feeling in Servia (they actually put down the Belgrade demonstration at 25,000, whilst it consisted at the outside of 600 or 700 people), and are, of course, very violent. They urge that this is the moment for action, and to plant the Servian flag at Kossovo; that the Turks are unfit to remain Europe, and, moreover, that Servia's best chance of frustrating Austria's scheme is to march into Old Servia and meet Austria with a *fait accompli*. A few newspapers are, however, more moderate

in tone, and have a more just appreciation of Servia's true position. They realise that it is impossible for Servia to disregard the advice of all the Powers and begin a war, that if she did so she would repent it. At the first attack upon Turkey the southern frontier would be closed, and Servia would then be unable to supply herself with arms and ammunition, and would find herself absolutely checkmated. It would, in fact, be madness, and all Servia can do is to put faith in the Powers and hope that they will see order restored in Albania.

I am inclined to think that this is the view held by the majority of thinking and responsible Servians, and that there need be no apprehension of any rash act on the part of the Government. Servia will, of course, join in if Bulgaria moves, but she will never take the initiative.

The wild reports of Turkish cruelty and outrages that have reached Belgrade rest, so far as I can ascertain, upon the flimsiest foundation. It appears to be true that Ilia Popovitch, the kaimakam of Berane, has been murdered; but it is now said to have been a case of private vendetta, and not, as suggested, wanton butchery by the Turks, whilst the news of a general massacre seems to have found its origin in the fact that some Turkish troops pillaged in Novi Bazar on their way through.

With regard to the state of Albania, although I have, of course, no direct information, I venture to submit, conclusions which have struck me from the information, such as it is, which has reached me here.

It is, of course, undeniable that in Albania a state practically of anarchy exists, but at the same time the situation is often grossly misrepresented and exaggerated, whilst every sort of report damaging to the Turks is magnified and circulated far and wide. It would be impossible to contend that the Turks have not misgoverned, but presumably they would long ago have settled their differences with the Albanians in one way or another were it not for extraneous factors. The Albanians are by no means disloyal to the Sultan, as was shown by the cessation of the insurrection on the news of the attack upon the Dardanelles by the Italians, but they have been paid and kept up to the mark by Austrian, Italian, Servian, and Bulgarian agents, who are working both in Albania and Macedonia. It is well known here that the son of Issa Bolietinatz was recently in Belgrade, and that a number of the arms now in the possession of the Albanians have been supplied from Servia, and there is therefore a certain irony in the fact that the Servian Government are now complaining of attacks by Albanians on serbs. As regards money payments the Albanians would seem to have taken a leaf out of the book of King Nicholas of Montenegro, who is said regularly to collect tribute from several quarters, including a small dole from Servia. Possibly a judicious distribution of money by Turkey to the Albanian leaders would go far towards restoring order in the country.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[36792] No. 138.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 85: Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, August* 28, 1912.

IN my despatch No. 79 of the 14th instant, I mentioned that though public feeling was running high, M. Gueshof had every hope of keeping it within bounds. Although no very striking new facts have occurred and relative calm apparently prevails owing to the public hope that satisfaction will be obtained by the Government from the Porte, in connection with the Kotchana massacres, signs are not wanting that a change is coming over the situation. On the one hand, the personal attacks against King Ferdinand, which do not for the moment display so much anti-dynastic feeling as impatience at the lack of action to which the country is condemned; the sudden affection displayed by the King for all that is military; the striking place accorded to the army at Tirnovo; His Majesty's reception of new cadets, a thing hitherto unprecedented in his reign; his loan of the Samara flag on Saturday last on the occasion of the Shipka anniversary; the adjournment, indefinite for the present, of His Majesty's departure abroad; on the other hand, the warlike tone that has pervaded the numerous meetings held all over the country, and that has reached a pitch never before attained in Bulgaria; and again, the complete change of front in the Government organs—all these facts tend to show a new and disquieting situation.

No Bulgarian Government could have been more Turcophil, or at least more inclined to live in terms of *bon voisinage* with Turkey than that of M. Gueshof. But in spite of his Excellency's efforts, the relations between the two countries have not proved satisfactory. No questions of any importance have been settled between them, frontier affrays have been more frequent than ever, the fate of Bulgars in Macedonia has not changed; there have been serious massacres at Ishtib and at Kotchana, and there has been no redress. The most pacifically inclined of men, as M. Gueshof, or the best intentioned, as M. Danef, have grounds for discouragement. It may be said that they have tried their best, but all in vain. And now, with the mass of the people against them, with a warlike propaganda spreading in the smallest villages, the moment is fast coming when they may have to choose between resignation and war. If they decide on the former course, the whole Government and the parties they represent will become the object of public odium and be doomed for good and all in the eyes of their countrymen; if they decide on the latter course, they will feel that they have done their duty and only bowed to the supreme will of the people. Moreover, King Ferdinand is not popular. The army is believed to be loyal, but there is a very warlike feeling prevailing amongst its ranks, and His Majesty may well himself find in the unpleasant predicament of having to choose between leading his army to the Turkish frontier or of turning his back upon Bulgaria for ever.

M. Gueshof himself describes the present position as "difficilement tenable."

It appears that much concern is felt in Government circles at Count Berchtold's visit to the Roumanian Court just at this moment.

I hear on very reliable authority that it has been decided by the Government that should the Turks make any concentration of troops on the frontier, orders will at once be issued for immediate mobilisation of the Bulgarian army.

I have also heard that the Bulgarian Government some six weeks ago gave an order for some 100,000 coats for the army, and they are now awaiting large provisions of medical stores.

The Bulgarian Minister of Finance is in a few days proceeding to Paris to terminate the negotiations for the 180,000,000 fr. loan promised to the Government for this autumn.

It is only in the last few days that the serious instability of the situation has been realised, due doubtless in part to the unsatisfactory report of the Kotchana Commission of Enquiry as well as to the universally growing state of unrest in the Balkans. The Macedonian Organisation has decided to persist in their lawless policy, and there is hardly any doubt that for the coming few weeks peace is at the mercy of a serious frontier affray or another massacre.

The Russian and the French Ministers are both of opinion that something should be done to satisfy Bulgarian public feeling. The Russian Minister has suggested to his Government that Russia should pose as champion of all orthodox Christians in the Peninsula. I think he is vaguely indicating a *beau geste*, with no possible practical outcome except that of gaining time and doubtless of treading on Count Berchtold's corns. The French Minister considers that the only practical solution to ease the present tension would be for the Turkish Government to give complete and prompt satisfaction with regard to the Kotchana incident. Although I share his views in this respect, I doubt whether this would be more than a palliative. The Bulgarians seem this time to be "out" for the autonomy of Macedonia.

The general opinion here is that the most critical stage will be reached when peace will be declared between Turkey and Italy, for then the public outcry will be unanimous in denouncing the Government, and particularly King Ferdinand, for having wasted yet another opportunity.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[37060] No. 139.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinje, September* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 20 of 31st August: Berana.

This incident seems to be settled as far as this country is concerned, but one cannot feel that situation here is yet normal. State of things on the frontier at Velika bad owing to constant firing of Turkish troops across frontier, while excitement

is kept up by reports of disorder and by apparent anarchy as regards both civil and military administration in the neighbouring part of Turkey. Result of [group undecypherable : ? action of] Powers respecting the frontier is being awaited with impatience, and I fear that unless something is done we may have another incident like that of Moikovacs, which could with sound reason be attributed to Turks, and this would not belie assurances of peaceful policy given us. I am sending you this after consultation with French and Russian Ministers. I think that these views are shared by my colleagues.

I am sending by post detailed accounts of the state of things at Velika.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[37062] No. 140.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 2, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 32 of 30th August and your telegram No. 158 of 31st August.

Although Austrian Government have sent no special instructions to their representative at Sophia to urge pacific counsels, the latter has spoken frequently in this sense to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Akers-Douglas in conversation to-day that from their recent reports from Sophia Austrian Government were not inclined to take pessimistic view of the situation. He was hopeful of Bulgarian Government being able to maintain peaceful attitude and to calm public opinion. They naturally wished to make as much as possible of their difficulties and of pressure of popular feeling.

[36734] No. 141.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 564.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 351 of 31st August: Turkey and Montenegro.

I approve.

You may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I think it is very advisable that the inhabitants of the district in question should be bought out. From Count de Salis's telegram it seems to be a small affair, and the sooner it is settled the better.

(Repeated to Cettinjé, No. 54; Berlin, No. 162; Vienna, No. 166; and St. Petersburgh, No. 809.)

[37163] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 812.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

SIR L. MALLET made to the French and Russian chargés d'affaires this morning a verbal communication in explanation of my views on the situation in the Near East.

He said that I appreciated the difficulties of the situation, and accepted the proposal of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for an exchange of views on the subject.

I had always advocated the necessity for reforms for the Christian population of European Turkey, and thought the prospects in this respect more hopeful under the new Turkish Government than they had been for the last few years. I considered satisfactory the assurance given by the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and unofficially confirmed by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that reforms would be extended to all Christian populations, and it was consequently more than ever necessary to do nothing which would diminish the prestige of the Turkish Government. I thought that the action of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople in asking for a confirmation of this assurance was judicious. The Turkish Government should be given every encouragement to carry out this policy, but this should be done privately

and unofficially, and all collective or simultaneous action at Constantinople should be avoided, and the steps taken should not be made public. I was willing to speak in this sense to the Turkish Ambassador here, but preferred not to instruct Mr. Marling to make any representation at Constantinople, though he might confer with M. de Giers on the situation.

I was ready in the meantime to join in recommending the Balkan States to keep quiet. I had already spoken in this sense at Sophia, and would like to know whether Russian Government proposed to speak similarly at Belgrade.

I deprecated all talk of a conference, at any rate till the war was over, as it would have a very disturbing effect at Constantinople. If a conference were held eventually, there must first be a general agreement between the Powers as to proposals to be made and conclusions desired.

(Sent to Constantinople, No. 568.)

[37163] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 430.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

SIR L. MALLET made to the French and Russian chargés d'affaires this morning a verbal communication in explanation of my views on the situation in the Near East, in reply to the request of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for an expression of my opinion contained in the notice left here by M. de Etter on the 30th ultimo, copy of which was enclosed in my immediately preceding despatch of to-day.

He subsequently forwarded to both copies of the statement which he had made, with an intimation that it was to be regarded as a record of his observations, and not as a written communication.

Sir L. Mallet said that I fully appreciated the difficulties which the situation presented, and gladly accepted the proposal of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to exchange views on the subject.

I readily admitted that reforms for the Christian populations were urgently necessary, and thought that, in some respects, the prospect was more hopeful than it had been for the last few years, as the Government actually in power in Turkey had granted reforms to the Albanians, and seemed inclined to extend them to other populations.

The assurance given by the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to M. Sazonof as communicated to Sir L. Mallet by M. de Etter on the 20th ultimo, that these reforms would be extended to the other Christian populations, and the unofficial confirmation of this by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to me to be highly satisfactory and made it the more necessary that nothing should be done at this moment to affect prejudicially the prestige of the Turkish Cabinet. I consider the action taken by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople in asking for confirmation of Turkhan Pasha's statement judicious, and that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs should be given every encouragement to carry out his offer to lay the question before the council and publish the result in the "Gazette," but that the greatest discretion should be used in the manner in which this is done, which should in my opinion be privately and unofficially. Anything in the nature of collective or simultaneous action by the representatives at Constantinople should be carefully avoided; and although I should be happy to instruct His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to confer with M. de Giers, I did not propose to instruct him to make any representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the reactionary parties in Turkey were looking out for an opportunity of accusing the present Cabinet of amenability to foreign pressure. I would, however, speak unofficially to the Turkish Ambassador here in the sense of recommending to the Cabinet to take the initiative without delay in some announcement which would reassure the Christian populations and before the Powers were compelled to make any representations. I thought that it should not be allowed to become public that the three Powers had taken any action.

Some announcement on the part of the Porte should satisfy the Balkan States that their interests are not being neglected, but it must be remembered that if Turkish assurances were conveyed to Sophia it would be looked upon as a guarantee by the Power conveying the assurance, and it might be more prudent to avoid anything of this nature.

In the meantime, I was ready to join in recommending the Balkan States to

remain quiet. I had already sent urgent instructions to Sophia, and would enquire whether the Russian Government proposed to make representations also at Belgrade.

I consider that my talk of a conference would be premature during the continuance of the war and was likely to have a disturbing effect at Constantinople, where political capital was already being made out of the rumours of European intervention. The guiding principle of a conference, if it were held eventually, should be that there must first be a general agreement between all the Powers, especially between those most directly interested as to the proposals to be made and the conclusions desired; otherwise a conference might become worse than useless, for it might divide, instead of uniting, the Powers.

Sir L. Mallet also impressed upon M. de Fleurian the importance which I attached to maintaining the concerted action, in regard to the Balkans, of all the Powers, in contradistinction to separate action by the two European groups, which might lead to dangerous results.

This observation was not, however, made to M. de Etter, nor was it included in the written summary sent to the chargé d'affaires.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37055] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 296.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires left with Sir L. Mallet on the 30th ultimo an *aide-mémoire*, copy of which is enclosed, on the question of the Balkans.

He said that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was alarmed at the situation which is developing amongst the Christian populations there, and was desirous of taking some action to calm them, but would like to know my views as to what could be said or done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Aide-mémoire communicated by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

CONFORMÉMENT aux renseignements venant de votre Ministre à Sophia, et aussi d'après le Ministre bulgare à Saint-Pétersbourg, l'opinion publique en Bulgarie se met de plus en plus en effervescence.

L'attitude du Gouvernement Guéchof vis-à-vis de la Turquie y est jugée comme n'étant pas suffisamment décidée et énergique et le Cabinet se trouve placé dans une situation extrêmement difficile. Il peut facilement être contraint à céder la place à un autre, qui serait sans aucun doute composé d'éléments politiques très peu désirables.

D'autre part, les nationalités chrétiennes dans les Balkans commencent à se croire abandonnées à leur propre sort par l'Europe et peuvent d'un moment à l'autre être amenées à recourir à des actes de terrorisme. Cet état de choses demande, semblerait-il, que des mesures promptes soient prises en vue de faire patienter les ports balkaniques et les chrétiens turcs—mesures capables de leur faire espérer à une amélioration prochaine de leur situation.

M. Sazonof pense qu'une démarche de nature à amener au moins un apaisement temporaire serait de rigueur, afin surtout de prévenir tout conflit armé jusqu'au moment où les conditions climatiques rendrait pareil conflit impossible.

Sans formuler de propositions définies ou possibles, M. Sazonof voudrait savoir si les Gouvernements britannique et français ne trouveraient pas nécessaire de procéder dès à présent à un échange de vues à ce sujet, pour ne pas être pris au dépourvu par les événements qui se précipitent et pour coordonner leurs manières de voir par rapport à la situation actuelle dans les Balkans.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 30 août, 1912.

[37054] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 297.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires informed Sir L. Mallet on the 30th ultimo that the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had assured the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that reforms would be extended to the other Christian population of the Balkans.

The Russian Ambassador at Constantinople had been instructed to get confirmation of this from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had assured him that the whole Cabinet were of Turkhan Pasha's opinion, but that he could not give any official or definite assurance before laying the question before the Council, which he offered to do, and to publish in the "Gazette" a notification of the intention to grant reforms.

Sir L. Mallet said that he thought that this was most important, and that it confirmed him in his conviction that nothing should be done to weaken the present Turkish Government.

M. Sazonof asked that His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople should be instructed to confer with M. de Giers on this subject and to support his Excellency in the endeavour to get something published in the "Gazette."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37295] No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 304.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires called at this Office on the 28th August, and, under instructions, asked that I would make representations at Constantinople to induce the Turks to withdraw their troops from the frontier of Montenegro at once and ratify the protocol of 1908.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37163] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 307.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 812 of to-day's date, Sir L. Mallet made to the French and Russian chargés d'affaires this morning a verbal communication in explanation of my views on the situation in the Near East, in reply to the request of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for an expression of my opinion contained in the notice left here by M. de Etter on the 30th ultimo, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 296 of to-day.

He subsequently forwarded to both copies of the statement which he had made, with an intimation that it was to be regarded as a record of his observations, and not as a written communication.

Sir L. Mallet said that I fully appreciated the difficulties which the situation presented, and gladly accepted the proposal of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to exchange views on the subject.

I readily admitted that reforms for the Christian populations were urgently necessary, and thought that, in some respects, the prospect was more hopeful than it had been for the last few years, as the Government actually in power in Turkey had granted reforms to the Albanians, and seemed inclined to extend them to other populations.

The assurance given by the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to M. Sazonof, as communicated to Sir L. Mallet by M. de Etter on the 20th ultimo, that these reforms would be extended to the other Christian populations, and the unofficial confirmation of this by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, appeared to me to be highly

satisfactory and made it the more necessary that nothing should be done at this moment to affect prejudicially the prestige of the Turkish Cabinet. I considered the action taken by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople in asking for confirmation of Turkhan Pasha's statement judicious, and that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs should be given every encouragement to carry out his offer to lay the question before the Council and publish the result in the "Gazette," but that the greatest discretion should be used in the manner in which this is done, which should in my opinion be privately and unofficially. Anything in the nature of collective or simultaneous action by the representatives at Constantinople should be carefully avoided, and although I should be happy to instruct His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to confer with M. de Giers, I did not propose to instruct him to make any representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the reactionary parties in Turkey were looking out for an opportunity of accusing the present Cabinet of amenability to foreign pressure. I would, however, speak unofficially to the Turkish Ambassador here in the sense of recommending to the Cabinet to take the initiative without delay in some announcement which would reassure the Christian populations, and before the Powers were compelled to make any representations. I thought that it should not be allowed to become public that the three Powers had taken any action.

Some announcement on the part of the Porte should satisfy the Balkan States that their interests are not being neglected, but it must be remembered that if Turkish assurances were conveyed to Sophia it would be looked upon as a guarantee by the Power conveying the assurance, and it might be more prudent to avoid anything of this nature.

In the meantime I was ready to join in recommending the Balkan States to remain quiet. I had already sent urgent instructions to Sophia, and would enquire whether the Russian Government proposed to make representations also at Belgrade.

I considered that any talk of a conference would be premature during the continuance of the war, and was likely to have a disturbing effect at Constantinople, where political capital was already being made out of the rumours of European intervention. The guiding principle of a conference, if it were held eventually, should be that there must first be a general agreement between all the Powers, especially between those most directly interested, as to the proposals to be made and the conclusions desired, otherwise a conference might become worse than useless, for it might divide, instead of uniting, the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37067] No. 148.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sinaia, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to telegram No. 69 of the 30th August from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna.

I am told by the new Russian Minister, who was received by the King of Roumania to-day to present his credentials, that he was categorically assured by His Majesty that the visit paid by Count Berchtold was purely one of courtesy, and M. Schebeko appears to be satisfied that the situation has undergone no change owing to the visit of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[37092] No. 149.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. -(Received September 3.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 29th August.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your instructions, strongly counselled patience, and generally did my best to encourage him to resist pressure of warlike party. His Excellency replied that he had heard the same story from Russian and French Ministers, but that daily growing warlike spirit in the army and King of Bulgaria's position had to be taken into account. The Government found themselves

in a very difficult situation; it was a dilemma between peace within and peace without.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had just seen Austrian Minister, who had told him that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was amplifying his proposals. This, his Excellency argues, amounts to waste of time, since the Grand Vizier had already rejected them. Bulgaria had lost all faith in Turkey.

Minister for Foreign Affairs wondered whether the seriousness of the position was realised abroad, and asked me to represent it to you again. I replied that I had already explained it fully. He repeated his vague statement that something must be done, and he concluded with an assurance that he would do all in his power to maintain peace.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[37236] No. 150.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 324.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 320 of 31st August: Balkans.

Austrian Ambassador read Austrian note to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. The latter considers the suggestions of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs excellent in theory, but quite impossible to realise in practice. He said that he would be ready to give them his warmest support if he thought they would lead to some definite result.

His Excellency was very relieved to learn that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs did not wish for a conference, and at once telegraphed to Paris to the effect that conference was most undesirable from the point of view of the Russian Government.

[37237] No. 151.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 325.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September 3, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is still much disturbed over the situation in Bulgaria, and fears that Gueshof Ministry will not be able to resist the pressure of public opinion. If it falls he thinks probably Stamboulof party will succeed it and war become inevitable. His Excellency thought there was no time to be lost; we must do something as soon as possible and prove effectively our interest in the welfare of Christian races. It would suffice if we could point to the settlement of the Montenegrin frontier and the extension of reforms to the Christian population of the four vilayets. But he insisted on the necessity of the latter concession being made as publicly as possible—in an "Official Gazette," for instance. The vain assurances of the Porte were not sufficient.

He fully concurred in the views expressed in your telegram No. 812 of 2nd September. Representations to the Porte might be made unofficially, but the result must be made public. His Excellency was very anxious that you should instruct Mr. Marling also to make representations at Constantinople in the sense in which you propose to speak to Turkish Ambassador in London.

Russian Government have spoken in the strongest fashion at Sophia and told the Bulgarian Government that in the event of war Russia would give them neither military nor diplomatic support, and warned them that they would have Austria and Roumania to deal with. Similar language had been held at Belgrade, and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Henderson that Servia had promised to make no movement without the consent of Russia. Bulgarian Government, however, were not so complaisant, and, in the event of war, Servia would of course be swept into the flood.

[37238] No. 152.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 326.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September 3, 1912.*

TURKEY and Montenegro.

Mr. Marling's telegram No. 354 of 31st August.

Mr. Henderson mentioned to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day the suggestion of buying out the inhabitants of the district to be ceded to Montenegro. His Excellency had not previously heard of it, but considered the idea an excellent one.

[37240] No. 153.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September 3, 1912.*

VIENNA telegram No. 70 of 29th August.

Austrian chargé d'affaires read a very long [group omitted: ? telegram] to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday, but refused to leave copy as he was instructed to make verbal communication. Secretary of State wrote a memorandum afterwards, which he was good enough to read to me this morning, but said he could not be certain of having remembered everything. His Excellency remarked confidentially that there was very little in it, the chief point being that the Powers should insist at Constantinople on the necessity for free and fair elections.

Communication began by reciting reception of original Austrian proposals by the various Powers: Germany and Italy had answered in a friendly manner, latter merely making the obvious reservation that she could take no action at Constantinople; then Russia had accepted with the reservation against collective action; England had expressed readiness to exchange views; and finally France had accepted, adding that the Powers must insist on the concessions granted to Albanians being also granted to Christian populations. The rest of the communication has presumably been made to you in identic terms.

Secretary of State also read to me a telegram he had sent on 1st September to Constantinople and Cettinjé, instructing the German representatives to take similar action in whatever form they considered best when Russian and Austrian representatives were instructed to urge the withdrawal or demobilisation of the troops on both sides, preparatory to settlement of frontier question. His Excellency explained to me that he had only mentioned Russian and Austrian representatives because they were those to whom he knew such instructions were being sent.

[37060] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 3, 1912.*

COUNT DE SALIS'S telegram No. 21 of 2nd September: Turkey and Montenegro.

You should make use of this information in speaking to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 391; St. Petersburgh, No. 820; and Cettinjé, No. 55.)

[37056] No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 418.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 3, 1912.*

THE councillor of the Turkish Embassy drew Sir L. Mallet's attention on the 29th ultimo to the enclosed telegram from Salonica, which appeared in the "Times" of the 27th August, relative to the declaration which the proposals of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had given Djavid Bey the opportunity to make.

Djevad Bey said that he was convinced that Djavid Bey's appeal to the chauvinism of the electorate will have a very powerful effect.

Djevad Bey also spoke of the communication made by the Turkish Government to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the proposals, indicating their inability to accept foreign intervention of any kind in their internal concerns.

The Marquis Pallavicini's reply seems to have been of a most soothing nature, and to have been to the effect that his Government disclaimed any intention of intervening in any form, and that their sole object had been to make things easy for the Turkish Government, to give them sympathy and encouragement, and to calm down the excitement raised at Sophia, Belgrade, and Cettinjé by the news of the grant of reform for Albania.

Djevad Bey exclaimed that words more honeyed had never been poured into Turkish ears, but he deplored the harm which had already been done and the impulse given to reactionary counsels.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 155.

Extract from the "Times" of August 27, 1912.

COUNT BERCHTOLD'S PROPOSAL: A YOUNG TURK VIEW.

COUNT BERCHTOLD has at least succeeded in putting a potent weapon into the hands of the committee for the forthcoming elections. How the Austro-Hungarian proposal will be turned to account is indicated in a declaration by Djavid Bey. The attainment of power by the Young Turks, he says, saved Turkey the application of the Reval programme, which threatened to break up the Empire. During the four years of the committee régime no Power dared to suggest intervention, but immediately the reins of government fell into the hands of Hamidian statesmen accustomed to "kow-tow" to Europe this Austrian menace, carrying in its train intervention and subsequent loss of Macedonia, was thrust upon Turkey. He rejoices, however, that the Committee of Union and Progress still remains, again to save the country from the hands of its enemies. The effect of such arguments upon the ignorant fanatical Mussulman population can be easily imagined.

[37263] No. 156.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Rome, September 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Secretary-General of the Italian Foreign Office read to me to-day a telegram from their representative at Athens, stating that the frontier incident between Greece and Turkey had caused considerable excitement in Athens. He reported his belief that the Greek Government were genuinely anxious not to magnify the affair, but was convinced that, should hostilities break out between Bulgaria and Turkey, Greece would not fail to seize the opportunity to join forces with the former.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

[37394] No. 157.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 4, 1912.*

BALKANS.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Russell this afternoon that all the Powers, with the exception of Great Britain, had now replied to his last proposals, and that these replies had all been of a favourable nature. Mr. Russell said he felt convinced

that answer of His Majesty's Government, which was no doubt already on its way to Vienna, would be equally sympathetic to his Excellency's suggestions.

Minister for Foreign Affairs leaves for Buchlau on Friday morning to receive visit of German Chancellor.

[37381] No. 158.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 324 of 3rd September.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to learn your views on the Austrian proposals as soon as possible.

[37236] No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 825.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 324 of 3rd September: Austrian communication about the Balkans.

Please thank Minister for Foreign Affairs, and inform him that a similar communication was made here yesterday.

[37237] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

YOU may support your colleagues in giving pacific advice to the Servian Government.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 396; St. Petersburgh, No. 827; Berlin, No. 170; and Vienna, No. 173.)

[37240] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Earl Granville.

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 3rd September: Austrian communication about the Balkans.

Please thank Minister for Foreign Affairs for this information. A similar communication was made here yesterday.

[37158] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 435.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires left with Sir L. Mallet on the 30th ultimo a memorandum,* copy of which is enclosed, proposing action at Constantinople by Great Britain, France, and Russia, with a view to secure the extension to the Christian races of the Balkans of the reforms granted to the Albanians.

Sir L. Mallet said that he would at once forward the paper to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 107.

[37157] No. 163

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 436.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires informed Sir L. Mallet on the 31st ultimo that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made a communication to the French Government of his anxiety respecting the present situation in the Balkans, and had proposed that the three Powers should exchange views on the subject.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that he was quite disposed to exchange views as to the best way of avoiding a conflict, and that this would be in accordance with the agreement made by the three Powers before the German Emperor's visit to Baltic ports.

M. de Fleuriau also stated that M. Sazonof was anxious lest Austria should be the first to propose a conference on the Near East, and thought that the Triple *Entente* should not allow itself to be anticipated by the Triple Alliance in making this proposal.

M. Poincaré had replied that the multiplicity of questions to be settled would justify a conference, and that he agreed that the Triple *Entente* should take the initiative in proposing it.

M. de Fleuriau asked Sir L. Mallet's personal views, and the latter replied that he thought that a conference now would be out of the question, but that it might become inevitable at the end of the war, although he considered that it might emphasise the points of difference between the two groups of Powers and lead to many serious difficulties arising between them.

M. de Fleuriau spoke of the general situation, and Sir L. Mallet said that personally he rather regretted that there seemed to be a tendency to keep Austria and Germany out of the interchange of views between Great Britain, France, and Russia about Bulgaria and Montenegro, and that at this moment it seemed to be rather a mistake that all the Great Powers should not act together.

M. de Fleuriau said that he was inclined to agree.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37159] No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 4, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires informed Sir L. Mallet on the 31st ultimo that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had instructed the French Minister at Sophia to warn the Bulgarian Government that they would get no sympathy from any quarter, if they took any hostile steps against Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37401] No. 165.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Athens, August 20, 1912.*

M. COROMILAS, whom I saw yesterday, appeared very despondent and takes the gloomiest view of the present situation in Turkey. He states that, according to reports which he has received, conditions in Epirus and Macedonia are worse than they have ever been before, that the present Turkish Government have no intention of fulfilling their promises to the Albanians, that, even if the Albanians are pacified, Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians will never rest until the same privileges are given them, and that there is every prospect of these two provinces soon being in a state of complete anarchy, involving the neighbouring States in inevitable complications.

M. Coromilas evidently thinks that the Greeks of Epirus have more to fear from the Albanians than from the Turks, and will be bitterly opposed to any scheme of

autonomy for an Albania including the vilayet of Janina. The views of the Greek Epirotes are tolerably well expressed in the enclosed translation of a telegram from the Epirote colony in Laurium, addressed to the Ottoman Legation as well as to the legations of the Great Powers here.

With regard to the Samian agitator Sofoulis, who is alleged to be responsible for the recently attempted filibustering expedition from Crete, I informed M. Coromilas that I had instructions, in combination with the Russian and French chargés d'affaires, to urge the Hellenic Government to restrain this person's activity.

M. Coromilas replied that he had been aware of Sofoulis's presence in Athens, and declared that on more than one occasion he had caused very strongly worded messages to be conveyed to him with the object of keeping him quiet. Similar assurances were received this morning by the Russian and French chargés d'affaires, and it is evident that the Greek Government have not, at least in the present case, given him the slightest encouragement to embark on an undertaking which could only be a cause of embarrassment to themselves.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

Enclosure in No. 165.

Telegram from the Epirotes of Laurium to the Imperial Ottoman Legation and the Legations of the Great Powers at Athens.

(Translation.) *August* 15 (28), 1912.

THE Epirotes of Laurium, in face of the new danger which threatens their fatherland, being unable to-day to repel by their own forces the invaders and eternal enemies of Epirus, the Albanians, invoke, on the one hand, the attention of the Ottoman Empire, as law-abiding members thereof, with the certainty that it will protect the land of Epirus from violence; and, on the other hand, they protest in the name of the rights of mankind to the Great Powers and appeal for their aid against the hordes of Scutari which, by violence and the sword, have devastated for ages a land which is struggling to maintain its age-long traditions.

[37490] No. 166.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September* 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 169 of 4th September: Balkans.

I conveyed this morning to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through the political director, your thanks for the information about the Austrian communication, and said that you had received a similar one. Secretary of State has telegraphed to Vienna his acceptance of programme, if it can be so called, with slight reservation that Turkey's feelings must not be hurt.

[37394] No. 167.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 398.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1912.

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 73 of 4th September: Austrian proposals.

What answer has French (Russian) Government given?

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 891).

[37630] No. 168.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September* 6, 1912.

RUSSIAN Minister, who has just returned from leave, tells me that M. Pashitch yesterday telegraphed privately to the Servian Minister at Sophia instructing him to express hopes that Bulgarian Government would not give way to popular excitement, and to request them not to lose sight of the danger threatening Servia from Austria in the event of a war.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[37635] No. 169.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 831 of 5th September: Balkans.

Reply of Russian Government has so far been confined to the remarks made by Minister for Foreign Affairs to Austrian Ambassador when the latter read Austrian note to him.

His Excellency, I understand, merely took act of the communication, and expressed agreement in principles which note recorded—or, as my French colleague remarked to me, he replied to banalities with banalities.

Both Minister and Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs are absent, and will not be back here for another week.

[37653] No. 170.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, September* 2, 1912.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of disorders on the frontier between Turkey and Montenegro, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of statements communicated to me by the Montenegrin Government with regard to occurrences which have taken place in the last few days. You will observe that the Montenegrin Government record that during the period in question the Turkish troops near Velika have not ceased to fire across the border into Montenegrin territory, with the result that various casualties have occurred. These statements have been supplied to the legations at Cettinjé with the evident intention of supporting the appeal made to the Powers to induce the Porte to accept a definite settlement of the frontier question.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Statements communicated to Count de Salis by the Montenegrin Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(1.)

DANS ces derniers jours les attaques à coups de fusils de la part des cordons turcs préposés aux blockhaus le long de Velika n'ont pas cessé. Avant-hier ils ont blessé le télégraphiste monténégrin Milogna Babovitch, pendant qu'il transmettait des dépêches avec un appareil de camp placé à côté du corps de garde monténégrin de Chomna.

Hier les cordons du kouló Ravan ne se sont pas contentés de tirer sur tout ce qu'ils voyaient dans la frontière monténégrine, mais ils ont transgressé ensemble avec les bachi-bouzoucks de Novchitch les confins par Mali Ravan pour pouvoir mieux

diriger leurs coups sur nos maisons et personnes. Heureusement, ce feu n'eut pas de suites fâcheuses.

Hier les cordons placés à Ivan Polié ont tiré toute la journée sur la partie inférieure de Velika.

Dans le district de Bérané avant-hier on entendait de rares coups de canon et de fusil. Hier le canon ne s'est pas fait entendre et il n'y a eu que peu de coups de fusil, qu'on entendait de chez nous.

Cettigné, le 13 (26) *août*, 1912.

(2.)

Les attaques de la part des cordons Impériaux ne cessent pas du côté de Velika, Polimlié et Chekoular. Hier ils ont tiré, mais sans conséquences fâcheuses; ce matin ils ont blessé mortellement le caporal Radé Stéchévitch.

Du côté de la Tara les Impériaux continuent de temps à autre à tirer sur le Monastère Dobrilovina et ses environs. Le moine Grbovitch n'est pas à même de continuer d'y demeurer, car, suivant la plainte qu'il vient d'adresser aux autorités Royales et Jabliak, il ne peut sortir du couvent sans que l'on tire sur lui. Comme il fait clair de lune en ce moment on tire sur lui même la nuit, dès qu'il sort de la maison.

La population dans le voisinage du monastère ne peut s'occuper des travaux des champs, exposée comme elle est aux coups tirés sur elle. Il lui est impossible de se rendre à l'église les jours fériés, les nizams tirant dès qu'ils aperçoivent quelqu'un.

Cettigné, le 14 (27) *août*, 1912.

(3.)

Le commandant Mikitch, de Velika, à la date d'hier télégraphie ce qui suit:—

"Les cordons turcs avec les bachi-bouzoucks des environs de Velika, après avoir ouvert un feu nourri ce matin vers 7 heures sur le corps de garde de Chouma, ont, vers 5 heures de l'après-midi, dépassé la ligne frontière au-dessous de Kodra et tiré de feux de peloton sur nos paysans et notre bétail. Les nizams du blockhaus au-dessus d'Yvan Polié, de Polia et des retranchements environnants ont, de leur côté, tiré en même temps. De Yézerski Vrh et du blockhaus Chabova Glava on a tiré sur nos corps de garde de Chouma et Tétrébignak. Au moment où je télégraphie je ne sais si quelqu'un a été blessé chez nous. Lorsqu'on a dépassé la frontière, les soldats ont tiré sur les assaillants et leur ont fait rebrousser chemin.

"Pour transporter de Chouma le caporal blessé Stéchévitch il a fallu attendre la nuit, vu que les cordons tiraient dès qu'ils apercevaient quelqu'un chez nous. Stéchévitch a succombé dans la nuit à la suite de ses blessures. La partie inférieure de Velika est surtout exposée au feu des nizams. Les gens sortent seulement la nuit, pour ne pas être tués. Les ordres que les nôtres ont de ne riposter aux coups tirés contre eux que si les agresseurs dépassent la ligne frontière encouragent surtout les bachi-bouzoucks, qui redoublent de zèle, pour tirer dans la direction de notre frontière.

"Du côté de Dobrilovina on a tiré aussi ces deux derniers jours. L'accès au monastère est impossible, à moins de se risquer à être tué.

"Depuis deux jours on n'entend plus ni coups de canon ni coups de fusil du côté de Bérané."

Cettigné, le 16 (29) *août*, 1912.

(4.)

Du côté de Velika l'état de choses continue à être le même; hier aussi comme les jours précédents les cordons n'ont pas cessé de tirer dans la frontière monténégrine. La partie inférieure de Velika souffre le plus, elle est la plus exposée aux coups tirés par les cordons et les bachi-bouzoucks, de manière que la population est littéralement tenue prisonnière, ne pouvant pas sortir des maisons. Du côté de Dobrilovina on n'a pas tiré hier. Djavid Pacha, suivant les assurances de la Légation Impériale ottomane, a pris des mesures pour faire cesser le feu de ce côté. Il est à espérer que la cessation

du feu soit réellement l'effet de l'ordre donné par Djavid Pacha, et que des ordres semblables et efficaces seront donnés à la fin aussi à Velika.

Depuis les événements dans le caza de Bérané 551 familles se sont réfugiées au Monténégro, composées de 3,744 âmes. Elles ne vont pas tarder à rentrer, vu que la paix a été rétablie à Bérané. Djavid Pacha y a rétabli l'ordre et, d'après les nouvelles de la frontière, Djavid Pacha a donné aux chefs des chrétiens de Bérané des assurances par écrit que les chrétiens auront les mêmes droits que les musulmans; qu'ils recevront des dommages et intérêts pour leurs maisons brûlées et détruites; que les montants de ces dommages seront fixés par une commission nommé par Djavid Pacha et les chrétiens mêmes; que dans les administrations locales et dans les tribunaux ils auront des employés connaissant la langue du pays, que le commandant des cordons—un certain Mounduc Effendi—contre lequel on se plaignait depuis longtemps, sera déplacé de Bérané, qu'aucun chrétien du caza de Bérané ne sera puni pour les derniers événements survenus dans le district de Bérané.

Cettigné, le 17 (30) *août*, 1912.

(5.)

Du côté de Velika et spécialement des koulés de Ravni et de Krcho les cordons Impériaux n'ont pas cessé de tirer hier sur les maisons, hommes, femmes et bétail qu'ils apercevaient chez nous. Comme il fait clair de lune en ce moment des coups de fusil ont été tirés aussi dans la nuit du 17 (30) au 18 (31) de ce mois. Les nôtres n'ont pas ripposté, les agresseurs n'ayant pas franchi la ligne frontière.

Cettigné, le 18 (31) *août*, 1912.

[37654] No. 171.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, September 2*, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 33 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a statement communicated to me by the Montenegrin Government with regard to outrages committed on the inhabitants of Berane by the Turkish troops during the recent troubles.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 171.

Note communicated to Count de Salis by the Montenegrin Government.

LES affaires de Berané entre Djavid Pacha et les chrétiens s'arrangent. Les réfugiés au Monténégro commencent déjà à rentrer dans leurs villages. Djavid Pacha leur a donné des tentes et en a promis d'autres pour ceux dont les maisons ont été brûlées.

A Andriéjévitza il y a quatre-vingt-quatre chrétiens blessés du district de Berané; ils y sont soignés en ce moment.

Voici la liste des victimes:—

Miloche Tchoukitch, Sava Tchoukitch, Miloutine Tchoukitch, Vesso Tchoukitch, Milia Tchoukitch, tués et mutilés. Les femmes Yelka Tchoukitch, Vélika Tchoukitch, Maritza Tchoukitch ont été tuées. Marko Yelitch, sa femme Militza et leur fille Maria ont été égorgés dans leur maison; à leur fils âgé de 6 mois les parties génitales furent coupées, à la suite de quoi il succomba; à leur fils aîné Arso, âgé de 18 mois, par un coup de sabre-baïonnette on a écrasé le testicule droit et le coup porté lui a produit une grosse blessure presque jusqu'à la vessie. Cet enfant est soigné à Andriéjévitza; son état est grave. Miloutine Gondovitch et Novitza Dovitch ont été tués et mutilés. La femme de Bojina Koutch tuée et son corps haché à coups de sabre-baïonnette. Trente et une personnes ont été faites prisonnières et enfermées à Berané, où elles ont été maltraitées par la faim et par des coups de la part des nizams; parmi ces personnes se trouvaient la maîtresse d'école Darinka Tchoukitch avec ses trois enfants.

D'après ce qui nous revient, toutes ces personnes viennent d'être mises en liberté par Djavid Pacha. Au pillage des maisons ont pris part les nizams avec les bachi-bouzoucks.

Cettigné, le 18 (31) *août*, 1912.

[37240] No. 172.

Sir Edward Grey to Earl Granville.

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 3rd September: Turkey and Montenegro, last paragraph.

You should thank Secretary of State, and may inform him that I sent similar instructions on 30th August.

[37749] No. 173.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 443.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1912.

THE French chargé d'affaires called on the 2nd instant and left with Sir L. Mallet a note, copy of which is enclosed, relative to action taken by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna with regard to the proposals of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Balkan question.

Sir L. Mallet said that he was sure that I should be glad that M. Poincaré was anxious to maintain concerted action by all the Powers, as that was my view, as had already been explained to M. de Fleuriau.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No 173.

Note communicated by M. de Fleuriau.

M. POINCARÉ a fait savoir à l'Ambassadeur de France à Vienne qu'il se réservait d'examiner les nouvelles propositions du Comte Berchtold avec la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie. Il a autorisé M. Dumaine à laisser entendre que le Gouvernement français, fermement attaché à la Triple Entente, ne poursuit en Orient aucun dessein d'intérêt exclusif, et que le concours de toutes les Puissances lui paraît nécessaire à la solution des questions balkaniques.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 *septembre*, 1912.

[37770] No. 174.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 269.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August* 30, 1912.

M. SAZONOF returned to St. Petersburgh on the 25th of this month and resumed his duties as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In a conversation which I had with him on that day his Excellency told me that the Austrian Ambassador had said nothing further to him with regard to Count Berchtold's proposal since he had communicated it to him officially, and it did not therefore look as if Count Berchtold intended to submit his views to the Powers in a more precise or definite form. His proposal had, in fact, been a "coup d'épée dans l'eau." The Austrian Ambassador, however, had, in the course of their conversation, made some remarks which were of considerable interest. In speaking of the mistrust with which Austria was regarded in Russia, Count Thurn had said that, in some form

or another, the question of the sanjak was raised on every possible occasion, and that his Government were tired of having it always brought up against them. It was the sanjak here, and the sanjak there; and Austrian designs on the sanjak were the favourite theme of the Russian press. He could, however, tell him that, when Austria withdrew from the sanjak, she did so with her eyes open and for strategical reasons. The military experts regarded it as a regular mousetrap, and maintained that the Power that occupied it would have to occupy Servia as well. An Austrian occupation of Servia was, of course, out of the question, as it would provoke a European war, and Russia might therefore rest assured that all the reports of Austrian designs on the sanjak were absolutely without foundation.

M. Sazonof added that he believed that what Count Thurn had told him was perfectly true, and that Austria had no designs on the sanjak.

His Excellency then said that, if you decided to send Mr. Marling instructions similar to those which the French Ambassador had already received, he would also instruct M. de Giers to give friendly counsels to the Porte with regard to Macedonia. Such friendly advice could not possibly do any harm, though he rather doubted whether it would do much good. The Bulgarian Minister, his Excellency continued, had recently told M. Neratof that it would be no satisfaction to Bulgaria were the concessions about to be accorded to the Albanians to be extended to the Christian races in Macedonia. The latter were already in possession of the privileges which they conferred, and what Bulgaria really wanted was to see Macedonia endowed with the organic statute provided for by article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.

I remarked that, if what General Paprikoff had said was true, the Porte would probably reply to any representations which we might make that the concessions now accorded to the Albanians did but place the latter on the same footing as the Christian races in Macedonia. His Excellency agreed that this was not unlikely.

On my calling on M. Sazonof two days later to inform him that you would prefer to speak to the Ottoman Ambassador in London rather than to take any action at Constantinople itself, his Excellency told me that he had already urged Turkhan Pasha to advise his Government to make some "semblant de concessions" to the Macedonians. He did not, however, venture to hope that the Porte would follow his advice, and the news which he had that day received from Bulgaria was causing him grave anxiety. Both the Russian Minister at Sophia and the Bulgarian Minister here represented the situation in very dark colours. According to them, public opinion was getting out of hand. The country was indignant at the apathy and inaction of the present pacific Ministry, and might sweep them away at any moment. It believed, moreover, that the Powers, while encouraging the grant of concessions to Moslem Albanians, had entirely disinterested themselves in the fate of the Christians of Macedonia. General Paprikoff had also stated that, according to telegrams which he had received from Monastir, fresh bomb outrages were being planned with the deliberate intention of provoking reprisals, that would in their turn force the hands of the Bulgarian Government and precipitate war.

M. Sazonof remarked that, though not a pessimist by nature, he was seriously alarmed at the turn which events were taking. European intervention in the style in which it was practised in the days of Abdul Hamid was, he knew, out of the question, and it was equally impossible for the Powers to invite the Porte to give practical effect to the 23rd article of the Treaty of Berlin. But, even if we could not hope to obtain any substantial concessions from Turkey, it was imperative for us to do something to convince the Balkan States that we have not altogether forgotten their kinsmen in Macedonia. Our first aim must be to tide over the next two or three months and to keep the Balkan States quiet by some means or another till the arrival of winter would remove the danger of war. The only way to do this was to inspire them with the belief that we were interesting ourselves actively on their behalf. He proposed telegraphing in the above sense to the Russian representatives in London and Paris.

I enquired whether his Excellency contemplated entering into an exchange of views with the other Powers as well, so that, without having recourse to any collective action, we might approach Turkey with the full weight of the European concert, as Count Berchtold had suggested in his proposal.

His Excellency replied that Count Berchtold's proposal was purely academic in character, and that he saw no advantage in waiting for Austria to take the whole matter into her own hands. Before saying anything to the Austrian and German Governments, England, France, and Russia ought to consult together and to come to some understanding on the subject. It would also, he thought, be opportune were they to consider what was to be done, should war break out in the Balkans, so as not

to be taken unprepared. The situation was, in his opinion, most critical, and it was impossible to say what a single day might bring forth.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[37771] No. 175.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 270.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 30, 1912.*

IN the conversation reported in my immediately preceding despatch, M. Sazonof told me that the Austrian Ambassador had informed him that, according to a report which his Government had received from Constantinople, Turkey was insisting that Montenegro should demobilise, and was making compliance with this demand a condition to her consenting to a meeting between Ibrahim Pasha and General Voukotitch.

Having been asked by Count Thurn for an expression of his views, he had said that the words mobilisation and demobilisation could hardly be applied to an army like that of Montenegro; that, in any case, it was unreasonable to expect Montenegro to demobilise, so long as the Turkish forces were maintained in full strength near the frontier; that, in his opinion, it would be advisable for the Powers to invite both Governments to withdraw their troops to a certain distance from the frontier, and at the same time to urge the Porte to ratify the arrangement with regard to the Turco-Montenegrin frontier.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[37815] No. 176.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 262.)
Sir, *Rome, September 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Marquis di San Giuliano returned to Rome on Friday last for a flying visit to confer with Signor Giolitti. The press states that a Cabinet meeting was held yesterday, at which the Ministers of War and Marine were present. General Caneva, Governor of Tripoli, has arrived in Rome on sick leave, and had interviews with the Prime Minister and the Minister of War yesterday, so it is thought probable that his report may have been discussed afterwards at the Cabinet meeting. It has not been possible to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who left Rome to-day to undergo a further cure at Fiuggi.

His Excellency was at the Foreign Office at an early hour this morning, and was closeted with the secretary-general when I arrived later to see the latter. It is probable, therefore, that Signor Bollati's remarks on the political situation may be taken to reflect accurately the views of the Foreign Minister.

The secretary-general told me that the Austrian chargé d'affaires had communicated to him yesterday the promised expansion of Count Berchtold's programme for the Balkan Peninsula. After reading the proposals carefully, he had come to the conclusion that they had been drawn up with excellent intentions, but that they meant nothing and would result in nothing practical.

It appears that his remark had a certain tone of relief. Not having seen the suggestions of Count Berchtold, I was unable to discuss them or ascertain Signor Bollati's views in detail. I suspect, however, that the Italian Government may have apprehended that the programme, when elaborated, would contain far-reaching proposals which might eventually further Austro-Hungarian policy, and bring about in the near future developments unwelcome to Italy, and even possibly the disruption of the Turkish Empire in Europe.

Whilst on this subject, I should report that the German Ambassador, to whom I paid a visit yesterday, recorded his personal conviction that the break-up of the European dominions of Turkey was now only a matter of time. His Excellency thought that there were no men of prominence in the whole Empire fit to govern in Constantinople; the few of any value, who had appeared in their extreme old age, would soon join the majority and leave nothing but mediocrity behind them. In his

own opinion, the main flaw in the present system of Turkish administration lay in their Parliament—an institution wholly unsuited, according to him, to Oriental countries, which were better governed by an autocrat.

I do not pretend to reproduce Herr von Jagow's exact words, and would beg that his remarks may be treated as strictly confidential. But if his views are those of the German Government, they may be worth remembering in considering the possible results of the present Austro-Hungarian proposals.

To my enquiry of Signor Bollati whether he could tell me anything as to the progress of the negotiations proceeding in Switzerland, he replied that, as I saw in the press, the fact that the pourparlers were taking place had now been officially recognised, but that he regretted to say that up to now their result was not very encouraging. I asked whether the report published in the Roman newspapers was correct, to the effect that an exchange of civilian prisoners had been arranged, and that the members of the Italian Sforza expedition, who, you will recollect, had been captured at the beginning of the war, were shortly to be released. The secretary-general said that he could not think how such a report had got about here. The Italian Government had been for a long time, and were still, extremely anxious to secure the release of those unfortunate scientists; they had long ago approached the Ottoman Government through the German Ambassador at Constantinople, offering the Vali of Rhodes and all the other captured Turkish civilian officials and non-combatants in exchange for the five members of the expedition. The Turkish Government had persisted, however, in maintaining that these were Italian officers in disguise, and had been originally sent out for purposes of espionage; they had therefore refused to entertain the Italian proposal.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

[37812] No. 177.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 126.)
Sir, *Athens, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 124 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a resolution passed at a meeting of Epirotes resident in Athens, held on the 28th ultimo, communicated to all the legations of the Great Powers and the Ottoman Legation here by a deputation of the persons organising the demonstration. The meeting was attended by about 600 individuals and has not aroused much enthusiasm. At the same time it expresses a very generally felt anxiety as to what will be the result of events now happening in Turkey, in which Bulgaria and Servia are no less interested than Greece.

Discussing the Austrian proposals to induce the Ottoman Government to adopt some system of decentralisation not yet clearly defined, the Bulgarian Minister, M. Hadjimischef, who is among the ablest and best informed of the foreign representatives in Athens, is of opinion that, if these proposals do not conceal any ulterior motive, as there is no reason to suppose, and genuinely aim at a restoration of peace and order in the Ottoman dominions, there is no reason why it should not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory result.

The main condition for the success of such reforms is that new subdivisions must be created in the affected districts more in accordance with ethnographical conditions than those actually existing, which were only made on the principle of *divide et impera*, and tended to herd in one vilayet Greeks and Albanians, in another Albanians and Serbs, and in another Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians. The difficulties of making a redistribution would, he thought, not be insuperable. Epirus and part of Thessaly might be welded into a province which should be almost entirely Greek. Monastir and Kossovo would have to be subdivided into three, distinguishing between the Serb, Bulgar, and Albanian population of the existing vilayets, while a somewhat similar distribution should be made in the vilayet of Salonica. It would not, however, be safe to leave the administration of the new provinces in the hands of the Turks without some safeguard for the protection of the Christian population, and it would be necessary for the Powers to devise some scheme by which European advice and assistance could be given to the Turkish governors. The Turks might not like this, but with all the Powers in agreement serious resistance would be out of the question. The present situation was intolerable, and unless something could be done a general

conflagration, which none of the Balkan States wanted (with the possible exception of Montenegro), could not be long delayed. In Bulgaria popular feeling was already so strong that it required all the energy of the present pacific Ministry to keep the warlike spirit of the people in check. In Greece things have not yet gone so far, but even here there are rumours of military preparations and the possibility of mobilisation.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

Enclosure in No. 177.

Resolution passed at a Meeting of Epirotes resident in Athens

DES bandes albanaises parcourent l'Epire engageant les habitants à proclamer en Épire aussi l'autonomie albanaise et à sanctionner par des souscriptions les demandes soumises à la Sublime Porte de la part des insurgés de l'Albanie.

Nous ne nous indignons pas du tout de la concession des privilèges que le Gouvernement ture pense faire aux Albanais; tout au contraire, nous suivons avec sympathie l'évolution de la question albanaise dans les limites de l'Albanie. Cependant, nous autres Épirotes d'Athènes et du Pirée, ayant aussi bien l'avis de nos compatriotes de partout, nous étant réunis aujourd'hui, le 15 août, 1912, dans la place du Théâtre municipal d'Athènes, nous protestons contre les tendances d'un petit nombre des Turcs-Albanais, qui s'efforcent de comprendre notre patrie, composée du vilayet de Janina, dans le vilayet qui se trouve sous l'influence albanaise, puisque notre patrie n'est qu'un pays grec dès temps anciens et habité aujourd'hui encore par une population de plus de deux tiers hellénique.

Nous protestons aussi contre la nomination d'un vali albanais à Janina, cela mettant en danger les intérêts de notre race; nous protestons également contre les efforts faits pour altérer la nuance ethnologique purement hellénique du vilayet de Janina.

Ayant ouï les communications et les délibérations faites, nous votons à l'unanimité et d'une seule voix—

1. De soumettre une protestation aux Ministres des Grandes Puissances et de la Sublime Porte à Athènes contre les efforts tendancieux d'albaniser l'Épire.

2. De prier les Ministres des Grandes Puissances de se faire l'enterprète des droits des Épirotes auprès de leurs Gouvernements et de joindre, en outre, leur prière afin que la nomination d'un vali albanais à Janina ne soit pas faite.

3. D'inviter le Gouvernement hellénique à exercer ses droits dus à la solidarité nationale et d'union et à protéger la population homogène de l'Épire, qui court aujourd'hui une période critique nationale.

4. Nous déclarons qu'en cas où les justes prétentions des Épirotes ne soient pas exaucées, ils se trouveront dans la nécessité impérieuse de se défendre à tout prix, afin de faire reconnaître leurs droits et de faire prendre par le Gouvernement ture des mesures qui assureront leur vie, leur honneur et leur sécurité menacés par des innombrables bandes de brigands.

5. Nous choisissons comme nos représentants pour remettre ce vote MM. Ziko Rossis, Kitsos Botsaris, Périclès Karapanos, Aristides Bulanos, Georges Gagaris, Nicolas Bitzios, Constantin Zikos et Charalambos Basiliou, et nous leur ordonnons de remettre le présent vote à leurs Excellences les représentants des Grandes Puissances, à son Excellence le Président du Gouvernment hellénique, à son Excellence le Ministre de Turquie, et aux directeurs de la presse hellénique en général.

Par ordre de l'Assemblée générale des Épirotes.

La Commission:

(huit signatures suivent.)

Athènes le 15 (28) *août*, 1912.

[37772] No. 178.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 272. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, September* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 269 of the 30th ultimo, as I was still too unwell to leave my bed to-day, I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be good enough to receive Mr. Henderson, second secretary of this embassy.

The latter accordingly saw M. Sazonof this afternoon. His Excellency said that the Austrian Ambassador had called upon him yesterday and had read to him the Austrian note defining Count Berchtold's proposals. The note was in German and very long, and apparently M. Sazonof had not fully grasped all its details. His Excellency had, however, gathered enough of its contents to state that he was theoretically in complete agreement with all the views expressed therein, and he would be prepared to give them his strongest support if he thought there was any possibility of the action proposed having any practical results. Of this, however, he was convinced that there was not the least chance, and he spoke contemptuously of the vanity of endeavouring to bring pressure on the Turks by means of what his Excellency termed "représentations de salon."

He said rather pointedly that, for want of anything better to say, he had repeatedly assured Count Thurn that the proposals were excellent. He informed Mr. Henderson, however, that the suggestion which had seemed to him the most feasible was that for securing a fair and proportional representation for the Christian races in the coming elections.

M. Sazonof was obviously greatly relieved to learn that the Austrian Government did not contemplate a conference. On ascertaining this, he had immediately telegraphed to Paris to put an end once and for all to the mistake that had arisen there (see Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 112 of the 29th August). In this connection his Excellency said that relations between himself and the French Ambassador here were still far from good, and little misunderstandings between them were continually arising. He complained, for instance, that M. Louis had on several occasions misrepresented his (M. Sazonof's) views to the French Government. The question of the conference was a case in point. M. Sazonof had never wished for a conference. In the first place, he realised that the Turks would be unlikely to agree to it, and would in any case bear ill-will to the Power that suggested it. He could see dozens of excellent reasons why a conference was most inadvisable, and mentioned the last Russo-Turkish war as an instance when a conference had led to the very war which it was convoked to prevent. A conference would be a great evil, but if it became inevitable, a still greater evil would be a conference proposed by Austria. His Excellency did not state his reasons for thinking so, but obviously he did not wish Russian prestige in the Balkans to be lowered by an Austrian monopoly in the initiation of proposals for the advantage of the Christian populations. Such were his feelings when M. Louis called upon him about a week ago. He had explained, he said, as clearly to M. Louis as he was doing on the present occasion, that almost the last thing he desired was a conference, but that "s'il avait la certitude" that Austria intended to propose one, rather than submit to such a calamity he would prefer to see a conference proposed by France. M. Louis had entirely misconstrued his remarks, and had telegraphed to Paris that M. Sazonof was now in favour of a conference, and would like the three Powers to come to an understanding as to its scope, &c. M. Sazonof continued for some time in this strain, and was clearly rather bitter against M. Louis. He stated that the French Government alone were anxious for a conference to take place, partly, no doubt, because M. Poincaré hoped that it would meet in Paris, where he himself would play a leading rôle. M. Sazonof, however, clearly resented the attempt which had been made to involve Russia in the proposal.

His Excellency said that he fully concurred in the views expressed in your telegram No. 812 of the 2nd instant, which Mr. Henderson read to him. He was, however, still much perturbed over the situation in the Balkans. He felt that the Gueshof Ministry might at any moment be forced to resign by the pressure of public opinion, and that if it fell it would probably be succeeded by one composed of Stamboulovists. In such an eventuality the King would be powerless, and war would inevitably ensue. The situation was extremely critical, and there was no time to be lost. The Powers must do something more than merely state their desire to help the Christian races. To allay the public excitement in Bulgaria they must show the

tangible results of their good intentions. In M. Sazonof's opinion there were two objects, which, if attained, would be sufficient to cut the ground under the feet of Bulgarian militarism, and keep the Balkans quiet till the first fall of snow cooled their passions. The first of these was a settlement of the Turco-Montenegrin frontier, and the second a public announcement of the intention of the Turkish Government to extend the concessions granted to the Albanians to the Christian population of the four vilayets. If the Powers could point to these two definite results of their good-will, the situation would be saved.

As regards the first, Mr. Henderson mentioned to his Excellency the suggestion which had been made that the difficulty in the way of the ratification of the Montenegrin frontier settlement might be solved by the Turkish Government buying out the population of the Arzhonitza enclave (see Mr. Marling's telegram No. 351). M. Sazonof had not heard of this proposal, but said that he thought it sounded both excellent and simple. He seemed, however, to mind little what means were employed so long as the desired end were attained.

As regards the grant of concessions to the Christians in Macedonia, his Excellency said that nobody in the Balkans put any faith in the mere assurances of a Turkish Minister, and he laid much stress on the necessity of such a grant being made as publicly as possible for example, by means of a statement in an official gazette. To induce the Ottoman Government to do this, pressure must be brought to bear upon them by the Powers. He had no wish to hamper the present Turkish Government in its scheme of reforms. He had no desire that the representations of the Powers should be made either collectively, or officially, or publicly. But it was vitally important that the Porte itself should make a public announcement of its intention to grant these privileges to the Christian races, and equally important that they should make it without any further delay. For that reason he was especially anxious that you should instruct Mr. Marling to use the same language at Constantinople that you proposed using to the Turkish Ambassador in London (see your telegram No. 812). No stone should be left unturned in the attempt to realise as soon as possible the two aims mentioned above. The time for mere pacific counsels had passed. Russia had used the strongest language possible both here and at Sophia and Belgrade. His Excellency stated that he knew that Servia would take no initiative, and was ready to be guided by Russia in the matter. But the tone of the Bulgarian Government was not so complaisant. The Russian Minister had warned the latter that if they made war at a moment when Russia disapproved of it, they would enter the lists at their own risks. They would have to deal with Austria and Roumania, and Russia would not move a finger either diplomatically, or politically, or militarily on their behalf. But M. Sazonof felt that Bulgaria was now out of control. Public indignation was running so strong that at any moment the dykes might give way ("les digues pourraient se rompre"), and the Balkans would be flooded with war. The King either could not, or would not, do anything to prevent it, and Servia would of course be compelled to follow the Bulgarian lead.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[37961] No. 179.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 752.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Miss Edith Durham, giving an account of the state of affairs in the Berana districts. Miss Durham's knowledge has evidently been derived from Montenegrin sources, and I have little doubt but that, if impartial investigation were possible, it would be found that the Serbs and Montenegrins were not entirely blameless. But I fear that her account of the excesses committed by the Turks is substantially accurate.

I propose to make strong representations to the Porte on the subject.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 179.

Miss Durham to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Andrijevitza, Montenegro, August 26, 1912.*

THOUGH a stranger to you, I venture to address you on the subject of the Turco-Montenegrin disturbances and the state of affairs in Berani nahié. I do so because I am the only foreigner on the spot, and because I have done my best to personally learn the facts. As you are doubtless aware, the affair began on the 3rd–4th August at Mojkovatz. The nizams in a frontier kula fired on and killed some Montenegrin peasants who were cutting grass. Whereon, Montenegro retorted and burned several kulas and crossed the frontier, chasing the nizams nearly to Bijelopolje. The nizams in the frontier kulas have for the past two or three years amused themselves by firing at the Montenegrin houses and peasants. As the houses are wooden the bullets pass clean through. The night before last, at Veliki (on Gusinje frontier), the nizams played this game. Bullets passed through several houses, and the telegraphist is reported wounded. I am told that the Turkish Government has denied the proximity of any kulas to Montenegrin houses or villages. I have therefore visited two recently burned kulas. In the one that stands on a cliff almost immediately above the village of Musanice there is a loophole that bears directly on the village, and must have been made for the purpose. It must be remembered that the Turkish Mauser carries at least 2,500 metres, and houses within a thousand can be found in plenty. These Asiatic troops with which Turkey chooses to ravage Europe are quite out of hand. The Berani people tell me that fifteen months ago there was a military revolt, and that the troops robbed the neighbouring Christian villages and plundered shops in the town.

Berani, being far from any consulate (Prizrend, nearly three days' journey distant, is the nearest), the Young Turks have been able to work there will there with impunity. They tried to force their Ottomanising policy by brutal flogging and imprisonment of all the educated men—schoolmasters, priests, &c. This, just a year after the "Liberty and Equality" had been proclaimed.

As elsewhere, they armed the surrounding Moslems, and made it penal for the Christians to possess weapons. As you are probably aware, the luckless Christians here are Orthodox Serbs who belong to the Vasojevich tribe which the Treaty of Berlin most cruelly cut in two—freeing part and casting back the others to the Turks. So unjustly and completely is the tribe divided, that one brother or cousin is a Turkish and one a Montenegrin subject.

This little enclave of Serbs is surrounded by Moslem Albanians. In accordance with the "Liberty and Equality" scheme, a Christian kaimakam (a native) was for the first time appointed. His appointment—as all else in this so-called constitution—was a farce, as the Moslem military and gendarme authorities have not supported him. When the Turkish Minister at Cettinjé (a mongrel Pole, one Bilinsky, and a morphinist to boot) sent an ultimatum to the Montenegrin Government re the Mojkovatz affair, and threatened to break off diplomatic relations, his game was spoilt by this same kaimakam (Popovitch) sending apology to Montenegrin Government and admitting the guilt of the nizams. A border commission, Montenegrin-Turk, was then appointed to investigate matter. The luckless kaimakam was on it.

What happened is as yet unknown. He started, and then sent hurriedly a message to his wife to leave immediately. She fled here.

This was on the 14th August. He had not been heard of since, and it is feared he is killed; and on night of the 14th–15th August military commandant of Berani fell on Lower Urzhanitza (a Serb village) and, under pretext of search for arms, a most barbarous massacre was carried out on sleeping villagers. It can truly be described as a miniature Adana. Things were done worthy of Attila. The refugees and wounded are unanimous in stating that it was the work of nizams, and that only a few Bashi-bazouk Albanians took part. Women and children were horribly mutilated. Two little boys, aged seven and twelve months, were castrated. The first died. The military doctor here summoned me to witness the state of the second. A most horrible sight—simply hacked. It is dying.

The women declare that a child was held by one arm and sliced to pieces before its mother's eyes. A woman was shot in the back when leaving her house at the orders of the nizams. Three men of the family Tehoukitch were decapitated and their heads carried in triumph on a three-forked branch. These men were killed in their beds. They were uncles and cousins of the schoolmaster at Podgoritza in Montenegro.

On Saturday, as there was a lull in the Turkish firing, I rode over the frontier with him to Upper Urzhanitza, and he told that no he had helped bury the decapitated bodies. Four other men were decapitated. The nizams rushed from village to village. The Serbs seized their arms. They burnt the kulas on the Montenegrin border, but let the nizams in them go free, on their surrendering—which was more than they deserved. But the Serbs are most anxious that no charge of injustice shall be able to be brought against them. They thus cleared the upper half of the valley and succeeded in holding it and saving the villages and crops in it. The villages around Berani (seventeen) have been burnt, and as they are wood the ruin is doubtless complete. I saw one house that was a mere heap of ashes and charred rafters—that of the beheaded men.

I could not visit Lower Urzanhitza, as it was under the Turkish guns, and the insurgents feared to allow me. In its ruins two girls with their breasts sliced off have been found, and an old woman wounded in twelve places. A lot of corpses there are still (or were on Saturday) unburied, as people here fear that a white flag would at once be fired upon.

Saturday night Djavid Pasha arrived, and sent very curt note to insurgents, telling them to cease the revolt "which they have made without reason (!), and to return to their houses (burnt!) and reap their crops (burnt!)." This has made them furious and desperate, and they say that they cannot surrender their arms unless the surrounding Moslems are disarmed; and this is a perfectly reasonable request, as you will admit. They also demand compensation for houses.

As things stand—if they are forced by superior numbers to yield—they are simply doomed to torment and destruction, unless some sort of guarantee of safety can be given them. Montenegro, their one door of escape, is closed to them by orders of the Powers. It is "Christiani ad leones," all Powers thumbs down. To give you an idea of the massacre at Lower Urzhanitza—the father of one of the castrated children was killed, mother outraged and killed, sister killed, little brother hid under some hay and escaped. One hundred and two in all are said to have been killed and wounded in that miserable little village. Other villagers, warned, fled and lost only house and all they possess. But at Lnge, fifteen women and children are reported killed. Altogether sixty-eight wounded have been carried in and treated here. Three as yet have died. Two more will in all likelihood. They have had to be transported on rude biers some seven or eight more hours, so have suffered horribly.

I assure you that some steps, in the name of ordinary justice, should be taken to secure, at least, reasonable safety of life to these wretched Serbs. Europe cast them back to the Turks and is responsible for their fate. They are in a state of desperation which I cannot describe. Pray that, if the Powers won't protect them here, that some nations or other will give them land to which they may emigrate, and say that, if the Powers will not do this, that they should at least give leave to Montenegro to come to their aid.

I trust very earnestly that you will do all you can to put a stop to this state of affairs. A massacre such as this, in Europe in the twentieth century, is a disgrace to all the civilised world.

With apologies for such a long letter,

Faithfully yours,
H. EDITH DURHAM.

P.S.—Since writing above, rumour of murder of kaïmakam has come here. The nizams were furious with him for giving judgment against them at Mojkovatz.

News also of massacre at Bijelopalje and Sjenitza.

H. E. D.

[38059] No. 180.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 9, 1912.*

IT is officially stated that two corporals of Bulgarian frontier post at Kuru Tepe were ambushed and killed yesterday by Turkish troops. A general fusillade followed. Further details wanting. Bulgarian Government have to-day instructed their repre-

sentative at Constantinople to make energetic representations to the Porte, demanding immediate cessation of firing, the finding of one of the bodies reported missing, and disciplinary punishment of the culprits. Identic representations made to Turkish chargé d'affaires here.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[38108] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

PROPOSALS of Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Balkans.

I have caused the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires to be informed that I am entirely in sympathy with the main objects of the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as outlined in the communication made to Sir L. Mallet on the 3rd instant, which I understand to be the maintenance of peace and of the political *status quo* combined with the extension of reforms to all the Christian populations.

From the communication made by the Grand Vizier to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople, which is confirmed from other sources, it appears to be the intention of the Turkish Government to proceed with administrative reform, and I therefore entirely agree with Count Berchtold in thinking the action of the Powers should be directed towards giving their moral support and individual encouragement to the Porte in the initiative which they have taken. I have already on more than one occasion expressed my sympathy with the Porte's intentions and my earnest solicitude on the subject of reform. I am in sympathy with Count Berchtold's desire for the impartial conduct of the elections, so as to ensure a more equitable representation of the various nationalities, and, as the Turkish Cabinet are directing their efforts to secure the freedom of the elections, I think the best course would be to take an opportunity of commenting with favourable emphasis on this policy; in this way the good intentions of the new Turkish Government will be strengthened without exposing them to the charge at the hands of their opponents in Turkey that they are acting under foreign pressure. I have myself already expressed to the Turkish Embassy my satisfaction on this point.

I appreciate Count Berchtold's object in initiating an exchange of views on the subject between the Powers, and cordially desire to maintain complete co-operation in order that there may be harmony of action in any eventuality which might arise.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 404; Berlin, No. 174.; and St. Petersburgh, No. 844.)

[38054] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 599.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

SIR L. MALLET spoke unofficially to Turkish Councillor of Embassy on 4th September by my instructions about situation in Balkans.

He said that I appreciated difficulties of present Turkish Government's position and the risk involved in anything like intervention, but situation of Christian population was intolerable, and intervention some time or other could not be avoided unless Porte made it unnecessary.

The action of the Turkish Government during the last four years had been a great disillusion, and all abuses had gone on as before revolution. I had, however, confidence in the intentions of the present Government, which had been greatly increased by the reforms granted to the Albanians. Could not Government let it be known in some way that they intended to give reform to Christian races? I attached importance to Porte taking initiative and thus rendering official representations unnecessary.

I was glad to learn that steps were to be taken to secure impartiality of elections.

This advice was entirely friendly and unofficial, and I hoped it would not be misunderstood.

Councillor said that he appreciated my intention, but thought that Government would have difficulty in publishing anything about reforms, and it would look like

yielding to Austro-Hungarian pressure. They intended to extend reforms and were in complete accord with the Powers on the subject, but latter would render programme abortive by making representations.

He would report to his Government what had been said, but hoped there would be no joint representation.

[38054] No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 841.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 599 to Constantinople of to-day's date: Balkan situation.

Inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially of substance, and add that, in my opinion, any further representation would have an effect quite contrary to that which is desired.

[38108] No. 184.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 405.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 176 to Vienna of to-day: Proposals of Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Balkans.

You may communicate the gist of this reply verbally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(To Paris and St. Petersburgh only:)

I am of opinion that, if the French and Russian Governments return somewhat similar replies, the conversations on the subject might conclude for the present.

I should be glad to learn the views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[38044] No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 445.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires told Sir L. Mallet on the 4th instant that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was sending instructions of a pacific character to the French representative at Belgrade.

I have accordingly telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister authorising him to support his colleagues in giving pacific advice to the Servian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38045] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 446.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires discussed with Sir L. Mallet, on the 4th instant, the latest proposals of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the Balkan question, and said that, in his view, they seemed harmless enough.

Sir L. Mallet agreed, and said that, as all the Powers, including Russia, seemed to be quite in accord in desiring to encourage Turkey on the path of reforms, whilst

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 845) and Earl Granville (No. 175).

avoiding any semblance of intervention, all of them might return a sympathetic answer to Count Berchtold and finish this discussion, which was causing such great anxiety to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. de Fleuriau seemed to agree.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38056] No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 447.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires left with Sir L. Mallet on the 4th instant a communication, copy of which is enclosed.

It is an extract from a letter from the French Ambassador at Constantinople to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs discussing the reforms granted to the Albanians and the extent to which they might be extended.

M. Poincaré is disposed to agree with the views expressed in this letter, although he does not wish to make any direct or collective recommendations to the Turkish Government, who themselves have expressed their intention of proceeding with the reform policy, and in whom he wishes to show confidence.

Sir L. Mallet did not discuss M. Bompard's letter very thoroughly, but asked M. de Fleuriau whether arms could be withheld from the Christians if the Mussulmans retained theirs.

He also said that he did not think that there would be any use in discussing details of this kind with the Turkish Government at the present moment.

M. de Fleuriau agreed with this and disclaimed on M. Poincaré's behalf any present intention of opening a discussion with Turkey.

M. de Fleuriau will be informed that I am obliged for this communication, and will ask the views of His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, but that I deprecate saying anything more to the Turkish Government for the present, although I thoroughly appreciate the utility of agreement as to what practical measures are possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Extract from Letter from M. Bompard to M. Poincaré.

LES Albanais ont formulé leurs revendications en termes très généraux, et le Gouvernement ottoman, en les acceptant, a eu soin de se tenir à son tour dans le vague. La valeur, l'étendue et quelquefois la nature des concessions faites par le Gouvernement aux Albanais dépendent donc entièrement de l'application qui en sera faite. L'avenir seul nous l'apprendra. On peut, cependant, mettre, dès à présent, certains points en lumière:—

D'une part—

1. Il n'est pas créé d'Albanie territoriale.

2. Les Albanais ne sont pas érigés en nation à l'instar de la plupart des communautés chrétiennes.

3. Non seulement il n'est pas institué une autonomie albanaise, mais il n'est pas opéré de décentralisation pour l'administration des provinces qu'habitent les Albanais.

4. Le turc demeura la langue officielle.

D'autre part—

1. Le Gouvernement laissera ouvrir des écoles privées albanaises.

2. La langue albanaise sera enseignée dans les écoles publiques des régions où l'albanais est la langue commune.

3. Les Albanais feront en temps de paix leur service militaire en Turquie d'Europe.

4. Les fonctionnaires des pays albanais en parleront la langue.

La question des armes, qui tient tant à cœur aux Albanais, a été la plus longue à régler; M. Bompard ne croit pas qu'elle l'ait été avec une extrême précision. En principe, on restituera aux Albanais les armes dites de luxe qu'on leur a prises, ou on les indemnisera de leur perte si on ne peut les retrouver, et on établirait, en outre, des dépôts d'armes de guerre, destinées à leur être distribuées en cas de besoin. En fait, il n'est pas douteux qu'on cessera, au moins provisoirement, de traquer les Albanais qui posséderont des armes chez eux ou même les porteront au dehors, quelle que soit la nature de celles-ci.

Dans quelle mesure les privilèges accordés aux Albanais pourraient-ils être étendus aux autres nationalités?

En ce qui concerne la possession et le port des armes, il n'est pas à désirer que ces privilèges soient étendus hors des régions albanaises, mais il serait juste que dans ces régions albanaises toutes les nationalités en bénéficiassent également.

Pour le service militaire, l'extension du privilège de l'accomplissement en Europe devrait être faite à toutes les recrues de la Turquie d'Europe sans distinction de nationalité.

Quant aux privilèges concernant la langue, ils pourraient avantageusement être généralisés au profit de l'Empire entier.

Mais il ne s'ensuit pas nécessairement qu'il y ait lieu pour les Grandes Puissances d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement ottoman en vue des extensions ci-dessus.

Il est à noter que les Albanais et le Gouvernement ottoman se sont entendus en dehors de toute intervention de l'Europe; or, cela est plus facile encore pour les populations chrétiennes, qui possèdent des organisations nationales officiellement reconnues ayant qualité pour intervenir en leur faveur auprès de la Sublime Porte, et le Gouvernement ottoman paraît, au surplus, disposé à traiter de lui-même toutes les nationalités de la Turquie de l'Europe sur le même pied que les Albanais.

[38054] No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 419.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a telegram which I have addressed to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople,* giving the substance of a conversation between Sir L. Mallet and the Councillor of the Turkish Embassy at this court relative to the situation in the Balkans.

Your Excellency should inform the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially of what passed on this occasion, and add that, in my opinion, any further representation would have an effect quite contrary to that which is desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38056] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 420.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris relative to the extension to the other races of the Balkans of the reforms granted to the Albanians,† and I should be glad to receive your observations on the opinions expressed in the extract enclosed therein.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 182.

† No. 187.

[38116] No. 190.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 368.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1912.*

MONTENEGRO.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that satisfactory arrangement as regards Berana affair will be reached very soon by Javid Pasha and Montenegrin Minister of the Interior.

As regards exchange of territory arranged for by 1908 commission, Government was doing its best to induce inhabitants to accept it. His Excellency told Russian Ambassador very confidentially that Turkish representative at Cettinjé had been instructed to proceed to district and use his personal influence as an Albanian with them, and he explained that mission was a delicate one, as if it was thought representative came on behalf of Government he would probably be killed.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that Government had determined to settle all outstanding frontier questions so as to be free to give all its attention to internal affairs.

(Sent to Cettinjé.)

[38109] No. 191.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 10, 1912.*

THE Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires called at this Office on the 3rd instant to make orally the further communication from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the question of the Balkans which I had been led to expect.

Count Trauttmansdorf began by informing Sir L. Mallet, who received him, of the gist of the replies returned to Count Berchtold's original communication by the other Powers, and went on to state that he wished me to understand that Count Berchtold disclaimed entirely any self-seeking motives in the initiative which he had taken, and that his Excellency did not wish to assume the lead either in making representations to the Sublime Porte or in a conference, if one should take place. His Excellency did not propose a conference, and Sir L. Mallet gathered that he did not see the utility of one. His intentions were entirely peaceful, and his one object was the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Count Berchtold's object had merely been to bring the Powers into line, no discussion having taken place for some years on the subject of the Balkans. If all the Powers were agreed in the main as to the general policy to pursue, the means of giving effect to it could also be discussed; but he wished to lay great stress on his desire to avoid hurting the feelings of the Sublime Porte and arousing their suspicions or susceptibilities. Any step which they might interpret as dictation would do more harm than good, and his Excellency accordingly disclaimed the idea of collective action either at Constantinople or at the capitals of the Balkan States.

If the Powers were agreed on the policy of encouraging Turkey in the path of reform, the right mode of procedure would be that recently adopted in Cettinjé, namely, the offer of advice by the Powers individually. Intervention had proved a failure in the past, and some other way must be found.

Count Berchtold thought that the way should be by encouragement whenever an opportunity offered. He did not propose to provoke the initiative, but to give moral support to the initiative of Turkey.

The Grand Vizier had informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople that the reforms granted to the Albanians would be extended to the Christian races of European Turkey, and the Turkish Government should be encouraged to pursue this policy.

It would be useful that that Government should realise that Europe was united in desiring peace, contentment in the Balkans, and the maintenance of the *status quo*; and Count Berchtold believed that the step which he had taken had already had a good effect, and that the present *détente* had its origin in his proposals.

Count Berchtold was of opinion that by way of concrete reforms the nationalities of Macedonia should be given a chance of participating in public life, which could be

done by ensuring the impartiality of elections, and that the "conseils généraux" should be re-established in the vilayets.

Count Berchtold did not wish to lay down the law, but merely to consult the Powers; but he asked whether the population should not be represented "in accordance with their ethnical situation." He considered it to be of the highest importance that the different nationalities should be properly and justly represented in the Turkish Parliament by members who could bring forward their grievances and make proposals; and he pointed out that if the Bulgarians had been so represented, most inconvenient questions would have been asked about the massacre at Kochana, and, indeed, such an incident would not have occurred.

Count Berchtold asked how far the Powers could encourage the Turkish Government to follow this line with special reference to the coming elections, and how far could they urge the adoption of this policy without doing harm.

Sir L. Mallet said that he had heard this communication with the greatest interest, and would at once report it to me. He could assure Count Trauttmansdorf that I deeply sympathised with the objects which Count Berchtold had generally in view, namely, the maintenance of peace and of the *status quo*, that I had greatly at heart the question of reform, and that I shared Count Berchtold's hesitation as to what step could be taken at this juncture in furtherance of the Porte's expressed intention.

Sir L. Mallet personally doubted whether it would be prudent to say anything about the elections, because the Turkish Government were already exerting themselves to secure impartiality in them. The question was moreover very difficult from more than one point of view.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38054] No. 192.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 432.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1912.

THE Conseiller of the Turkish Embassy called on the 4th instant and was received by Sir L. Mallet, who informed him that he had received my instructions to speak to the Ambassador, or failing his Highness, to himself, in a private and unofficial manner in regard to the situation in the Balkans.

Sir L. Mallet began by saying that I fully appreciated the difficulties confronting the present Turkish Cabinet and the risk which might be involved if anything in the nature of intervention took place. He said that I had taken note of the communication made by the Grand Vizier to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. At the same time the position of the Christian population was intolerable, and intervention could not be avoided at some time or another unless the Porte rendered it unnecessary. The inaction of the Turkish Government during the last four years had been a great disillusion for the well-wishers of Turkey, for all the manifestations of fraternity and assurances of reform had come to nothing—massacres had continued as before, and it was impossible to palliate them. It was, indeed, in the face of Kochana, difficult to maintain that the Ottomans were capable of administration.

I was, however, still hopeful, in spite of this, that my confidence in the good intentions of the present Government had been greatly increased by the reforms granted to the Albanians.

Sir L. Mallet asked whether the Turkish Government could not make some public announcement, or let it be known in some other way, that they intended to give reforms to the other Christian populations, and said that I attached the greatest importance to the Porte taking the initiative and thus rendering unnecessary any official representations.

I begged the Turkish Government to take this into their earnest consideration, and to endeavour to find a way of letting their intentions be known. In taking the initiative they would avoid criticism on the part of the Mussulmans and would gain the sympathy of Europe.

Sir L. Mallet added that I was very glad to learn that the Turkish Government were taking steps to secure the impartiality of the elections, to which I attached great importance. This advice was entirely friendly and unofficial, and Sir L. Mallet hoped that it would not be misunderstood.

Djevad Bey said that he fully appreciated my intentions, and would report to his

Government on the subject. He took notes of Sir L. Mallet's remarks, but thought that the Turkish Government would find great difficulty in publishing anything, as it would inevitably lead to their being accused of yielding to pressure from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. They had every intention of extending reforms and were quite in accord with the views of the Powers, but he begged Sir L. Mallet to represent to me that the Powers would render the programme abortive by making representations. He asked whether these remarks of Sir L. Mallet were also being addressed to the Turkish representatives at Paris and at St. Petersburgh.

Sir L. Mallet said that I had long intended to say something to Tewfik Pasha; that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh some time ago; and that these remarks must in no sense be looked upon as a representation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38269] No. 193.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 11.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, September* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant concerning the arrest of deputies to the Greek Chamber embarking from Crete, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state, for the information of the Secretary of State, that the Admiralty consulted the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, as to the feasibility of His Majesty's ships arresting deputies, and to enclose herewith his reply.

I am to add that a copy of the letter quoted by the commander-in-chief was sent to the Foreign Office in Admiralty letter of the 2nd February, 1912.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 5, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer, Crete, reports that if public embarkation of deputies from Canea is to be stopped it will be necessary for "Diana" to remain under steam continuously owing to the slow speed of the Russian gun-boat, which is now the only other stationnaire in Cretan waters. For the reasons given in my predecessor's letter of the 20th January, it is not possible to prevent deputies making their way in small numbers to Athens surreptitiously.

[38190] No. 194.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 398 of 5th September.

Following is the gist of reply made verbally by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Austrian chargé d'affaires:—

French Government have already recommended to the Turkish Government in a friendly way to extend concessions granted to the Albanians to the other Balkan races. Porte replied that it was disposed to act in that sense.

French Government share the views of the Austrian Government in regard to the elections and steps to be taken at Constantinople to ensure their impartiality and secure equitable representation of the various nationalities, but consider that advice to be given to the Turkish Government ought to avoid all appearance of interference in internal affairs.

[38289] No. 195.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 11, 1912.*

BALKANS.

I have given French Minister for Foreign Affairs a full account of your reply to Austrian proposals (see your telegram No. 176 of 9th September to Vienna). He states that his answer was to the same effect. He concurs in view expressed in your telegram No. 405 of 9th September that the conversations on the subject might stop for the present.

I have also communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum of the conversation between Sir L. Mallet and the Councillor of Turkish Embassy in London. I suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, though it was intelligible that Russia, as the self-constituted protector of the Balkan Christians, should, through fear of Austria arrogating to herself that position, be desirous of putting pressure on Porte in favour of the Christians, it would not be to the advantage either of France or of England that they should join with Russia in such a proceeding, for it would irritate Mussulman opinion and be resented in Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco and in India, and indispose Turkish Government to be conciliatory to their Christians from fear of being thought by the Turkish Mussulmans to be acting under pressure from the Christian Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he fully appreciated the danger of putting pressure on the Porte, and he had pointed this out to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs when he and M. Isvolsky found fault with the French Government for not being sufficiently pro-Italian to suit the ideas of Russian Government. He told them that French Government, however much their sympathies might be in favour of Italy, desired for high political reasons to observe a strict neutrality in Turco-Italian war, for France had large interests of all kinds in the Ottoman Empire. He has spoken to the same effect in regard to Balkan question, and he has no intention, though France is the ally of Russia, to be dragged into endangering French interests by ill-advised action at Constantinople.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is much preoccupied by present state of affairs in the East. The King and Government of Bulgaria are anxious to maintain peace, but the Ministry may disappear or be forced, as well as the King, for personal reasons, to give way to the agitation in the army and country to go to war. His Excellency thinks that the Turkish Government are most anxious to be conciliatory with Bulgaria, but that, if they make a *casus belli* with Greece on the question of Cretan deputies taking their seats at Athens, Bulgaria will certainly join Greece against Turkey (see my immediately preceding telegram of to-day).

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs whether fear of Roumanian action and of resentment of Russia if her peaceful counsels were not attended to would not restrain Bulgaria. He thinks that the feeling in Bulgaria would be that if Bulgaria were victorious Russian public opinion would force Russian Government to be with Bulgaria, and that if Bulgaria were defeated the same public opinion would insist on Russian Government intervening to prevent Bulgaria from being squashed.

[38294] No. 196.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 9th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me to-day the telegram from Austrian chargé d'affaires in London containing substance of your communication to him on the subject of his Excellency's proposal. It tallies with your above-mentioned telegram to me. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed himself to me as highly satisfied at manner in which you had received his proposals for joint discussion of Balkan affairs by the Powers, and agrees with you that in giving advice to Turkey every care should be taken to avoid hurting her susceptibilities.

On my asking Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he intended to continue the

conversations and make further proposals he replied in the negative, and added that he would wait to see what developments might occur in the Balkans. He was satisfied for the moment at having achieved this, that the Powers were now ready to discuss without loss of time any complications which might suddenly arise in the Near East.

[38283] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 312.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 11, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires called on the 6th instant with reference to the enquiry made by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days since as to my views regarding the sort of representations and recommendations to be made to the Porte.

M. de Etter was now instructed to say that M. Sazonof thought that there would be no object in further discussing this, as he could not himself think of anything special to say.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38312] No. 198.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 402.)
Sir, *Berlin, September 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Imperial Chancellor proceeded on the 7th instant to Buchlau in Austria, to stay with the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the other guests including the German Ambassador at Vienna and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg left again to return to Germany the following night, and it is reported that several conversations took place between the two statesmen in Count Berchtold's study, a room which has become historical owing to the interview in it four years ago between Count Aehrenthal and M. Isvolsky.

The following semi-official communiqué has been published here:

"The two days' visit of the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, to Count Berchtold at Buchlau has given the leading statesmen of the two allied Powers several opportunities for thorough political conversations. In these conversations all the pending questions of general foreign politics, especially those of the Near East, were discussed, and the complete agreement of both Powers on all points was once more shown to exist."

Previous to the meeting both the German and the Austrian press took some pains to declare that there was no particular political importance to be attached to the visit, which was merely the return for Count Berchtold's visit to Berlin in the spring, and was settled long before Count Berchtold came forward with his Near Eastern proposals, and it was stated that no communiqué would be issued on the subject. This attitude, however, gradually changed when it became known that the two Ambassadors were also to be present, and the German papers now speak of the meeting as a valuable and important contribution to the political situation. About a week ago the "Cologne Gazette" published an apparently inspired telegram from Berlin pointing out that, though Austria had the assurance of the complete sympathy of her ally in the matter of the Berchtold proposals, Germany could not well do anything to expedite matters, as the question was one on which all the Great Powers must act together. This telegram is now constantly referred to, and it is remarked that, though Count Berchtold and the Chancellor have certainly thoroughly discussed the Balkan situation and have found that they are in complete agreement, one cannot expect to see any definite results from the meeting. The usual phrases appear in all the articles about the satisfactory state of harmony and mutual understanding existing between the two allies, but several of the papers cannot resist referring to the unfortunate precedent of the last Buchlau meeting, which was followed so closely by all the troubles consequent on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reference is also made to the veiled threats a few days ago of the "Wiener Reichspost" to the effect that if Count Berchtold's invitation to the Powers to exchange views obtained no good results Austria

would be at liberty to take her own line of action in the Balkans without considering the wishes and feelings of other Powers, and it is said that this idea of a possible "forward" policy is not to be ascribed to Count Berchtold, but to the more violent military or imperialistic party, which, it is hinted, is closely connected with the Heir Apparent. Most of the papers say very plainly that Austria must not count on Germany's assistance if she is really contemplating any violent measures.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[38301] No. 199.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 389.)
Sir, *Paris, September 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 118 of to-day's date, copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs acquainting me with the tenor of the verbal reply which he has returned to the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in regard to Count Berchtold's proposals for dealing with the situation in the Near East.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie.

L'AMBASSADEUR de Sa Majesté britannique a exprimé, d'ordre de Sir Edward Grey, le désir de savoir quelle réponse a été faite par le Gouvernement de la république aux dernières propositions formulées par le Ministre austro-hongrois des Affaires Etrangères concernant la situation en Orient.

M. Poincaré a l'honneur de faire connaître à Sir Francis Bertie qu'à la communication verbale du chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie il a répondu verbalement dans le sens suivant :—

Le Gouvernement de la république a déjà, par l'intermédiaire de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, recommandé amicalement au Gouvernement ottoman l'extension aux autres nationalités des Balkans des concessions accordées aux Albanais.

La Sublime Porte a répondu qu'elle y était disposée.

En ce qui concerne les élections et les démarches que le Comte Berchtold serait d'avis d'effectuer à Constantinople en vue d'assurer leur entière liberté et par là même une équitable représentation des diverses nationalités dans la future Assemblée, le Gouvernement de la république partage les vues du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, mais il est d'avis que les conseils à donner au Gouvernement ottoman doivent éviter toute apparence d'ingérence dans la politique intérieure de l'Empire.

Le chargé d'affaires de France à Londres a déjà été informé des vues du Gouvernement de la république à cet égard.

M. Poincaré saisit, &c.

Paris, le 10 septembre, 1912.

[38106] No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 12, 1912.*

SIR L. MALLET communicated to the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires on the 9th instant my reply to the second communication of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Balkans.

Count Trautmansdorff thanked him, and said that he felt sure that Count Berchtold would highly appreciate its tenour and friendly tone.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38365] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 436.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 12, 1912.*

THE conseiller of the Turkish Embassy informed Sir L. Mallet on the 9th instant that he had telegraphed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs the gist of the observations made to him on the 4th instant, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 432 of the 10th instant, and had received a reply to the effect that the Turkish Cabinet would at once take into consideration my advice, which he said they highly appreciated, and would telegraph further.

Djevad Bey again expressed the strong hope that there would be no joint representations or anything official, as the Committee of Union and Progress were making great capital already out of the Cabinet's difficulties. This was not the moment for adding to the Government's burden. A war, a rebellion, and internal dissensions fully occupied them.

The Government greatly appreciated the fact that my representations had been made privately and unofficially, and in no way resented my advice; but, of course, if every Government was going to make representations, their suspicions would be aroused.

Sir L. Mallet said that he must tell Djevad Bey frankly that my advice, after what had happened at Kochana, would have been given in any case, but that it was of no use to disguise the fact that conversations had been proceeding with the Powers on the subject of reforms, and it was probable that other Powers had already given advice or might do so. All were actuated by a desire not to embarrass the Government at this moment, but to assist them by sympathy and encouragement in their determination to extend reforms, but all were united in taking a serious view of the questions of reform.

Sir L. Mallet asked Djevad Bey what effect he thought would be given to the promises of reform to the Albanians, and how they would be carried out.

He said that he had not received any official information on the subject, but that the Turkish papers reported that the local authorities had received the instructions necessary to put the reforms into force.

The news from Albania was reassuring, and hope was expressed that Bulgaria would return to calm when the result of the Kochana trial was known, and the guilty were punished.

Sir L. Mallet asked whether that meant that the guilty were to be punished, and he replied in the affirmative, on which Sir L. Mallet said that he felt sure that I should be pleased, as I felt strongly on this subject.

Djevad Bey said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that there had been aggressions against Armenians by Kurds in the neighbourhood of Van, and that the necessary measures had been taken for the punishment of the guilty.

Sir L. Mallet expressed satisfaction at this news, as the reports received here had been disquieting and had occasioned me anxiety.

Djevad Bey has since been told privately by my instructions that much depends upon the prompt punishment of those who were guilty of the Kochana massacre. It would do more than anything to strengthen the Powers in pressing Bulgaria to keep the peace, and would enable the present pacific Bulgarian Government to hold their own with popular feeling in Bulgaria.

I have also caused to be expressed to Djevad Bey my appreciation of the spirit in which his communication was made, and he has been informed that I entirely endorse all that Sir L. Mallet has said, and that the desire of His Majesty's Government is to make it easy and not difficult for the Turkish Government to carry out its good intentions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38215] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 452.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 12, 1912.*

THE French chargé d'affaires called on the 6th instant to inform Sir L. Mallet of the reply given by the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to

second communication from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs made by the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Paris.

The chargé d'affaires said that Count Berchtold had noted the Turkish grant of reforms to the Albanians with satisfaction, and thought that it was possible to "ask the Porte to extend the reforms to the other Christian nationalities, and to recommend to the Porte the freedom of the elections in order to ensure an equitable representation of the various nationalities."

M. Poincaré had replied that he had already recommended the extension of reforms, and that he agreed about the freedom of elections; but that equitable representation of nationalities would be difficult to mention, if it meant the revision of the electoral laws.

The chargé d'affaires had assured him that Count Berchtold meant that equitable representation would be secured by freedom of elections.

Sir L. Mallet read to M. de Fleurian the answer which I proposed to give to Count Berchtold, and M. de Fleurian said that it seemed to correspond entirely with M. Poincaré's views, and that he would let me know whether his Excellency had any observations to offer.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38560] No. 203.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, September 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 20 of 31st August: Turco-Montenegrin frontier.

Montenegrin Government complain that Turkish troops are still arriving on the frontier; that there are already twenty battalions in the country round Berana as well as artillery; and that concentration continues.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[38561] No. 204.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, September 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 22 of to-day.

According to official accounts there has been no further firing at Velika for some days.

Miss Durham reports great distress at Berana among the inhabitants of the burnt villages. David promised liberal compensation, but there will be great suffering unless something is paid soon, so as to provide shelter before the winter.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[38547] No. 205.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 13, 1912.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram to Athens of 13th September:—

"It is reported here that Greek officers in Crete have been warned by Greek Government to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Greece when ordered. Officers, of whom I have caused enquiries to be made, deny the truth of this report, and I cannot ascertain whether it is accurate or not.

"Have you any information?

"(Sent to Foreign Office.)"

[38290] No. 206A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 121 of 11th September: Ægean islands.

I am prepared to repeat warning if French Minister for Foreign Affairs will do same.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 612; Rome, No. 303; Vienna, No. 182; St. Petersburgh, No. 863; and Berlin, No. 187.)

[38726] No. 206.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 337.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 841 of 9th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed at first to favour some representation on our part at Constantinople, but, on my pointing out how necessary it was for us to do nothing to add to the difficulties of the new Turkish Government, his Excellency expressed assent and did not press matter. He told me that he had reason to know that both Germany and Austria were working hard for the return of the Committee of Union and Progress to power.

Your telegram No. 845 of 9th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had used very similar language to the Austrian Ambassador here. He did not express any wish for a continuation of the conversations for the present.

[38832] No. 207.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Belgrade, September* 4, 1912.

I SAW M. Yovanovitch, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, yesterday, and asked him for his latest news from Albania. He said that there appeared to be a momentary lull, but he did not think it would last, and if troubles broke out afresh they would be attributable to Count Berchtold's proposal which had, so to speak, been a direct encouragement to the Albanians. But apart from this, there were to him unmistakable indications that foreign agents were at work to keep the country aflame. He asked me whether, if Count Berchtold had been genuinely desirous of assisting the Turkish Government, his proposal would have been given to the press practically before it was communicated to the Powers interested. Any scheme he intended to propose naturally became more difficult of acceptance by the Porte if it had the appearance of being forced upon them, and he should surely have sounded the Powers and the Porte first before publishing his idea to the world. The proposal had furthermore caused much disquiet in the Balkan States because these felt they should also be invited to a discussion in which they were so vitally interested, and if they were not permitted to take part in it, some arrangement or other would be made with Turkey which would certainly not suit them. This feeling to a large extent accounted for the popular excitement now manifesting itself in Bulgaria and Servia.

I pointed out that popular feeling in Servia did not appear to be very dangerous at present, that the attempted demonstations had been failures, and that a German newspaper reporter who had lately come from Sophia had told the German chargé d'affaires here that the importance of the great demonstration in Sophia over the Kotchana massacre had been much exaggerated, the number of people present had been more like 5,000 or 6,000 than the 20,000 or 40,000 reported.

M. Yovanovitch did not pretend that the demonstations here had been very significant, but warned me against being too optimistic. The present state of affairs in Turkey, he said, was becoming intolerable, and a solution would have to be found. If it were not found this year we should have the same thing all over again next year, and he therefore rather thought the sooner the better. I then expressed to him the same hope as I had done a few days ago, that Servia would not try to force a solution, to which he replied that Servia certainly would not move -the Government had given Russia this assurance- he also did not think either Bulgaria or Greece would, Montenegro however might.

I have, &c,
RALPH PAGET.

[38811] No. 208.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Sophia, September 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 30th ultimo and on the 2nd instant, I had lengthy conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs which confirmed the views I had expressed in my despatch No. 85 of the 28th ultimo on the disquieting state of affairs in this country. M. Gueshof said that Bulgaria had never before been confronted with so serious a situation. All Bulgarians had been aroused by the Kotchana massacre, and the want of good faith on the part of the Turkish Government who had, contrary to their promises, not allowed the presence of a second Bulgarian member on the committee of enquiry, and given the soldiers furlough so as not to appear as witnesses, had completed the exasperation. It was not so much the demonstrations in the streets that counted as the deep underlying feeling which pervaded all classes and conditions of the people. The army was quite loyal, but the warlike feeling which animated officers of every rank as well as the men was intense. One of the most disquieting features of the situation were the personal attacks made upon the Sovereign. His Majesty had been greatly perturbed by them. Count Berchtold's visit to the King of Roumania at such a moment as this had also created the worst impression; the Bulgarian Government considered it almost a threat. Of all the Balkan States Bulgaria was the only one which could look back upon twenty-five years of undisturbed continuous peace at home. Servia had been a change of dynasty, Greece a military *pronunciamento*, even Roumania had had a serious revolt to crush. Was Bulgaria's peace at home to be disturbed? That was the great question the Government had to solve. They were confronted with the dilemma, peace within or peace without.

M. Gueshof said he could not for the present see the way out of the situation, but something must be done by the Powers to help Bulgaria. I endeavoured, but in vain, to extract from his Excellency the exact nature of Bulgaria's demands. All that I could gather was that he might, in a few days, "have something to ask."

M. Gueshof also said that he feared he might not be able to maintain himself in office. To this I replied that I was convinced that His Majesty's Government would much regret if the pressure of events proved too strong for him, as they had considerable faith in his pacific policy. I laid great stress on the fact that His Majesty's Government did not want the peace of the Balkans disturbed. His Excellency concluded that it was precisely this wish for peace, which was that of all the Powers, which placed the Bulgarian Government in the serious dilemma they found themselves; pressure for peace from without, pressure for war from within.

On the 2nd instant, M. Gueshof's official reception day, I spoke to his Excellency in the sense of the instructions you had sent me in your telegram No. 55 of the 31st ultimo. I said that you were fully alive to the difficulties of his position, and appreciated his efforts to calm the agitation caused in Bulgaria by the Kotchana incident. That you were fully convinced that the best hope for the future of Macedonia lay in the maintenance of peace, and that Bulgaria would forfeit the sympathies of Europe if she abandoned her pacific policy at this moment. I pointed out to him that the Turkish Government had given most categorical assurances that they intended to punish those guilty of the massacre; that they were initiating an era of reforms, which the Great Powers would encourage the Porte to extend to all the other Christian populations; that the cordial reception accorded by the Powers to Count Berchtold's proposal to enter into conversation on the subject was the best proof of their good intentions. If, however, Bulgaria continued her warlike agitation, the reactionary element in Turkey would be greatly encouraged, and the task of the Turkish Government, as well as that of the Powers, would be rendered still more difficult. I strongly counselled patience in awaiting the outcome of the efforts of the Powers, and said that surely the present Bulgarian Government must be strong enough in the country to be able to resist the warlike movement. M. Gueshof replied that he had heard much the same story from the French and Russian Ministers; but what was he to do, King Ferdinand's position itself was in danger. The Austrian Minister had just left him, and had informed him that Count Berchtold was now submitting his proposals to the Powers in a more definite form, and that he hoped Bulgaria would facilitate their task. M. Gueshof argued that the discussion of those proposals was a mere waste of time. After being apparently well received by the Porte, they had been politely but categorically declined by the Grand Vizier as *nulles et non avenues*. All future discussions of these proposals would consequently be fruitless. He had done his best to be on friendly terms with Turkey, but all in vain; Bulgaria had now lost all faith in Turkey.

In the course of the conversation I pointed out to his Excellency the grave dangers to which Bulgaria would be exposing herself in the event of war, and asked him whether they had carefully weighed the possibilities of Roumanian and Austrian intervention. To this he replied: "But do you really think that the Emperor of Austria would at his age embark on war?" (Here he broke off.) "Don't let us talk of war." I heartily agreed, adding that counsels of peace were the object of my errand.

Reverting to the seriousness of the situation in Bulgaria, M. Gueshof wondered whether it was realised abroad, and to my saying that I had explained it fully to you to the best of my ability, his Excellency asked me to represent it to you again. As I was leaving, M. Gueshof repeated his vague statement that "something must be done," and concluded, "in the meantime you can assure Sir Edward Grey that I will do all in my power to maintain peace."

Whilst the French Minister's counsels of moderation have been in the same strain as mine, the Austrian, German, and Italian Ministers have given no moderating advice recently. The Russian Minister, on the other hand, used most forcible language. He told me that he warned M. Gueshof that aggression on the part of any of the Balkan States would have the most dire consequences for the aggressor, and that Europe would know how to extinguish any incipient conflagration. M. Gueshof, whilst saying that he realised that pacific counsels were natural, hinted that, perhaps, in this case, they might not wholly represent the views of the Russian Government. Whereupon M. Nekludof emphatically stated that the instructions he had received on this point were categorical and final. It appears that M. Gueshof was considerably taken aback by the peremptory tone in which the message was delivered.

It should be noted that his Excellency has not been as confidential in his conversations with the other foreign representatives as he has been with the Russian Minister, and, in a lesser degree, with the French Minister and myself.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[38812] No. 209.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Sophia, September 9, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 74 of the 10th ultimo I had the honour to report that the various Macedonian charitable institutions had elected a permanent executive committee under the presidency of Colonel Protogeroff to organise meetings of protestation throughout Bulgaria against the Kochana massacre. In the face of their success and subsequent importance, the aims and point of view of this committee are not without interest.

They are not in favour of the annexation of Macedonia, but in favour of its autonomy. Macedonia, they say, is rich in natural resources of all kinds awaiting development, and the country has no debts; its annexation by Bulgaria would entail its participation in the heavy charges weighing upon this kingdom. They come to the conclusion, therefore, that the only acceptable solution of the question would be the grant of an autonomy to Macedonia, with a Christian governor, a local assembly, and local militia under the guarantee of the Great Powers. They will not hear of any decentralised form of Government under the Porte. In their opinion there are but two ways of obtaining their object:—

1. Intervention on the part of the Powers;
2. A Bulgarian war of liberation.

In the first alternative they have not much confidence, being convinced that the two groups of Powers will never come to any definite agreement. They do not pin any faith to the Triple Alliance, but show some faith in the Triple *Entente*, though they are suspicious that Great Britain may not be disposed to act, as she trusts that Kiamil Pasha may soon return to power, and consequently wishes to spare Turkey. The

argue that if Great Britain allows herself to be influenced by such a possibility she will be committing a grave error of judgment, for experience has shown that, under the prevailing condition of affairs in Turkey, no Turkish Government is durable, nor strong enough, while it lasts, to pursue any firm line of policy. Seeing that, with the exception of Kiamil Pasha, all other currents in Turkey are inclined to be under the influence of the Triple Alliance, it would serve Great Britain better should she adopt a more far-sighted policy. Moreover, they declare, England has every reason to avoid and prevent a combination between the Balkan States and Austria, or an Albania with enlarged frontiers under the ægis of Austria, opening to the latter the way to Salonica. This, they contend, is contrary to British policy, and in direct opposition to British interests. With this doubt in regard to Great Britain's attitude, the committee come to the conclusion that nothing remains open to them but the adoption of the second alternative, namely, war. According to them such a war, undertaken for the liberation of their fellow-countrymen, would be popular in Bulgaria, and in no way open to hostile criticism from outside, since it would be prompted by humaneness.

The opinion of the committee as to whether Bulgaria is disposed to go to war is as follows: They do not believe that King Ferdinand, in spite of certain assurances to the contrary, made for the purpose of acquiring popularity, is really favourable to war, but rather that His Majesty is inclined to leave the solution of the question to the intervention of the Powers. As to the Government, the committee think that they would be disposed to war if they could come to an understanding with the other Balkan States. But, in such a case, such a war would no longer have for its object the autonomy, but the annexation, of Macedonia. They even go so far in their anticipations of success as to roughly picture the result of the subsequent partition, ascribing to Greece the vilayet of Janina, to Servia the region north of Uskub, to Montenegro the districts she now claims from Turkey, and to Bulgaria the remainder. They also contemplate an autonomy for Albania. Such a solution, they opine, would have the support of the Triple *Entente*, notably of Russia and Great Britain, who would both prefer to see European Turkey in the hands of the small Balkan States than in those of Austria and under the influence of Germany.

But, the committee concludes, as the Bulgarian Government has not yet arrived at an understanding with the other Balkan States, and is therefore for the present not inclined to war, it is for them (the committee) to use every means at their disposal to force Bulgaria to engage in a war of liberation, not for the annexation nor the partition but for the autonomy, of Macedonia, a war for which no understandings are necessary, but a war undertaken for humanitarian principles only.

The committee have not yet come to any final decisions as to the exact means they intend to employ for forcing the war upon Bulgaria. The only definite plan of action that they have so far fixed is—

1. To organise in Bulgaria national committees composed of Bulgarians from the kingdom (not Macedonians), whose task will be to organise meetings to provoke the fall of the Cabinet.

2. To organise in Turkey committees to prepare the population, by supplying arms, &c., for future action.

Emissaries have already been sent to Macedonia with that object in view. Besides the support of band leaders of secondary importance, the committee count upon that of Tchernopeyeff in the north of the vilayet of Salonica, of Tchaouleff in the vilayet of Monastir, now actually in the district of Ochrida, where he is actively employed in endeavouring to suppress the Interior Organisation, directed by Matoff, brother of the celebrated Christo Matoff, one of the representatives of that organisation at Sophia. They also hope to supersede the Internal Organisation in the district of Uskub.

Besides these two resolutions, the committee have come to no further decisions up to the present as to the steps to be taken by them for forcing war upon the Government. For they have been given to understand that the Government will in the course of this week come to some definite determination as to whether or not they will declare war. Should the Government decide for war, but claim delay on the ground that preparations are not completed, that support from outside has not yet been secured, in short, that the moment is inopportune generally, then the committee will remain quiet. Should, on the other hand, the Government definitely refuse to entertain any idea of war, and decide to rely upon the good offices of the Great Powers, the committee will take the matter into their own hands and employ every means within

the limit of the law, disclaiming all acts of violence which may result, to bring about the fall of the Government.

The importance of the committee cannot be denied. They are in close touch with some of the members of the Government, and their attitude is said to be not without influence upon the latter.

It seems strange, though it is perhaps just as well, that the committee are not more *au courant* of the close relations actually existing between the Balkan States.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[38813] No. 210.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, September 9, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 85 of the 28th ultimo I had the honour to report on the circumstances which led up to the present warlike attitude of Bulgaria. I will now venture to offer some additional observations on the subject, as well as on the general situation in the Balkans as seen from Sophia.

The massacre of Kochana was doubtless responsible for the violent outbreak of public feeling throughout Bulgaria, but it has been only an incident which did not cause but merely hastened on the crisis. For years past the feeling in Bulgaria has been that war with Turkey is inevitable. Most Bulgarian Governments have been at the best only on correct, never on friendly, terms with Turkey. When M. Gueshof came to office, eighteen months ago, he resolved to do his utmost to place the relations of the two countries on a more friendly footing. But, try as he would, there was no response from the Turkish side. The Porte showed no enthusiasm in the settlement of any of the long-outstanding questions pending between the two countries. The discouragement of so well-intentioned a Government as M. Gueshof's can be readily understood. Then suddenly events in Turkey took a revolutionary turn, and the triumphal march of the Albanians confirmed the conviction that nothing could be obtained from Turkish Governments except by force. In this frame of mind, Bulgarians suddenly heard that large numbers of their countrymen had been brutally murdered. They rose up in indignation, held meetings of protest, attacked the King's person publicly, and urged the Government to fight or to go. If M. Gueshof retired, war seemed inevitable, so M. Gueshof stayed to endeavour to restrain as far as possible the daily swelling tide of warlike feeling. But in the meantime he had changed his views, he is no longer the man who would rather abandon office than fight. If it comes to a question of war, he will probably carry it on himself; he has the opinion of the whole country with him. He has blamed the organisers of the meetings for their methods, but he has told them that the Government are as patriotic as they, and that they will do their duty, and that it must be left to them to choose the best time and means to act. The people have accepted this statement, and are now waiting to see what M. Gueshof will do. They say they want the lot of their brethren assured in Macedonia, but what they really want is the autonomy of Macedonia.

The man in the street only sees the state of anarchy in Turkey, the success of Albanian methods, the war with Italy, and wishes to obtain some concessions from the Porte whilst Turkey's hands are full. How much more reason have those in power to think that the present opportunity is favourable, knowing as they do that if it came to fighting they would have the support of Servia, Greece, and Montenegro, and until last week they imagined that they could count upon even that of Russia! They were almost entitled to believe this, for it was Russia who had reconciled Bulgaria to Servia, and Bulgaria to Greece; it had not been an easy task, and only accomplished on the personal intervention of the Emperor of Russia himself. Under the circumstances, therefore, it was perhaps only natural that they should expect Russia to assist them in their hour of need. Even in spite of the categorical declarations of Russia that she will in no way help Bulgaria and Servia, there lurks a feeling that Russia cannot abandon them should, once the Balkan States move, Austria threaten Servia. They cannot believe that Russia could look on with her arms folded, for it would be the abnegation of Russia's policy in the Balkans, the abandonment of the Slav races to Austria.

It is clear that the question is a duel between Russia and Austria. Russia's

rebuff has been a bitter blow to Bulgaria and Servia; it will also be a blow to her own prestige unless she finds means to uphold it. Much reliance is also placed here on the sympathies of England and France for Russia, and on their own anti-"Drang nach Osten" policy. Russia has successfully gathered Bulgaria and Servia to her side to act as a barrier against Austria's advance to the Ægean Sea; but should she fail these two Balkan States there will be nothing left for them as last resort but to endeavour to come to terms with her rival. Servia would possibly, in exchange for political guarantees for herself and the Serbo-Croats, consent to incorporation in the Dual Monarchy—a solution of the Servian question contemplated by some of the ablest Servians themselves; whilst Bulgaria, though she might succeed in obtaining some slight territorial compensations, would have to give up for ever all ideas of the Greater Bulgaria of San Stefano, and be contented to play the rôle of a second Roumania.

The danger of the situation really lies in the fact that neither Bulgaria nor Servia can believe that Russia could abandon her policy of centuries in the Balkans without even an attempt at resistance. The Balkan States have been brought together by Russia—true, for a defensive purpose, but defensive and offensive are terms much akin under certain conditions. They are now working together, and, once they are quite ready and think the moment opportune, it is not the withholding of loans by France, nor the admonitions of Russia nor of the whole of Europe, that will hold them back. They care little whether they bring about a European war or not. A change of Government here might have for effect the destruction of the system of *ententes* collaborated with so much difficulty, and such an opportunity as the present might never occur again. Their present policy, I am told, is to wait for the internal state of Turkey to become even more chaotic than it is now, and then to back up their demands by force of arms. But they think that the moment should not be delayed too long. They argue that the present is almost as favourable as it will ever be, they count upon the Emperor of Austria's desire not to be drawn into war at his age, while they feel apprehension of his successor's intentions, and, moreover, of the fact that the strength of the Austrian army will almost be doubled in a few years. Last March, when in Belgrade, I reported that the Servians had on more than one occasion during the winter unofficially offered their services to the Italians, who had politely and firmly refused them. Judging from the manner in which the continuance of the war is welcomed here, I am not sure that a fond hope is not cherished that Italy, weary of her efforts, may come to terms with the Balkan States to deal a death-blow to Turkey.

The calm at present is relative; the people and the army are in expectancy of what the Government will do. Much is going on behind the scenes; preparations are being made, plans discussed. It is not only in Sophia nor in Belgrade that the spark may be struck which will set the Balkans aflame; Athens also is a dangerous *foyer*.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[38833] No. 211.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 54.)

Sir, *Belgrade, September 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that a second demonstration of protest against the alleged Sienitza massacres was held in Belgrade on the 1st instant. This meeting, which had originally been fixed for the 28th August, but was postponed in order to give longer notice, was more fully attended than the first demonstration, but was still far from being a credit to its organisers. It had been announced during the week that the mayor and some of the more prominent politicians would speak, but as time went on and no news confirmatory of the massacre arrived, these orators withdrew and left the field to a pope and a few other quite unimportant personages. Turkey was of course denounced in no measured terms, and a resolution was passed calling upon the Servian Government to assist the Serbs in Old Servia, if necessary by force of arms. The proceedings, however, did not arouse much excitement or enthusiasm.

Although, as I pointed out in my despatch above referred to, such demonstrations are of very little importance, and are indeed in all probability promoted by the

Government for purposes to which I shall refer presently, it would not be correct to infer that public opinion in Servia is altogether indifferent to the present situation. There is undoubtedly much talk of war, and especially within the last few days there have been signs that the ferment in Bulgaria is having an effect here, and Belgrade has become decidedly bellicose. But the elements that advocate a forward policy seem to be more influenced by personal or party motives than by any true feeling of patriotism or by hatred of the Turks, and do not trouble to examine carefully the difficulties of to be encountered and the risk to Servia of a conflict. Thus the conspirator or military party sees a chance of an increase of power, the Obrenovitch party hope a war may result in the overthrow of the Karageorgevitch dynasty and of the present radical régime, whilst others, again, see the possibility of realising their dream of a southern Slav kingdom comprising Croatia, Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. There is, thus, no united movement of importance on foot, and, moreover, the bulk of the nation, which is composed of small landowners and peasants, is inclined to be apathetic. They desire peace and quiet to enable them to develop their lands, and would seem averse to any policy of adventure.

So far as the intentions of the Government are concerned, there would not appear to be cause for any apprehensions. Since their first burst of indignation over the supposed Sienitza massacres which manifested itself in the official "Samouprava," they appear to have determined to avoid war so far as in their power lies. If, as stated in a portion of the press, the demonstrations which took place in Belgrade were organised by the Government, their objects were probably to prepare the way for an application to the Skupshtina for additional funds, to subsequently gain kudos from the Powers for their restraint, or to prevent Bulgaria reproaching Servia with apathy, rather than to excite popular opinion.

Servia is not, like Bulgaria, fully prepared for war. Some three months ago a credit of 21,500,000 dinars was sanctioned by the Skupshtina for the purchase of arms and ammunition and artillery equipment. These have not yet been delivered, and the military stores are therefore still incomplete. In the usual course of events such arms and ammunition, &c., would reach Servia viâ Salonica and through Turkey, but in the event of war this route would of course be no longer open, and, furthermore, at the very first signs of hostilities, Austria, if she did not herself march into Servia, would at any rate immediately close the northern frontier. Servia would then find herself entirely cut off from military supplies, and at a great disadvantage in a war of any duration. From a financial point of view also her position seems rather doubtful. Taxation is already very high, and one-fifth of the revenue is devoted to the service of the public debt. It has been stated at times that there exists a war chest of 50,000,000 fr., but it is difficult to believe that in Servia such a hoard would have survived sufficiently long to enable it to fulfil its intended purpose.

Important as such considerations of arms and money might appear, they would in all probability carry no great weight in a moment of intense popular excitement. But, on the other hand, there exist two factors which are practically a guarantee for the prudence of the Servian Government; these are the fear of Austria and uncertainty lest Russia should carry out her threat of refusing help to the Slav States if they begin a war and then find themselves hard pressed. It follows that, in the interest of peace, this fear and this uncertainty should be, as far as possible, encouraged. In this respect the military preparations lately made by Austria along the Servian frontier are proving most useful. Unfortunately, the idea that Russia must, and will, come to the rescue of the Balkan States if they are in difficulties is too firmly rooted for the recent Russian assertions to the contrary to have carried conviction, but perhaps this was scarcely necessary, as the habit of obedience in Servia to Russian orders will in itself be sufficient to secure the desired end.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

[38757] No. 212.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 772.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 752 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 9th instant whether his attention had been called to the telegrams that appeared in the "Times" of the 4th

instant, giving an account of the outrages committed on the Christian villagers in the district of Berana. I said I did not know who the "Times" correspondent was, but I had received a letter, the author of which had actually seen some of the victims who had been brought across the frontier, and I was fully convinced that the "Times" information was substantially true. I wished in a friendly manner to bring these facts before the Turkish Government, and to point out how such acts of savagery perpetrated by Turkish soldiery, if allowed to go unpunished, must alienate the sympathy of the civilised world. His Excellency said that Tewfik Pasha had already telegraphed that these reports were sent by Miss Durham, who was a well-recognised Turcophobe, and they were probably exaggerated. I replied that I had seen some of Miss Durham's letters, and that, so far as I could judge, she was very careful to distinguish between what she learnt by hearsay and what she had seen with her own eyes, and that in this particular instance it was clear, if indeed she was the author of the "Times" publications, she was recounting ascertained facts.

If she were a Turcophobe, as his Excellency alleged, it was a natural consequence of the horrors she had witnessed. His Excellency asked what I wished him to do. I said I must leave the actual measures to his judgment; what was necessary was to prevent such barbarities occurring in future. His Excellency finally said that he would speak to the Minister for War and urge him to order strict investigation and the punishment of the guilty. I cannot say that I have much hope that anything effective will be done.

The present Ministers may be, and I believe are, ready and anxious to put an end to atrocities of this kind, but in practice they will probably prove to be powerless before the instinctive feeling of every Turk that repression of what they consider to be rebellion on the part of the Christian races by wholesale massacre is perfectly venial, and that the shielding of those guilty of such acts is legitimate and even meritorious.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[38815] No. 213.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Sophia, September 11, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to report to you by telegraph, two corporals of the Bulgaria frontier post at Kara Tépé, in the district of Peshtera, were killed by Turkish troops on the 8th instant.

According to the latest official information these two men were shot at 8:30 that morning, one falling dead on the spot and the other dying of his wounds in the course of the afternoon. A fusillade was engaged on both sides, which continued until 8 o'clock in the evening. It was renewed on the part of the Turks at dawn the next day; the Bulgarians, however, refraining from retaliation until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the line of firing extended to the neighbouring fort of Kourtovo. The fusillade lasted intermittently until 9 o'clock in the evening, in spite of the fact that the officer in charge of the Turkish post had informed the Bulgarian officer by a letter, requesting an interview, that he had ordered his men to cease all firing. The shooting was only definitely checked yesterday.

On learning the news M. Gueshof at once instructed the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople to make energetic representations to the Porte, demanding immediate cessation of the firing, the finding of one of the bodies—at first reported missing but since found—and the disciplinary punishment of the culprits. His Excellency at the same time made identic representations to the Turkish chargé d'affaires here.

Although such frontier affrays are relatively of frequent occurrence, this particular incident is unfortunate, coming at this moment when public feeling is running high. As it happens, however, it does not at present seem to have attracted the attention one expected.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[38816] No. 214.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, September 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learn from an usually reliable source that the Government have fixed the 14th October as the last delay for the delivery of the provisions, forrage, kit, munitions, and medical stores ordered by them for the army.

It may also be of interest to note that, following upon the Servian Minister's visit to Belgrade, and that of the Bulgarian representative at Cettinjé to Sophia, M. Tochef came here from Belgrade for forty-eight hours on the 7th instant, and his colleague at Athens has also been summoned here by M. Gueshof.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[38825] No. 215.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Vienna, September 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Reichspost" publishes this morning an interview with one of the Albanian bishops who are attending the Eucharistic Congress in this city. The bishop, whose name is not disclosed, sums up the situation in Albania as follows:—

The state of affairs in that province remains unaltered and is as serious as ever. The Albanians no longer put any faith in the promises of the Turkish Government, for they have seen how they were broken in the case of the Malissors. The only remedy for the situation would be the immediate execution of the concessions made at Prischtina and Uskub, and the carrying out of the engagements entered into with the Malissors, and even then these reforms would have to be instituted under European control. Count Berchtold's proposals are appreciated by thinking people in Albania, but the mass of the population have been so often disappointed that they have lost patience, and as soon as Bairam is over the revolt will break out with greater force than ever throughout the province.

The people are convinced that the intention exists to dismember Albania and to hand over portions of it to Montenegro, Servia, and Greece, and they are determined, if necessary, to shed their last drop of blood in defending the integrity and freedom of their country. Two factions exist, one of which demands complete autonomy, the other merely the extension of their ancient rights, and the first is gaining ground. The Albanians are not afraid of the Turkish army. They will not march on Uskub, but will make a desperate stand in the mountains. In the event of a war between Bulgaria and Turkey, the Albanians would probably fight on the side of the Turks, for they have always been reliable supporters of the Empire and have never aimed at the dismemberment of Turkey. They merely wish for a guarantee of the further development of their country, and they desire schools and European culture. The Albanians look expectantly to Austria, whose Emperor is the protector of the Catholics of Albania. Will he help them?

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[39008] No. 216.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 16, 1912.*

CETTINJE telegram No. 22 of 13th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs denies that there has been any increase in Turkish forces for the last fortnight in Berana district, although troops are being sent to Scutari, where there is certain effervescence amongst Malissoris and Mirdites.

(Repeated to Cettinjé.)

[39000] No. 217.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, September 16, 1912.*

BALKANS.

With reference to my telegram No. 112 of the 14th instant.

The following is confidential:—

I was informed yesterday by Greek chargé d'affaires that he, personally, was of opinion that the conclusion of peace between Italy and Turkey would cause more trouble and excitement in Greece and Bulgaria than has been the case up till now, as that moment would be considered an auspicious one for attempting to realise at least a part of their desires. Greek chargé d'affaires considered, however, that there were two factors which would prevent any serious danger of war—the first was the superior strength of the Turks and the second was the fact that the Turkish Government had been clever enough to hold up the railway questions pending with these two countries, so that, if the situation became acute, they could be used as sops.

[38999] No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 10. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 16, 1912.*

I LEARN very confidentially that Servian Government have applied to Lloyds Bank for assistance in connection with payment for 75,000,000 cartridges ordered from Kynochs, with special provision that they are to be delivered within three weeks. Servian Government are said to be paying down 100,000*l.*

Have you any confirmation of this? And what is your view of significance of transaction?

[38560] No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 621.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 16, 1912.*

COUNT DE SALIS'S telegram No. 22 of 13th September: Turco-Montenegrin frontier.

You should endeavour to ascertain whether this complaint is well founded, and, if it is, you should warn the Turkish Government of the danger of such proceedings.

(Repeated to Cettinjé, No. 59.)

[38664] No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 316.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 16, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires called on the 10th instant to convey the thanks of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the communication to him of my answer to Count Berchtold's second representation.

M. Sazonof himself had replied that he was glad that Austria did not intend to act separately from the other Powers in the Balkans; that he appreciated the object of the proposals; but that he could not conceal from himself that there would be great difficulties in the way of their realisation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38875] No. 221.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Athens, September 9, 1912.*

A MASS meeting was held yesterday among the columns of the Temple of Zeus to protest against the treatment of the Greek population in the Ottoman dominions. About 15,000 persons were probably present, although some of this morning's papers put the figure considerably higher. Proceedings were throughout of an orderly character. The only speech of importance was made by Professor Soteriades, of the University of Athens. He described the ill-treatment of Greeks in Turkey, especially in Epirus, and concluded by declaring that the cup was full, that both enslaved and free Greeks had had enough of words, resolutions, and protests, and that it was time for the Government, which enjoyed the full confidence of the people, to state likewise that it had had enough certificates of "correct attitude" with which foreigners were continually feeding it.

The resolutions passed by the meeting were subsequently submitted to the Prime Minister. The grounds on which they were based were as follows:—

The anarchy existing in Turkey, in consequence of which bands of brigands roamed up and down the country blackmailing and burning property without let or hindrance.

The indifference of the Turkish authorities where the Christian population was concerned, and consequent want of security for life, honour, and property.

The violation of all special privileges enjoyed in certain districts exclusively inhabited by Greeks.

The insincere application of reforms by the new régime.

The resolutions themselves were to the effect that the Greek Government should take such means as seemed good (1) to obtain the acceptance by the Porte of the demands submitted to it by the Patriarch for the recognition of the rights of the different nationalities within the Empire to a certain measure of independent existence; and (2) to ensure the application of reforms by means of a European guarantee.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[39053] No. 222.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 128.)
Sir, *Athens, September 11, 1912.*

M. COROMILAS spoke to me this morning on the subject of Crete. Developing the views expressed to the French chargé d'affaires by the Prime Minister, reported in my telegram No. 35 of the 2nd instant, he urged that the only immediate way of settling the question was to send a Royal Commissioner, nominated by the King of Greece, and acting in his name, to dissolve the Revolutionary Assembly and proceed with the election of an ordinary Chamber as provided by the constitution. This, however, he regarded as a temporary measure until the conclusion of peace between Italy and Turkey and a decision as to the fate of the other Greek islands hitherto under Turkish rule.

I suggested that it would be a fundamental change in the *status quo*, tantamount to the protecting Powers handing over their authority to the King of Greece, and, in my opinion, would not be accepted either by the Powers or by Turkey. To this he only replied that the Turkish Government would be obliged to give way.

He said that, in the event of the restoration of the old régime of a High Commissioner, the Greek Government could give no certain guarantee that the Cretan deputies would be kept out of the Greek Chamber.

He then went on to speak of the growing exasperation against the ill-treatment of Christians in the Ottoman dominions. He stated that reports of murders, rapes, and other illegalities, invariably unpunished, were reaching him daily from Epirus and Macedonia, and that, unless the Cretan question could speedily be got out of the way, relations between Turkey and Greece could only go from bad to worse. He hinted plainly that an understanding existed between the four Balkan States, and that if

nothing were done soon to improve the lot of the Christians in European Turkey, in spite of all restraining influences, of the sacrifices and risks involved, and of their sincere desire for peace, they would be forced into an attempt to work out the salvation of their kinsmen across the frontier with a combined army of 550,000 men.

Allowing for a certain amount of rhetorical exaggeration in the above statement, it is evident that the present situation is viewed here with considerable anxiety.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[39170] No. 223.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September 17, 1912.*

BALKANS.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asks me to tell you that, though he has himself received no disquieting reports, he has been informed both by Russia and Austria that those Governments are very anxious as to the situation in Bulgaria and Servia, who they think have come to terms and mean to fight. Secretary of State is strongly of the opinion that Powers should agree as soon as possible as to steps to be taken to localise trouble should it break out. M. Sazonof has hinted this to him, and he has replied expressing strong approval, and urging Russia to take the initiative and make proposals. Secretary of State thinks it would be far more useful if, instead of repeating our good advice, which is getting stale, all the Powers could tell the Balkan States definitely that all arrangements are made for localisation, and that if they choose to fight they will have to fight it out and take the consequences.

[39184] No. 224.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 16th September.

Tenders for the supply of 75,000,000 cartridges were called for a short time ago in connection with purchases of arms referred to in my despatch No. 41. Military attaché states that tenders are now being considered by a committee here. An Austrian firm has offered at lowest price, but Servian Government demur to buying from Austria for fear of disappointment in quality, and lest Austrian Government should possibly interfere with delivery. As regards the period of three weeks named for delivery, it is true that by that time both categories of the reserves will have been called up for annual training and that maize harvest will have been completed, but I see no reason to think that Servian Government contemplate initiating any aggressive action or that there is any special significance in preparations, which are not unnatural seeing present state of Balkan unrest.

Servia is in habit of receiving all warlike material viâ Salonica; delivery within specified time seems therefore almost impossible. Only last week Turks allowed 300 tons of explosives, &c., to pass in.

[37961] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 440.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 17, 1912.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 752 of the 5th instant, transmitting a copy of a letter received from Miss Durham, giving an account of the state of affairs in the Berana districts.

You may communicate the substance of this letter to the Sublime Porte, but the communication should be of an unofficial nature, and Miss Durham's name should not be mentioned as the source of your information. You should say that the facts related

have made a painful impression on His Majesty's Government, but that I am convinced that the present Turkish Government are resolved to put a stop to any repetition of such barbarities.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39139] No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 441.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 17, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador, who has returned to London, called to announce the decision of the Turkish Council of Ministers with reference to the advice given them by me to grant reforms to the other Christian populations of the Empire. The details would be communicated in a few days.

Sir L. Mallet told his Highness that he was sure that I should be much gratified at this announcement, and that he would report it to me at once.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39549] No. 227.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 18.)

(Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 17 septembre, 1912.*

J'AI eu hier la visite du Ministre de Bulgarie. Mon entretien avec lui m'a laissé l'impression que si les Puissances n'obtiennent pas de la Turquie satisfaction pour les vœux des Bulgars, qui visent en substance la réalisation pour la Macédoine des réformes promises par l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, l'ouverture des hostilités entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie est inévitable.

J'ai répété tous les arguments dont nous avions déjà fait usage militant contre une action bulgare. J'ai insisté sur leur poids et j'ai attiré sans réticence aucune l'attention du Ministre sur les conséquences désastreuses pour la Bulgarie qui peuvent être le résultat du parti irréfléchi que, sous l'influence des comités macédoniens, la Bulgarie paraît aujourd'hui disposée à prendre.

Il m'a paru que mes paroles n'ont pas laissé d'impressionner le Ministre.

Il m'a promis de les transmettre textuellement à Sophia.

Après M. Paprikof, je reçus l'Ambassadeur de Turquie, que j'ai mis au fait de la nervosité extrême qui dominait en Bulgarie. J'ai mis de l'insistance à développer à l'Ambassadeur la nécessité pour la Turquie, pour obvier à des complications sérieuses, de prendre en main, sans plus de retard, l'œuvre de l'introduction en Macédoine de réformes qui garantiraient aux populations chrétiennes leur sécurité personnelle et celle de leur propriété, l'égalité devant la loi et pour chacune des nationalités une participation à l'œuvre de l'organisation et du gouvernement.

En vue de ce qui précède, aussi des nouvelles alarmantes qui nous parviennent des États balkaniques et de la nécessité évidente de ne négliger aucun effort pour prévenir le danger de guerre dans les Balkans, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne jugerait-il pas utile et opportun de faire entendre à Constantinople par la voix de son Ambassadeur, sous forme tout amicale et exclusant le caractère d'une démarche identique, des représentations dans le sens de ce que j'ai dit à l'Ambassadeur de Turquie.

Veuillez vous en informer auprès de Sir Edward Grey.

[39257] No. 228.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September 17, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister told Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that unless Powers took Macedonian question in hand and induced Turkey to inaugurate

serious reforms war was inevitable. Bulgaria, he said, demanded application of article 77 of Treaty of Berlin.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to him most seriously, saying that a Great Power like Russia could not allow herself to be dragged into war at the bidding of Bulgaria, that she had liberated Bulgaria and given her independence, and that if Bulgaria was mad enough to embark on war contrary to her expressed wish she would do so at her own risk and peril, and Russia would regard her historic mission as at an end. What, his Excellency asked, would be position of Bulgaria at the end of war. She would not be allowed to retain any portion of Turkish territory, and would be faced with a revolution.

Bulgarian Minister replied that revolution would come at once if his Government remained inactive. They would proclaim at the commencement of war that their sole object was to procure some amelioration of the lot of their kinsmen in Macedonia, and not an aggrandisement of territory.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged Turkish Ambassador to urge on his Government to do something at once on their own initiative, and has suggested reform of administration of justice and representation of Christian element in the administration. He is instructing the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to speak in the same sense. He is also sending a circular telegram to Russian Ambassadors in the other capitals. He has spoken to Austrian chargé d'affaires, begging him to tell Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he has no desire to poach in his preserve, and that the step which he is taking is merely outcome of the recent Austrian proposals, and is forced on him by the seriousness of the situation. His Excellency expressed desire that Russia and Austria, as the two Powers the most directly interested, should agree to pursue a policy of complete disinterestedness. His Excellency is very anxious that His Majesty's representative at Constantinople should be instructed to speak in the same sense as the Russian Ambassador. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has reason to believe that Bulgaria will not move for another three or four weeks, and will not do so even then unless she is assured of co-operation of other Balkan States. He is consequently instructing the Russian Ministers at Belgrade and Cettinjé to use all their influence to restrain Servia and Montenegro. He hears that Turkey is inclined to keep Greece quiet by concessions in Crete.

[39313] No. 229.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 18, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs mentioned yesterday that a telegram from Italian representative at Cettinjé appeared to anticipate further trouble on Montenegrin border. All other telegrams received from Balkan States were more optimistic than they had been lately. He is hopeful that there will be no outbreak of war in any of those States.

[39333] No. 230.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 18, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday in the course of conversation that the situation, under appearance calm, was not improving, and that warlike movement in the army continued to increase.

The time-expired men were not disbanded as usual on 14th September. I learn also that all other military precautions short of mobilisation are being taken. There does not, however, seem to be any likelihood of outbreak of conflict before three or four weeks.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[39355] No. 231.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 280.)
Sir, *Rome, September 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday evening's "Giornale d'Italia" publishes interviews with the Greek chargé d'affaires and the Bulgarian Minister accredited to Italy, on the subject of the situation in the Balkans.

The former, M. Caclamanos, is reported to have stated that recent events in Turkey have undoubtedly produced a certain agitation in Greece, which has given rise to the meetings in Athens, Patras, Volo, and other Greek cities. He denied absolutely, however, that his Government had ordered, or was about to order, any mobilisation of troops. Greece, while prepared to face any emergency, was maintaining a perfectly loyal and correct attitude towards Turkey.

In regard to Bulgaria, M. Caclamanos said that the relations between her and Greece were certainly very cordial, and were the result of the events in Macedonia consequent on the assumption of power by the Young Turk party in Constantinople. But apart from the identity of interests and action which is the logical result of the present situation, he was not aware that there was any explicit agreement between the two countries which might cause European public opinion any actual anxiety.

M. Rizof, the Bulgarian Minister, whose anti-Turkish attitude is known to his colleagues and to the Foreign Office here, has, it is stated, authorised the following declaration:—

"I have just received a telegram informing me that 6,000 Bulgarians with artillery, doubtless belonging to the regular army, had an encounter with the Turks on the frontier yesterday.

"Bulgaria at this moment is having her great manœuvres, and has more than 100,000 men under arms. The King and His Ministers are pacific, and do all they can to avoid war; but if there were to be a fresh massacre of Bulgarians, their efforts in this direction would be reduced to a dangerous minimum.

"I have no precise information as to what steps my Government have taken to remind Turkey of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. What is certain is that the situation of the Christians of the various nationalities in the Ottoman Empire is most lamentable.

"I am equally ignorant as to whether there is any agreement between Bulgaria and the other Balkan States. But, believe me, if Bulgaria were forced into war, no agreement would be necessary for Servia, Montenegro, and Greece to attack Turkey. This is a moral certainty."

I may incidentally mention that M. Rizof's wife is a Montenegrin lady.

I have, &c.
H. G. DERING.

[39344] No. 232.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 130. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 18, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador has this afternoon made a fresh proposal on behalf of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, viz., that Powers should advise Porte in an amicable manner, in order to deprive Bulgaria and Servia of any pretext for war, to grant to Bulgarians of Turkish provinces the moral and material advantages contemplated in article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs told M. Isvolsky that he would like to have some definite statement in writing for consideration, but that he did not think it at all likely that either the Porte would accept such advice if given, or that German or British Governments would join with Russia in giving it in present circumstances.

With regard to localisation of the war if Bulgaria and Servia make an attack on Turkey, which Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs apprehends, French Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out to M. Isvolsky that Russia and Austria, with the concurrence of Germany, may be able to [group omitted: ? take] measures of persuasion which are not available for France and England.

[39008] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1912.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 377 of 16th September: Turkish concentration on Montenegrin frontier.

You may inform Montenegrin Government if you think it desirable to do so.

[39449] No. 234.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September* 19, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that chances of peace or war now depended, in his opinion, on whether any incident, such as a massacre, occurs, and whether Powers show their intention of insisting on and guaranteeing satisfactory reforms in Macedonia.

I see no reason to suppose that anything likely to increase the chance of war, as suggested by German Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 114 of 17th September), has recently passed between Bulgarian and Servian Governments. Rather the contrary, the latter seems to be representing at Sophia risks that would be incurred by war, and to be using their influence to restrain Bulgarian Government. But the position of the Servian Government is not without difficulty, as they are being pressed by military party here, which is being worked from Bulgaria. The Government hesitate to manifest a too decided attitude against war lest Bulgaria should reproach them with cowardice and of failing in the solidarity which she had expected. There is, however, little, if any, probability of a departure from their present pacific attitude unless Bulgaria moves, in which case they would be compelled to join, or face a revolution.

(Repeated to Sophia and Constantinople.)

[39587] No. 235.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September* 20, 1912.

BALKANS.

My telegram No. 114 of 17th September.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that Russian chargé d'affaires made formal proposal to him yesterday for representations by Powers at Constantinople, urging grant of concessions indicated in article 23 of Berlin Treaty. His Excellency replied that he must consult Imperial Chancellor and Germany's ally before giving official answer, but that speaking personally and unofficially he was opposed to proposal. Turkey had just informed Germany officially that she proposed to extend reforms granted to Albania to all European vilayets, and he considered it impossible to approach Turkey immediately with fresh demands. Secretary of State added to me that even if Powers made proposed representations, and Turkey agreed, it would take at least a year to decide upon exact meaning of article 23, whereas something immediate was required; besides, grant of such concessions would probably only whet the appetite of Balkan States. He repeated his earnest desire for an agreement between the Powers for localising any eventual trouble, and thought that existence of such an agreement, of which Balkan States could easily be allowed to hear, would have an excellent effect.

"Times" correspondent here has just returned from Constantinople and Sophia, and was informed by Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Bulgaria would take the field in six weeks, to which he replied that, when two gentlemen announce their intention to fight a duel six weeks hence, people were not much impressed. I told Secretary of State this story, and he highly approved and agreed with the answer. He thinks that Russian pessimism is due to language of Bulgarian representative at

St. Petersburgh, and not to news from Bulgaria, and he believes that Bulgarian representative used this sort of language partly in hopes of being given something or other to keep them quiet and partly to show their own people how warlike they are and that they are only forced to keep the peace by the Powers. His own news from military attaché in Bulgaria was excellent, particularly as to perfect quiet and discipline in army.

[39572] No. 236.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 20, 1912.

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 130 of 18th September: Balkans.

Russian chargé d'affaires submitted similar proposal to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. His Excellency said he must withhold definite pronouncement till he had had time to study details more thoroughly, but showed pretty clearly that this new step on the part of Russia was not very welcome. He advanced no definite objection, but in the course of general conversation said that he felt sure neither England nor France would be willing to adopt this new Russian proposal.

[39591] No. 237.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 76 of to-day: Balkans.

German chargé d'affaires, who has seen Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs since he has had more leisure to study the Russian proposals, tells me that his Excellency, while not actually condemning Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' latest suggestions, does not appear to view them with much favour.

From the same source I learn that reports which have reached Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Bulgaria, which of late have been much better, have now again assumed a less hopeful tone.

[39344] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 426.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1912.

BEFORE reading your telegram No. 130 of 18th September to-day, I had told French Ambassador that I thought representations at Constantinople by the Powers would only weaken authority of present Turkish Government by giving opportunity for committee party to attack them. This would be undesirable, as present Turkish Government's intentions were good. I might, however, in a friendly way give Turkish Ambassador here the serious information we received from Sophia.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 194; Vienna, No. 190; St. Petersburgh, No. 885; Rome, No. 314; Constantinople, No. 639; Sophia, No. 64; Belgrade, No. 13; and Cettinjé, No. 64.)

[39497] No. 239.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 462.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1912.

THE French Ambassador remarked to Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th instant that in certain quarters much alarm existed as to the Balkan situation, but that he did not share these apprehensions. The proposals of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, badly drawn up and futile as they were, had no doubt been one cause of the agitation, but he considered that their chief object was to reply to the recent

Bulgaro-Servian alliance engineered under the ægis of Russia. The French Ambassador at Vienna had reported that he had ascertained that Count Berchtold, before communicating his proposals to the Powers, had acquainted King Ferdinand with them, which indicated that the latter had divulged at Vienna the fact of the Bulgaro-Servian understanding. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told the French chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh of the language which he had held at Sophia warning Bulgaria not to disturb the peace, and had intimated that if Bulgaria disregarded this advice and made a dash towards Constantinople, Russia would prevent her from going further than Adrianople.

Sir A. Nicolson asked M. Cambon whether it was not possible in these circumstances that Bulgaria and Servia, having been encouraged by Russia to make an alliance, might not consider that they had been left in the lurch by Russia when they had hoped that the moment had at length arrived to profit by an alliance formed under the ægis of Russia.

M. Cambon said that probably this was what would occur, and that the two Balkan States would consider they had been duped. He added that the policy of M. Sazonof was childish and inconsequent, and in reality he was mainly responsible for all the agitation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39713] No. 240.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 388.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 384 of 20th September: Balkans.

Russian Ambassador will make representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

[39627] No. 241.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 646.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 384 of 20th September.

We cannot take responsibility that active interference advocated by Russian Ambassador would entail upon us, and I approve what you have said. If Russian Ambassador presses the subject again, you can say that if discussed at all it should presumably be between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself.

[39449] No. 242.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.**

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1912.*

YOU should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we have most strongly urged restraint at Sophia, and that we earnestly support the advice to maintain peace that has already been given by other Powers to the Balkan States.

(To Cettinjé only.)

We are much surprised to hear that Montenegrin officers and men are taking an active part in Albania, and we strongly deprecate this and any action that may lead to war with Turkey.

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* Also to Count de Salis (No. 65).

[40576] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 478.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 21, 1912.*

I INFORMED M. Cambon this afternoon of the conversation of to-day with the Turkish Ambassador.

M. Cambon told me that M. Poincaré had made reservations about one of the Russian proposals—that which related to the separate representation of nationalities. M. Cambon himself thought that it would be much better to speak simply of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, without going into details. M. Poincaré would not take any step in Constantinople without an agreement with us, and understood that we were not prepared to make formal representations.

This I confirmed, saying that the utmost we could do would be to let Mr. Marling repeat what had been said to Tewfik Pasha.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40154] No. 244.

Sublime Porte to Tewfik Pasha.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 22.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 21 septembre, 1912.*

LE Monténégro, non content du soulèvement qu'il a provoqué à Béram, s'emploie maintenant à fomenter des troubles sur d'autres points de notre frontière. Ainsi les populations serbes orthodoxes de Yachkova et de Bijova, appuyées par les Monténégrins, ont attaqué les troupes Impériales dans ces localités; de même, des Malissaures catholiques, s'élevant à plus de 6,000, auxquels se sont joints nombre de Monténégrins, ont cerné la ville de Touz; enfin, les fortins turcs sur la frontière sont souvent l'objectif de coups de fusil de la part des gardes-frontière monténégrins, comme à Vélipolia et en dernier lieu à Yalovitcha, où ils ont tué un officier et blessé un soldat turcs. Malgré toutes ces provocations, les autorités Impériales continuent cependant à conserver une attitude calme et conciliante.

[39715] No. 245.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Salonica, dated 21st September:—

"I am informed that orders have been received to suspend delivery of war material landed on 14th September in transit for Servia. Twenty wagons are detained at Uskub and another twenty here."

[39734] No. 246.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 779. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 388 of the 20th ultimo, in which you were so good as to send me a copy of an *aide-mémoire* presented to you by the Turkish Ambassador in London respecting the recent frontier incident in the neighbourhood of Berana.

The document presents the Turkish official version of the origin of the incident, and naturally makes out a strong case against Montenegro, but whether the assertions on which Tewfik Pasha's arguments are based are accurate, I have no means of saying. There are no foreign consuls near enough to the scene to obtain any trustworthy information, and I should be very much inclined to question whether even the Turkish Government itself receives accurate reports from its own agents, either military or civil,

whose accounts are sure to be so dressed up as to present their own conduct in the most favourable light, and to cast all blame on Christian rebels or Montenegrin intriguers. Mr. Summa's letter to Mr. Lamb, a copy of which I have sent privately to Sir A. Nicolson, seems to show that at Scutari, at all events, Montenegro has a large measure of responsibility to bear for the troubles in that district, and if this is the case at Scutari, it may be so also further along the frontier. The Russian Ambassador, who is constantly consulted by the Montenegrin chargé d'affaires here, believes that the balance of blame lies with the Turks, but he admits that "les Monténégrins ne sont pas précisément des anges." Probably the most authentic account of the incidents which were the immediate cause of the Berana incident is that given by Miss Durham in the letter enclosed in my despatch No. 752 of the 5th September, and that lady certainly places the blame on the Moslem villagers, but there is nothing to show that, as has been stated in the local press here, they were not provoked by the Christian neighbours, and, of course, Miss Durham would be the last person to be told of it. It would be supererogatory to pursue further the question of the relative degree of responsibility to be apportioned to either side, for, with the ease with which evidence to order can be produced in this country and probably also in most of the neighbouring States, it is impossible to prove anything satisfactorily. A clearly demarcated and satisfactory frontier is, of course, most desirable, as it would prevent misunderstandings and pretexts for aggression; but it would not put an end to frontier incidents which, with a mixed and warlike population accustomed to settle feuds by force of arms on both sides of the line, will disappear only with the advance of political intelligence and civilisation.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

[39781] No. 247.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 283.)

St. Petersburgh, September 18, 1912.

Sir,

M. SAZONOF returned to St. Petersburgh on the 13th instant, and in a conversation which I had with him on the following day, his Excellency informed me that the latest reports which he had received from Sophia were to the effect that, even were the present crisis to pass over without a rupture of the peace, war would inevitably break out in the spring. It would be something, he said, to secure such a respite, as the Powers might, in the meanwhile, take preventive measures, or, at all events, arrange to localise the war, should it break out. He knew that he could count on the co-operation of the Governments in London, Paris, and Berlin and, though he could not himself go to Vienna, Austro-Russian relations were now on such a footing that he could always exchange views with Count Berchtold.

I remarked that I did not quite share the view that, if war did not break out within the next few weeks, it would necessarily be postponed till the spring of next year. During the crisis of 1908–9, the Bulgarians had rather favoured the idea of a winter campaign, as their troops were better fitted to endure its hardships than those of Turkey, while it would enable them to mass all their forces on the side of Adrianople, as a very small number of men would then suffice to defend the snow-clad passes on the south-western frontier against a possible irruption of the Turks.

M. Sazonof replied that this might be so and that, in any case, he knew that the present Bulgarian plan of campaign was to advance with their concentrated forces on Adrianople and to force a battle outside that town. Were they, however, to gain a decisive victory there and to march on Constantinople, Russia would be obliged to warn them off, as, though she had no desire to establish herself at Constantinople, she could not allow any other Power to take possession of it.

I observed that though the possession of Constantinople might enter into King Ferdinand's ambitious dreams, I did not believe that his subjects aspired to anything beyond the realisation of the Greater Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stephano; and I enquired whether Russia proposed to forestall the Bulgarians at Constantinople should the latter endeavour to bring the war to an end by an advance on the capital. His Excellency replied that Russia would, in that case, present an ultimatum at Sophia and that that would suffice to arrest the further advance of the Bulgarian army.

On my asking what his Excellency thought that Austria and Roumania would do, in the event of war breaking out, M. Sasonof said that they would certainly mobilise

and that he feared that, if Servia joined Bulgaria, Austria would occupy Belgrade. He trusted that Roumania would stop at mobilisation and that she would not advance into Bulgaria; but in either case Russia would probably have to mobilise too. I remarked that, if Roumania did attack Bulgaria, I feared that public opinion in this country would force the hands of the Imperial Government and compel them to take action. In that case the war might become general. The only way to localise it seemed to me to be for Austria and Russia to agree not to intervene at all and for both of them to use their influence at Bucharest to prevent any intervention on the part of Roumania. The Powers could, at the same time, give the Balkan States to understand that, whatever the issue of the war, the settlement of the Eastern question would rest with Europe and not with them.

Yesterday evening, M. Sazonof dined at the Embassy, and spoke to me again on the situation in the Balkans.

He had, he said, received very serious news since our last conversation. The Bulgarian Minister had that day informed him that if the Powers did not at once take the Macedonian question in hand and induce Turkey to initiate serious reforms in that province, Bulgaria would be compelled to go to war. By serious reforms, General Paprikof had explained that he meant the application of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.

M. Sazonof had replied that it was impossible for the Powers to ask for the execution of that article, and that if Bulgaria carried out her threat she would find that she would not only have to fight Turkey but Austria and Roumania as well. It was ridiculous of her to think that she could drag a great Power like Russia into war at any moment she liked to name. Russia had, indeed, liberated Bulgaria from Turkish rule and had given her her independence; but if Bulgaria was mad enough to embark on war, in defiance of Russia's express wish, she would do so at her own risk and peril. Russia would in that case consider her historic mission at an end and leave Bulgaria to her fate. What, moreover, his Excellency enquired, would be Bulgaria's position at the end of the war, even supposing it to be victorious? She would not be allowed to retain possession of any portion of Turkish territory, in spite of all her sacrifices of blood and money, and would find herself confronted with a revolution at home.

To this General Paprikof had replied that Bulgaria must run the risk. Revolution was already at her door and would inevitably break out were the Government to continue to pursue a policy of apathetic inaction. In support of this contention he had cited the daily attacks made on the King, whose position was rapidly becoming untenable. The general had then proceeded to speak of the intolerable position of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, and had declared that, on the outbreak of war, the Bulgarian Government would solemnly proclaim to the world that the only aim which they had in view was to ameliorate the lot of their kinsmen across the frontier, and that they would not seek any territorial aggrandisement.

M. Sazonof remarked to me that such language was but natural in the mouth of a Bulgarian, adding that he was sure that if I were a Bulgarian I should have spoken in the same sense. I replied that this was quite possible, but that had I done so I should not have expected anyone to believe my professions of absolute disinterestedness.

His Excellency then proceeded to say that he had sent for the Turkish Ambassador and had impressed on him the seriousness of the situation, begging him to urge his Government to do something on their own initiative. He had, he said, suggested to Turkhan Pasha the advisability of reforming the administration of justice and of allowing the Christian element to be represented in the provincial administrative bodies. He had also telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople instructing him to speak in the same sense to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. As, moreover, he had reason to believe that Bulgaria would not move unless she was assured of the co-operation of the other Balkan States, he had instructed the Russian Ministers at Belgrade and Cettinjé to use all their influence to prevent Servia and Montenegro joining in an attack on Turkey. His Excellency did not say whether he was making any representations at Athens, but told me that he had heard that Turkey was inclined to keep Greece quiet by the promise of concessions on the Cretan question.

M. Sazonof also informed me that he had addressed a circular telegram to the Russian Ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna, instructing them to communicate what he had told me to the respective Governments, and to invite their co-operation. His Excellency expressed his earnest hope that His Majesty's representative at Constantinople would be instructed to hold somewhat similar language to that of his Russian colleague. He had, he added, sent for the Austrian chargé d'affaires, and had begged him to explain to Count Berchtold that, in acting as he was

doing, he was not attempting to "braconner sur son terrain," and that his present action was but the natural outcome of the recent Austrian proposal, and had been forced upon him by the seriousness of the situation. He was most anxious that no Power should strike out a line of its own, and he thought that Russia and Austria, as the two Powers most directly concerned in the Balkans, should agree to pursue a policy of complete disinterestedness.

I told his Excellency that I was sure that you would be pleased to learn that he had approached the Austrian Government in this spirit, as I knew that you were most anxious that nothing should be done that might divide Europe into two hostile camps on the Balkan question. I cannot, however, help feeling that M. Sazonof has rather cleverly seized this opportunity to oust Austria from the leading rôle in the European concert, and to place the conductor's bâton in the hand of Russia.

From what M. Sazonof told me, it is not likely that Bulgaria will take any decisive action for another three or four weeks.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[39768] No. 248.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 417.)

Berlin, September 20, 1912.

Sir,

AS I have had the honour to report in my telegrams Nos. 114 and 115 of the 17th instant and to-day respectively, Herr von Kiderlen still maintains his optimistic view of the situation in the Balkans, though he is slightly shaken by the pessimism of both Russia and Austria.

The semi-official "North German Gazette," in its weekly review of foreign affairs last Sunday morning, declared that, though reports pointing to an outbreak of war in the Balkans continue to circulate, they did not seem to be confirmed, and it was to be hoped that the forces working for peace might yet succeed: the Balkan States understood their own interests well enough to avoid war unless national passions were excited to such a degree as to overcome all sensible considerations, and the unanimous desire of the Great Powers to prevent any breach of the peace was a very strong factor for good.

The "Cologne Gazette" of the 17th instant published an apparently inspired telegram from Berlin, saying that if one took all the threatening reports from Bulgaria as gospel, war was obviously imminent; but there was no need to be too pessimistic, for it was by no means the first time that the Balkan States used threats of the warlike excitement of their population when they were particularly anxious to obtain something or other; in any case, the reference to popular excitement could not absolve the Government of the Balkan States from the responsibility for any breach of the peace, by which they would come into conflict not only with Turkey but also with the Powers.

The same paper on the 18th instant published a Constantinople telegram, of which a full translation was given in yesterday's "Times." (I have the honour to enclose it for convenience of reference.*) The telegram was followed by a letter from the same correspondent, describing and explaining what he believed to be the desires and intentions of the Balkan States. In this letter, he declared that the plan upon which the four Balkan States had agreed was not to obtain any extension of territory for any of them, but to insist on a very full measure of autonomy being granted to the European provinces. It was believed in Bulgaria that this demand for autonomy, coupled with the self-denying agreement as to non-extension of territory, would remove any suspicion and hesitation on the part of Greece and Servia and even of Roumania. The letter concluded with an expression of the belief that the Balkan States would not venture on a war against the express orders of the Powers for the present; but that their idea was to await the almost certain failure of the Berchtold proposals, and then to come forward, with an appearance of more justification, with their demands for autonomy: Turkey would presumably refuse, and then "events" would follow.

The remark of the "Times" correspondent in the enclosed cutting* that Greece, and probably Bulgaria, too, would seek satisfaction on railway questions by diplomatic means, so closely resembles what the Greek chargé d'affaires said to me (see my telegram

* Not printed.

No. 113 of the 16th instant), that I presume it originated from the same source. I asked Mr. Mackenzie to-day if I was right, and, without denying it, he told me there had been a long article on the subject in the "Börsen-Courier" a few days ago.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[39874] No. 249.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 406.)

Sir,

Paris, September 22, 1912.

I HAVE received a letter from M. Paléologue, political director at the Quai d'Orsay, informing me that M. Poincaré has had conversations with the Russian and Turkish Ambassadors in Paris which have caused him to view the situation in the Balkans with disquietude. His Excellency, so M. Paléologue states, has telegraphed to the French Ambassador in London to communicate to you and to M. Sazonof a draft agreement copy of which is herein enclosed and which M. Paléologue has forwarded to me *à titre personnel*.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE

Enclosure in No. 249.

Draft Agreement.

LE Gouvernement de la République française, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement Impérial russe, également soucieux de sauvegarder la paix et de maintenir le *statu quo* dans la Péninsule balkanique, estime d'un commun accord qu'une action collective des Grandes Puissances peut seule conjurer les graves événements qui menacent la tranquillité et l'équilibre de l'Orient européen.

En conséquence, lesdits Gouvernements conviennent de soumettre à l'agrément du Gouvernement Impérial allemand et du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal austro-hongrois les dispositions ci-après :—

"1. Les Puissances interviendront simultanément et dans le plus bref délai, auprès des Cabinets de Sophia, de Belgrade, d'Athènes et de Cettigné, pour leur conseiller de ne rien entreprendre qui puisse troubler la paix ou affecter le *statu quo* de la Péninsule balkanique.

"2. Si ces conseils ne sont pas entendus, les Puissances combineront aussitôt leurs efforts pour localiser le conflit et y mettre fin. Elles déclareront notamment aux États perturbateurs qu'ils n'auraient à espérer, d'une victoire éventuelle, aucun profit territorial.

"3. Si la suite des événements nécessitait l'emploi de moyens plus énergiques, tels qu'une démonstration militaire ou navale, les Puissances n'y recourraient qu'après s'être concertées.

"4. En même temps qu'elles s'acquitteront de la démarche spécifiée au § 1 les Puissances interviendront auprès de la Sublime Porte pour lui conseiller d'exécuter, sans retard, les réformes administratives que réclament légitimement les populations chrétiennes de la Péninsule balkanique."

[40717] No. 250.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, September 23, 1912.

LE Gouvernement de la République française, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement Impérial russe, également soucieux de sauvegarder la paix et de maintenir le *statu quo* dans la Péninsule balkanique, estiment d'un commun accord qu'une action collective des Grandes Puissances peut seule conjurer les graves événements qui menacent la tranquillité et l'équilibre de l'Orient européen.

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2. Si ces conseils ne sont pas entendus, les Puissances combineront aussitôt leurs efforts pour localiser le conflit et y mettre fin. Elles déclareront notamment aux Etats perturbateurs qu'ils n'auraient à espérer, d'une victoire éventuelle, aucune augmentation territoriale.

3. Si la suite des événements nécessitait l'emploi de moyens plus énergiques, tels qu'une démonstration militaire ou navale, les Puissances n'y recourraient qu'après s'être concertées.

4. En même temps qu'elles s'acquitteront de la démarche spécifiée au paragraphe 1, les Puissances interviendront auprès de la Sublime Porte pour lui conseiller d'exécuter, sans retard, les réformes administratives que réclament légitimement les populations chrétiennes de la Péninsule balkanique.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 23 septembre, 1912.

[39778] No. 251.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 22, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister two days ago again emphatically declared to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that, should Bulgaria and Servia make use of their *entente* to attack Turkey, Russia felt it her duty to warn them with unsparing outspokenness that in such an eventuality she would be guided by her own interests.

Warning simultaneously given in Belgrade, also advising Servia not to follow Bulgaria in case of war, has so far met with no response, as the Servian Minister here yesterday merely communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs text of Russian declaration without any comments from his Government.

It appears that Bulgaria and Servia are disgusted with Russia's attempt to separate Balkan States after bringing them together. From what I gather, their solidarity seems invulnerable at present.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[39732] No. 252.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 22, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister has to-day telegraphed at length to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in London stating he has good reason to believe that four Balkan States are meditating some decisive step shortly, namely, a demand which they will simultaneously present to the Porte for grant of reforms to Macedonia under guarantee of the Powers, accompanied by a declaration that they will respect territorial *status quo*.

[40019] No. 253.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, September 23, 1912*

BERLIN telegram No. 115 of 20th September: Balkans.

Story of "Times" correspondent in Berlin is absolutely denied by "Times" correspondent here, who was present at interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40030] No. 254.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 23, 1912.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day as instructed in your telegram No. 16 of 21st September.

He replied as before that Servian Government are using their best efforts to encourage Bulgarian Government to resist popular pressure for war, but that situation is serious, and he fears that their efforts may not be successful unless the Powers in addition give advice to hold out some definite hope of substantial reforms in Macedonia.

Russian Minister tells me that two days ago he presented a memorandum stating that if Balkan States commenced war Russia would leave them to their fate, and urging Servian Government to inform Bulgarian Government that they would dissociate themselves from aggressive action. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would lay the memorandum before the King and the Council of Ministers, but gave Russian Minister to understand that he thought it unlikely that the advice could be followed.

Unfortunately the idea prevails both in Servia and Bulgaria that, notwithstanding Russia's official declarations, public opinion in Russia will not permit Balkan States to be abandoned, and Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that this idea is ineradicable.

I pointed out that there is no real agitation or excitement in Servia, and that Servian Government should not allow themselves to be merely taken in tow by Bulgaria and dragged into an adventure. Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that as yet agitation was slight, but said that if Bulgaria attacked it would be impossible for Servia to hang back.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[40034] No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 613.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 23, 1912.*

I INFORMED Turkish Ambassador on 21st September of the disquieting news which we had received from Bulgaria, and the difficulty which the Bulgarian Government asserted they experienced in keeping the agitation in check. I told the Ambassador that His Majesty's Government, as well as other Powers, especially Russia, had given the most serious warnings at Sophia, and had impressed on the Bulgarian Government that the Powers were desirous that the peace should not be disturbed, and that any action on the part of Bulgaria of an actively hostile character would meet with severe displeasure. Similar warnings had been given at Belgrade and Cettinje. At the same time the Ambassador was informed that in order to strengthen these representations it was most desirable that the Powers should be able to show that Turkey did intend to introduce liberal reforms into Macedonia and elsewhere, and that it would be a great step in advance if a thoroughly good administration were established, and if those who had been guilty of the outrages at Kochana were punished. The hands of the Powers would be strengthened in any further representations at the Balkan capitals if the Turkish Government were to publish even an outline of the reforms which they intended to introduce, and if the Powers were assured that it was the firm intention of the Porte to establish a stable and good administration. The Ambassador was given very clearly to understand that the remarks which I had made were conceived in a perfectly amicable spirit, and with the object of communicating to him the substance of the information which had reached us as to the state of affairs in Bulgaria and other Balkan States, and of making friendly suggestions as to the course which the Turkish Government might perhaps be disposed to take in order to meet the immediate exigencies of the situation. I told his Excellency that I was opposed to making any formal representations at Constantinople, as I thought that such steps would embarrass the Turkish Government, and that my sole desire was to assist them in carrying out the good intentions with which I knew they were animated. (End of R.)

You should take an opportunity of informing unofficially and in a most friendly manner the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to what passed between the Turkish Ambassador and myself.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 436; St. Petersburgh, No. 898; Berlin, No. 199; and Vienna, No. 194, omitting last paragraph.)

[40047] No. 256.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 96.) *Sophia, September* 18, 1912.

Sir,

THE leading article of the Paris "Temps" of the 12th instant on the unrest in the Balkans has caused considerable annoyance here. I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of an article which appeared in the semi-official "Mir" of yesterday in reply. I beg to call attention to the comminatory tone of the last two paragraphs aimed directly at Russia

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 256.

Extract from the "Mir" of September 17, 1912.

"THE GREAT POWERS AND BULGARIA."

IN its edition of the 12th instant the "Temps" present us with an article full of advice and warning for the Balkan States and especially for Bulgaria. We Bulgars are not sentimental, and we can read such articles on "Balkan Unrest" with perfect calm. We owe so much from the intellectual point of view to France and to French literature, that we cannot do otherwise than listen to the counsels which come to us from Paris. But, not being sentimental ourselves, we have never regarded advice and warning as mere sentimental exclamations, and we have always sought to read the sense of such advice and such warnings "between the lines." The article in the "Temps" betrays far rather the extreme anxiety of those who inspire that journal than any which is felt in the Balkans; and it is to that very anxiety in Parisian articles that one must attribute the misinterpretation of facts which distinguishes the article in question.

The "Temps" asserts that we in Bulgaria have all thought that the moment has come to take advantage of Turkey's difficulties in order to make war upon her. We beg leave of the Parisian journal to declare that the insinuation is insulting. If the Bulgars were really inspired with the wish to make trouble when Turkey was in difficulties, they might have marched upon Constantinople in 1908 when the Turkish army itself was divided in two, one half of it marched on Constantinople in order to bring the other to reason and provoke the downfall of Abdul Hamid. But at that time we were full of enthusiasm ourselves, and shared in all sincerity the hopes of Europe that, with the establishment of a constitutional régime, Turkey herself would ensure such peace, order, and reform as would put an end to the volcanic agitation in the Balkans; and we took no "advantage of Turkish difficulties." In the presence of a fact of this kind, it is unworthy of a newspaper like the "Temps" to stigmatise us with the suspicion that it is only the difficulties, in which Turkey finds herself involved at the moment, which have rendered us restless and warlike. And it is the more unjustifiable for those who inspire the "Temps" to vex us with such insinuations, seeing that in the selfsame article Turkey is stated to be incomparably stronger from a military point of view than she was in 1908, when we made no attempt to profit by her troubles. It is not the "difficulties of the Turks" but the desperate situation of our own fellow-countrymen in Turkey which rouses us to-day; and it is but an irony upon the misfortunes of these martyrs to impute to free Bulgaria the desire to see diversion in the difficulties of Turkey.

Moreover, just as the "Temps" makes no attempt to discover the real causes of Balkan unrest, so its reasoning is equally at fault when it talks of the relations between the "small Balkan States." We have been deafened with reproaches from Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh, to the effect that we small Balkan States have been the

victims of our own egotism, that we have not sought to understand our common interests, and that with our hatreds and our quarrels we have made the situation irremediable. We small Balkan States have been made to appear by the Western Powers more responsible for the state of things in Turkey than Turkey herself, because we would not agree among ourselves. To-day if there exists no formal *entente* between these small States, at least they are no longer irreconcilably at loggerheads; their fellow-countrymen in Turkey have ceased to cut each other's throats; and instead of receiving encouragement from those who should be first to give it with a view to consolidating these new relations, we read articles designed to diminish what little faith exists among them in the lasting nature of such an *entente*. Thus quite recently, the "Times" correspondent at Salonica put forward his opinion that nothing need be done for Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople, because a movement in that direction might form the pretext for renewed persecution between Bulgars and Greeks and Bulgars and Serbs; and, in the article already quoted, the "Temps" threatens Bulgaria in the following terms: "The *ententes* between the Balkan States, which have taken the form of a Holy Alliance against Turkey, could never remain intact in the face of the pressure which will be exerted at Belgrade, Cettinjé, and Athens, with a view to isolating Bulgaria in any adventure she might run the risk of embarking upon." We are obliged for such frankness and cynicism. But those who call themselves our friends should know that we can in future turn a deaf ear to all their advice as regards *ententes* among the Balkan States; and that we shall seek a remedy where we shall find it and in no matter what combination may happen to suit our interests.

So the Paris newspaper tells us how difficult our position will become when France and the other nations have succeeded in isolating us in the manner suggested, and why they have complacently restored the old conditions of distrust and hatred among the small Christian States in the Balkans. We have little use for such lectures. If disappointment awaits us, it is because we believed that the Powers were sincere in counselling us to live on good terms with the other Christian people in the Balkans, and that they really desire the good of the nations of the peninsula. But we do not despair; we will go on to the very end to see what it is that those, whom up till now we have naïvely considered our friends, desire: is it peace in the Near East or larger spoils for themselves?

[40048] No. 257.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 97.) *Sophia, September* 18, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 94 of the 14th instant, reporting on the frontier incident at Kara Tépé, I have the honour to state that M. Gueshof told me yesterday that the incident in question was due solely to the aggressive attitude of Major Aghiah Bey, inspector of the Turkish frontier posts, who last year, as one of Mahmoud Chevket Pasha's right-hand men, prevented by his conduct the completion of the labours of the Frontier Delimitation Commission. This officer is said, in order to hide his close connection with the Young Turks, to curry favour with the present Turkish Government by showing extraordinary activity on the frontier. At Kara Tépé it appears that he was responsible for the construction of earthworks on Bulgarian territory. This was observed by Corporal Golevski, who had the work stopped. Two days later he and a comrade were ambushed and shot. Aghiah Bey is stated to be well supported by the following officers: Zékirin Effendi, Salih Effendi, and Nechad Effendi.

M. Gueshof said that the Turkish authorities had so far done nothing to punish or even find the guilty. The Turkish officers on the spot had actually refused to sign the protocol of enquiry drawn up in conjunction with their Bulgarian colleagues.

A copy of this despatch will be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[40049] No. 258.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, September* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report the following as symptomatic of the times and as indicative of the spirit now animating the Bulgarian Government:—

It will be remembered that the French Government had a short time ago suggested putting the screw on the Bulgarian Government by refusing the quotation of the loan on the Paris Bourse, the final contract for which was to have been signed by the Bulgarian Minister of Finance between the 15th and 20th of this month. The French Minister here pointed out to M. Poincaré that the effect would be ill-advised and useless, inasmuch as, according to the very terms of an article in the interest (see my despatch No. 50 of the 25th May), the loan would not be issued in the case of war in the Balkans.

M. Poincaré fell in with M. Panafieu's views, and authorised him to tell the Bulgarian Government that they did not put any obstacles in the way of the loan, but suggested that M. Théodoroff, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, should defer his visit to Paris, say, till the end of the month.

M. Panafieu informed M. Théodoroff of this fact, who, to the former's great surprise, merely said that there was no hurry, as Bulgaria did not want any money.

Yesterday M. Panafieu broached the subject again to M. Gueshoff. Again he met with the same lack of interest, his Excellency remarking with a smile that Bulgaria did not wish people to think that she was contracting loans for the purpose of making war; in fact, that Bulgaria did not want money now; she had plenty.

Considering that for the past eighteen months the Bulgarian Government have been trying to get money, and that until a few weeks ago they have been pressing the French Minister to help them, such a complete *volte-face* is remarkable. It would seem to indicate clearly that they have something at the back of their minds, and that that something is not peace.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY

[40050] No. 259.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 99. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, September* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Russian Minister tells me that he communicated to M. Gueshoff on the 14th instant a verbal message he had received from the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to the effect that the Turkish troops were in perfect readiness, that should Bulgaria attack Turkey the latter would conclude peace with Italy at once; that in order to keep Greece quiet the Turks would be prepared to give her Crete; that the Albanians would take care of the Servians, and that consequently Bulgaria would find herself alone. To this his Excellency replied that Bulgaria would not fight alone, and hinted that she could rely on the support of Servia, Greece, and Montenegro.

From a very reliable source I hear that M. Gueshoff's reply to Russian Minister was couched in a somewhat more forcible language. It appears that he pointed out again to M. Nekludoff that it was Russia herself who had been instrumental in bringing about a rapprochement between the Balkan States, and that now apparently she wished to destroy the result of her efforts; but that if Russia made any attempt to detach Greece or Servia from Bulgaria at this moment, it would be the end of the solidarity of the Balkan States—the death-knell of Russia's influence in the Balkans.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[40051] No. 260.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, September* 18, 1912.

IN the course of conversation with M. Gueshoff yesterday, I asked his Excellency whether there was any truth in a rumour I had seen reported in the German press, to the effect that Bulgaria was endeavouring to come to an understanding with Roumania as regards the Balkan question.

M. Gueshoff replied that, when the situation in Turkey appeared at its worst, just before the appointment of Ghazi Moukhar Pasha as Grand Vizier, the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs had one day said to the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires that in the case of a cataclysm in Turkey and of a Bulgarian advance Bulgaria would find Roumania at her back for the first two or three weeks, and after that they would have to see what was to be done, a remark which was taken by the chargé d'affaires as a hint that an arrangement might be arrived at between the two countries. The Bulgarian representative had then asked M. Majoresco whether a mobilisation on the part of Roumania was meant, as it certainly would not be worth while for so short a period, but M. Majoresco then broke off the conversation by saying that it was better not to talk of war.

To my enquiry as to whether the question had been raised since then M. Gueshoff evaded a direct reply, but said that, according to his information, he thought that Count Berchtold had given the advice to Roumania to keep quiet, and to await developments in case of a conflict in the Balkans. It was absurd, his Excellency added, that Roumania should think of moving if Bulgaria's intentions were only the securing of reforms for Macedonia; if her motives were self-aggrandisement, then it would be a different pair of shoes. He also referred to the Emperor of Austria's great age and his aversion to war. This is not the first time that his Excellency had made this remark, and I cannot help thinking that he has some grounds for believing that neither Austria nor Roumania will move in the case of war.

M. Gueshoff then turned to the question of Count Berchtold's proposals, which he said he had heard could be considered as dead. According to information he had received, the German Chancellor had, in the course of his recent visit to Buchlau, advised Count Berchtold not to persevere with them.

M. Gueshoff also spoke of the discontent in the army, which continued to increase in a disquieting fashion. He said he regretted that he could not tell me that the situation was more reassuring; it was not so; the apparent calm was quite superficial.

This appearance of calm, to which his Excellency referred, is one of the most disquieting features of the situation, clearly indicating that the people are merely according a respite to the Government. It would seem, indeed, judging from the comparative silence of the Opposition press, as if the Government had actually pledged themselves to act. I hear from two independent sources that King Ferdinand, a few days ago, actually received General Savof, the Stamboulovist Minister of War, who now stands impeached for treason, and has always been acknowledged as the most efficient officer in the Bulgarian army, and the most likely to be commander-in-chief in case of war. His reception by King Ferdinand is very significant.

There is considerable military activity. The time-expired men were not disbanded on the 14th instant as usual. The manœuvres at Shumla have proved a useful cloak for the transport from Sophia of large quantities of arms and ammunition which have been directed under cover of night to Philippopoli. I also hear that the Macedonian deserters from the Turkish army, who are refugees in Bulgaria, are to be supplied with arms and drills by officers of the reserve. It is estimated that a corps of some 30,000 men will be raised in this way.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[40191] No. 261.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Vienna, September 24, 1912.*

DELEGATIONS.

Speech from the Throne just pronounced, after laying usual stress on value of Triple Alliance, alludes to sympathy with which Austro-Hungarian Government are following efforts of Italian and Turkish statesmen to conclude peace on basis honourable for both parties.

With regard to Count Berchtold's recent proposals, the speech declares that it evoked expressions of unanimous desire on the part of the Powers for maintenance of peace and the *status quo* in the Balkans.

Text by post.

[40192] No. 262.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, September 24, 1912.*

DELEGATIONS.

Principal points in Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement just delivered are :—

1. No change in relations with other Powers.
2. Peace between Italy and Turkey would mitigate Balkan troubles.
3. Object of his recent proposal was to bring Powers into line in order that they should advise Porte to carry on work of reform.
4. Situation still precarious, and statesmen of Balkan States are faced with task of great difficulty.
5. Hopes that Turkey will realise how serious situation is.
6. Denies that Austria-Hungary is identified with Committee of Union and Progress.
7. Austria-Hungary will give her moral support to grant of legitimate claims of inhabitants of Roumelia.
8. Austria-Hungary is fortified in her Balkan policy by knowledge that it is analogous to that of Germany as proved by recent conversations with Imperial Chancellor.

The last paragraph of the speech assumes a somewhat pessimistic tone, and concludes by saying that only if Austria-Hungary is well equipped on land and sea can she look to the future with confidence.

Translation by post.

[40187] No. 263.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 24, 1912.*

MR. CARNEGIE showed your telegram No. 648 of 23rd September to Constantinople to political director, who said he had just learned from Austrian chargé d'affaires that his Government had made representations to Turkish Government in precisely the same sense as your remarks to Turkish Ambassador on the subject of reforms.

[40189] No. 264.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 24, 1912.*

POLITICAL director told Mr. Carnegie confidentially to-day that Bulgarian Minister, who has just returned from Sophia, informed him yesterday that the agreement

between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro is now complete, and that they are ready to move against Turkey, which they will do on its becoming apparent that the Powers are unable to compel Turkey to introduce necessary reforms in Macedonia. The four States do not aim at territorial expansion, but demand that reforms should be guaranteed by the Powers, and that the Ministers of the four States at Constantinople should be entrusted with the task of seeing that they are properly executed. The four States do not intend to declare war suddenly, but propose to produce a diplomatic position from which only issue would be war.

Political director pointed out to Bulgarian Minister extravagant nature of demand which Turkey could not grant, and expressed his doubt that the four States would act together, for a small concession from Turkey to Greece respecting Crete would detach her from her allies. Servia, moreover, would have to reckon with Austria, and there were many ways in which the Powers could put pressure on all four States. Bulgarian Minister admitted that co-operation of Greece was doubtful, and said that in no case would Bulgaria move alone.

[40206] No. 265.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 413.)
Sir, *Paris, September 24, 1912.*

THE Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the course of conversation to-day with Mr. Carnegie, referred to the proposed agreement between England, France, and Russia in regard to the Balkans, draft of which I had the honour to transmit to you in my despatch No. 406 of the 22nd instant. M. Paléologue said that there were two objections which you would probably raise to the proposal in its present form. Firstly, it would mark the division of the Powers into two groups, a step which you had always deprecated in dealing with questions concerning the Balkans; and, secondly, you had expressed the opinion that more harm than good would be done by the Powers making further representations at present at Constantinople as is suggested in paragraph 4 of the draft agreement. M. Paléologue said that, in order to remove the first objection, M. Cambon had been instructed to inform you and M. Sazonof that as soon as an agreement on the subject had been come to by the three Governments, M. Poincaré was ready to communicate it, as coming from himself, to all the Powers simultaneously. No mention need be made of the fact that England and Russia had already accepted it. In regard to paragraph 4, M. Paléologue observed that it had been inserted solely with the idea of making M. Poincaré's proposal more palatable to M. Sazonof.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[40201] No. 266.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 24, 1912.*

NEAR East.

I read your telegram No. 648 of 23rd September in translation to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said it tallied exactly with Turkish Ambassador's account of your conversation, and expressed his warm thanks for communication. His Excellency called my attention to official statement published yesterday of measures which were to be taken to put reforms in operation; he admitted that they were rather vague, but urged that so many difficult questions were involved that greater precision was impossible. He admitted also that nothing had actually been done to carry out measures adopted, but Government were drawing up lists of officials with a knowledge of local languages and conditions for service in Macedonia. List would include men of all races.

Minister for Foreign Affairs professed to believe that the accounts of warlike feeling in Bulgaria, and particularly in Bulgarian army, were exaggerated, and did not consider Balkan situation as really menacing, and he was clearly confident that Turkey need not fear result of a war if it break out. He admitted that troops were being assembled, but asserted that this was only in view of forthcoming manœuvres at

Adrianople, which form part of usual military programme. He had just given similar explanation to Bulgarian Minister, adding that he hoped that presence of considerable Turkish forces near frontier would assist Bulgarian Government to calm warlike agitation in Bulgaria. Turkey believed in and reciprocated sentiments of the Gueshof Cabinet, but could not admit being forced into yielding to Bulgarian pressure in internal affairs.

I told his Excellency that my information led me to believe that situation was more serious than he admitted, and warned him against underrating its gravity. Bulgarian Minister informs me that he found Minister for Foreign Affairs distinctly bellicose.

[40200] No. 267.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 24, 1912.*

TURKISH Government have stopped twenty truckloads of ammunition destined for Servia at Uskub.

Turkish Minister tells me that the reason he has given to the Servian Government is that their attitude appears to be no longer friendly. He represented to Minister for Foreign Affairs that they took no measures to contradict false report about massacre, that there is open talk about war against Turkey in the country, and that the existence of an alliance, or at any rate an understanding, between Bulgaria and Servia becomes increasingly certain: that since Bulgaria has assumed a hostile attitude towards Turkey, he must ask before ammunition is passed that Servia should explain what is her position, and give an assurance that in the event of war she would remain neutral.

Minister for Foreign Affairs gave an evasive answer somewhat to the effect that Servia would have to be guided by events. He complained that Turkish Government were not acting fairly, since it had been the practice for the Governments to reciprocally pass through ammunition for one another. Turkish Minister replied that this practice held good when relations were cordial, but Turkish Government could not be expected to pass ammunition possibly for use against themselves.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40324] No. 268.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 397.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 394 of 24th September.

Orders have been given to embody nine redif divisions in European provinces, nominally for six weeks' training. Military attaché reports signs of nervousness at the War Office.

[39874] No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 25, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 406 of 22nd September: M. Poincaré's proposals.

I have agreed with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that proposals Nos. 3 and 4 are undesirable, but I am willing to join with France and Russia in proposing Nos. 1 and 2 to Berlin and Vienna.

M. Cambon has been informed of above.

[39547] No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 460.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 25, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called on the 19th instant and showed to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that newspaper reports as to the peace negotiations were not to be credited, as absolute secrecy was being observed; that the discussions were still continuing, but that it was impossible to foretell their results or their duration.

His Highness also showed to Sir A. Nicolson another telegram to say that the Vali of Salonica had received undoubted information that Bulgarian bands were renewing activity and were preparing bomb and other outrages.

Tewfik Pasha did not allude to the Balkans or Crete beyond saying that the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople had informed the Porte that his Government were employing strong language at the several Balkan capitals in the interests of peace. Tewfik Pasha did not say that the Ambassador had urged the Porte to introduce reforms, and Sir A. Nicolson did not enter into these questions with his Highness.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40034] No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 463.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 25, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called at this Office by appointment on the 21st instant.

His Highness was told of the information which had reached His Majesty's Government from Sophia as to the great agitation prevailing in Bulgaria, and the difficulty which the Bulgarian Government experienced in restraining the people from resorting to extreme measures. The Bulgarian Government had impressed upon the Powers that they much feared that, unless some reforms were introduced into Macedonia without loss of time, public excitement would force the hands of the Government, even so far as to involve a breach of the peace.

Tewfik Pasha was also informed that His Majesty's Government, as well as that of Russia and other Powers, had spoken as seriously as was possible at Sophia in the sense of warning the Bulgarian Government of the desire of the Great Powers that peace should not be disturbed and that the Balkan States should not embark upon any hostile adventures. His Majesty's Government, and particularly that of Russia, had been exceedingly emphatic in impressing upon the Bulgarian Government that any action on their part of an actively hostile character would meet with severe displeasure. At the same time his Highness was told that, in order to strengthen the representations which had been made at Sophia, it was most desirable that the Powers should be able to show that Turkey did intend to introduce liberal reforms into Macedonia and elsewhere.

The Ambassador replied that he was well aware of the feeling which existed in Bulgaria, and that his Government were engaged in drawing up a programme of reforms based largely upon the results of the enquiries which had recently been made by the commission which had visited Albania and parts of Macedonia. It was, however, very difficult for a Government to apply reforms to a country in whose districts a state of anarchy and disorder prevailed, and in which bomb outrages and assassinations were continually, if not daily, taking place.

The Turkish Government, he said, did not approve of the proposals of Count Berchtold, which appeared to foreshadow some kind of autonomy or decentralisation. On the last occasion on which the populations of European Turkey had imagined that some form of autonomy was about to be granted to them the results had been most unsatisfactory, and had given rise to internecine warfare between the various nationalities.

I told the Ambassador that it would doubtless be a good step in advance if a thoroughly good administration were established, and if those who had been guilty of the outrages which had occurred at Kochana were punished. It would produce a good

effect, and would certainly strengthen the hands of the Powers in any further representations made in the Balkan capitals if the Turkish Government were to publish even an outline of the reforms which they intend to introduce, and if the Powers were assured that it was the firm intention of the Turkish Government to establish a thoroughly stable and good administration.

I made it very clear to his Highness that the remarks which I had made were conceived in a perfectly friendly spirit, and with the object of communicating to him the substance of the information which had reached us as to the state of affairs in Bulgaria and other Balkan States, and of making friendly suggestions as to the course which the Turkish Government might perhaps be disposed to take in order to meet the immediate exigencies of the situation.

I told his Highness that I was opposed to making any formal representations at Constantinople, as I thought that such steps would embarrass the Turkish Government, and that my sole desire was to assist them in carrying out the good intentions with which I knew that they were animated.

Tewfik Pasha replied that he thoroughly understood the friendly spirit which prompted me in what I said, and that he would convey my remarks to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39973] No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 25, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called on the 20th instant and told Sir A. Nicolson that he had been instructed to lay before me, especially on the eve of the arrival of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the serious situation which existed in the Balkans, and the urgent necessity that the Powers should insist on Turkey introducing without delay proper reforms in her European provinces. If "something" were not done (promises were insufficient) at once his Government would have very great difficulty in restraining the warlike spirit in Bulgaria. The Minister proceeded in this strain for some time.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Madjarof that His Majesty's Government were well aware of the agitation in his country, and were also acquainted with the fact that Russia had spoken very seriously at Sophia, and had given the Bulgarian Government clearly to understand that she and all the Great Powers were of one mind in viewing with the gravest displeasure any warlike adventure or disturbance of the peace. On the other hand, the best Government which Turkey had enjoyed for generations were animated with the most honest intentions towards the introduction of reforms, and the Powers would cordially and sincerely encourage and stimulate Turkey in this excellent direction. But patience must be exercised, and, to speak frankly, Sir A. Nicolson could not conceive a greater act of folly than for Bulgaria to *brusquer* a situation and imagine that she could by herself impose upon Turkey by force of arms a policy which the Turkish Government, if given time, would doubtless introduce and realise. M. Madjarof would forgive Sir A. Nicolson for saying so, but it was absurd for Bulgaria to risk her future on so hazardous a throw of the dice, and incur the ill-will and displeasure of all the Great Powers. She herself had nothing to complain of, she was a prosperous independent kingdom, and it really would not be worthy of her past were she to render herself the instrument of turbulent and irresponsible Macedonian agitators.

The Minister said that Bulgaria alone might not achieve much, but for the first time for centuries she could count on the co-operation of Servia, Greece, and Montenegro, and this formed a combination powerful enough to impose their will on Turkey.

Sir A. Nicolson told him that he was nursing a delusion. It was very doubtful whether Servia and Greece could or would afford any material aid; and, moreover, these States must take into account the forces arrayed against them. The Powers were fully alive to the desirability of reforms being introduced as soon as possible, and, as Sir A. Nicolson had said, they would encourage and assist Turkey by every possible means in doing so, but warlike action on the part of Bulgaria or any other Balkan State would defeat all these objects, and would probably prove a great injury to the cause of reform and to the prosperity of the States themselves.

Sir A. Nicolson promised to convey to me what M. Madjarof had said, and told him that he was expressing my sentiments in what he had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40444] No. 273.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, September 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 114 of 17th September.

I asked Political Director of Foreign Office whether Secretary of State had yet had an answer to his suggestion that Russia should take the initiative in proposing measures for the localisation of an eventual war in the Balkans.

Political Director looked much puzzled, and said that, though he knew that Secretary of State was very anxious for agreement with this object, he was not aware that he had made any suggestion to Russia. Russian chargé d'affaires informs me that Secretary of State never made such suggestion to him, though he referred vaguely to idea having come up in private conversation between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and German chargé d'affaires.

My telegram No. 115 of 20th September.

Russian chargé d'affaires had still had no reply to Russian proposal for representations at Constantinople.

[40451] No. 274.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, September 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 65 of 21st September.

I duly made a communication to Prime Minister in this sense.

As far as I can ascertain, two Montenegrins were killed in the recent fighting near Tuzi, and another was wounded, being an ex-officer of former territorial army. Turkish Legation do not appear to have definite evidence of other participation, though in the circumstances one is much inclined to suspect it.

The King told me yesterday he was sure of the obedience of people in old Montenegro, but it was harder to prevent frontier population from helping friends and relations across the border. He would do his best, and could assure me that last accounts circulated by Austrian telegraph agency respecting a [group undecypherable] attack by his troops on Berana were as untrue as the former ones.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40452] No. 275.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 26, 1912.*

SERVIAN military attaché has told Bulgarian military attaché that he has been informed by Turkish Minister of War that all the redif divisions of the 1st and 2nd "Inspections" are being mobilised. Bulgarian military attaché has reported this to his Government.

Except for the embodying of redifs, which I reported in my telegram No. 397 of the 25th September, and which will not even bring the Turkish European army up to its normal peace numbers, British military attaché is strongly of opinion that no mobilisation is at present proceeding, and that statement attributed to Minister of War was not made seriously.

[40604] No. 276.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 27, 1912.*

I ASKED Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day what he thought of Balkan situation. His Excellency replied that at present the danger spot appeared to be Montenegro and Bulgaria. The former had hitherto listened to the advice of the Powers, and he thought that she would probably be induced to keep quiet. But the Italian Minister at Sophia, who was generally optimistic, had sent less bright reports for the last three days. His Excellency remarked that some of the foreign representatives in Bulgaria were more hopeful than others. The most pessimistic was the Russian. The Russian Government were evidently most anxious at the outlook. I observed that I thought that all the Powers realised the danger, including Austria-Hungary, as proved by Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs recent speech. His Excellency agreed; he thought that it was certainly necessary for Turkey to take immediate steps to stop massacres which were going on in Macedonia and grant concessions which would satisfy population, besides helping to rebuild burnt churches and villages. Otherwise it would be difficult for Bulgarian Government to control public opinion, as they were showing every disposition to do.

[40599] No. 277.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 27, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 394 of 24th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently was not satisfied with reasons given by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs for calling out of redifs, and asked for further explanations at Constantinople. Minister for Foreign Affairs told Russian Minister that excuse given to Bulgarian representative that increase of Turkish troops on frontier would help Bulgarian Government to calm agitation here was almost an insult.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40603] No. 278.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 27, 1912.*

I LEARN that war material for Servia, detained at Uskub some days ago, was released yesterday morning, but was again stopped later in the day at Kumanovo. Together with fifty-one truckloads just disembarked at Salonica, Turkish Government have now detained altogether ninety-one truckloads, mostly shrapnel and guns from France.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40718] No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 454.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 27, 1912.*

INFORM French Government of instructions sent to His Majesty's representatives at Balkan capitals (see my telegram No. 22 to Belgrade [of to-day]), and say that reason for step taken by Great Britain, France, and Russia, would be that proposed representation by four Balkan States would make it appear that everything subsequently done by Turkey was under pressure. This would make it more difficult for Turkey to proceed in favourable direction in which she is now going. It would also

appear to be an attempt to force the hands of the great Powers who are already acting in the way they consider most likely to be effective at this moment.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 208; Belgrade, No. 21; Vienna, No. 202; Sophia, No. 70; St. Petersburgh, No. 917; Athens, No. 171; Rome, No. 330; Cettinjé, No. 70; Constantinople, No. 669.)

[40718] No. 280.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.**

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 27, 1912.*

RUSSIAN representatives at Belgrade, Sophia, Athens, and Cettinjé have been instructed strongly to deprecate a proposed formal joint representation of these four States to Great Powers.

You should do the same if French representatives are similarly instructed (see my telegram No. 454 of to-day to Sir F. Bertie).

(Repeated to Paris, No. 455; Berlin, No. 209; Vienna, No. 203; Rome, No. 331; Constantinople, No. 670; and St. Petersburgh, No. 918.)

[40680] No. 281.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, September 20, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 124 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that I still lack positive confirmation of the report that the Greek officers in the Cretan service were recently warned by the Greek Government to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Greece when ordered. Some of my colleagues, however, tell me that they have information from reliable sources that the report is true.

It would, in my opinion, be a misfortune for this island were the Cretan gendarmes suddenly to be deprived of their Greek officers.

In view of the possibility of hostilities between Greece and Turkey, the Cretans appear to have been taking stock of their military resources. It is understood that there are some 4,000 men available, who have had a training of from eight months to a year in the militia, and an attempt would almost certainly be made to send them to the help of Greece.

There are besides 6,000 or more Mannlicher rifles available for arming volunteers, apart from the militia.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[40740] No. 282.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 454 of 27th September: Balkans.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is absent. Acting political director will submit question to him as soon as possible.

[40825] No. 283.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 40 of 27th September.

I learn that Cabinet not finding explanations of Porte satisfactory, decided last night to commence mobilisation to-morrow. Cabinet meets this afternoon under Presidency of King for final decision.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

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* Also to Count de Salis (No. 71), Mr. Barclay (No. 71), and Mr. Beaumont (No. 172).

[40760] No. 284.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 27th September.

Russian Minister's instructions were to deprecate proposed form of joint representation of Balkan States when occasion arose in conversation with political men, and to use all possible tact in so doing.

French Minister received this morning enquiry from his Government as to nature of proposed representation of Balkan States, but no instructions to act.

[40741] No. 285.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September 28, 1912.*

BALKANS.

Your telegram No. 454 to Paris and No. 22 to Belgrade, both of 27th September.

I informed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day of instructions sent to British representatives in four Balkan States, and of reasons for those instructions. His Excellency highly approved, made a note of four capitals, and said he would send similar instructions.

My telegram No. 120 of 26th September.

I asked Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he had yet had an answer to his suggestion to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia should take initiative in proposing localisation agreement. His Excellency said he had not actually proposed this to M. Sazonof, but had suggested it to him as he was on the point of departure; it was therefore natural that he had not yet had an answer. M. Paleologue had expressed concurrence in idea, but doubt as to who would take initiative. German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had replied that when M. Sazonof was in Paris he had better urge him to do so.

[40758] No. 286.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September 28, 1912.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs urged on Turkish Ambassador this afternoon importance of his Government doing something at once, and suggested appointment of a Christian as mutessarif with extensive powers somewhere in Macedonia might have a tranquillising effect, and might be accepted as an earnest of serious reforms to come.

[40824] No. 287.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 13 of 27th September.

Servian Government have now stopped eighteen truck loads of Turkish war material.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40754] No. 288.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 409.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 28, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 41 of to-day.

Bulgarian mobilisation will be regarded with complete confidence here, but will almost certainly be met by similar preparations on at least equal scale.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[40742] No. 289.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 115 of 20th September.

German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has now sent official answer to Russian proposal for representations at Constantinople to the effect that as Russia has made these representations without waiting for answer, and Austria-Hungary has made somewhat [group undecypherable], and Porte has promised to grant reforms, there would be no object in Germany now urging Turkey to do what she has already promised to do.

Secretary of State informs me that Bulgaria has asked for representations to be made at Constantinople against concentration of troops near Bulgarian frontier. He thinks that it would be desirable to reply that if Bulgaria will give guarantees Powers will inform Porte of such guarantees, and ask in return for withdrawal of troops. He has telegraphed to obtain your views and those of other Governments.

[40781] No. 290.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 801.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 429 of the 12th instant, in which you were so good as to ask for my observations on the opinions expressed by the French Ambassador here to his Government on the reforms granted to the Albanians, and on the extent to which they might be extended. My own views on these two questions have already been submitted to you in my despatch No. 723 of the 22nd August. As I was then unaware of the measures taken by the Government to give effect to the concessions made to the Albanians my remarks were of general character, but their tenour was on the whole in fair agreement with those of M. Bompard. I have now received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub a despatch enclosing a translation of the instructions given to Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, to whom the task of carrying out the reforms has been entrusted, and it will probably be of more practical utility that, instead of criticising M. Bompard's notes, I should offer some remarks in the light of this more recent information. Copy of Mr. Peckham's despatch is enclosed herewith.

As a preliminary observation, it is worth calling attention to the fact that though several of the foreign representatives here, myself included, have pointed out the advisability, in Turkey's own interests, of publicly stating what steps were being taken to fulfil the Government's promises to the Albanians, official statement should have reached me from the provinces, and should not have been published in every paper in the capital. The most obvious conclusion is that Ministers were conscious that the extent of the concessions they were offering would appear inadequate, not only to the Albanians, but also in the eyes of Europe, and particularly of the Balkan States, which are keenly interested in watching what benefits are to accrue to their co-nationals by the extension of the scheme to the other Roumelian provinces, and that they therefore thought it more prudent to commit themselves only to the vague statement of a general acceptance of the Albanian demands which was appended to the list of them enclosed in

my above-mentioned despatch. An examination of the instructions to Ibrahim Pasha appears also to confirm this view.

It will be convenient to take the various points in detail:—

No. 1. The Albanian demand was understood to be for the recognition of local customary law: The Government promises to instruct the Ministry of Justice to prepare a law to make good the defects of the existing legal organisation, and to submit it to the Chamber. This, to judge by the legislative output of the last three years, is as good as postponing reform till the Greek Kalends, and even so the nature of the reform is left doubtful.

No. 2. Albanians to perform their military service in European Turkey: The Government promises that the ranks of the cavalry and artillery shall be filled by Rouneliote (not Albanian exclusively) recruits; but if I understand the last sentence of the instructions aright, such recruits will be drawn from districts in Albania that have hitherto escaped military service.

No. 3. Right to carry arms: The Government's promise merely allows the restitution of arms worthless for military purposes, but otherwise maintains the depôt arrangement made two years ago after the general disarmament, except for a promise that the arms stored shall be properly cared for.

No. 4. The qualifications promised for local officials is knowledge of the "mœurs et besoins du pays," not "la langue et les coutumes," a difference that leaves the Government a fairly free hand in its appointments.

No. 5. Transformation into "lycées" of Sultanieh schools of the existing Idadieh (secondary schools) of the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Janina, &c.: This demand is granted in full, but it is to be noted that it is not one that will affect the Christian races, as such, who have their own schools.

No. 6 affects only Mussulmans, and, like the preceding article, is accorded in its entirety.

No. 7. Right of Albanians to establish their own schools: This is a privilege already assured by the constitution, and is enjoyed by all the various non-Mussulman religious communities. It is, however, an innovation to recognise the right in the case of a Mussulman race.

No. 8. The local language to be taught in primary and secondary schools: Accepted. Whatever may be done for the Albanians to fulfil this promise, it may be safely predicted that the teaching of any language other than Turkish spoken in the Rumelian provinces will be of the most perfunctory kind, and that it will only be attempted in rare cases.

No. 9. Demand for various public works and improved communications, &c.: Ibrahim Pasha is to prepare a scheme for these purposes, but nothing is said of the means of carrying them out, and in the present state of the Ottoman Treasury it is unlikely that much can be done in the near future.

No. 10. Creation of new "mahiés" (communes): A project for the purpose is to be prepared, but even the preparation of projects takes time in this country, to say nothing of their execution.

No. 11. Respect for Moslem customs and traditions: Accepted.

No. 12. Impeachment of the Hakki and Said Pasha Ministries: Refused, such process being the privilege of the Chamber.

No. 13. Amnesty: This had already been granted.

No. 14. Compensation for houses destroyed: This demand having already been conceded a list of claims is to be prepared by the commission of enquiry and presented to the competent department.

It would seem, at first sight, as though the framer of these instructions, while conscious that the recognition of the Albanian nationality and language was inevitable, had been chiefly concerned to give effect to the concessions as a whole in such manner as to make the extension of them to the other Balkan provinces of Turkey of as little benefit to the Christian races as possible. I very much doubt whether the Ministers were so much preoccupied with the effect of the extension of the reforms to the Christian communities, who, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 723 of the 27th August, already enjoy many of the newly won privileges of Albania, as with the prospect of their being claimed by other Moslem races, such as the Kurds and Arabs. In Turkish eyes this is a far graver question, for it would be looked on as the first step towards disintegration of the Moslem elements of the Empire. It is a consideration which appeals to every Moslem, and was no doubt used by the Government to induce the

Albanian leaders to agree to an acceptance of their demands, that can scarcely have been satisfactory to the ignorant mass of the tribesmen.

Except for the recognition of their nationality and language the concessions to the Albanians are politically unimportant, and, as M. Bompard observes, their value in practice will depend entirely on their application. This is equally true as regards the benefit to be derived by the Christian races from the extension of the reforms throughout the rest of Roumelia, and I fear that it would be sanguine to hope that any Government, including even the present liberal-minded Cabinet, will show itself capable of carrying them into effect in a broad spirit of toleration. The concessions themselves are not indeed very important additions to the privileges which the Christian races already enjoy; regional military service is not a vital matter to people who prefer to pay the military exemption tax, any more than is the arrangement concerning the carrying of arms where the possession of them has never been even tolerated, so that thus the only concession that might improve the condition of the Christian Rouneliotes is the stipulation for the appointment of functionaries acquainted with the local laws and customs, and even this in a country where races are so inextricably mixed together will, with the best will in the world, prove very difficult in practice. This has, no doubt, been quite well recognised, and hence probably has arisen the introduction of reforms in conformity with article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. Decentralisation may very likely be the cure for the ills of Turkey, but it would require a very strong and stable Government to carry out such a policy, and, unfortunately, the chance of seeing such a Government established in the Turkey of to-day, where no substitute has been created for the authority of the Sultan and Caliph, destroyed by three years of committee rule, is small.

One remark of M. Bompard's seems to call for remark, viz.:—

"Il est à noter que les Albanais et le Gouvernement ottoman se sont entendus en dehors de toute intervention de l'Europe; or, cela est plus facile encore pour les populations chrétiennes, qui possèdent des organisations nationales officiellement reconnues y ant qualité pour intervenir en leur faveur auprès de la Sublime Porte."

In theory this should be true, but the practical lesson of the last three years is that insurrection is more successful to obtain concessions than the protests of patriarchs or exarchs to protect the privileges of their flocks.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

P.S.—Since I wrote the above, the decisions of the Council of Ministers for the execution of the programme of reforms has been published in the local press, and I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation thereof taken from the "Liberté" of the 23rd instant. It agrees very closely with the instructions given to Ibrahim Pasha, but I notice that the qualification of knowledge of local language is not required of Government functionaries.

It is also significant that the question should have been brought before the council by the Minister for Foreign Affairs instead of the Minister of the Interior as would have been more natural.

C. M. M.

Enclosure 1 in No. 290.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 73.)

Uskub, September 15, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the formal reply of the Government to the fourteen Albanian demands. I originally enumerated these demands in my despatch No. 66 of the 10th ultimo, but believe that a more accurate list has subsequently been published by the "Yeni Asr."

I note the following points:—

1. The impeachment of the two last Cabinets is definitely refused, as *extra vires*, this cannot come as a surprise to any of the leaders who have the faintest idea of constitutional law.

2. I have been unable to check the accuracy of this translation, but suspect a mistranslation in article 2. As it stands, it appears to mean that all Roumelian recruits

shall be enlisted in the cavalry and artillery of the Roumelian army corps and divisions. I suppose the true meaning to be that recruits chosen for cavalry and artillery shall do their service in Roumelia, the infantry and other arms being left to the ordinary hazards of distribution. The reception accorded to this arrangement will depend largely on its administration, it is not likely to produce discontent unless Albanians are sent to parts of the Empire where climatic conditions differ widely from those which they have been accustomed to.

3. It is to be noted that the Albanians demanded a grant of arms, while the present answer appears merely to contemplate storage arrangements for arms already owned. I have already noted (No. 69 of the 20th August) that the adoption of the depôt system is likely to produce some discontent with the rank and file, though recognised by the leaders as inevitable.

4. The Albanians demanded that officials should speak Albanian, distrusting either the capacity or the honesty of interpreters. This is not formally granted though several recent appointments have been of Albanian-speaking officials.

5. The Albanians demanded that the mother tongue of the pupils should be the language of instruction; in the Government reply it appears to be contemplated simply as an extra subject of study.

Hassan Bey, whom I met lately, assured me that, though local disorders were possible, there would be no general recrudescence of the revolt. (I have not heard Riza Bey's opinion on this subject). He also assured me that the rumours current as to Isa Boletin's arbitrary actions were unfounded, and that perfect order prevailed in Albania. The Serb authorities have a very different tale to tell, and quote a number of instances of robbery, cattle-lifting, and violence, of which the Albanians are said to be guilty. As another of Hassan Bey's statements to me was almost certainly untrue, I suspect that his conception of order leaves the Serb inhabitants of the province out of its reckoning.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 290.

Reply of Sublime Porte to Albanian Demands.

(Traduction.) *Le* 19 *août*, 1328 (1912).

NOUS communiquons le rapport suivant de la Sublime Porte, qui a été sanctionné par l'iradé Impérial du 18 août, 1328 (1912):—

Après une étude des deux dépêches qui ont été expédiées par Ibrahim Pacha, président de la commission d'enquête albanaise, concernant la supplique de quatorze points signée par une cinquantaine de chefs albanais, ainsi que la conclusion du susdit président sur cette supplique, la Sublime Porte a pris la décision suivante:—

1. Préparer par l'entremise du Ministre de la Justice un projet de loi, qui sera soumis à l'approbation de la Chambre à sa séance prochaine, pour les endroits où l'organisation judiciaire en vigueur n'est pas satisfaisant (n'a porté aucune utilité).

2. Comme les recrues des vilayets de Roumélie qui sont appelées chaque année ne suffisent pas au besoin de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie des sept corps d'armée et des trois divisions indépendantes qui se trouvent en Roumélie, il est nécessaire que ces lacunes soient complétées par les recrues d'Anatolie; il a été décidé de garder en temps de paix les recrues de la Roumélie pour faire leur service militaire dans la cavalerie et l'artillerie des sept corps d'armée et des trois divisions indépendantes, sauf en cas de guerre et d'incidents extraordinaires dans l'intérieur, et généraliser cette mesure aux endroits de l'Albanie où le service militaire n'a pas encore fonctionné.

3. Envoyer aux endroits où ils ont été confisqués et rendre à leurs propriétaires les fusils confisqués auparavant en Albanie qui servent pour le décor comme fusils anciens, pistolets, sabres, &c. En ce qui concerne les nouveaux fusils et les fusils prohibés, les mettre dans des dépôts qui seront construits dans des endroits désignés par le commission d'enquête, qui mettra sur chaque fusil une étiquette portant le nom, le prénom et le domicile de son propriétaire. Pour la conservation de ces fusils en bon état les autorités militaires nommeront des armuriers spéciaux.

4. Rédiger et communiquer aux Ministères compétents les listes des fonctionnaires qui ne savent pas les mœurs et les besoins du pays pour être remplacés par d'autres.

5. Transformer en sultaniés les écoles idadiés qui existent dans les chefs-lieux des vilayets de Kossovo, Scutari, Monastir et Janina; créer de nouvelles écoles sultaniés et écoles d'agriculture dans les chefs-lieux des sandjaks dont la population dépasse 300,000 habitants; accepter dans ces écoles l'enseignement aussi de la langue du pays.

6. Inscrire dans le budget du Ministère des Evkafs des crédits spéciaux pour l'entretien des médressés qui existent ainsi que pour la création de nouveaux médressés aux endroits où c'est nécessaire, qui seront également entretenues par le budget du Ministère des Evkafs; faire dans ce but les études nécessaires, prendre les renseignements nécessaires et communiquer au Ministère des Evkafs quels sont les crédits supplémentaires nécessaires pour l'entretien des médressés qui existent et dans quels endroits on doit créer de nouveaux.

7. La liberté de l'enseignement privé étant consacrée par la constitution et par la loi sur l'instruction publique, accorder dans les limites de la loi et sans aucun obstacle les permis demandés.

8. Accepter aux écoles primaires et basses secondaires l'enseignement aussi de la langue du pays.

9. Comme l'extension et la multiplication des travaux publics, du commerce et de l'agriculture ainsi que la construction des routes et des chemins de fer font partie du programme du Gouvernement, étudier et communiquer au Ministère des Travaux publics quelles sont, dans ce pays, les voies de communication les plus importantes et les plus urgentes.

10. Les conseils généraux des vilayets de Roumélie désigneront pendant cette année, en vertu de la loi sur l'organisation des nahiés, les endroits où il faut créer de nouveaux nahiés, et ils prépareront et communiqueront au Ministère de l'Intérieur les listes y relatives, contenant les noms des villages qui formeront les nouveaux nahiés, le nombre des habitants, les noms des localités qui seront choisies comme chefs-lieux des nahiés, et la distance de chaque village du chef-lieu du nahié.

11. Communiquer aux intéressés que le Gouvernement a eu toujours soin de la conservation des mœurs et des traditions musulmanes, et comme le moyen le plus efficace pour le succès de ce but est l'extension de l'instruction par les écoles laïques et religieuses, communiquer aux intéressés que ce moyen fait une partie spéciale du programme du Gouvernement.

12. Communiquer que le renvoi devant la Haute Cour des Ministères de Hakki Pacha et de Saïd Pacha est un droit que la constitution ne reconnaît qu'à l'Assemblée nationale, le Conseil des Ministres ne peut rien faire à ce sujet et qu'on doit attendre l'ouverture de la nouvelle Chambre.

13. Publier un iradé Impérial sanctionnant la loi provisoire sur l'amnistie à accorder aux citoyens, militaires et fonctionnaires de la gendarmerie et autres qui ont pris part au dernier mouvement.

14. L'indemnité des maisons détruites étant déjà une question décidée, prendra les mesures nécessaires et procéder à leur exécution conformément à la liste qui sera rédigée par la commission d'enquête, le Ministre compétent et le susdit Ibrahim Pacha étant informés à temps.

En vous communiquant ce qui précède, nous portons à votre connaissance que comme la loi provisoire sur l'amnistie a été déjà sanctionnée par un iradé Impérial et a été appliquée, tout le reste sera exécuté strictement en conformité à l'iradé Impérial susmentionné.

Enclosure 3 in No. 290.

Newspaper Extract.

LES RÉFORMES.

LE Conseil des Ministres s'est occupé des réformes adoptées pour l'Albanie et qui doivent être étendues aux autres régions de l'Empire.

Le procès-verbal des délibérations du Conseil des Ministres, a été communiqué à tous les journaux.

En voici la traduction française:—

"Le conseil a pris connaissance des tezkérés du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères demandant de donner aux fonctionnaires du vilayet des instructions précises concernant les mesures à prendre pour mettre fin aux causes de dissension entre les divers éléments

en Roumélie, établir des relations équitables entre eux et le Gouvernement, assurer l'ordre, et d'appliquer à toutes les parties de l'Empire, en tenant compte des exigences locales, les décisions prises relativement à l'Albanie, ainsi que du tezkéré responsif du Ministère de l'Intérieur, daté du 28 août, 1328, indiquant lesquelles des décisions en question devraient être appliquées aux autres vilayets ottomans.

"Il a été décidé—

"1. De charger le Ministère de la Justice de rédiger, en se mettant en rapports avec les vilayets intéressés, les projets de lois à soumettre au Parlement, qui assureraient le règlement, conformément aux coutumes locales, des procès qui surgiraient dans les vilayets où, de même que dans les régions de l'Albanie qui sont privées d'organisation judiciaire, les cadres judiciaires n'ont pas encore été organisés, et ce jusqu'à ce que la population locale, les tribus et les bédouins se soient civilisés au point de pouvoir profiter de l'organisation judiciaire actuelle. Il est bien entendu que, comme il est dit dans le tezkéré du Ministère de l'Intérieur, les provinces qui sont pourvues d'organisation judiciaire devront être comme auparavant soumises aux dispositions de la loi.

"2. De faire les communications nécessaires à toutes les administrations centrales, pour que tous les fonctionnaires sans distinction de race ni de religion possèdent les qualités requises par la loi et soient choisis de préférence par ceux qui connaissent la langue et les coutumes du pays. De charger les Ministères de l'Instruction et de l'Agriculture de fonder des lycées et des écoles d'agriculture dans tous les chefs-lieux de vilayet et dans tous les chefs-lieux de sandjak dont la population est supérieure à 300,000 habitants, et d'ajouter l'enseignement de la langue du pays aux programmes d'études des écoles.

"3. De charger le Ministère des Evkafs de fonder des médressés dans les villes qui en ont besoin et d'augmenter les crédits des médressés dont les crédits sont insuffisants.

"4. La prospérité et le bien-être de l'Empire ottoman dépendant de l'amélioration de sa situation économique, qui, à son tour, dépend de la facilité des transports, et le Ministère des Travaux publics faisant le nécessaire pour la réalisation, dans les limites du budget des chemins de fer et des chaussées dont la construction est décidée par l'Etat, il a été également décidé de charger le Ministère de l'Intérieur d'ordonner à tous les vilayets de faire savoir en détail au Ministère des Travaux publics les endroits où il faudrait construire des chemins de fer et des routes, rendre navigables des cours d'eau, irriguer des terrains et les facilités qu'il faudrait accorder aux entrepreneurs pour rendre plus facile la réalisation de ces travaux, et au Ministère du Commerce et de l'Agriculture les mesures à prendre pour faciliter les progrès du commerce et de l'agriculture et tirer un plus grand profit des forêts et des mines.

"5. De charger le Ministère de l'Intérieur de demander aux vilayets de faire étudier par les conseils généraux des vilayets combien de nahiés il faudrait former là où l'organisation des nahiés n'a pas été faite et de hâter la préparation et l'envoi des listes indiquant la population de chaque nahié, les localités qui pourraient être choisies comme chefs-lieux et la distance de ces chefs-lieux à chaque village, le Ministère devant faire le nécessaire à l'arrivée de ces listes.

"6. La décision relative au service des recrues de Roumélie dans les corps d'armée, divisions, corps d'artillerie et de cavalerie de Roumélie, sauf en cas de guerre ou d'événements intérieurs extraordinaires devant être appliquée à tous les vilayets de Roumélie, il a été décidé de charger les Ministères de l'Intérieur et de la guerre de faire des communications dans ce sens aux vilayets et aux autorités militaires. Il a été également décidé d'informer de ces décisions le Ministère des Affairs Etrangères."

[40830] No. 291.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, September 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Russian Minister told me yesterday that he had two days previously, under instructions from his Government, read out to M. Gueshof a declaration to the effect that Russia had at one time shown much sympathy towards the Serbo-Bulgarian *entente*, and had hailed with delight the cessation of internecine struggles between them. From the very outset she had never ceased to look upon this *entente* in any other light than an act for mutual defence and the

recognition of mutual interests. Should now, however, Bulgaria and Servia, without taking heed of Russia's incessant warnings, resolve to make use of their *entente* to attack Turkey together, an act which would expose their integrity and their independence to a dire trial, Russia felt it her duty to warn them with unsparing outspokenness ("avec une franchise impitoyable") that in such an eventuality she would have to be guided solely by her own and direct interests.

M. Nekludof said that M. Gueshof had appeared much concerned at this declaration, and had again harped upon the impossible situation in Bulgaria, out of which a way must be found.

The Servian Minister, whom I also saw yesterday, referred to the above Russian declaration, and said that M. Gueshof had told him that he had listened to M. Nekludof quite unmoved, and had replied that his declaration in no way alarmed him, as Bulgaria and Servia considered their interests to be identical with those of Russia.

M. Spalaikovitch then alluded to a declaration simultaneously made at Belgrade by the Russian Minister, counselling Servia to declare to Bulgaria that she could not follow her in a war which would be especially fatal to her (Servia).

M. Pashitch had sent him a copy of the text which he had communicated to M. Gueshof, but he had not been charged to make any statement in the sense desired by Russia.

Continuing the conversation, M. Spalaikovitch said that the whole time Russia and the other Powers spoke of war as if the Balkan States wanted to plunge into war. Nothing was further from their wishes. What they wanted was to secure reforms for Macedonia. It was no use counting any longer upon the promises of Turkey. The Balkan States would not rest now until reforms were granted to Macedonia under the guarantee of the Powers. Russia, after all her endeavours to join the Balkan States together, was now trying to separate them, but Servia would remain faithful to her ally. If she did not do so now her ultimate fate was sealed; she would be eaten up by Austria and Bulgaria. Even an occupation of Belgrade, or some northern points of Servia, could be but temporary; the Powers, and especially Russia, certainly could not allow it to be permanent. If they did, it would be the end of Russian prestige in the Balkans—the triumph of Austro-German policy. There was no other way out of the difficulty for Servia than to stick through thick and thin to Bulgaria. And now was the time or never for Bulgaria to put forward her claims; the internal situation of the country compelled her to do something, and Servia would back her up. The military preparations on all sides were not being taken with the special object of declaring war upon Turkey, but with the object of backing up their demands. There need be no war if Turkey gave the reforms they asked for.

I gave counsels of moderation to M. Spalaikovitch, and urged that the present Turkish Government should be given a fair chance, since they had already shown their willingness to give reforms. I also pointed out to him that perhaps they were counting too much upon an Austrian occupation of Belgrade being only a temporary measure, and that the Powers might not be prepared to hazard a European war on that account. He replied that all risks had been carefully weighed.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[40831] No. 292.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 102.)

Sir, *Sophia, September 24, 1912.*

I HAVE endeavoured in my despatches for some time past to depict to the best of my ability the changes which have come over the situation here, and of which the Kotchana massacre has been the starting point, if not an opportune pretext. Taking various circumstances into consideration, such as the difficult, almost dangerous situation of King Ferdinand; the untenable posture of the Gueshof Government, unless they do something for their kinsman in Macedonia; the understanding existing between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro; the belief of these States that, owing to Italy having her hands full, the balance in Europe will never be so favourably inclined to the side of Russia, their protector—they argue that in a few

years Austria's army will be doubled, the Emperor Francis Joseph may no longer be on the throne, and Italy will have recovered from the effects of her war—Bulgaria feels that the time for action has now arrived.

As far as I can judge, I am convinced that they are not bluffing this time, and by putting facts together, such as the active military preparations and orders for stores to be delivered by the 14th October; King Ferdinand's reception of the impeached Stamboulovist Minister-General Savof, the probable commander-in-chief in case of war; the sudden and unexpected want of interest in the conclusion of the French loan; the incessant interchange of views between M. Gueshof and the Servian Minister, and the Greek Minister; M. Gueshof's repeated declarations that something must be done; the apparent confidence with which he has expressed the unlikelihood of Austria or Roumania moving "if Bulgaria's intentions were only the securing of reforms for Macedonia"; and above all the truce existing between the Government and the Opposition, and even the Macedonian agitators here—I have come to the conclusion that the Bulgarian Government are meditating some decisive step shortly.

In my opinion this step, which they will not undertake alone, but only in conjunction with Servia, Greece, and Montenegro, may be in the form of a demand, which they will present simultaneously to the Porte for the grant of extensive reforms to Macedonia under the guarantee of the Powers, and probably accompanied by a declaration to the Powers that they will respect the territorial *status quo*. As no territorial aggrandisement is contemplated, the four Balkan States feel convinced that neither Russia nor Austria will move, nor that any Power can object, since their step will be merely a request for the Powers to honour the signatures affixed by them to the Treaty of Berlin.

I was confirmed in my opinion on the 22nd instant by the Russian Minister, who told me that he had that very day telegraphed to M. Sazonof in London that he had good reason to believe that such a step was contemplated by the Balkan States. He does not think that their demands will be delivered in the form of an ultimatum. No doubt, however, the extensive military preparations are intended to give more weight to these demands, and should they not be accepted favourably by the Porte, possibly to enforce them.

The reasons of the delay in taking the step contemplated by the Balkan States are not clear. Naturally it takes time to bring four parties into line; moreover, their military preparations are not yet completed. But above all, I think that they are awaiting the result of the "Balmoral Interview."

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[40847] No. 293.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Belgrade, September 24, 1912.*

I CALLED upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th instant and again yesterday, when I spoke as instructed in your telegram No. 16 of the 21st instant.

The views expressed to me on these occasions by M. Pashitch do not differ materially from those which I have reported from time to time as held by M. Yovanovitch, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, but M. Pashitch, apart from his present offices of Minister-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, is certainly the most prominent political figure in Servia, and his opinions therefore carry greater weight.

M. Pashitch considers that for the present phase of unrest in the Balkans Austria is directly responsible. Count Berchtold's "decentralisation" proposal, it is feared, may develop into a large autonomous Albania, and Servians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Montenegrins all see their national aspirations in jeopardy, and feel that they must either strike now or renounce these entirely. In support of the contention that Austrian aims in Turkey are not straightforward, M. Pashitch points to such facts as that when at the outset the Porte had decided to take drastic military measures against the Albanians, which would quickly have subdued the insurrection, Austria had counselled leniency, milder methods, and concessions, well knowing these to be useless; also, that at the present moment Austria is exciting the Malissors.

M. Pashitch looks upon the present situation in Bulgaria as extremely serious, but says it may yet be saved unless some fresh incident such as the Kotchana massacre

occurs, and if the Powers will only show in time that they mean seriously to take the question of reforms in Macedonia in hand. Upon this latter point, M. Pashitch specially insisted on both occasions when I saw him. He said the conditions in Macedonia were intolerable for the Christians, and the Balkan States must be given some hope of a betterment of the lot of their co-nationals in Turkey. Mere advice to keep quiet would no longer be of avail. This notwithstanding, the Servian Government were exerting what influence they possessed at Sophia to encourage the Bulgarian Government to stem the popular clamour for war, and he had instructed the Servian Minister to represent that Servia has the serious menace of Austria at her back to consider, and cannot therefore enter upon a war light-heartedly. I pointed out to M. Pashitch that if Austria is a danger to Servia, Roumania appears no less an uncertain factor in the case of Bulgaria. To this, however, M. Pashitch would not agree. He said Roumania would not interfere until questions of territory were involved. As a matter of fact, he did not think Austria would move against Servia under any circumstances; the danger of a European war would be too great. But even so, the Servian Government did not want war; the country required peace for development; their armaments were not quite completed; they would be scarcely quite ready for two years, and the possible risk of Austria always remained. He could therefore assure me that Servia would not move unless Bulgaria commenced hostilities.

I made the observation that, in addition to the risk from Austria, it would be well also to take into account the fact that the Turkish army is by no means weak, and things might not go as smoothly as public opinion in Bulgaria and Servia seems to expect; furthermore, that the Balkan States have been now repeatedly warned by Russia that if they find themselves in difficulties she will not come to their aid, and that if they are successful against Turkey they will not be permitted to profit by their victory territorially. With such risks as these I could not see how war could be contemplated. I added that from what the Russian Minister had told me and what I had heard from others, it appeared that the Russian official declarations were not believed either in Servia or Bulgaria, and the idea prevailed that Russian public opinion would not permit the Balkan States to be abandoned to their fate. It seemed to me this was a decidedly dangerous view to take, and one which the Government should do everything in their power to combat. M. Pashitch replied that it was quite true the conviction that Russia would not ultimately desert them existed in the minds of all Servians and Bulgarians, and he thought this conviction for the present ineradicable. "If," he said, "some means were found to destroy this faith in Russia we should look for other friends." Since this could only refer to Austria, I suggested that Servians would probably find this rather cold comfort, to which M. Pashitch remarked that Servia certainly would be in an unenviable position, but Austria would only be too glad to come to an arrangement with Bulgaria.

Before seeing M. Pashitch yesterday, the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, had told me he recently presented a memorandum to the Servian Government, in which, amongst other things, he urged them to dissociate themselves from any hostile action Bulgaria might take against Turkey. I therefore asked M. Pashitch whether it was necessary Servia should follow Bulgaria blindly into war. I dwelt upon the fact that there is no real agitation or excitement in Servia, and that it seemed scarcely a commendable policy for Servia to be taken in tow by Bulgaria and to be dragged into an adventure. His Excellency admitted that at present there was practically no agitation in Servia, but he reverted to the old argument that Servia, on account of her claims in Macedonia and other reasons, cannot afford to let Bulgaria move without moving also. He maintained that any Servian Government which did otherwise would have to face a revolution.

M. de Hartwig, who, from his close relations with M. Pashitch, should be able to form a more or less correct opinion, is not very hopeful of the prospect at present. He is much hampered by the fact, to which I have alluded above, that the Russian warnings are not believed, specially amongst the military party. Also, having been one of the chief promoters of the Serbo-Bulgarian *entente*, he finds his present position of trying to keep the two countries apart a somewhat false one. But, at the same time, he thinks that the Servian Government are honestly working in Bulgaria to prevent war. He has represented that with the troops Servia and Bulgaria can put in the field, respectively about 160,000 and 220,000 men, they cannot hope to defeat the Turkish army. The Montenegrins (about 30,000) are only formidable in their own fastnesses, and the Greeks (about 90,000) would not be likely to cause Turkey much difficulty. This argument he thinks has made some impression.

Both M. Pashitch and General Putnik, the Minister of War, are willing to admit

that there is much risk, but cannot be moved from the position that if Bulgaria attacks Turkey Servia must join.

M. de Hartwig is telegraphing to his Government to ask whether they cannot hold out some hope to the Servian Government that the Powers will insist on material reforms in Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the unrest is causing dislocation and detriment in matters of finance and commerce, and, in order to allay nervousness, the Government have considered it necessary to contradict the report that the Skupshtina is to be convoked in special session, and to publish a communiqué in the official organ stating that the rumours about the imminence of war are untrue.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[40790] No. 294.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 810.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 25, 1912.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the calling out of fresh troops and on the nervousness preceptible at the office of the General Staff.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 294.

Major Tyrrell to Mr. Marling.

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, in which I mentioned the probability that the four European redif divisions of the I Inspection would be called out for manœuvres, I now have the honour to report that orders have been given to call out not only these four divisions but also the redif divisions of Serres, Drama, Ishtib, Uskub, Elbassan, and Mitrovitza (part of which was already embodied), belonging to the II Inspection.

I noticed to-day, for the first time since the present crisis began, signs of nervousness and irritation at the office of the General Staff, the tone being "Let us have war and be done with it, one way or the other. Of course, Austria is at the bottom of it, and when Bulgaria begins everyone else will follow suit, but anything is better than this continual annoyance." Of course, the same state of feeling has been reached on many other occasions during the past three years, and I only mention it now as tending to show, with reference to the present crisis, that the point at which the Turks begin to lose patience has been reached.

Unfortunately I could not see the Minister of War, who was out all day.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[40832] No. 295.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Sophia, September 26, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, reporting on military preparations made by Bulgaria in the course of the past few weeks.

Besides those enumerated by him, it should be mentioned that a list of actual stores required in case of mobilisation has been sent to dealers in different parts of the country; that all functionaries have been requested by the department in which they are employed to state where they would have to serve in case of mobilisation; that, contrary to official denials, Bulgarians between the ages of 16 and 45 have not, under cover of the emigration law, been allowed to leave Bulgaria during the past week.

The British consular agent at Rustchuk reported last week that two staff officers were purchasing large quantities of stores in the neighbourhood. Mr. Mayer again reports, on the 23rd instant, that large quantities of cartridges are being transported by night to Shumla, although the manœuvres were terminated. He had heard that the branch of the National Bank at Rustchuk had received instructions to send all their gold stock to Tirnovo. He also states that the Commercial Bank at Rustchuk, of which M. Gueshof, the Prime Minister, is the chief shareholder, had that very day refused to advance any money, and that the foreign banks showed great reserve.

It might here be mentioned that the stock of the National and Agricultural Banks in gold and silver is roughly put down at 6,000,000*l.*

Tightness of money is being felt all over the country and many merchants and tradesmen have been put to great embarrassment. A deputation of Sophia tradesmen was received by M. Gueshof on Sunday, who it is said assured them that the situation was not so critical as made out; that the Government would do their duty in the interests of the country and that they can go about their affairs without anxiety. Such a statement on the part of his Excellency does not, however, coincide with the language he has been holding for some time to the foreign representatives.

The situation is decidedly obscure, but it is evident that it cannot last much longer in its present state and that the crisis will have to be resolved one way or another shortly.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

P.S.—I have the honour to enclose copy of a despatch which I have this morning received from the British consular agent at Bourgas, also reporting on the warlike preparations in his district.

C. B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 295.

M. Tacchella to Mr. Barclay.

Monsieur, *Bourgas, le 25 septembre, 1912.*

DEPUIS une quinzaine de jours les autorités locales civiles et militaires font des préparatifs de guerre, savoir :—

1. Les lignes de chemins de fer Bourgas–Philippopoli, Nova-Zagora–Harmanli sont gardées militairement, et un fonctionnaire est placé à chaque 500 mètres; et deux ou trois à chaque pont.

2. Depuis dix jours on réquisitionne les chevaux des particuliers.

3. On a ordonné aux trois grands moulins, l'un à Yamboli, l'autre à Karnobat, le troisième ici, de tenir à la disposition de l'armée 50,000 tonnes de farine.

4. On a ordonné à tous les pharmaciens de dire la quantité d'objets à pansements et médicaments qu'ils peuvent fournir dans le plus bref délai.

5. Lundi passé une commission militaire et civile a acheté de notre ville tous les mocassins ("tsaroukhs") existant chez les marchands ici.

J'ai, &c.
ATT. TACCHELLA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 295.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Mr. Barclay.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, September 25, 1912.*

SINCE my return from Belgrade at the end of last week I have endeavoured to find out all that I can regarding the military preparations that have been made in Bulgaria during the last few weeks. I have now the honour to put before you a list of these preparations and an analysis of their importance as bearing on the question of whether Bulgaria intends to force war upon Turkey or not.

The chief preparations that have been made are as follows:

1. The men who should have been dismissed from military service on the 14th instant have been retained with the colours.

2. Twenty million rounds of small-arm ammunition have been purchased and distributed amongst the regimental depôts. There have also been other movements of ammunition to Philippopoli.

3. Five hundred horses have been purchased.

4. Large purchases of grain, flour, and cloth have been made.

5. The railway lines have been picketed to prevent the destruction of bridges and culverts.

6. All horses, carts, cattle, and food-stuffs in the country have been counted.

7. The newspapers have been forbidden to publish military information.

8. General Savof, ex-Minister of War, is reported to have been received by the King.

The first seven of these preparations are precautions that might be considered desirable on the eve of war. The question therefore arises whether they place Bulgaria in a sufficiently favourable position to enable her to fight Turkey, or are only taken with a view to impressing Turkey and the Powers, and to bringing about the autonomy of Macedonia without a war.

As regards the retention of men with the colours, the number of men retained may be taken to be about 20,000. The cost to the State of their retention probably works out to between 100*l.* and 500*l.* a-day, and this is a large sum for a small State like Bulgaria to pay unnecessarily. It will be interesting to see whether the reservists, who should be dismissed to their homes on the 27th instant after attending the manœuvres at Shumla, are retained beyond that date.

The small-arm ammunition was ordered early in the year, and the fact that it has been distributed does not appear to be of great importance. It is, however, important to note that no further orders for ammunition appear to have been given, and that the total stock in the country is believed to amount to not more than 700 rounds per rifle. This is insufficient for a country whose sources of supply would probably be cut off on the outbreak of war.

The number of horses purchased during the year is stated to be 1,700. Of this number 1,200 were ordered early in the year, and I cannot find any confirmation of the statement that a further 500 have been purchased lately. The number that they would require for a full mobilisation of the field army would probably amount to about 14,000. There would be no means of getting these after the outbreak of war if Russia and Austria stopped supplies.

The purchases of food-stuffs and cloth can be utilised even if war does not take place. I understand, however, that unusually high prices are in some cases being paid.

The picketing of the line appears to be an unnecessary precaution. Turkey is not anxious for war, and would be unlikely to provoke it by outrages at the present time.

The ban against the publication of military information is a natural and inexpensive precaution.

General Savof was Minister of War under the late Stamboulovist Government. He and some of his fellow-Ministers are being proceeded against by the present Government on account of the misappropriation of public money during the time that they were in office. It is thought that if General Savof were reinstated in the army, as would probably happen in the event of war, the case against these Ministers would be dropped. To this fact is ascribed much of the clamour for war which has proceeded from the Opposition. The mere fact of the King receiving General Savof would not, however, appear to force the Government to relax in any way their prosecution of him and the other Ministers.

An analysis of the military precautions taken leads to two conclusions:—

1. That the total cost of these precautions is not large in proportion to the stakes for which Bulgaria is playing.

2. That they do not suffice to place Bulgaria in a favourable position to commence a war that would probably last for a considerable time.

I am of the opinion that at the present time Bulgaria does not seem to go to war. A fact that helps me to this conclusion is that General Fitchef, the chief of the General Staff, whose conversations with military attachés are usually confined to platitudes or to questions of *Weltpolitik*, which he likes to discuss, has suddenly become communicative. He is now not unwilling to give information regarding Turkey, and the favourable position in which Bulgaria is at the present time placed with regard to her enemy.

There is one factor with regard to Bulgaria which should not be ignored and which may upset all conclusions to which a consideration of facts may lead. The Bulgarian people have an absolute belief in themselves and in their army, and contempt for the Turks and Roumanians, which in neither case is merited. This state of mind may cause them to compel the King and the Government to send an ultimatum or to force war on Turkey without being properly prepared and in spite of the risk that they run that Roumania may attack them in rear.

I do not see any reason to agree with the statement that is often made that the winter is an unfavourable time for Bulgaria to make war. She is an agricultural country, and her theatre of war is probably intended to be the valley of the Maritza, and not the more mountainous district to the south of Sophia.

I have only dealt with the military points of the present situation as seen from Sophia, and have addressed a separate despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade regarding recent events in the Servian army.

I have, &c.
E. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[40850] No. 296.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Belgrade, September 26, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 57 of the 24th instant I have mentioned that M. Pashitch did not think that in case of war against Turkey Servia need seriously apprehend that Austria would attack her. So far as I can gather, the Servian Government do not propose, should war break out, to allow themselves to be restrained by any consideration in this connection. They recognise the futility of endeavouring to oppose Austria, and their idea is therefore said to be to join Bulgaria with all the forces at their disposal (about 164,000 men), leaving Belgrade and the north entirely unprotected, and, in the event of Austrian troops entering Servian territory, to appeal to the Powers for justice.

No attempt to induce the Servian Government to dissociate themselves from Bulgaria is likely to succeed, as, in addition to the question of interests in Macedonia, they fear the Bulgarian Government would, if balked in this manner of going to war with Turkey, turn round upon Servia and come to some arrangement with Austria about Servia and Macedonia.

My Russian colleague, M. de Hartwig, is of opinion that, whilst negotiations are certainly in progress between Servia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro with a view to presenting a demand for reforms to Turkey, there is good reason to believe that the Servian Government will not be drawn into taking any decisive step without first consulting the Powers.

The Government organ, the "Samouprava," of the 24th instant, has a long leading article on the present situation, in which, among other passages intended to reassure the public, it says:—

"There can be no serious warlike complications against the wish of the Great Powers. The Balkans have penetrated so far into the region of the great interests of Europe that the idea of any Power either great or small acting merely in its own interests is excluded. This circumstance removes the danger of war more or less indefinitely."

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[41064] No. 297.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, September 30, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that reports of mobilisation from Turkey have had an unfortunate effect on the situation, and that Servian Government would have to mobilise.

The information just received by Servian Government is that the second inspection comprising the Salonica, Monastir, Uskub Army Corps of fifty-eight battalions,

divisions of Drama, Serres, Uskub, and Mitroviza, have been mobilised. Ibrahim Pasha is said to have asked for 50,000 rifles for arming population and Bashi-Bazouks.

I said that information I had received was that Turkish Government had abandoned their original scheme of grand manœuvres, but Under-Secretary of State maintained his information to be correct, and that Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared to Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople that Turkey was mobilising.

Under-Secretary of State further said that Servian Government would probably recall their Minister from Constantinople, as the Turkish Government are obdurate over the war material question.

Russian Minister informs me that two days ago Bulgarian Government sent a request to Servian Government to commence mobilisation in twenty-four hours, but that he was able to induce Servian Government to postpone giving order.

There is, however, no doubt that everything is fully prepared for mobilisation here, and order may be given at any moment.

I have not taken any steps in the sense of your telegrams Nos. 22 and 23 of the 27th and 29th September, as my French colleague has had no instructions as yet.

Notwithstanding change for the worse in the situation, there seems no real nervousness in financial circles, and there seems to be an impression that the Balkan States desire to push matters as far as possible short of actual war.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[41022] No. 298.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, September 30, 1912.*

KING of Servia has signed order for general mobilisation. Skuptchina has been convoked for 3rd October.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[41021] No. 299.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 29th September.

Decision to mobilise has not yet been taken. Russian chargé d'affaires is speaking this afternoon in the sense desired, and I will take first opportunity of doing the same.

There has apparently been some difficulty in bringing Servia into line, and it is unlikely that any of the four States will act separately.

There has been similar difficulty with regard to joint representation referred to in your telegram No. 172 of 27th September, and it is at least possible that idea will be abandoned.

[41023] No. 300.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, September 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 29th September.

None of my colleagues have so far received similar instructions except Russian Minister.

When he communicated them to Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter replied that it was too late. Royal ukases ordering mobilisation would be published in a few hours in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[41024] No. 301.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, September 30, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 43 of 29th September.

Royal ukase just published orders general mobilisation to commence immediately, all classes from year 1886 onwards. Calm [group undecypherable : ? prevails].

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[41025] No. 302.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, September 30, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 45 of to-day.

M. Danef, probably sent by the King, has called on Russian Minister to tell him that the only means now left to avert war is the application of article 23 of Treaty of Berlin and the appointment of foreign Christian vali under the guarantee of the Powers. War would therefore seem inevitable. There is no bluff this time.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[40717] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 465.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson at his house on the evening of the 22nd instant to say that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that they had learnt that the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin had been speaking with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the measures which should be taken for "localising" hostilities should a conflict break out in the Balkans. His Highness asked whether any similar steps had been taken here by Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that, so far as he knew, no proposals had been put forward to His Majesty's Government by Austria-Hungary or Russia on that point, but that he thought that he recollected some allusion to localising the war in a telegram from Berlin. He promised to enquire when he returned to this Office next day.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40717] No. 304.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 479.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office on the 23rd instant and left with Sir A. Nicolson a paper identical with that enclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 406 of the 22nd instant. Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government had already spoken at Sophia, Belgrade, and Cettinje. As to point 4, his Excellency knew what I had said to the Turkish Ambassador.

Sir A. Nicolson promised to forward the paper to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40716] No. 305.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE Greek Minister, under instructions from his Government, informed Sir A. Nicolson that they understood that Italy did not intend to retain any of the Ægean islands; that some Powers had expressed a desire that she should not do so, but that some guarantees as to the future would be obtained from Turkey before the islands were definitely retroceded. The Greek Government wished to suggest that the Powers should see that a régime similar to that of Samos or of the Lebanon should be established for the Sporades under a Christian Governor-General selected by the Powers. It would, of course, be impossible to replace the islands exactly in the same political status as before, and an autonomy under Turkish suzerainty would be the best solution.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Gennadius that he would report this communication, and that he had no remark to make. M. Gennadius asked if Sir A. Nicolson would emit an opinion. Sir A. Nicolson asked to be excused from doing so.

Sir A. Nicolson took the opportunity of saying to M. Gennadius that he felt sure that M. Venizelos was too prudent and reasonable a statesman to be affected by the somewhat wild talk which was being held at Sophia and Belgrade, and would keep Greece peaceful and quite. M. Gennadius said he was sure M. Venizelos was most anxious that peace should be preserved, but that he feared that if a conflict did break out in the Balkans it would be very difficult for Greece to keep out of it.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[40588] No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires called on the 23rd instant and expatiated to Sir A. Nicolson on the warlike spirit existing in his country, the difficulty of keeping it within bounds, and the urgent necessity of the Powers inducing Turkey to grant immediate reforms.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Gruitch that his Government should restrain the hotheads in his country, as the Powers were all unanimous that peace must be maintained, and that anyone who disturbed it would do so at his risk and peril. It would be most imprudent for Servia to endeavour of herself to undertake the task of bringing pressure to bear on Turkey.

M. Gruitch said that Bulgaria and Servia in combination, if left to themselves, could very well bring Turkey to reason.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that it was really a head-strong and risky policy to contemplate any hostile action against Turkey, contrary to the wishes and in face of the warnings of all the Powers. Such a course of action would in all probability be disastrous to those who embarked on it, and was scarcely the best method of inducing Turkey to initiate reforms. He would very strongly counsel peace, patience, and moderation.

M. Gruitch asked whether His Majesty's Government had used similar language to Bulgaria, and Sir A. Nicolson said that Great Britain and other Powers had done so, both to her and to Montenegro.

M. Gruitch observed that Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria had never been so united before. Sir A. Nicolson said that if they were united in the cause of peace all would be well.

M. Gruitch continued to elaborate his views as to the danger of the situation—views with which we are well acquainted—and Sir A. Nicolson said that all he could advise was that no hostile or hasty action should be taken, but peace preserved and patience exercised.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[41008] No. 307.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires told Sir A. Nicolson on the the 24th instant that he had received instructions from M. Pasitch to express his hopes that in the programme of reforms which Turkey would be invited to introduce, the sanjak of Novi-Bazar and 3 or 4 cazas in the north of the Vilayet of Scutari would not be omitted, as had been the case in the Mürzteg Agreement.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Grouitch that he had no reason to believe that any special exceptions would be made by Turkey when she introduced reforms. M. Grouitch asked that we should remind Turkey to extend her reforms so as to cover the localities he had mentioned. Sir A. Nicolson said this seemed to be unnecessary and premature, and that it would be better to wait till further knowledge and more detailed information were obtained as to the scope and bearing of any reforms Turkey might introduce.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[40587] No. 308.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. T. Russell.

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.*

THE Austrian chargé d'affaires called on the 23rd instant and read to Sir A. Nicolson portions of a telegram from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople had been instructed to speak in a friendly and general way as to the hope that Turkey would be able to place the Powers in a position to say at the Balkan capitals that she was determined to meet as far as possible the wishes of the nationalities under her rule, and that impartial and free elections would be held. Moreover, Count Berchtold said that the Marquis Pallavicini could point out that though perhaps the nationalities were in part responsible for the present disturbed condition of affairs, still the misdeeds of certain Turkish Ambassadors were also blamable, and it would be a good thing were the Porte to mark their displeasure with the faults or crimes of these people.

Count Berchtold thought that the Russian proposal for intervention and a more or less specific programme of reforms might do more harm than good at Constantinople, and was, therefore, of opinion that friendly and general observations would be more likely to have practical results.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Trauttmansdorff generally what His Majesty's Government had said and done both here with the representatives of the Balkan States and at the various Balkan capitals, as well as with the Turkish Ambassador here and with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople. Count Trauttmansdorff said that this was in harmony with what Count Berchtold had done. Sir A. Nicolson told him that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was quite satisfied with our procedure.

Count Trauttmansdorff said that their last news from Sophia was not very reassuring.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[41020] No. 309.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 414.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 30, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs absolutely denies calling up of four redif divisions mentioned in my telegram No. 411 of to-day, and French and Russian Embassies have no confirmation of the news.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[41197] No. 310.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 459 of 28th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent instructions in the sense of your telegram No. 676 of 29th September to Constantinople to French Ambassador there yesterday morning. He has been told that representations should be made to Porte in most friendly manner, and that it is desirable that any action taken by the Powers should be simultaneous but not collective. French representatives at Berlin and Vienna have been instructed to concert with their British and Russian colleagues in urging on German and Austro-Hungarian Governments common action on the part of all the Powers at Constantinople in Balkan States.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will communicate to me his views in a note to-night.

[41198] No. 311.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 454 of 27th September.

French representatives at Sophia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinjé having reported that proposal to make a formal representation to Great Powers had been dropped Minister for Foreign Affairs does not consider that any representations on the subject are necessary. French representatives have been instructed to act in the sense desired by you should proposal be revived.

[41199] No. 312.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 1, 1912.*

BERLIN telegram No. 124 of 29th September, second paragraph.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed German chargé d'affaires that he shares the views of German Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to reply to Bulgarian Government.

[41189] No. 313.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 1, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché considers that number of men ordered to be mobilised amounts, roughly, to 360,000 in all, 150,000 in Servia, 80,000 in Greece.

Cavalry regiment from Sophia has moved to Yamboli.

Tirnovo Stara Sagora trans-Balkan line is to be available for military traffic in about a fortnight. Order for 30,000,000 small-arms ammunition has been distributed among four Austrian firms.

[41039] No. 314.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, October 1, 1912.*

MOBILISATION ordered. Ten classes army reserve and four classes territorial forces called up.

[41174] No. 315.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 1, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

In consequence of mobilisation, Chamber must meet within five days, and it is thought probable that Cretan deputies will be admitted.

[41190] No. 316.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 47.)
Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 1, 1912.*

UNLESS Turkey can be induced to demobilise, war now seems to be inevitable. Attitude here is that they are tired of Turkish promises of reform so often given and never kept, and of listening to pacific advice of the Powers who do nothing to help them.

Mobilisation brings about 120,000 men under arms. Crown Prince has been appointed commander-in-chief, and will leave for Thessaly after the arrival of the King on 5th October.

[41193] No. 317.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 29th September: Warning against mobilisation.

Russian Minister made a representation in this sense yesterday.

King confined himself to giving assurance that he would be the last of the Balkan Sovereigns to mobilise.

[41279] No. 318.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 1, 1912.*

ORDERS were issued this morning to prepare for mobilisation.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[41191] No. 319.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October 1, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister received instructions, mentioned in your telegram No. 23 of 29th September, yesterday, when the decree of mobilisation had already been issued. Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, assured him that, notwithstanding mobilisation, King and Government were still most anxious to do all in their power to avoid war, and, he added confidentially, that mobilisation would not be hurried and would not be complete for a fortnight.

As all my colleagues have now received instructions, I shall urge on Servian Government recommendation to avoid movements of troops to frontier.

[41192] No. 320.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October 1, 1912.*

AFTER a year's absence in France, Prince George returned to Belgrade last night. This is regrettable, inasmuch as he has a considerable following in the army, and he is likely to use his influence to encourage agitation.

[41200] No. 321.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, October 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Paris No. 454 of 27th September: Proposed representation by Balkan States.

Similar instructions were sent by Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Austro-Hungarian representative in Balkan States.

[41201] No. 322.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Constantinople No. 676 of 29th September: Proposed advice to Turkey.

I communicated substance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday morning, and was given to understand that, according to Austrian information, the Turkish manœuvres had been split up in such a way as to avoid giving cause for alarm to Bulgaria, and that in those circumstances proposed step at Constantinople and Balkan capitals seemed unnecessary. A few hours later, however, when the news of the Bulgarian and Servian mobilisation reached Vienna I returned to the Ministry and was informed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had just acted, somewhat tardily it was admitted, in the sense of your above-mentioned telegram. Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople had been instructed, if all his colleagues were similarly instructed, to urge strongly on the Porte the necessity of withdrawing Turkish troops from the frontier, while Austro-Hungarian representatives in the Balkan capitals had been instructed to persuade Bulgarian, Servian, and Greek Governments to cancel forthwith their mobilisation orders.

Exact terms of these instructions have been telegraphed to Count Mensdorff for communication to you.

Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to a question in the delegations last night stated that between mobilisation and war lay a very [? group omitted] and responsibility for decision, and that great Powers were striving hard for the maintenance of peace.

In accordance with explicit instructions received from Ministry last night the press argues in to-day's issues that mobilisation does not signify war, and that hostilities will in all probability still be averted.

[41202] No. 323.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 1, 1912.*

I LEARN from Servian Minister that all Servian subjects, including clerk in his legation, have been recalled to Belgrade for military service.

Servian Minister does not think that Austria-Hungary contemplates any military movement at present.

[41203] No. 324.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 1, 1912.*

NO information yet concerning any movement by Austria-Hungary. It is not considered likely that additional troops will be sent into Bosnia or the Herzegovina, but if concentration near Servia is intended it is more probable that a zone in Hungarian south and south-west of Temesvar will be chosen.

Bulgarian military attaché in course of conversation with military attaché stated that Bulgaria would have immediately at her disposal nine divisions of twenty-four battalions, each to be increased later to eighteen similar divisions with five aeroplanes. Servia would have initially five divisions. One Bulgarian division was calculated as equal to two Turkish, and estimated number of Turkish divisions exclusive of redifs was twelve in European Turkey with seventeen aeroplanes. Bulgarians knew Turks had been mobilising for six days. He said that Bulgarians were confident that result of initial encounter would be the withdrawal of Turks to Adrianople and siege of that fortress.

[41210] No. 325.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 1, 1912.*

AT an interview which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, his Excellency informed me that he considers danger of war imminent, as Turkey has no option but to defend herself in view of the orders issued by the Balkan States for a general mobilisation. Seeing that the present Government's general policy was to introduce reforms both in Asia Minor and Europe, and in view of the fact that they were doing all in their power to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Kotchana massacres, Turkish Government consider attack absolutely without provocation.

The Turkish Government are convinced that if war is to be avoided, Austria must make use of very peremptory language at Belgrade. The Minister, however, seemed doubtful as to whether Austria's intentions were peaceful, and whether Germany, her ally, would be inclined to exercise a restraining influence on her. Pressure would also have to be brought to bear on Athens, if necessary by a blockade, by Great Britain.

The Government would be unable to avert the most serious carnage which, in his opinion, would result in Asia Minor from an attack on the islands by Greece, and throughout Islamic countries the effect of four Christian Powers making an unprovoked attack on Turkey would without doubt be seriously felt.

[41204] No. 326.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 1, 1912.*

HAVING received information that preparations were being made to imitate military measures taken in Greece, we summoned the Cretan Government this afternoon and asked for explanation.

They informed us that they had been informed from Athens of the Greek mobilisation, and that decree for mobilisation of all the reserves of the Cretan militia was already signed and would be promulgated this evening, and that in case of war between Greece and Turkey, militia would be sent *en bloc* to assist former. Thousands of volunteers would probably go also and would be supplied with arms by the Cretan Government. Neither men nor munitions of war would, however, leave island before the declaration of war.

They said that patriotism and the duty of Crete towards Greece overpowered all other considerations and that the whole of Crete was unanimous.

We replied that we should report matter to our Governments, who we were sure, would not tolerate participation of Crete in a war against Turkey.

In the case of war, we think that the best way to prevent departure of Cretans, would be to declare Crete in a state of blockade so far as ships under the Greek and Cretan flags are concerned, and to increase naval force in Cretan waters in order to render blockade reasonably efficacious.

If war breaks out there will be universal excitement in Crete, and the internal situation will become difficult and dangerous.

(Sent to Athens.)

[40992] No. 327.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 215.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1912.

HERR von KÜHLMANN read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 28th September a telegram from Herr von Kiderlen to the effect that the Bulgarian Minister had stated that the Bulgarian Government considered that the mobilisation of the Turkish redifs was a menace, and if persisted in would compel Bulgaria to take such measures as she might consider necessary. The Bulgarian Minister had added that perhaps the Powers would take steps at Constantinople with the view of inducing Turkey to counterorder the mobilisation.

Herr von Kiderlen would not object to giving this advice at Constantinople if the other Powers associated themselves in the step and if Bulgaria were to give some positive proof that she would adopt a peaceful attitude.

Sir A. Nicolson told Herr von Kühlmann that he would report this communication to me. Sir A. Nicolson added, as his personal opinion, that if the Powers were to approach Turkey on that point, she would probably reply that in view of what was passing near her frontiers, and the language and attitude of the Balkan States, she was compelled to take certain preparatory measures, and that she could not abandon them unless the Powers were to guarantee that none of the Balkan States would disturb the peace. Sir A. Nicolson did not know if the Powers would be disposed or able to give such a guarantee. Sir A. Nicolson gave Herr von Kühlmann in outline what had been said to Tewfik Pasha and to the various Balkan States, and pointed out that Turkey had apparently abandoned her intention of holding manœuvres in the Adrianople vilayet.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41195] No. 328.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 418.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 1, 1912.

IN reply to Servian and Bulgarian mobilisation, Turkish Government have now decreed general mobilisation, which probably includes all effectives except those of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia.

(Repeated to Sophia, Belgrade, Athens, and Vienna.)

[41215] No. 329.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October* 1, 1912.

MY telegram No. 17 of 1st October.

After consultation with my Russian and French colleagues I made a representation to Minister for Foreign Affairs based on your telegram No. 23 of 20th September. I stated that I had been instructed to urge Servian Government to take no steps for mobilisation. This was now unfortunately too late, but it was most desirable that Servian Government should avoid any action, such as moving troops to the frontier, which might provoke a counter-movement on the part of Turkey, or do anything which might lead to a rupture of relations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, to show the good intentions of Servia he had cancelled instructions sent to Servian Minister to leave Constantinople to-day if he could not get satisfaction from the Porte over the war-material question. As regards movements of troops these were subject to military exigencies, and the Government could not well interfere with the military authorities, but he was most anxious not to precipitate conflict, and Servia would be as prudent as compatible with safety. I said that it seemed improbable that Servian Government could have any fear of attack from Turkey, and to secure a peaceful issue it was desirable to remain quiet and to gain time.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that if Turkey would give promise to Powers as to application of article 23 of Berlin Treaty and appointed Christian valis in Macedonia situation would be saved. I replied that my personal view was that if Balkan States persisted in this attitude it would be difficult to arrive at a solution.

Russian, French, and German Ministers have made similar representations. Austrian Minister was instructed to join, but, in view of mobilisation, has telegraphed for fresh instructions and hopes to see Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow.

Russian Minister thinks that, if Turkish Government could be induced to promise Powers even the smallest concession, it would much strengthen the hands of the Servian and Bulgarian Governments against agitation and much diminish the present tension.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[41393] No. 330.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 19 of 1st October.

Austrian Minister, who is most anxious Servian Government should understand that Austria is acting in agreement with other Powers, told Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning that he entirely associated himself with representations made by his colleagues yesterday. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave him the same replies as to myself, adding that mobilisation would occupy some time. I learn, however, that mobilisation is being accelerated and is likely to be complete in three days.

An offer by Turkey made to Powers to give some reforms as desired by Christian population seems to be the only prospect now of avoiding a conflict, and any steps to secure an offer should be hastened as much as possible since mobilisation was making situation increasingly uncertain and dangerous, and Government may lose control of circumstances.

It seems to me likely from manner of Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that Servian, and probably Bulgarian, Governments would not resolutely insist on article 23 of Berlin Treaty and appointment of Christian valis, but if given a fair chance would be willing to discuss and demobilise if Turkey would do likewise.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[41395] No. 331.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 420.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 2, 1912.

TURKISH Government have issued orders forbidding the departure of all Greek merchant vessels, on the ground of their being required in connection with movements of troops. Greek Minister has entered an energetic protest, and Minister for Foreign Affairs has undertaken to examine question.

[41333] No. 332.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 2, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 1st October.

Mobilisation will be complete to-morrow. Russian Minister tells me very confidentially that he has obtained promise from the King not to begin hostilities on the frontier; but ten battalions of Turkish infantry and 5,000 Bashi-Basouks are stated to be advancing to Scutari through the Seltchi defile along the frontier. It would be most desirable to induce the Porte by any possible means to stop them. Otherwise conflict appears to be imminent quite irrespective of the course of events in other parts of the Balkans.

I still think that the King is pacific, but fears for his position and prestige make him incapable of showing it or opposing his advisers and other warlike elements here.

Should Turkish troops come near frontier he will be powerless to keep his promise.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[41347] No. 333.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 2, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 407 of 28th September.

Attack on convoy made by Albanians, but no doubt Montenegrins participated in it.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[41348] No. 334.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 2, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 25 of 1st October.

German Minister received instructions after orders for mobilisation had been issued and it was too late to take any action.

[41299] No. 335.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 29th September.

Austrian Minister has received instructions to urge Greek Government to demobilise. French chargé d'affaires is also instructed to speak very plainly to prevent any inconsiderate action. Instructions of German chargé d'affaires are similar to mine. We propose to go together to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to impress upon him the danger of provocative action, and above all of making any concession to the Cretans which would at once precipitate war. I would be glad to learn whether any steps are being taken for reoccupation of Crete or whether Turkish mobilisation can be delayed.

It would strengthen our representations if we were authorised to state that Powers will give guarantee that concessions promised to Christian population shall be effectively carried out.

[41341] No. 336.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 2. Treaty.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 2, 1912.*

PLEASE inform me whether British subjects can claim exemption for horses or other personal property requisitioned by Greek Government for the purpose of mobilisation.

[41353] No. 337.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 2, 1912.*

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY has made no move. Honved Minister Hazel stated confidentially to a member of the Hungarian delegation that no general or partial mobilisation was intended, but that time-expired men would be retained with the battalions. There is reason to believe that officers of reserve of technical troops have been warned to hold themselves in readiness to join, and also officers of the following corps: 16th Herzegovina, 15th Bosnian, 13th Agram, 7th Temesvar, 3rd Graz. Connection by telephone with military centres was prohibited to-day. Minister of War in Austrian delegation denied rumours of mobilisation, and stated that Austria would take no steps in the meantime. This is in accordance with information from Italian sources that pressure is being put upon Austria by Germany to refrain from action. Russian Embassy have received orders to state that test mobilisation in Poland is normal and has no significance.

[41363] No. 338.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 2, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

At an interview which I had yesterday with the Servian Minister he used language almost identical to that of M. Gueshof, except that he expressed himself still more forcibly. He said that Servia would die fighting if Russia executed her threat and remained inactive whilst Austria entered her territory: Servian policy would be completely reversed, and she become one of the most loyal partners of the Dual Monarchy. Russia, France, and England had now to decide without a moment's delay between propping up a Turkey in a state of decomposition, followed by the consequent advance of Austria to Salonica, or supporting as a barrier to that advance a solid block of friendly Balkan States, amongst which Turkey herself would ultimately be included.

As M. Spalaikovitch has been one of the leading factors of the present situation his views are not without importance.

[41349] No. 339.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, October 2, 1912.*

SOBRANJÉ convoked in extraordinary session for 5th October.

[41351] No. 340.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 2, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires declares that Bulgaria will be ready to-morrow and Servia on Friday, and he hopes, and evidently thinks it probable, that war will be declared this week in order not to give time to the Powers to exercise pressure and to the Porte to complete her preparations. He says that the whole business is engineered by Bulgaria, and he realises that Servia stands to gain least and suffer most. He is convinced that Austria-Hungary will occupy Belgrade at once, and says that Servia has mobilised 300,000 men, which means that she expects to have to defend herself against Austria-Hungary, as 200,000 would have been enough for fighting Turkey. Defence against Austria-Hungary would be of guerrilla nature, so that Austria-Hungary would require very large force and much time to make any effect. Belgrade itself would no doubt be evacuated at once. He has been told, but not by his own Government, that Serbo-Bulgarian treaty includes a clause that they shall only attack Turkey when they receive word from Russia, and he is convinced, though M. Sazonof and even M. Kokowzew may have nothing to do with it, Bulgaria and Servia are being pushed on by Russian influences.

Greek chargé d'affaires is less optimistic than he was, but still seems to think that war will be avoided by grant of some concessions. He believes even Bulgarians do not really want to fight.

German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs takes line to me and all my colleagues, even those of Balkan States, that war is probably now inevitable, and that we must see to its localisation, but he makes no definite suggestions.

[41350] No. 341.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 2, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister has this afternoon communicated to French Minister for Foreign Affairs demands of the Balkan States. They are:—

1. Nomination by the Porte with the consent of the Powers of a Swiss or Belgian Governor-General.
2. Institution of legislative assemblies.
3. Creation of local gendarmeries.
4. Carrying out of reforms under the supervision of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and of the representatives at Constantinople of the four Balkan States.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had said to Bulgarian Minister that for four Balkan Governments to mobilise, and then to ask the Powers' support for such demands, failing which there would be war, was putting the knife to your throat. The mobilisation had been unnecessary, and what was necessary now was that troops of Balkan States should not be concentrated, so that the Powers might consider what could reasonably be done; for to put forward such demands as Bulgarian Minister had communicated to him would be to provoke Turkey to war.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that best chance of averting war would be an understanding between Russia and Austria to put restraining pressure on Bulgaria and Servia pending a consideration of the situation by the Powers. He fears, however, from a conversation this afternoon with the Russian Ambassador, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who arrives at Paris this evening, will propose that the Powers should present to the Porte a programme of reforms which it is not likely to accept.

[41210] No. 341 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 2, 1912*

PARAGRAPH 2 of Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 417.

I suppose that Greeks living in Egypt may be exposed to attacks if war is declared, or if the Greek fleet makes a descent upon any of the Ægean islands.

165*

[41191] No. 342 A.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.**

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1912.

YOU should associate yourself in any representations in regard to which all your colleagues have received instructions from their respective Governments respecting advice to Government to which you are accredited to counterorder mobilisation or to refrain from dispatching troops to the frontier.

You will understand that you should not take any action until all your colleagues have received identic instructions.

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* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 30), Mr. Beaumont (No. 185), and Count de Salis (No. 82).

[41204] No. 342.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 482.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 2, 1912.*

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 138 of 1st October.

Enquire of Government to which you are accredited whether they would be disposed to send vessels to establish as effective a blockade as possible, and to warn Cretan Government that the Powers intend that Cretan neutrality should be observed. If an occupation is necessary the force would have to be a considerable one, as the islanders are excited, and there are large stocks of rifles in the island for arming volunteers.

[41615] No. 343.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. T. Russell.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1912.*

SIR A. NICOLSON told Count Trauttmansdorff to-day that we had sent instructions to the four Balkan capitals, as desired by Count Berchtold, to urge the various Governments to demobilise and not to move troops to the frontier. In fact, Sir A. Nicolson said that our representatives at those capitals had now received general instructions to associate themselves with all their colleagues in the above sense and direction if their colleagues received instructions. As to saying anything at Constantinople, as desired by Count Berchtold, to the effect that Turkey should not send redifs to the frontier, we had not done so—firstly, because since his request had been made Turkey had been compelled to mobilise, and, secondly, because the pressure should first be placed on the Balkan States, as they had been the first to mobilise.

Sir A. Nicolson also told Count Trauttmansdorff, as M. Sazonof had desired that he should do, that he hoped Count Berchtold would keep in close touch with his Russian colleague, and that Austria would not take any measures which might excite Russian public opinion. Sir A. Nicolson gathered, he said, from M. Sazonof that the latter was fairly confident that Russian public opinion would not become unmanageable so long as a conflict, if one were to break out, were confined to the Balkan States and Turkey, but that the case might be otherwise if Austria were to advance, for instance, into Servia. Sir A. Nicolson hoped Count Berchtold would consider these observations as quite unofficial and friendly, but we were very anxious that Austria and Russia should have no differences, and also that all the Powers should act together. Austria and Russia were the most directly interested, and the closer they kept together the better.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41616] No. 344.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 472.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1912.*

SIR A. NICOLSON asked Tewfik Pasha to-day whether he might speak to him as an old friend and quite unofficially as to the existing situation. Sir A. Nicolson asked whether his Highness thought it possible for his Government to declare in some way their firm intention to carry out reforms and to discuss the question with the Powers.

His Highness replied that his Government had already announced their intention to carry out reforms, but that it was quite impossible for any Turkish Government at this moment, and under the provocation of the four Balkan States, to have the appearance of yielding to threats. Tewfik Pasha expatiated on the unprovoked attitude of the Balkan States, and gave Sir A. Nicolson to understand that a pronouncement by Turkey of any concessions in the way of reforms was barred by their action.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 947, Telegraphic).

Sir A. Nicolson asked whether it would not be possible for Turkey to make peace without delay with Italy, as this might have a calming effect. Tewfik Pasha replied that he believed his Government were most anxious to make peace, and that the mission of Reshid Pasha was with that object. His Highness had not heard how the negotiations were progressing.

Tewfik Pasha said that Turkey was quite equal to tackling the Balkan States, but he did fear, with Gabriel Effendi, that, if war did break out, reprisals of a grave nature might be taken against the Christians in Turkey. His Highness said the Powers should exercise the strongest pressure possible on the Balkan States to demobilise.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41204] No. 345.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea regarding the seriousness of the situation in Crete.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn at their Lordships' earliest convenience what vessels they could conveniently send to Cretan waters if, as is possible, the protecting Powers decide to blockade the island in order to prevent Cretan militia reserves from proceeding to Greece.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[41368] No. 346.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 422.)

Sir, *Paris, October 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 142 of yesterday's date, to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to one which I addressed to his Excellency on the receipt of your telegram No. 459 of the 29th ultimo on the subject of representations to the Porte as to moving redif divisions towards the Bulgarian frontier, and to the four Balkan States with regard to their mobilisation.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 346.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

PAR une note en date d'hier son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire savoir à M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, que Sir Edward Grey a donné son assentiment à une proposition du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie tendant à conseiller au Gouvernement ottoman de ne pas rassembler à la frontière les divisions de rédifs, récemment appelées, si, de leur côté, les États balkaniques ne mobilisent pas. Sir Francis Bertie a ajouté que le représentant anglais à Constantinople a reçu l'ordre de donner cet avis à la Porte dans le cas où ses collègues recevraient des instructions similaires et, d'autre part, que, si toutes les Puissances étaient d'accord, des représentations pressantes pourraient être faites à Belgrade, Athènes, Sophia et Cettigné, en vue d'obtenir des États balkaniques qu'ils ne mobilisent pas ou ne portent pas leurs troupes sur la frontière.

* No. 326.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il partage sur ces deux points les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et que des instructions conformes ont été envoyées dès hier à Constantinople, Sophia, Belgrade, Athènes et Cettigné.

Paris, le 1er octobre, 1912.

[41722] No. 347.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, October 3, 1912.

NOS représentants en Bulgarie, Serbie et Grèce nous signalent les mobilisations générales simultanées décrétées dans ces trois États; quant au Monténégro, ses mesures et ses dispositions agressives étaient déjà notoires. Il y là évidemment une simultanéité d'action qui ne peut être interprétée que comme la mise en exécution d'un plan concerté. Nous en avions des indices que nous suivions avec l'attention qu'exigeait leur importance. Mais jusqu'à ces derniers jours nous nous refusions à croire que sans aucun motif donné par nous la coalition des États susmentionnés pût revêtir le caractère d'une menace. Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman soucieux avant tout d'assurer le développement des institutions du nouveau régime et animé des meilleures intentions, s'est constamment appliqué à ne suivre dans son attitude vis-à-vis des États balkaniques qu'une politique pacifique, conciliante et même en bien des cas empreinte d'une longanimité que la malveillance seule a pu interpréter comme une marque de faiblesse. Il serait superflu de rappeler toutes les occasions dans lesquelles le nouveau Cabinet a fait preuve d'une patience excessive en réponse aux provocations d'éléments perturbateurs encouragés par la tolérance, sinon la complicité, d'autorités. Il a même dans l'esprit le plus large évité de donner trop d'importance aux tentatives desdits États de s'occuper abusivement des affaires intérieures de l'Empire, estimant que la seule réponse à y faire était d'étudier en conformité et en exécution de son programme les mesures les plus efficaces à prendre pour donner sans tarder satisfaction aux demandes et réclamations jugées fondées et légitimes des diverses populations de l'Empire.

Non seulement le nouveau Cabinet n'a fourni aucun prétexte à une action dirigée par les États voisins contre l'Empire, mais il a soigneusement évité tout ce qui aurait pu avoir l'air d'une provocation de sa part. S'il s'est vu obligé de prendre des mesures militaires de précaution et de les prendre d'urgence, c'est uniquement à la suite des nouvelles inquiétantes venant surtout de la Bulgarie où le Gouvernement risquait de ne pouvoir enrayer l'effervescence belliqueuse provoquée dans les masses par des agitateurs dangereux. Quant aux manœuvres, dont on a cherché à dénaturer le caractère et la portée, elles se réduisent à des exercices d'entraînement qui n'ont rien d'anormal et qui sont exécutées séparément par nos divisions surtout en raison de la convocation annuelle des rédifs. Il ne reste donc évidemment comme motif à leurs préparatifs de guerre que le simple désir desdits États de satisfaire leur ambition particulière au mépris du droit des gens, des principes humanitaires et des intérêts de la paix générale. En signalant cet état de choses à la plus sérieuse attention des Grandes Puissances, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman croit de son devoir de les prévenir qu'en présence de l'attitude manifestement agressive des États susdits, il réserve toute sa liberté d'action, convaincu que le monde civilisé ne manquera pas de rendre justice à son attitude, dont la modération ne peut exclure la dignité ni les soucis de sauvegarder sa sécurité et ses droits.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 3 octobre, 1912.

[41362] No. 348.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 2, 1912.*

I have just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked him what was going to happen now that the Turks had ordered general mobilisation. Would it be possible, I urged as a personal suggestion, to relieve tension by bringing about a gradual demobilisation on both sides. He replied that it was too late; no pressure, however strong,

from the Powers would bring about demobilisation, it would only accelerate outbreak of conflict. Besides demobilisation would probably mean the downfall of the King. He maintained that Turkey had started by sending large numbers of troops to the frontier, and in consequence Bulgaria had been obliged to order mobilisation in self-defence. Servia and Greece had joined her, they were united in a common cause and nothing would separate them.

I said I had heard Balkan States wanted application of article 23 of Berlin Treaty and appointment of foreign Christian valis, but if that was their minimum there seemed to be little chance of arriving at a peaceful solution. Turkey would not accord such demands, and Powers were not prepared to enforce them upon Turkey. He replied that Balkan States would endeavour to enforce their demands on Turkey. But I could not extract from him actual demands of Balkan States.

His Excellency said that he had received news from Monastir to the effect that Young Turks were regaining the upper hand; present Turkish Government was doomed; he could not understand how England could rely on such a broken reed as Kiamil Pasha; no Turkish Government would ever be strong enough to carry out serious reforms. The perpetual state of unrest in the Balkans must cease. Language held by Russia at Sophia, and especially at Belgrade, had, after all her past encouragement, provoked unspeakable revulsion of feeling. Bulgaria hoped that present British Government would remain faithful to the traditions of Mr. Gladstone.

Minister for Foreign Affairs' attitude was calm, and there is no doubt that Bulgaria has made up her mind to go to all lengths.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[41493] No. 349.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 3, 1912.*

BALKAN States will probably early next week present a memorandum to Powers and to the Porte demanding application of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and appointment of foreign Christian valis under the guarantee of the Powers, accompanied by declaration that they will respect present territorial *status quo*.

In view of heavy expenditure entailed by mobilisation and of extreme state of tension of public feeling, which will not allow time for lengthy discussion once army is concentrated on frontier, French Minister has suggested to his Government that the Powers should at once exchange views as to the answer that should be returned to the memorandum of the Balkan States. He has suggested that Powers should take official note of above-mentioned communication and of formal engagement as to the observance of territorial *status quo*, adding that Powers are collectively resolved to make that engagement binding on all parties whatever may be the consequences of a conflict.

This will, in French Minister's opinion, secure non-intervention on part of Austria-Hungary, as she could hardly refuse, without showing her hand, to associate herself with other Powers.

Matter is urgent, as the concentration of troops will be completed before the end of next week.

[41485] No. 350.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 3, 1912.*

REOCCUPATION of Crete.

Your telegram No. 478 of 1st October.

French Government are prepared to agree, but consider recourse should not be had to that extreme measure until after an attempt has been made to carry out the project for nominating a provisional commissioner in Crete.

[41498] No. 351.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 3, 1912.*

CRETE.

Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to examine question thoroughly before replying to proposals contained in your telegrams Nos. 482 of 2nd October and 490 of 3rd October.

[41489] No. 352.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 349.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 942 of 1st October and your telegram No. 947 of 2nd October.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed himself in favour of proposed blockade, and said that in addition to small Russian ships now in Cretan waters a cruiser was now on its way, and would arrive within a fortnight.

His Excellency considers reoccupation of the island very serious matter under the present circumstances as it would require large force, and it would be delicate matter for Russia to obtain permission to send her troops through the Straits. He would therefore personally prefer to restrict our action to an effective blockade, and on my calling his attention to danger of massacre of Mussulmans, suggested that we might land detachments of sailors to guard the towns where there is a Mussulman population.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he could not decide either question by himself, and that he must refer them both to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris. The latter would probably send reply direct to London through Russian Ambassador.

[41476] No. 353.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 3, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 2nd October.

Bulgarian Minister, who has returned from leave, considers war practically inevitable. He says that only means of avoiding it is for the Powers to put strong pressure on Turkey. He admits that if Balkan States win, their declaration against extension of territory will not be worth much as they each expect a "tartine." He seems to expect Austria, Russia, and Roumania to remain quiet and not to intervene. He says that Bulgaria will be ready on Monday or Tuesday and Servia a day or two later.

[41477] No. 354.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October 3, 1912.*

I HEAR on good authority that it has been arranged between Bulgaria and Servian military authorities that two Servian regiments should proceed to Sophia. As so insignificant a number of troops can have no fighting value the object must be to bind Servia irrevocably.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[41492] No. 355.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 3, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché was presented to-day to chief of general staff by his Russian colleague. In course of long conversation chief of the staff questioned Russian military attaché closely about Russian test mobilisation in Poland and was assured that it was normal and had no political intention. On being questioned in return chief of the staff emphatically declared that no other course than watching events was intended. No steps had been taken to reinforce regiments in Galicia or elsewhere and retention of two years' service men with battalions was rendered necessary by change from three to two years' service and was not in any way a result of the political situation.

[41490] No. 356.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 3, 1912.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that nothing could now prevent war breaking unless Powers would agree to take question of reforms in hand themselves and to insist at Constantinople on their immediate application. As it would be impossible to induce all the Powers to take such a step, he looked on war as inevitable and thought that Bulgaria and Servia would be ready to move in five days' time.

Russian public had so far accepted the situation calmly enough, and would, he believed, maintain their present attitude so long as Austria-Hungary did not move. He feared, however, that when war broke out Austria-Hungary would at once occupy sanjak, and in that case public opinion in this country would be roused to danger point.

View thus expressed by his Excellency is, I believe, correct. In the conversation with the Emperor, reported in my despatch No. 66, Secret, His Majesty said that were the Balkan States to be involved in war with Turkey there would be such an ebullition of Slav sympathy in Russia that, much as he desired peace, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. Even if Austria-Hungary does not take sanjak, it will be difficult for the Russian Government not to intervene should Bulgaria suffer reverses. It seems, therefore, essential if war is to be localised that Austria-Hungary and Russia should engage not to take any separate action.

Tone of Russian press has considerably cooled towards England during last few days in consequence of disappointment of hope that had been entertained that Balmoral meeting would bring about some combined action on the part of Triple *Entente* in connection with Balkan question.

[41356] No. 357.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 3, 1912.*

CRETE.

We are arranging with Admiralty to send vessels to Crete to enforce Cretan neutrality by effective blockade. Two vessels are already there and two more will be sent. Please urge French Government to do likewise. We propose that blockade should only be applied to vessels under Greek and Cretan flags, and should be limited to preventing Cretans from attempting to leave for Greece to join Greek army. Measures will, of course, not come into force till war has actually been declared.

(Repeated to Canea, No. 180; St. Petersburgh, No. 957; and Athens, No. 191.)

[41341] No. 358.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(No. 2. Treaty.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 2, Treaty. See article 13 of Commercial Treaty with Greece of 10th November, 1886.

[41356] No. 359.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 3, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant regarding the situation in Crete.

In reply, I am to request you to urge the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to cause the necessary instructions to be issued for the dispatch to the island of His Majesty's ship "Hampshire" and another vessel to reinforce the two ships already there. It is understood that these two additional ships can be sent from Gibraltar on the 5th instant. I am to add that Sir E. Grey considers that it would be well to have such naval force as is at present in the Mediterranean in readiness for emergencies.

A copy of a telegram which has been dispatched to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris is enclosed herewith,* from which it will be seen what instructions should be sent to the blockading squadron.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[41557] No. 360.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, October 3, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs expressed to me to-day his opinion that, were the King of the Bulgarians to take any steps to retract mobilisation in his country, there would, in present state of public opinion there, not improbably be a revolution. He considered that, if Austria and Russia worked together, there should be no difficulty in localising hostilities.

[41614] No. 361.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 427.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 4, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 145 of 2nd October.

Popular feeling in favour of war is being roused, meetings and demonstrations being organised. Press is united in advice to sink party differences against a common enemy, its tone being distinctly warlike. Under these circumstances it would seem all but impossible that any Turkish Government could accept any compromise or listen now to proposals such as suggested by Bulgarian Minister at Paris, or even a programme for reform put forward by the Powers, as foreshadowed in last sentence of that telegram.

(Confidential.)

In spite of apparent confidence of public in eventual success of Turkish arms, the higher commanders are beginning to realise their unpreparedness and the difficulties they will have in concentrating their armies.

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* No. 357.

[41622] No. 362.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 4, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 427 of to-day.

The view taken by Kiamil Pasha is that pressure might be brought to bear on Balkan States by the Powers to countermand mobilisation, Powers undertaking to discuss reforms for Macedonia here. His Highness attached much importance to necessity of pressure being brought by all the Powers simultaneously, and had spoken to German Ambassador in this sense. Latter had appeared to agree, and had promised to telegraph to Berlin.

[41655] No. 363.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 429. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 4, 1912.*

I HAVE been informed confidentially by Kiamil Pasha that in the event of war, according to information received by the Turkish Government, Italy would interfere actively on behalf of the Balkan States, and proposed to land a force of 30,000 men at a highly vulnerable point, the port of Dedeagatch.

The Turkish delegates at Ouchy have accordingly received instructions, issued on the 2nd, to propose favourable terms which, in his Highness's opinion, Italy might properly accept, and which, Kiamil Pasha hopes, may in a few days bring the war to an end.

These terms, I understand, would be evacuation of the islands and payment of indemnity by the Italians; autonomy under local ruler to be conceded to Tripoli and Benghazi; orders to be sent to the Turkish troops to cease fighting, though the Turkish Government could not guarantee that these orders would be obeyed.

[41618] No. 364.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 4, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 145 of 2nd October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Bulgarian Minister's communication was made without consulting Greek Government, but his language was almost equally warlike. He is exasperated at action of Turks in seizing Greek ships before hostilities had begun, and complains that the Turkish telegraph officials are holding back or mutilating telegrams exchanged between two countries. He has for nearly two days been without news from Constantinople.

My impression is that he is anxious that actual declaration of war should be made by Turkey.

Meeting of Chamber has been postponed until 7th October, but may be still further delayed, as it is technically only adjourned. He pretends that no decision has yet been reached with regard to Cretans.

[41617] No. 365.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 4, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador saw German Minister for Foreign Affairs twice yesterday and gave him an account of a conversation between French and Russian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and asked whether Germany would agree that either Russia or Austria as mandatories of the other Powers or of all five Powers together should declare to Balkan States that they would not "admettre" breach of the peace, and

that they would undertake to move Turkey to institute necessary reforms, making at the same time representations in that sense at Constantinople. German Minister for Foreign Affairs at first interview made two observations—(1) That phrase of not admitting breach of the peace must not mean that the Powers would prevent such breach by force, and (2) that Germany was not much inclined to demand from the Porte further reforms, at least not the excessive measures demanded by the Balkan States. M. Cambon insisted on the absolute necessity of further representations at Constantinople in favour of reforms, though not necessarily just those asked for by Balkan States, and German Minister for Foreign Affairs gave way. At second interview German Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had seen Chancellor, and had had excellent news from Vienna of Austrian readiness to keep in as far as possible with other Powers; Germany was ready to accept anything both Austria and Russia agreed. M. Cambon told him that France was ready to follow or to take the initiative as desired, and German Minister for Foreign Affairs said he did not care who led as long as someone did. Finally, they drafted together a telegram to Paris urging that Russia and Austria should present a note to the Balkan States and to Turkey, the two main points of which should be that the Powers would not in any case allow any change in the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans, and that they would "tenir main" in the execution of such reforms as would not infringe the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Germany had strongly advised Austria to communicate not with St. Petersburgh, but with Paris, as Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was there. M. Cambon presumes that that is being done to-day.

[41621] No. 366.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 2nd October.

Russian, Austrian, and Italian Ministers are urging the Montenegrin Government not to be first to commence hostilities; French and German Ministers are without instructions.

Montenegro will certainly follow any initiative taken by Bulgaria, but she could be urged not to precipitate events. None of my colleagues has, so far, been instructed to advise that mobilisation should be counter-ordered, nor would such advice, I venture to think, be of any use at the present moment.

[41619] No. 367.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 50. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 4, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day: Balkans.

I learn from a reliable source that, on opening of Greek Chamber, proposal will be submitted for recognising the Declaration of Union passed by Cretan Assembly in October 1908 and arranging for formal election to be held in the island. This is the preconcerted signal for the outbreak of hostilities. Chamber will not meet until all preparations by four States have been completed.

[41607] No. 368.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 4, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador, who has just seen King of Greece, informs me that His Majesty strongly disapproves of mobilisation of Greek army and complains bitterly of Bulgarian action which has brought it about. The King leaves Vienna to-night on his return to Athens.

[41624] No. 369.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 4, 1912.*

SERVIAN Legation here have just received telegram from their Government to the effect that Turkish troops are concentrating in great numbers on their frontier, and that situation becomes hourly more menacing. Servian military attaché has been summoned back to take command of a regiment.

[41606] No. 370.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 490 of 3rd October to Paris.

Should Cretan militia attempt to leave for Greece and precipitate declaration of war, I presume that we should do our best to prevent it. I doubt whether the assurance to the contrary of the Cretan Government is worth much.

[41627] No. 371.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 4, 1912.*

MILITIA reservists are coming in.

Bands of volunteers also being formed.

[41606] No. 372.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 4th October: Mobilisation of Cretan militiamen.

While doing your best to prevent such embarkation, you should do nothing in which your colleagues cannot join you.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 501; Athens, No. 200; and St. Petersburgh, No. 968.)

[41686] No. 373.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, September 24, 1912.*

IN the course of conversation a few days ago the King referred to Count Berchtold's proposals, remarking that he was without any information as to what might be the practical effect which it was desired to produce. An Albanian autonomy was an idea which it was hard for him to grasp. The Albanians, tenacious as they were of their own characteristics, had always been content to depend on some other Government. They had never formed an independent community nor had there been anything of the kind for the Turks to destroy when they conquered the country. Previous to that date the Albanians in the north had lived under the Serb dynasties which had ruled the country round Scutari. They were a people but not a nation, and it was hard for him to imagine how they could become one.

An article in the "Cettinski Vjesnik," explaining, it may be presumed, the views held in the highest quarters in this country, betrays the same anxiety with regard to the possible creation in the Balkans of a new non-Slav state. Such a state would, it is maintained, be an instrument in the hands of its protectors for paralysing the

existing Slav Governments according to the interests of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. No direct allusion is made to the barrier which the creation of an autonomous Albania would doubtless oppose to any hopes of Montenegrin expansion in the direction of Old Servia. A reminder of this nature is hardly required by readers of the "Vjesnik," and it is difficult to understand on what grounds the "Reichspost" of Vienna can have considered itself justified in stating early in the month that Count Berchtold's proposals had been favourably received in Cettinjé.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[41714] No. 374.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, October 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to the naval force which may be required to enforce the neutrality of Crete by means of a blockade, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that arrangements have been made for four ships (in all) to be shortly in Cretan waters. Two ships are at present at Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[41637] No. 375.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 4, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Varna, 4th October:—

"Prefect informs me that entrance to port is mined. Vessels must anchor 3 miles outside bay of Varna and hoist pilot flag. Entrance and exit allowed between 8 A.M. and 6 P.M. No lights allowed at night along coast.

"Troops leave by sea and by rail as usual. About 5,000 are embarking for Bourgas."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[41794] No. 376.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 5, 1912.*

KING opened extraordinary session of Sobranjé to-day amidst much enthusiasm. Speech from throne gives no reason for mobilisation, but merely asks deputies to sanction ukase declaring state of siege and other measures imposed by difficult circumstances through which Bulgaria is passing. These measures include a moratorium or delay in payments for three months, a reduction on all official salaries, vote of 2,000,000*l.* for immediate military expenditure.

[41793] No. 377.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 5, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché states mobilisation of units here completed, and that concentration has commenced. The infantry brigade and the artillery left Sophia this morning by road for Philippopoli. This leaves railway free for use of divisions at Vratsa and Pesvna.

It is unlikely that army will be ready for a general advance before 22nd October, but a few battalions are reported to have been detached to the south of Philippopoli.

[41774] No. 378.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 5, 1912.*

CRETE.

Your telegrams Nos. 482 and 490 of 2nd and 3rd October respectively.

French Government, before coming to a decision as to measures of coercion, desire views of His Majesty's Government on proposal for nominating a provisional commissioner.

[41782] No. 379.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 5, 1912.*

GERMAN Minister has received telegram from his Government reporting that Servian chargé d'affaires at Berlin stated a few days ago that representatives of all great Powers at Belgrade had made a representation declaring to Servian Government that if Servia would demobilise and not recall Servian Minister from Constantinople Powers would guarantee reforms.

My German and French colleagues say that this is pure invention so far as they are concerned. My own conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported in my telegram No. 19 of 1st October.

[41783] No. 380.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 5, 1912.*

RESERVES have now come in; concentration of troops at various points commencing, and will probably occupy four to five days.

[41784] No. 381.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 5, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that four Balkan States intend to present demand for reforms, as reported in Mr. Barclay's telegram No. 50 of 3rd October. The demands are practically agreed upon, but not the form in which, nor the time when, they shall be presented. Russian Minister tells me that some disagreement has arisen between Servia and Greece which is causing delay, but I gather that this is not of serious importance.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that reconciliation between Servia and Montenegro was complete, and latter had promised to stand by Servia unreservedly. He seemed, however, doubtful whether this promise could be relied on.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[41905] No. 382.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 185 of 2nd October.

Italian Minister yesterday informed Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government had not changed the attitude adopted at the beginning of the war as regards the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, and associate themselves

with the other Powers in advising Greek Government to abstain from action provocative to Turkey.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied in same terms as to my other colleagues and myself yesterday, that Greek mobilisation was rendered necessary by Turkish military preparations, and that situation of Christians in European provinces was intolerible and could only be improved by international control of the Turkish provincial administration.

[41789] No. 383.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 351.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 350 of 3rd October.

In speaking to me to-day of M. Poincaré's last proposal Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said he welcomed it as the only means of stopping the war, though he was doubtful if all the Powers would adhere to it. It was necessary, he added, to base our action on 23rd article of Berlin Treaty, as Balkan States would not otherwise listen to us. He thought from language of Turkish Ambassador here that Turkey wanted to avoid war if possible and that it would be easier for her to yield to pressure of united Europe. Step proposed by M. Poincaré might not therefore be displeasing to her.

His Excellency did not think that any military action would be taken before Wednesday or Thursday unless something unexpected occurred.

[41799] No. 384.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 5, 1912.*

TURKISH Ambassador said to me this morning that all his information went to show that Austria-Hungary contemplated no military intervention in the Balkans.

On my enquiring whether, in his opinion, they would view with indifference Servian incursion into sanjak his Excellency fired up and exclaimed that in such a case Austria-Hungary was bound to dispatch troops to assist in repulsing the invaders. He made the statement in such a way as to imply that this obligation was binding and had something more than a moral nature to support it.

[41800] No. 385.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 5, 1912.*

BALKANS.

French Ambassador submitted latest French proposal to-day. He tells me that it took Minister for Foreign Affairs rather by surprise, who said that he must defer expressing any opinion until he had had more time to think it over. French Ambassador begged for an early reply, as he wished to transmit it to his Government before departure of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs from Paris.

According to Minister for Foreign Affairs' latest information is that King of Bulgaria would welcome any intervention which could stop war, provided that it does not jeopardise his position among Bulgarians.

[41656] No. 386.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 5, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Roumania has no intention of mobilising, but that she will continue in the calm attitude she has observed hitherto. He sets his hope on the Great Powers acting in agreement in the present crisis, and in this case Roumania will act with them as regards Balkan questions in docile accord. Should the Great Powers disagree, she will then consider what course to follow.

His Excellency considers it fortunate that the recent heavy rains have restricted the scope of the Roumanian autumn manœuvres which were to have been held in the Dobrutcha, but are now confined to the Ploeshti district.

(Confidential.)

His Excellency told me that last week Turkish Government informed Roumanian Minister at Constantinople that concentration of Turkish troops near Bulgarian frontier, though ostensibly for manœuvres, was intended to intimidate Bulgaria, and Turkish Government asked Roumania on her side to make some declaration which would frighten Bulgaria. This Roumanian Government refused to do, as they felt it would be more likely to excite than to intimidate Bulgaria.

[42059] No. 387.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 474.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1912.*

SIR A. NICOLSON took the opportunity of the Turkish Ambassador's visit on the 5th October to sound His Highness as to how far he thought his Government would go in the way of realising reforms at this moment, or of enabling the Powers to impress on the Balkan States that the execution of reforms in the near future was assured. Tewfik Pasha said that he could only give Sir A. Nicolson his personal opinion, and that he was in a calmer atmosphere than that which permeated Constantinople. He thought if the Powers, in a perfectly friendly way, approached the Porte and expressed a desire seriously to discuss reforms, the Turkish Government would willingly respond; but the Powers must make it clear that they were acting, not at the instigation of the Balkan Governments, but on their own initiative. Sir A. Nicolson remarked that perhaps the Porte would give some guarantees as to carrying into execution article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. Tewfik Pasha observed that if article 23 were mentioned his Government might reply that it was "cache," as other articles of the Treaty of Berlin had been violated or disregarded to the detriment of Turkey. But His Highness was sure his Government would be ready to act in the spirit of article 23, and really set to work at reforms when the situation was calm. It was impossible to put any reforms into execution in the present state of things. His Highness also said that great care should be exercised as to the form and manner in which the Powers approached the Turkish Government just at the present moment when so much effervescence reigned, or more harm than good would be done. In former days pressure on the Sovereign was possible, as the Sovereign then governed everything, now there was, what he termed, "national sovereignty," and neither the Sultan nor the Government could ignore or run counter to national feeling.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41804] No. 388.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Corfu, October 6, 1912.*

OVER 1,000 troops of local levies and 100 horses left here last week.

[41787] No. 389.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 6, 1912.*

PLEASE refer my telegram No. 427 of 4th October.

The Turkish Government will be very unwilling to submit to the attempts of the Balkan States to fix the entire responsibility of war on her, in spite of bellicose demonstrations of populace.

I gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs that both he and Kiamil Pasha were in favour of some such course as spontaneous proposal to Powers of introduction of reforms, which proposal is also being considered by a section of the Cabinet; such a surrender on the part of the Cabinet is now, however, scarcely possible, since, with the increase of war enthusiasm, moderate counsels in the Cabinet were over-ruled.

Turkey's financial and military unpreparedness are fully recognised by the non-committee party, who, relying on the confidence inspired by Kiamil Pasha's name in England and France as well as in Turkey, are making an effort to secure his appointment as Grand Vizier, hoping that he might make peace with Italy at once and by an announcement of a liberal scheme of reforms in Roumelian provinces avert the impending war in the Balkans.

Whether a Kiamil Cabinet could withstand for long the attacks of the Extremists is very doubtful, and a solution to the Balkan question would not appear to be facilitated by his advent to power, in view of the language held by the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Sophia telegram No. 48).

Loud protests are already being raised against a hasty conclusion of peace with Italy by the Committee press, which professes to see a close connection between the threats from the Balkans and peace negotiations with Italy (Berchtold proposals forming the connecting link). It is also very doubtful whether application of liberal schemes in Macedonia, which would be regarded as subservience to threats from Balkan States only lately Christian "rayahs" of Turkey, would be tolerated by Moslem feeling now worked up.

[41788] No. 390.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 434.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1912.*

CRETE.

Your telegram No. 178 of 1st October to Canea and Mr. Marling's telegram No. 365 of 6th September.

It is rumoured here that British and French troops have already reoccupied Crete.

In view of the present situation and conceivable contingency of initial success of combined Balkan Powers in the event of war, I venture to submit that such occupation might place us and detachments in a very awkward position—the detachments owing to passions that would be roused in the island, while here the Turks would base hopes thereupon which might prove unrealisable.

[41808] No. 391.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 6, 1912.*

BALKANS.

My telegram No. 92 of 6th October.

A few hours after French Ambassador had handed French proposals to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday he received telegraphically from his Government another form drawn up in accordance with alterations suggested by you. This he

managed to convey to the Minister for Foreign Affairs late last night before the latter had replied to the original proposal or had even offered any comment upon it. French Ambassador again urged necessity of prompt decision. This morning early he received the Minister's reply, which he immediately transmitted to his Government. While consenting to proposal in principle, Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests one or two alterations, the chief one being that the collective step should not be taken simultaneously at the Balkan capitals and at Constantinople, but that representations to the Porte should be deferred until the result of the action of the Powers in the former places was ascertained.

French Ambassador thinks that this suggestion was prompted by Germany with object of gaining a good mark at Constantinople.

German Ambassador, whom I have just seen, did not seem to consider that Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply would produce complete unanimity among Powers, but expressed hope that question would be finally settled on arrival of Russian Minister or Foreign Affairs to-morrow in Berlin.

[41809] No. 392.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 6, 1912.*

BALKANS.

Bulgarian Minister here, who has served in five administrations in Sophia and speaks with some authority, assured me this morning that Bulgaria would demobilise the very day she knew that the Powers would themselves undertake the reforms in Macedonia. If, however, it was decided to entrust these to Turkey, there was no hope of averting the war, as Bulgaria could never place any faith in Turkish promises. He stated emphatically that Bulgaria sought no territorial expansion, and that her actions could therefore not be affected by the French proposal on that subject.

The Minister said, further, that Bulgaria being quite ready had everything to lose by delay, and that the sooner that hostilities commenced the greater was the prospect of success crowning Bulgarian arms.

I replied that Bulgaria was about to face best soldiers in the world, that she would receive but scant aid from her allies, and that in the circumstances it would be wiser to pause until the Powers had discovered a peaceful solution of present problem.

[41811] No. 393.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 6, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs came by appointment to see me this afternoon. He showed me the Franco-Russian formula for an endeavour to avert war, and on my observing that you might object to the words "prendre en main," he stated to mean merely "take the initiative." He says that he is not sure that his formula as it stands will prevent Bulgaria from going to war, but he feels certain that it is the only hope of doing so, and that without the words "prendre en main," which is a sort of guarantee by the Powers instead of Turkish promises, which experience has shown to the Balkan States to be quite unreliable, it will be impossible to restrain Bulgarians, who have now advantage over Turks of preparedness.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to give you his explanation of "prendre en main," and begs most earnestly that you will adopt his formula, which has been accepted by German and Austro-Hungarian Governments. He feels confident that Turkish Government will not make objection.

[41904] No. 394.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, October 6, 1912.*

KING opened special session of Skupshtina yesterday. Speech states that special session is owing to circumstances induced by sufferings of Servian co-nationals in Turkey, that Servia has endeavoured maintain a correct attitude, hoping that reforms would be introduced and that friendly advice of Powers at Constantinople would bring about an altered state of affairs, but unfortunately this has not been the case, and Servia was surprised by mobilisation, consequently had to mobilise herself for her security, and that it is the duty of Servia, together with other Balkan Christian States, to use every effort to induce conditions which will ensure a just and continued peace in the Balkans.

[41781] No. 395.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 6, 1912.*

WARLIKE feeling is growing stronger. Twelve to fourteen trains are leaving daily for Thessaly with about 400 men each. All available steamers, horses, and carts have been requisitioned. Things have gone so far that I think that it is now impossible for war to be averted or even delayed for many days.

[42019] No. 396.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 6, 1912.*

CRETE.

Your telegram No. 509 of to-day.

I have communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-night your views respecting appointment of provisional High Commissioner.

His Excellency will confer with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before replying. His information from Athens leads him to fear that effervescence in Crete, which might perhaps have been avoided by prompt appointment of High Commissioner, is now such that it would require very considerable military force to maintain order in Crete and that its disembarkation could not be effected without opposition which might entail hostilities with the Cretans.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs' information from French Ambassador at Constantinople is very positive that the Turkish Government would accept the appointment of provisional High Commissioner, and would shut their eyes to the King of Greece being consulted by Powers provided that the fact were not officially brought to their notice.

[41785] No. 397.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 6, 1912.*

I LEARN that Austro-Hungarian authorities have stopped eighteen truck-loads of ammunition for Servia at Bruck.

Train communication between Belgrade and Semlin practically stopped. Newspaper correspondents not allowed to cross river except with special passes.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[41810] No. 398.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, October 6, 1912.*

THAT Italy should be prepared to land a force of 20,000 men in Turkey in Europe is most improbable, even if she wished to do so, and this is in my opinion most unlikely in view of the policy which she has followed throughout the war. I reported in my despatch No. 298 of the 29th ultimo that 30,000 men had left for Tripoli, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs has since told me that these men are to fill up gaps. There is an Italian force of about 5,000 men at Rhodes and no further troops are available in Italy. The military attaché learns that in the regiments at home there are now only 150 seasoned men, the others being newly joined recruits.

Yesterday and to-day the rumours that an agreement with Turkey is on the point of being arrived at have greatly increased, and the conclusion of a disgraceful peace is beginning to be attacked by the Opposition press. I think it doubtful that Italy would agree to Tripoli and Cyrenaica being made autonomous and placed under a local ruler. No modification of the annexation decree will be admitted, but in the matter of religious supremacy the Italian Government will probably, I think, be ready to meet the wishes of the Turkish Government.

[41742] No. 399.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 508.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1912.*

WE feel that, in view of their great and direct interest in the Balkans, co-operation between Russia and Austria is essential to secure preservation of peace. We welcome therefore the proposal that they should make the communication (1) and (2) of M. Poincaré's formula to the Balkan States, stating that they do so on the ground that the Powers are entering into communication with the Turkish Government as to reforms in the European provinces of Turkey.

We suggest that all the five Powers should inform the Turkish Government that they take note of the publicly declared intention of the Turkish Government to introduce reforms, and that they (end of R.) "discuteront immédiatement avec la Sublime Porte dans l'esprit de l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin et de la loi de 1880 les réformes que comporte l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe et les mesures propres à en assurer la réalisation dans l'intérêt des populations, étant entendu que ces réformes ne porteront aucune atteinte à l'intégralité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman."

(R.) To make it clear that it is in the interest of Turkey to accept this proposal I think it would be desirable to add, that if Turkey accepts this proposal and gives effect to it, the Powers will give a renewed guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman possessions in Europe, but recognising that agreement amongst the Powers is essential to any action to preserve the peace, I do not make this addendum if objection is raised to it a condition of our assent to M. Poincaré's proposal, and am prepared to support it as amended above.

I have suggested the omission of the word "chrétiennes," as the whole population will benefit by reforms, and it is undesirable to give the proposal a form that accentuates religious differences or may suggest a motive invidious to Mussulman feeling.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 236; Constantinople, No. 722; Rome, No. 316; St. Petersburgh, No. 978; and Vienna, No. 231.)

[41774] No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 509.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 450 of 5th October: Crete.

Appointment of a commissioner would be violently resented in Greece unless done publicly with consent of Greece, and would have to be imposed upon Crete by force. If made to please Greece it would be equally resented by Turkey, and would gravely prejudice position of three protecting Powers at Constantinople. I can therefore see no advantage in the proposal, and am still of opinion that three Powers should concentrate on naval and military measures necessary to prevent Cretan militia reserves joining Greek army or union of Crete and Greece being made effective at this moment.

[41811] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 510.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 508 of to-day.

Since its despatch I have received a new formula from French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the text of which I am sending you in another telegram.

The phrase "prendront en main" might be construed to mean that the Powers will themselves decide and carry out the reforms, and for this reason I should have preferred some phrase such as "s'occuperont de," but in interest of speedy agreement I agree to text of M. Poincaré's latest proposal, understanding that it is already accepted by Russia and Austria. I presume that the last paragraph of all after No. 3 is not intended to form part of the actual communication to be made to the Balkan States; it is not necessary or suitable for that purpose, and would prejudice the consequent step at Constantinople.

It is, however, important to take the consequent step at Constantinople in the form and with the phrases that it will make it easy for Turkey to accept. I hope, therefore, that Ambassadors at Constantinople in informing the Porte of the communication made to Balkan States will be instructed to say that the realisation of reforms depends upon the Balkan States refraining from a breach of the peace, and that the Powers hope that Turkey will upon this condition enter at once upon a discussion of reforms.

I should like to add that if Turkey agrees and makes reforms effective the Powers will guarantee the integrity of her possessions in Europe, and the British Ambassador will be authorised to join in that if his colleagues are similarly instructed.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 979; Berlin, No. 237; Vienna, No. 232; and Constantinople, No. 723.)

(To Constantinople only.)

You can act on this telegram as soon as all your colleagues are similarly instructed, but it should be an identic communication and not a collective one, presented *in corpore*.

[41811] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 511.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 6, 1912.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. (End of R.):—

"Les Gouvernements russe et austro-hongrois déclareront aux États balkaniques:—

"1. Que les Puissances réprouvent énergiquement toute mesure susceptible d'amener la rupture de la paix;

"2. Que, s'appuyant sur l'article 23 du traité de Berlin, elles prendront en main, dans l'intérêt des populations, la réalisation des réformes dans l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe, étant entendu que ces réformes ne porteront aucune atteinte à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman: cette déclaration réserve d'ailleurs la liberté des Puissances pour l'étude collective ultérieure des réformes;

"3. Que si la guerre vient néanmoins à éclater entre les États balkaniques et l'Empire ottoman, elles n'admettront à l'issue du conflit, aucune modification au *statu quo* territorial dans la Turquie d'Europe.

"Les Puissances feront collectivement, auprès de la Sublime Porte, les démarches dérivant de la précédente déclaration."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 980; Constantinople, No. 724; Berlin, No. 238; and Vienna, No. 233.)

[41921] No. 403.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, September 25, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 127 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that between thirty and forty Cretan "deputies" have left Crete for Athens up to date. In general they have started in groups of two or three persons from Canea, Candia, and Rethymo attracting as little attention as possible.

Last Thursday, however, the coasting steamer "Nikolaos" proceeded at night to a point on the coast between Canea and Kissamos and picked up eleven deputies, amongst them M. Pologeorghis, and then steamed straight for Piraeus with her lights out in order to avoid capture. My colleagues and I only heard of this more wholesale departure after it had occurred, and we had no opportunity of stopping it.

It is most probable that the rest of the sixty-nine deputies will also reach Athens before the Greek Chamber opens on the 14th October.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[42051] No. 404.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 105.)
Sir, *Sophia, October 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of two Royal ukases promulgated yesterday, the 17th (30th) September, the first of which orders a general mobilisation of the Bulgarian forces and the second proclaims a state of siege throughout the kingdom. By virtue of the latter civil tribunals are for the moment replaced by courts-martial, and the press becomes subject to the restrictions customary in similar circumstances.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 404.

Royal Ukase No. 5.

NOUS, Ferdinand I, par la grâce de Dieu et la volonté de la nation, Roi des Bulgares,

Sur la proposition de notre Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes, à nous présentée par son rapport No. 1241 du 17 septembre de l'année en cours, et sur la base de l'article 145 de la Loi sur l'Organisation des Forces

[41817] No. 405*.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 815.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 27, 1912.*

WHEN I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th instant, I took an opportunity to revert, as instructed in your despatch No. 440 of the 17th instant, to the atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman troops in the Berana district, saying that the facts had made a most painful effect on His Majesty's Government, but that you were convinced that the Turkish Government was resolved to put a stop to such barbarities. I was about to give his Excellency a short account of Miss Durham's further experiences, when he interrupted me by saying that if my information came from the same source as before he could rebut it with equally impartial evidence derived from a French journalist who had just arrived from Berana and had given him a report of what he had seen. Gabriel Effendi declined to tell me the name of the journalist or the paper that he represents, but promised to send me extracts from his report. I received the extracts to-day, and have the honour to transmit a copy thereof to you herewith. From them it appears probable that the author is the correspondent of the "Temps," mentioned by Miss Durham in her letter to Mr. Nevinson of the 4th September (your despatch No. 446); but the French Ambassador has no knowledge of any representative being now in Constantinople, and I have been told that the author is not connected with the "Temps," but with the "Humanité."

Be the author who he may, his account certainly puts a very different complexion on the affair, for, with the exception of the mutilation of the child, there is hardly a point on which he does not differ from Miss Durham, and he puts the whole blame for the origin of the incident on the Montenegrins.

The only conclusion to be drawn is that great brutalities were perpetrated on both sides, but it will probably be impossible ever to prove satisfactorily who were the first aggressors or who set the example in acts of savagery.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 405*.

Extract from Report of French Journalist.

UN journaliste français qui s'était rendu sur les lieux nous adresse un rapport dans lequel nous puisons les renseignements suivants.

Une jeune étudiante en médecine de la Faculté de Paris, de nationalité serbe, a assuré que le Gouvernement monténégrin n'a pas cessé un moment d'armer la population ottomane et de faire avancer ses troupes sur notre territoire.

Ce Gouvernement a constamment et méthodiquement trompé tant le Gouvernement Impérial que les légations étrangères à Cettigné. C'est ainsi que l'attaque de la frontière par les bachi-bouzouks, opérée soi-disant le 7 août, est une pure invention de sa part. Au contraire, ce sont les soldats monténégrins de la frontière, qui, le 25 juillet, ont commencé à tirer sur nos postes d'Ambarina et de Prézénichts, au moment même où une commission mixte vérifiait une contestation de propriété entre Serbs ottomans et Monténégrins; de ce moment, le Monténégro mobilise le bataillon de Kolachine.

Le 3 août, ses soldats attaquent tous nos postes de la région de Moykovatz et font usage de canons; nos soldats, très peu nombreux dans chaque poste, se retirent devant cette attaque inopinée, et les assaillants s'avancent en territoire ottoman, à deux heures de marche.

Le Monténégro, enhardi par notre attitude conciliante dans l'affaire de Rustem Bey, arme les paysans ottomans de la rive gauche du Lim, les 7 et 8 août et ceux de la rive droite les 10 et 11 du même mois.

Le 10 août, dans le village de Kalodéré, quatre musulmans, dont une femme, qui revenaient du marché de Bérana, sont tués. Ce sont là les premières de toute cette affaire.

Les 14 et 15, les soldats monténégrins brûlent nos postes et emmènent du poste de Pechter à Podgoritza seize de nos soldats comme prisonniers. Le même

jour, le poste de Tourià est pris; douze soldats ottomans qui avaient rendu leurs armes sont tués et vingt-cinq sont emmenés prisonniers du poste de Gormasela à Andrévitza. Enfin, dans la nuit du 15 au 16, les paysans insurgés et les Monténégrins cernent Bérana.

Le rapport de ce journaliste étant du 18 août, la relation des faits s'arrête à l'attaque de Bérana.

Dans les considérations personnelles qu'il ajoute à cet exposé, ce publiciste croit que le Monténégro a voulu profiter de ce qu'il y avait à peine 150 hommes à la garnison de Bérana et que le caïmacan de l'endroit était serbe, non pas que ce dernier fût suspect de patriotisme, mais supposant que les paysans serbes s'en trouveraient moralement influencés. Il croit, également, que la population n'est en rien responsable de ces événements; elle est la victime d'aventuriers, gens sans aveu, touchant à toutes les caisses et qui sont en relations constantes avec les autorités monténégrines. Il a vu—chose inouïe—le Général Voukotitch donner à ces chefs l'ordre de faire rentrer les insurgés dans leurs villages. Des Serbes, en personne, lui ont déclaré à Andrévitza que toute la faute revenait aux Monténégrins et aux Serbes, sans lequels "ils arriveraient bien à s'entendre avec les Turcs."

De part et d'autre, des atrocités ont été commises; mais le journaliste affirme que du côté ottoman on semble avoir été plus humain. Il ne cite que trois cas absolument authentiques: à Andrévitza il a vu un enfant serbe de 1 an et demi qui avait été apporté mourant du combat d'Irjanichta et qui portait quatre coups de couteau dans la région sexuelle; un médecin major ottoman a vu le cadavre d'un de nos soldats à qui on avait arraché la peau du visage; enfin, les meurtriers du Lieutenant Ahmed Effendi lui avaient arraché les yeux, les oreilles et le nez.

Ce journaliste déclare, de même, que les Serbes reconnaissent que nos soldats sont absolument au-dessus de tout reproche, mais qu'on ne peut pas en dire autant des bachi-bouzouks. Il ajoute, d'ailleurs, que ces derniers n'ont fait que défendre leur vie et leurs biens.

militaires du Royaume bulgare, et conformément à la décision du Conseil des Ministres du 16 septembre de l'année en cours,

Avons décrété et décrétons:

Premièrement, qu'une mobilisation générale des forces militaires du royaume soit effectuée.

Deuxièmement, nous confions l'exécution du présent ukase à notre Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes.

Rendu à Sophia le 17 (30) septembre, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 404.

Royal Ukase No. 6.

NOUS, Ferdinand I, par la grâce de Dieu et la volonté de la nation, Roi des Bulgares,

Sur la proposition de notre Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes, à nous présentée par son rapport No. 1242 du 17 septembre, et sur la base de l'article 77, dernier alinéa de l'article 73 de la constitution, et conformément à la décision du Conseil des Ministres du 16 septembre de l'année en cours,

Nous avons décrété et décrétons:

Premièrement, nous proclamons l'état de siège dans tout le royaume.

Deuxièmement, nous confions l'exécution du présent ukase à notre Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes.

Rendu à Sophia le 17 (30) septembre, 1912.

[41888] No. 405.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 425.)

Sir, *Paris, October 5, 1912.*

SINCE the arrival in Paris of the Russian Foreign Minister on the evening of the 2nd instant, the French press has been confidently expressing the hope that his Excellency's presence in Paris and the opportunity thus afforded of conferring with M. Poincaré may result in some initiative being taken to avert war in the Balkans.

The following communiqué to the press was issued after the Ministerial Council yesterday:—

"Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a rendu compte de son entrevue avec M. Sazonof et exposé dans quelles conditions la France, en plein accord avec la Russie et les Grandes Puissances, continuait d'agir pour essayer d'empêcher la guerre dans les Balkans, pour localiser le conflit s'il venait d'éclater et pour assurer en tout cas le maintien du *statu quo* territorial."

M. Sazonof visited the President of the republic at Rambouillet on the 3rd instant, in company with M. Poincaré, and remained to luncheon.

A luncheon was given yesterday in his Excellency's honour by M. Poincaré, to which all the French Ministers at present in Paris were invited.

M. Sazonof is to leave Paris to-morrow.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[41891] No. 406.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 428.)
Sir, *Paris, October 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the report of an interview with M. Sazonof, published in the "Temps" of to-day's date, on the subject of the crisis in the Balkans.*

His Excellency declared that "l'Europe s'est retrouvée" in the need for collective action in this emergency. The formula submitted for the approval of the Powers as the basis of this action represented the maximum of precision in a text necessarily drawn up in general terms, but the essential words were there. It was not a question simply of a promise of reforms, but of their "realisation," and the practical means for attaining this end. As the Balkan States repudiated territorial expansion, they ought logically to be satisfied. M. Poincaré and he had together received the Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian Ministers in Paris, and had formally explained their point of view to these representatives. Russia was ready to adopt either alternative proposed, viz., action in common with the other Powers or Austro-Russian action in the name of the other Powers. Russia had no *arrière-pensées*, nor had the other Powers. Events had shown that the Franco-Russian alliance and the Triple *Entente* were entirely prepared to assume the pacific rôle with a view to which they were constituted, and that the Triple Alliance was giving them useful assistance.

I also transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Figaro" of to-day's date containing the account of an interview granted by M. Sazonof to M. Recouly, foreign editor of that paper.* His Excellency suggested that recourse might be had to article 23 of the Berlin Treaty for the elements of the programme of reforms; and he mentioned also the solution found in the case of the "Lebanon" as being possibly a useful guide for the same purpose.

The "Liberté" and the "Matin" also publish interviews with M. Sazonof.

The French press emphasise the activity of the French Government in dealing with the Balkan question. The "Temps" observes that, if an agreement is established between the Powers, the French Government will be chiefly to thank for bringing it about.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[41963] No. 407.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 435.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1912.*

GREEK Minister, under instructions from his Government, has appealed to me and will appeal to my colleagues to support his protest against seizure by Turkish Government of Greek vessels.

I said I could not do so without instructions.

(R.) Turkish Government are now putting Turkish crews on detained vessels.

Consul-general at Salonica reports Greek steamers there released.

Vice-consul at Dardanelles has been informed by captains that most of the vessels detained there are insured at Lloyd's, while in one case an Englishman has part interest.

[41998] No. 408.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 508 of this afternoon did not reach me until after 9 P.M. I saw French Minister for Foreign Affairs at his house at 10·30. He had just received from French Ambassador at London your acceptance of Franco-Russia formula for

* Not printed.

[41909] No. 407 A.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 436.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 6, 1912.*

(R.) "AGENCE OTTOMANE" publishes a statement to-night to the effect that it hears from official source that, with a view to bring about necessary improvement in the administration of the vilayets of Europe, the Ottoman Government has decided to apply the reforms proposed in 1880 by Eastern Roumelian International Commission, reforms which will be applied to all creeds with strict impartiality.

This is confirmed by Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that this practically meets the demands expected to be formulated by the Balkan States, and consequently removes their pretext for hostile action. (End of R.)

Until Parliament meets and confirms this law, the details of which will require to be modernised, there could be no question, his Excellency said, of giving a guarantee.

A bad impression is likely to be produced among extremists and in the army by this apparent surrender to threats, and especially by the reference to Eastern Roumelia. The advantage of gain of time for mobilisation may, however, his Excellency considers, reconcile the army to the Government's action.

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communication to the Balkan States. As expédition is essential, he proposes to authorise Austro-Hungarian and Russian Governments to carry out communication forthwith, and he hopes that it will be made to-morrow.

With regard to proposed communication to Porte, he regrets that—as he hears from M. Cambon—you wish it to be identic, but separate and not collective, for a collective communication would be more effective for the purpose of influencing the Balkan Governments.

Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs in wording which you suggested. Word "chrétien" was struck out at the request of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and on their suggestion words were added providing that reforms should not impugn the sovereignty of the Sultan.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has personally no objection to your proposed addition that Powers will, if the Porte accepts their proposals, give a renewed guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman possessions in Europe; but he fears that discussion which you suggest will entail [may cause *sic*] a delay which it is of utmost importance to avoid if peace is to be preserved.

[42068] No. 409.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 7, 1912.*

BALKANS

Your telegram No. 510, Urgent, of yesterday.

I have seen French Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon. The final paragraph subsequent to No. 3 of the Franco-Russian formula was not intended to form part of communication to be made to Balkan States by Russia and Austria. His Excellency, having ascertained by a telephonic communication with the French Ambassador in London that you were not at all likely to waive your objection to collective action at the Porte, has, with the concurrence of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, struck out the word "collectivement" from the final paragraph above referred to.

I had communicated to French Minister for Foreign Affairs last night (see my telegram No. 153 of yesterday) your suggested wording of communication to be made to Porte (see your telegram No. 508 of 6th October), and I informed him this afternoon of the contents of your telegram No. 510, Urgent, of last night. His Excellency says that communication made to-day to the French Government by the Turkish Government, and, he concludes, also to the Powers, of their intention to carry out article 23 of Berlin Treaty and the Ottoman Law of 1880 on reforms will render it easy for the Powers to take note of these assurances in the identic communications to be made by them to the Porte, and to request an immediate discussion of reforms.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection personally to your suggestion that if Turkey makes reforms effective Powers should guarantee anew integrity of her possessions in Europe.

[42069] No. 410.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 7, 1912.*

YOUR urgent telegram to Constantinople No. 734 of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this afternoon that in deference to your objection he had dropped his proposal that the communication to the Porte should be collective.

[42067] No. 411.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 7, 1912.*

MOBILISATION seems to be complete, and troops are now concentrating on frontier.

Montenegrin assent to text of joint note to be presented to Porte by the Balkan States was given yesterday. King told me confidentially this morning that the Greek Government had suggested short delay before presenting it, but that he had been obliged to reply that events were too strong for him, and that he could not concur in this course.

As far as I can gather from the dispositions that are being made, first operation of Montenegrins would be attack on Turkish position opposite Podgoritza, and that their principal objective would be Scutari rather than Old Servia.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[42072] No. 412.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram to Paris No. 490 of 3rd October.

British Senior Naval Officer has shown me his instructions concerning an eventual blockade. They confine the blockade to Greek and Cretan vessels "which commanding officers of warships have good reason to think are carrying Cretan reserves to join Greek army. Such vessels should be stopped so long as they are in Cretan waters and Cretan reserves induced to leave the vessels, but there must be no attempt to sink such vessels or to use force against them, nor should violence be shown to Cretan reserves."

British Senior Naval Officer informs me that any measures he may take are thus restricted to those of persuasion.

As persuasion is not likely to have any effect, it seems hardly worth while for warships to intervene unless they are authorised to use force.

The idea of my colleagues and myself in suggesting a blockade was to forbid Greek steamers to touch at Cretan ports and thus anticipate any attempt to embark Cretan militia.

[42065] No. 413.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 441.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 436 of 6th October.

Dissatisfaction over so-called surrender of Government to Balkan menace, fomented by extremists, has been gaining ground all day and large demonstrations are threatened. Government have consequently declared martial law.

[42043] No. 414.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(*Decode.*) *Corfu, October 7, 1912.*

NAVAL force left here last night.

[41551] No. 416 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 735.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 420 and 435 of 2nd and 6th October: Detention of Greek vessels.

Lloyd's point out that British interests are affected by the detention of these vessels, since underwriters at Lloyd's are very considerably interested in their cargoes, and they submit that action of the Turkish Government is contrary to international law.

You should point out to the Turkish Government that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the measure cannot be justified by international law, and that, in so far as the interests of British subjects are affected, His Majesty's Government must strictly reserve all rights.

[41808] No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 726.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 723 of yesterday and Russell's telegram No. 94 of same date, repeated to you.

Proposal as made to us by French Ambassador was understood to contemplate immediate communication at Constantinople, and object of my suggestions was to give communication to Turkish Government a less one-sided character by pointing out that Turkish acceptance of proposal about reforms would be conditional upon success of Powers in securing Turkey in peaceful possession of European provinces. This would in effect be a bi-lateral agreement between Turkey and the Powers by no means prejudicial to interests nor derogatory to dignity of Turkey.

I shall speak to Turkish Ambassador this afternoon in this sense, and you can, if our attitude is misrepresented at Constantinople, speak privately in the same sense.

Meanwhile you should not press your colleagues to make any communication at Constantinople, but simply hold yourself in readiness to act upon my telegram No. 723 when your colleagues are ready to do the same.

[41742] No. 416.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 734.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

MY telegram to Paris No. 508 of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs is proposing to Powers that communication at Constantinople should be in terms of second paragraph of the above telegram beginning "We suggest" down to "Empire Ottoman," and should be collective and not identic. You are authorised to join in a collective communication in the above terms when your colleagues are ready.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 246.; Paris, No. 520; St. Petersburgh, No. 990; Vienna, No. 241.; and Rome, No. 324.)

[42449] No. 417.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 736.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

TURKISH Ambassador has been instructed to request us to warn Greece not to interfere with the Turkish islands. I have explained how we have used our influence diplomatically in the Balkan crisis to secure that Great Powers should do nothing derogatory to dignity of Turkey, but that, in the event of war between Turkey and Balkan States, if one Great Power takes part on one side others will do so on another, and we cannot use force except to ensure the neutrality of Crete and prevent its militia from helping Greece. We have sent four ships for this purpose, but I cannot promise to do anything more that would break up the concert of the Powers.

[41811] No. 418.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. T. Russell.

(No. 243.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

I HAVE pointed out to Austrian chargé d'affaires objection to phrase "prendront en main" in communication to Balkan States, but have said that I am so anxious to see Austria and Russia in agreement that I waived all criticisms, and agreed to the formula proposed.

[42457] No. 419.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

I SHOWED the Austrian chargé d'affaires to-day the proposed communication to the Balkan States submitted to me by M. Cambon last evening.

The chargé d'affaires showed me the text which Count Berchtold had sent him, and which corresponded exactly.

I observed that the words "prendront en main" might be construed to mean that the Powers would themselves execute the reforms. I assumed that this was not what was really meant by the phrase, but I was so anxious for agreement between Austria and Russia that I had waived all criticism and agreed last evening to the proposal which M. Poincaré had made, as it had Austrian and Russian consent. I added that I understood that the last paragraph of the proposal was not intended to be communicated to the Balkan States, or it would have been numbered. It was not suitable for a communication to them.

The chargé d'affaires said that he assumed my view was correct.

I informed him that, within the last ten minutes, I had received the proposal which M. Poincaré was making as to the communication to be made in Constantinople, and had agreed to it. M. Poincaré was no doubt making it to all the Powers direct.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42458] No. 420.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

IN talking to the Austrian chargé d'affaires to-day, I took the opportunity of telling him that, during the whole of my conversations with M. Sazonof, he had never once mentioned the Straits or any alteration or advantage to be obtained for Russia in the Balkans. He was entirely concentrated upon how peace could be preserved and the *status quo* saved from disturbance.

The chargé d'affaires said that he was sure that the desire of his Government was the same as that of M. Sazonof.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42456] No. 421.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 482.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

I SHOWED the Turkish Ambassador to-day, for his private information, the text of the proposed communication to be made by Austria and Russia to the Balkan States.

He observed that article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin related to something between the Powers and Turkey to which the Balkan States were not parties.

I remarked that the proposed communication was to the Balkan States alone. It left quite vague what should be said in Constantinople, and I had urged very strongly that whatever was said there should be in a form acceptable to Turkey. The text of what we proposed to say in Constantinople, if the other Powers agreed, was read to the Ambassador, and it was pointed out that there was no mention in it of the Balkan States.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41741] No. 422.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Paget.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires called on the 2nd October and said to Sir A. Nicolson that the Servian officers who had been at our request placed on the retired list in consequence of their complicity in the assassination of the late King had been, under the mobilisation decree, recalled to the colours, as was necessary under the law, but that they would be replaced on the retired list as soon as the army was demobilised. The Servian Government trusted that His Majesty's Government would take note of this communication and would not raise objections.

Sir A. Nicolson took the opportunity of speaking again seriously to the Servian chargé d'affaires as to the situation which the mobilisation had produced and the grave risks which Servia was incurring, and emphasised the advisability of Servia recalling the mobilisation decree and giving both the Powers and Turkey the opportunity of discussing seriously the question of reforms, &c.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42305] No. 423.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 250.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1912.*

I TOLD the German chargé d'affaires to-day that we had on Saturday morning received the first definite proposal from M. Poincaré about the Balkan trouble. I heard that Count Berchtold had replied that this proposal would take time for consideration. We had felt the same, but had replied accepting it generally on Sunday morning. At six o'clock on Sunday evening M. Cambon had communicated to me another proposal from M. Poincaré superseding the former one, and made in consequence of suggestions from Count Berchtold. I showed the German chargé d'affaires the text of this and said that I had made some verbal criticisms on it, but had waived them, on the understanding that Russia and Austria are both agreed, from my great desire to promote that agreement. I had therefore agreed to the communication to the Balkan States as agreed to by Russia and Austria.

The question of the communication to Constantinople was left vague. I had expressed the hope that the Ambassadors at Constantinople in informing the Porte of the communication made to the Balkan States would be instructed to say that the realisation of reforms depended upon the Balkan States refraining from a breach of the peace, and that the Powers hoped that Turkey would on this condition enter at once upon a discussion of reforms with the Powers.

I had instructed Sir Gerard Lowther to act in this sense at Constantinople when his colleagues were similarly instructed. I felt that while securing the substance of reforms we ought to make it as easy as possible for Turkey to accept the proposal of the Powers, and I thought this could be done by making it clear that if Turkey accepted the proposal about reforms she would get the *quid pro quo* in return, and be in peaceful possession of her European provinces.

The German chargé d'affaires had not yet heard M. Poincaré's last proposal. He had little doubt that his Government, which desired an agreement between Russia and Austria, would accept it, and he promised to let me know when this had been done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42090] No. 424.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No 131.)
Sir, *Athens, September 30, 1912.*

DURING the last month the fear of complications with Turkey has been steadily growing; there has been a heavy fall of nearly all securities on the Bourse, and on

the 18th the Prime Minister, whose inclinations are certainly in the direction of peace, went so far as to say that if some step forward could not be made with the Cretan question he feared that war was inevitable. Since then the landing in Samos has still further complicated the situation, and the reported death of two or three Greek subjects during the promiscuous firing which followed the attack on the Turkish garrison and the so-called insult to the Greek flag when the "Rumelia," a liner belonging to the Pantalion Company, was fired upon by the Turkish troops, has aroused considerable indignation. M. Gryparis, the Greek Minister at Constantinople, was at once instructed to demand an indemnity for the damage done to the ship and for the two persons injured as well as the punishment of the responsible officer. To satisfy public opinion, the Government are further contemplating the dispatch of a ship of war to protect Greek interests in the island, and an appeal to the Powers to secure the removal of the Turkish garrison stationed there in clear violation of the Firman of December 1832.

While naturally a good deal of sympathy is felt here with the expedition of M. Sofoulis to Samos, there appears to be no evidence that it received any official encouragement. M. Sofoulis is on very bad terms with the Prime Minister, and M. Karasevdas, an ex-Greek deputy, who left Piræus on the night of the 17th with M. Sofoulis, is also one of his political opponents. The party, which consisted further of three Cretan band leaders from Macedonia and the correspondent of the "Secolo" of Milan, transhipped at Syra, where they were joined by some Samians with rifles and ammunition. Icaria was chosen as the base of operations of the expedition, which was composed principally of Samians and Icariots, assisted by a few Cretans who had crossed to Icaria soon after the declaration of its independence.

The naval and military preparations made up to now are as follows:—

Recall to Piræus of the fleet which was cruising among the Ionian islands. The battle-ship "Spetzai" has been sent to Leghorn and the "Psara" has been docked at the Piræus for immediate repairs. At Salamis various smaller repairs to some of the destroyers are being carried out with all possible speed. The two new destroyers which are now ready for delivery by the Vulkan works at Stettin have been ordered to proceed here at once without waiting for any trials, all officers now on leave have been recalled, and many of those actually *en disponibilité* are to be or have been placed on the active list.

On the 25th the announcement was made that the untrained exempts of the 1900, 1901, and 1902 classes and reservist officers were to be called up for forty days' exercise. It is however pointed out by the Government papers that these measures were adopted on the advice of the French mission, and have nothing to do with the international situation. The reserve officers called up are infantry of the 1907 and 1908 classes and thirty officers of artillery.

It is also said that the Government have made arrangements for the immediate delivery of a large quantity of ammunition which in ordinary course was to have been furnished by instalments up to next February.

The first ship flying the new Icarian flag (see my despatch No. 122 of 27th ultimo) arrived at the Piræus on the 24th September. She is named the "Cleopatra" and has been chartered as a national vessel.

Many complaints have recently been made of the congestion of goods at the port of Piræus. The accommodation at the custom-house has for years past been inadequate, and the International Financial Commission have on several occasions urged the Ministry of Finance to enlarge the buildings and quays. A German engineer has prepared plans in connection with the general improvement of the port, and for more than a year the Government have been in possession of the necessary funds, part of the 1911 loan being destined for the purpose. Pressure is again being brought to bear on the new Minister of Finance, and he has promised that as soon as the German plans have been approved work will be begun, he hopes not later than the beginning of next year. Meanwhile, temporary arrangements are being made for the transfer of the present offices to the first floor of the building in which they now are, so as to leave the basement available for the storage of goods.

A large number of emigrants have recently left Piræus for America. The "Macedonia" took 1,000 early in the month, and the "Themistocles" and "Niger" 1,600 a few days later. Altogether, it is said that nearly 30,000 have sailed from Greece during the last three months—among them a considerable proportion of Cretans.

The new docks at the Piræus, the regulations for which were forwarded in my

despatch No. 62, Commercial, of the 14th ultimo, were unofficially opened on the 25th September, when the battle-ship "Psara" entered the larger of the two docks.

I have, &c.,
HENRY BEAUMONT.

P.S. *October* 1.—A decree ordering the mobilisation of the land and sea forces was signed this morning at 1 A.M.

H. B.

[42091] No. 425.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 132.)

Sir, *Athens, October* 2, 1912.

A CABINET Council was held on the night of September 29–30 to consider what steps should be taken in view of the news of Turkish mobilisation in the neighbourhood of the Bulgarian frontier. It broke up at about 1 A.M., no decision having been reached, but it was given out as almost certain that, whenever news was received of similar action having been taken in Servia and Bulgaria, a general mobilisation would be ordered here.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 176 of the 30th ultimo to urge the Greek Government not to proceed to mobilisation reached me the following morning. At this time none of my colleagues had received similar instructions except the Russian chargé d'affaires, who, being authorised to act independently, went to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs the same afternoon. His representations were received with vague assurances that what he had said would receive due consideration.

Late the same night a Cabinet Council was again held, and towards midnight, news having been received from Sophia and Belgrade of the steps taken for mobilisation in Bulgaria and Servia, a decree, which had already been prepared, calling up five additional classes of reserves and four classes of territorials, was signed by all the Ministers present.

Including the five classes now with the colours, this will bring under arms a force of between 120,000 and 130,000 men.

A similar decree calls up the naval reserves from 1879–1888 inclusive, and orders the mobilisation of the fleet.

The news was communicated to the press at 2 A.M., when M. Venizélos made a short address to the correspondents who were awaiting the decision, to the effect that the neighbouring Empire, having decided to mobilise its forces in European Turkey, had compelled the Balkan States, who were in complete solidarity, to meet the common danger by joint mobilisation, and confront a situation which was leading the Turkish Government to "seek by means of a foreign war an escape from internal difficulties."

Yesterday, active preparations were everywhere being made for the mobilisation, and all day long reservists were streaming into Athens to report themselves at headquarters and find their billets in various private houses which had been requisitioned for the purpose.

In the course of the day I learned that the French chargé d'affaires had been instructed to "speak very plainly to the Greek Government in order to prevent any inconsiderate action," while the German chargé d'affaires had also received instructions to act with me in any representations which we might make. M. de Halgouët, the French representative, went to see M. Coromilas, who said that he was not prepared to accept pacific advice from the Powers, and that the four States were determined now to take matters into their own hands. In reply to a further enquiry, he added that the Government would probably not consent to stop preparations even if they received assurances that the Porte would do the same. The utmost they could concede was, that if the Powers agreed to the Greek proposal that a Royal Commissioner for Crete should be nominated by the King of Greece, he was still ready to keep his promise that the Cretan deputies would not be admitted into the Greek Chamber, and as he is doubtless aware that this proposal has been vetoed, it now appears that war can only be averted by forcible intervention.

Baron Braun, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, as I have already reported by telegraph, received somewhat stronger instructions than my other colleagues to

endeavour to stop mobilisation, but his representations have not been more successful than those of the Russian and French chargé d'affaires.

The action of the Government has the undoubted support of the whole nation, and but little fear seems to be entertained of the result of the conflict.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[42078] No. 426.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 430. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, October 6, 1912.*

M. SAZONOF was dining with the Russian Ambassador yesterday at the hotel where I am staying, and he expressed the desire to have some conversation with me the next day. He called on me for the purpose this afternoon. His Excellency showed to me the Franco-Russian formula for an endeavour to avert a war in the Balkans, and asked me to telegraph to you to urge that you would accept it as it stood. On a cursory examination of the text of the formula I noticed words to which I thought that you would take exception, viz., that the Powers "prendront en main . . . . . la réalisation des réformes." I told M. Sazonof that I thought that you would consider "prendront en main" too strong a term, and as committing the Powers to action. His Excellency said that Sir Arthur Nicolson had pointed this out to the French Ambassador, but "prendront en main" merely meant that the Powers would take the initiative, and was for the purpose of giving to the Balkan States some confidence that reforms would really be instituted. He did not feel at all sure that the formula as it stood would prevent Bulgaria from going to war, but he felt convinced that it would be the only chance of doing so. The Balkan peoples had learnt by sad experience that Turkish promises were quite unreliable. "Prendront en main" would be a sort of guarantee by the Powers in lieu of those promises. If there were not some such guarantee, it would be impossible to restrain the Bulgarians from taking advantage of their superior preparedness over the Turks for war.

M. Sazonof requested me to give you these explanations, and to beg you most earnestly on his part to adopt the Franco-Russian formula which he informed me had been accepted by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments. His Excellency expressed himself as confident that the Turkish Government would not make objection to it.

M. Sazonof throughout the conversation referred to Bulgaria as the great factor in the situation, and as being difficult, if not quite impossible, to restrain. He spoke of Servia and Greece as not very anxious to fight, provided that some sort of plausible means were found by the Powers for extricating them from their present position of difficulty.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[42197] No. 427.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 355.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 510 of 6th October to Paris.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that M. Sazonof would no doubt have been informed of its contents before he left Paris, but personally, he feared that time would not admit of discussing proposed modifications with Powers.

His Excellency apparently takes very pessimistic view of the situation. He thinks that though promised application of law of 1880 would have satisfied Balkan States a few months ago, it will not do so now that they have mobilised unless it is considerably revised, and unless it is supplemented by provisions of a more decentralising character. He tells me that Bulgarian Minister, who is leaving in a few days to join Bulgarian army, considers war almost inevitable. Public opinion here takes same view.

His Excellency expressed regret at polemical campaign carried on between Austrian and Russian press, and said he had approached Austro-Hungarian Government on the subject, but that it was very difficult to induce press to moderate its language. On my asking whether he still believed Austria would occupy sanjak, his Excellency said that both Governments were agreed in principle to localise war, but that Austria had not so far taken any positive engagement. He did not think that she would move at once [?] when war broke out, but she would almost certainly do so later on. She would find a pretext for doing so in some frontier incident, or if Servians or Bulgarians were to attempt to set up military administration of their own in any portion of Turkish territory which they might occupy during war. On my suggesting that two Governments might give each other definite engagement that neither would intervene, his Excellency said it was a delicate matter to ask for such an engagement, and that Austria might think her position at end of war would be stronger were she already in occupation of sanjak or Belgrade.

His Excellency rather fears that Balkan States will present ultimatum to Turkey in the course of three or four days, and nothing can then stop war.

[42230] No. 428.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, October 8, 1912.*

I CALLED to-day on M. Venizelos. In reply to my question whether any relief of the existing tension has been brought about by the Turkish offer to put in operation the reforms proposed by the Eastern Roumelian Commission of 1880, his Excellency said that the moment had long passed when those reforms would have been sufficient. He added that it was a matter of intense disappointment to him that the Powers had not yet arrived at an appreciation of the fact that there is practically nothing to choose between the old and the new régime in Turkey, and that European Governors-General and a gendarmerie under European officers are essential if good administration is to be ensured. Misgovernment in Turkey, which was a matter of inconvenience to the Powers, was to the allied Balkan States a matter of life and death, and if the great Powers would not put an end to it they must. I suggested that what the Great Powers had been unable to obtain from the Turkish Government, the self-respect of the latter would prevent them from conceding to the demands of the Balkan States, and I asked whether the desire for reforms was the real motive underlying the action of those States. Upon the first point, his Excellency replied that if a peaceful solution was to be prevented by Turkish self-respect so much the worse. Upon the second, he declared that the Balkan States had no ulterior object in view other than the attainment of reforms in Turkey. Greece was so far in a different position to the others that she had the Cretan question also, in which it was necessary to find a *modus vivendi*, but for the moment that had become a secondary matter.

To my question whether he could count upon not being embarrassed by the Cretan deputies when the Chamber opened, M. Venizelos replied that unfortunately he could not.

M. Venizelos having made use of the term "allied States," I asked him if he meant it in its strict sense, but I could not extract from him more than that I might draw my own conclusions from the course of recent events.

The impression I derived from my interview with him was that he believes war to be imminent. To my mind the most hopeful symptom is that all the parties interested are evidently disinclined to take the responsibility of declaring it; the worst symptom is the confidence of the Greek Government that, at least in the first stages of hostilities, the forces of the four States will be stronger than those of Turkey.

My Russian and Austro-Hungarian colleagues have received instructions to make a strong representation to the Greek Government, in the name of all the Great Powers, against a disturbance of the peace. In doing so, they are to declare that the Powers will take upon themselves to see to the application of reforms under article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. In principle this ought to render the demands of the Balkan States superfluous, but the latter are not likely to forget the length of time which has elapsed since this unfulfilled obligation was first assumed.

[42221] No. 429.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 8, 1912.*

I HAVE seen Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs early this morning, and I enquired of him when the French formula would be communicated to the four Balkan States. He replied that he had telegraphed last night to the four Austro-Hungarian representatives in the four capitals to concert with their Russian colleague as to its communication. Up to last night Russian Embassy here had no information as to similar instructions having been sent to Russian representatives, but the Russian Ambassador left yesterday afternoon for Berlin to see Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and will probably obtain from the latter that instructions be sent without loss of time.

On my enquiring of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he thought French formula will satisfy Balkan States and lead to demobilisation, he shook his head. For him, the trouble is that Bulgaria will demand precise interpretation of term "prendre en main" of the French formula, which, like yourself, he told me he only reluctantly accepted in order to save time. Bulgaria will certainly want to know whether Europe will limit her action to persuading Turkey to introduce reforms, or whether she undertakes the duty of seeing them carried out.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me that, so far, instructions have been sent to the Austro-Hungarian representatives merely to communicate text of French formula to the Balkan States, taking it for granted that they will reply to it without loss of time.

I pointed out to him that it was probable that Balkan States would have to exchange views with each other before giving a common reply, and that we should probably reach the end of the week before that reply is received. His Excellency thought that this was probable, but that it would be difficult for the Powers to take action at Constantinople before they had the promise of the Balkan States to demobilise if Turkey gave a satisfactory reply with regard to execution of reforms.

(Confidential.)

Bulgarian Minister spoke to me most earnestly last night with regard to present crisis. He was very depressed, and told me in his opinion Bulgaria must take a definite decision by Monday next, when mobilisation will be complete. He assured me most solemnly that King and leading Ministers would be assassinated if they gave the order for demobilisation before satisfactory European guarantees are obtained for the execution of Macedonian reforms. I may sum up his views thus: "Bulgaria demands minimum reforms—a few essential ones—but maximum European guarantees for their execution." I reported this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and asked him if I could inform you if he was optimistic or pessimistic as to the situation. He replied: "I tell you privately I am pessimistic, but officially to the world I must appear optimistic."

[42223] No. 430.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 8, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

In conversation with me this morning Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that in the present serious aspect of Balkan crisis it would be well if England used her influence at Constantinople to persuade Porte that it was really in their interest to yield on the question of some kind of European supervision of the execution of the proposed Macedonian reforms. Could not the Porte be persuaded to take the initiative in inviting the Powers to exercise a kind of European supervision of the faithful carrying out of the proposed reforms? After Crimean War and Berlin Treaty, he said, Turkey had agreed to various degrees of supervision. European supervision would, therefore, be nothing new for Turkey.

[42213] No. 430 A.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 442.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 8, 1912.*

MONTENEGRIN chargé d'affaires handed in an abrupt note to Porte this morning, stating that in view of frequent incidents on frontier his Government had decided to leave solution of all questions pending between the two countries to the arbitrament of war.

Diplomatic relations are consequently broken off, Montenegrin chargé d'affaires' communication being equivalent to a declaration of war, and chargé d'affaires and staff, who have received their passports, leave Constantinople in a few hours.

(K.) Montenegro would seem to have been put forward by the three other States in order that they might be in a position to base a refusal to accept advice of Great Powers on the fact that one of the allies was already engaged in hostilities.

[42225] No. 431.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 8, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 53 of 5th October.

Bulgarian Minister who has been appointed to the General Staff has told one of my colleagues that Bulgarian army will be ready to advance in about six days.

[42224] No. 432.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, October 8, 1912.*

RUSSIAN and Austrian Ministers have just made joint declaration, text of which will be communicated to you.

King replied that intervention of Powers was tardy. It was two months ago since he had solicited that intervention, but Europe had remained dumb. For thirty-four years he had suffered wrongs from the Turks, who had occupied points on his territory, refused junction with his roads or co-operation to prevent flooding of his territory. Above all, continued massacres of Christian brothers on the frontier had struck him to the heart. Even if his allies failed him, feeling of his country would force him to action.

After delivering his reply, the King entered his carriage and started to join the troops at Podgoritza. Relations with Turkey have been broken off, and hostilities may begin at any moment.

[42256] No. 433.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 8, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that having learnt from French Ambassador that you have acceded now to suggestion for collective action at Constantinople, and wish it to be carried out as soon as possible, he has so informed French representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome, and instructed them to acquaint Governments to which they are accredited that French Government are ready to join immediately in such collective action.

[42255] No. 434.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 8, 1912.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has been keeping the Italian Government informed of the negotiations between the Great Powers for representations at Constantinople tending to avert Balkan war and to induce Ottoman Government to grant reforms in European provinces. He told me he had been so instructed as France is taking initiative in the matter, and that French Government had also consulted the Italian Government with regard to all steps to be taken at the capitals of the Balkan States.

He agrees with me that should war break out inconvenient situation for Italy and Austria might be created by bombardment of Albanian ports in the Adriatic by the Greek fleet, supposing that Turkish fleet were not in a position to prevent it.

[42227] No. 435.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 8, 1912.*

I HAVE just returned from a long conversation with the Prime Minister.

His Excellency discussed development of situation since my departure on leave. He assured me that both His Majesty and he himself had used their utmost efforts during the last few weeks to dissuade the remainder of the Cabinet, the leading statesmen, and the War Office officials from pressing for mobilisation, but in vain.

The King was on horns of a dilemma—if His Majesty had not signed the mobilisation decree he would, in Prime Minister's opinion, have lost his Throne; if war should unfortunately break out he would doubtless still risk it, but his action would then be in sympathy with Bulgarian nation. Previously to mobilisation, Prime Minister had offered on several occasions to resign, but His Majesty had asked him to continue in office, and the Russian Minister had acted in the same manner.

I spoke strongly to Prime Minister in a strain similar to that employed by Sir A. Nicolson to the Bulgarian Minister in London, as reported in your despatch No. 29 of 25th September.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[42231] No. 436.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 54 of to-day.

I saw the Prime Minister directly after my Russian and Austrian colleagues had presented to him their identic instructions. His Excellency asked them to explain to him the meaning of the second paragraph of these instructions, viz.: "That the Powers would take in hand the realisation of reforms in the administration of European Turkey." Neither of the Ministers were able to enlighten him on this point, and they said they would refer to their Governments for exact information as to such reforms.

M. Gueshof informed them that he would not fail to acquaint His Majesty and his colleagues with the contents of the document now brought to his notice, but he pointed out to them that their action had come very late in the day.

His Excellency further told me that he had informed the Ministers that the Bulgarian Government now found themselves in the exact position of the Russian Government in 1877. On the 13th March of that year Lord Derby wrote as follows to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh: "In handing in the draft protocol, Count Schouvalof declared that in view of the sacrifices Russia had incurred, on account of the stagnation of industry and commerce and of the enormous expenditure necessitated by mobilisation, Russia could not demobilise without obtaining some tangible results with regard to the amelioration of the lot of the Christians in Turkey. The Ambassador added that the Emperor sincerely desired peace, but not peace at any price." The Prime Minister gave me the text of the above in French.

(Very Confidential.)

(P.) M. Gueshof once more assured me that the very utmost had been done by him to avoid war. He said that he did not fail to realise the enormous gravity of such an issue, but he added privately that he feared it was inevitable.

[42232] No. 437.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 56. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 8, 1912.*

KING FERDINAND approved in its entirety on the 4th instant the ultimatum of the Balkan States to Turkey, which was drawn up in Belgrade. Slight technical objections to the wording have, on the other hand, been raised by the Greek Government; while *carte blanche* has been given in this respect to the other three

Balkan States by Montenegro. The ultimatum will be presented to the Turkish representatives at Athens, Belgrade, Cettinje, and Sophia as soon as a formula has been found acceptable to the three States.

Montenegro, I am told on most reliable authority, intended to declare war to-day, and it appears that it was only with the greatest difficulty that their allies were able to restrain them.

A whole division of Servian troops is expected to pass through Sophia in three days' time; it is now on the march towards the Bulgarian frontier. Considerable excitement will be caused by the presence here of Servian troops, and the present Serbo-Bulgarian *entente* will doubtless be greatly solidified thereby.

The following are the chief points of the ultimatum to be delivered to the Ottoman Government: that an autonomy under the ægis of the Great Powers be granted to Macedonia; that the carrying out of reforms in a satisfactory manner be under the responsibility of the Ambassadors at Constantinople; the governors and all the higher officials to be Christians. No time limit is to be fixed for Turkey's reply to the ultimatum, but I understand that, according to present arrangements, it will be repeated after an interval of five days, on which occasion a twenty-four hours' time limit will be fixed, after which delay the four Balkan States will declare war simultaneously.

The wording of the ultimatum is such, in my opinion, as to exclude acceptance by the Powers.

[42223] No. 438.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 249.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 98 of 8th October.

If other Balkan States are going to make Montenegrin declaration of war a reason for doing the same no diplomatic action will be of any avail at the moment, but in any case Turkey could not be pressed to yield to European supervision without some guarantee that European Powers would guarantee to her peaceful possession of her provinces.

[42019] No. 439.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 154 of 6th October: Crete.

In any case appointment of a commissioner would have no effect on preventing Cretan deputies from taking their seats or on Cretan militia reserves joining Greek army. It is, therefore, secondary question which can well be deferred for later consideration. As time is running short, I trust French Minister for Foreign Affairs will decide as to giving warning respecting reoccupation, and also agree to send French vessels to patrol Cretan coasts.

[41575] No. 440.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister made the following communication on the 1st October to Sir A. Nicolson:—

"On account of the provocative attitude of Turkey in massing troops near the frontier, the Bulgarian Government have considered it necessary to mobilise their forces as a defensive measure."

Sir A. Nicolson made no remark.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41574] No. 441.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(No. 64.) *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

Sir,

THE Greek Minister made the following communication to Sir A. Nicolson on the 1st October:—

The military measures of Turkey and the disturbed situation in all the vilayets of Europe, a situation which may induce the Ottoman Government to seek a diversion by an armed attack in order to emerge from internal difficulties, have decided the Greek Government to decree on the evening of the 30th September, in agreement with and at the same time as the other Balkan States, the mobilisation of all sea and land forces.

Sir A. Nicolson remarked to M. Gennadius that all he could do was to take note of this communication. Sir A. Nicolson observed that the measures were taken against our wishes and advice. Sir A. Nicolson said he noticed it was stated that the mobilisation was decreed in agreement with the other Balkan States. M. Gennadius said than an agreement did exist. Sir A. Nicolson enquired what facts existed that Turkey was contemplating a diversion by an armed attack. M. Gennadius said it was generally believed that she might have such an intention.

Sir A. Nicolson did not pursue the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41974] No. 442.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 471.) *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador called here on the 5th instant and informed Sir A. Nicolson that his Government had heard that the Cretan deputies would be allowed to take their seats in the Greek Chamber. They trusted that, if this did occur, the Powers would reoccupy the island.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42144] No. 443.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 492.) *Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.*

Sir,

THE French Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd instant that the French and Russian Ministers for Foreign Affairs considered that before having recourse to an occupation of Crete (in consequence of the action of the Cretan deputies) they desired that the question of a provisional commissioner, named by the Powers, the King of Greece being privately and previously consulted, should be first laid before Turkey.

Sir A. Nicolson read to M. Cambon Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 419 of the 2nd October on this subject, but though the question now seemed to him of very secondary importance, and could have very little chance of being accepted by the Porte, still perhaps I might agree possibly to it after the insistence of the French and Russian Governments.

Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that the reason for the exclusion of Cretan deputies was mainly due to a wish to avoid a rupture between Turkey and Greece, but as a rupture had practically occurred and the Chamber met on the 5th instant, it did not much matter whether the Cretan deputies sat or not, and the question of a commissioner seemed to him very belated. The more important question was to prevent the Cretan militia reserves from being dispatched to join the Greek army, and he asked whether M. Poincaré had replied as to patrolling the Cretan coast to prevent their departure. M. Cambon said he had received as yet no reply to his telegram.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42263] No. 444.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 77.) *Canea, Crete, October 2, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 138 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the decree of the Cretan Government, dated yesterday, ordering the reserves of the Cretan militia to join the head-quarters of their battalions (Candia and Canea) within three days from to-day. Supplementary decrees promote qualified corporals to the rank of sergeant and postpone until 1st (14th) December the enrolment of this year's recruits.

The members of the Cretan Government present in Canea, MM. Michelidakis and Koundouros, told us quite frankly that their intention was to send the Cretan militia officially to help the Greeks in case of war with Turkey. There should be 5,000 men available, but a large though uncertain number of militia have left the island, mostly for America, and it is not expected that more than 3,500 will mobilise. It is certain that a considerable number of Cretans, who have not been passed through the militia will be enrolled as volunteers, and MM. Michelidakis and Koundouros informed us that these could be supplied with arms from the Government depôts.

General Limbrites gave his consent to the mobilisation by telegraph and also declared his intention of returning at once to Crete.

If, as we presume will be the case, the protecting Powers decide to prevent the Cretan militia taking part in a war between Greece and Turkey, my colleagues and I think that the task of our ships of war would be much facilitated by declaring a blockade of the island. This would enable us to deal with vessels arriving to take off the militia, instead of waiting until they were embarked or about to embark. Austrian and other foreign ships would, presumably, have to be exempted.

In case of war the interior situation of the island will be very grave. Any reports of massacres of Christians in Turkey will cause intense excitement and render the position of the Cretan Mussulmans somewhat precarious.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Enclosure in No. 444.

Decree in the "Official Gazette" calling up the Militia Reserves in Crete.

(Translation.)

GEORGE I, King of the Hellenes.

Considering the resolutions of the Revolutionary Assembly of the Cretans dated the 2nd March and the 4th June, 1912, the legislative decree No. 98 of the 8th June, 1904, concerning the reserves of the active army and the provisions of articles 57, 61, and 67, and section 3 of article 102 of resolution No. 42 of the 18th December, 1910, concerning recruiting for the land forces, and on the proposal of the Commissaire for Public Safety and Public Works;

We order and decree:

We summon for service all the trained infantry reserves of the classes of 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, and 1911 to present themselves for enrolment in the battalion to which they belong, without delay, within three days from to-morrow, the 19th September, 1912.

The same Commissaire for Public Safety and Public Works is charged with the publication and execution of the present decree.

In the King's name.

The Revolutionary Administrative Committee,
A. MICHELIDAKIS.
TH. LIMBRITES.
M. R. KOUNDOUROS.

Canea, Crete, September 18, 1912.

[42293] No. 445.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de communiquer à son Excellence la teneur du télégramme ci-dessous qu'il vient de recevoir de son Gouvernement :—

"Le chargé d'affaires du Monténégro vient de remettre note par laquelle, alléguant que son Gouvernement aurait épuisé tous les moyens amicaux pour le règlement des nombreux conflits avec le Gouvernement de l'Empire ottoman, annonce que tous les rapports cessent à partir d'aujourd'hui, laissant la reconnaissance des droits de son Gouvernement et de ses frères en Turquie au sort des armes."

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 8 octobre, 1912.

[42234] No. 446.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October* 8, 1912.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Minister tells me that he made joint representation with Russian Minister this afternoon. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he could give no answer at once, but he could assure the Powers that he would do all that he possibly could to avert war. He would at once call a Council of Ministers and consult with the Bulgarian Government, to whom an identical representation had been made. He said that the fact that Montenegro had declared war—without, however, consulting the other States—had complicated the situation, and it was regrettable that the Powers had not taken this step before the mobilisation.

It is difficult to say how far situation is still within control of the Government. There is no real enthusiasm in the country for war, but it would doubtless be difficult to bring military party and other extremists to reason.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[42393] No. 447.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Belgrade, October* 9, 1912.

INFORMATION has reached me that not long ago the chiefs of the different parties in the Skupshtina were confidentially told that an agreement regarding spheres of interest in Macedonia had been arrived at between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments, and that a complete understanding now existed in this matter. They were further informed that a declaration would be made to the Powers that the object of war was not territorial expansion, but merely reforms. The result in the end would, however, be the same, as the Balkan States would insist on administrative autonomy and the appointment of Christian governors, and it was to be expected that in a short time the provinces would follow the example of Eastern Roumelia and declare their annexation respectively to Servia and Bulgaria.

[42400] No. 448.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 9, 1912.

MY telegram No. 355 of 7th October.

In spite of declaration of war by Montenegro, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was to-day less pessimistic, and did not think that it extinguished all hope of a peaceful termination to the crisis.

He had not yet received from the Russian representatives to the Balkan States

[42396] No. 448*.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 445.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 9, 1912.*

AT request of Ottoman Government, Imperial Ottoman Bank have asked Paris if it would be possible to issue a loan of £ T. 15,000,000 nominal at 5 per cent.; surplus of tithes would not be sufficient security for whole sum, but some customs revenues would be required.

Paris has met proposal coldly.

any report with regard to action which they had taken conjointly with their Austrian colleagues, but he had heard indirectly that Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece would in any case await the result of the communication which the five Ambassadors were to make at Constantinople.

His personal opinion was that if Turkey at once announced her readiness to place the question of reforms in the hands of the Powers the Governments of the three Balkan States might be able to restrain popular movement in favour of war, and eventually to demobilise. Terms of article 23 were rather vague, and the Balkan States would probably insist on receiving an assurance that the governors of all the vilayets in European Turkey should either be Christians, or, if Mahommedans, should be approved by the Powers. This point, as well as that of finding some solution of the Cretan question that would give satisfaction to Greece, presented the chief difficulties. If Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece could be induced to keep quiet it would not be difficult for Europe to bring pressure to bear on Montenegro and Turkey to stop fighting. His Excellency said that initiative taken by Montenegro was quite inexplicable, and that he did not believe that any of the other three States would commence hostilities before Monday.

[42397] No. 449.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 446.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 734 of 7th October: Communication to be made to the Porte.

Austrian Ambassador had not received instructions.

French Ambassador's instructions are not precise and he had not received text of communication agreed upon by you and French Government, and he and Russian Ambassador conceive our joint communication should include in points mentioned that made at Sophia 7th October.

But should Austrian Ambassador receive instructions similar to mine, all have agreed, in view of the urgency of the matter, to send in at once the communication beginning "We suggest" down to "Empire ottoman" in a "collective" form, French Ambassador stating that his instructions are categorical on this point.

[42611] No. 450.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 447.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 9, 1912.*

OPPOSITION to Government by war parties supported by Committee of Union and Progress has been much encouraged by declaration of war by Montenegro and by imminence of peace with Italy.

If at the dictation of Powers present Government give any guarantee that would be likely to satisfy Bulgarians, they will probably be driven from office.

Present conciliatory Cabinet cannot, my German colleague considers, possibly survive presentation of our proposed communication.

Last night after a council of war Mahmoud Shevket Pasha told me that it was now essential, if peace with Italy was made, to detach Greece from her confederates by conciliating her in some way.

[42379] No. 451.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 9, 1912.*

IN absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs at Delegation I saw Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this morning. He told me although the outbreak of war between Turkey and Montenegro was serious, it had not, in his opinion, greatly aggravated general situation, especially if hostilities limited themselves to desultory fighting along the frontier. The key to the situation was still at Sophia, and he was afraid,

from information which had already reached Ministry, that the answer of Bulgaria to the Austro-Russian communication would be most unsatisfactory.

I enquired of him whether the Austro-Hungarian Government had taken into consideration the next step which would be taken on receipt of Bulgarian reply. He told me he thought that Minister for Foreign Affairs would probably leave lead in the matter to France.

As regards action at Constantinople by the Powers, he told me last night instructions had been sent to Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople to act in concert with his colleagues. It was indifferent to the Austro-Hungarian Government whether the action were collective or individual, the essential point being that it should be taken in hand without delay.

[42359] No. 452.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 9, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché considers that concentration of troops is proceeding more rapidly than was generally expected, and that Bulgarian army may be able to advance about the middle of next week. Points of concentration probably Tirnova and Semendi. General Savow is to direct operations with the King as commander-in-chief.

[42410] No. 453.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 123 *a*. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 9, 1912.*

I LEARNED from Russian Councillor of Embassy last night, while discussing the rupture between Montenegro and Turkey, that the Montenegrin Government had recently informed Austrian Minister at Cettinjé that Montenegro was to take first step in the war with Turkey, but that they had assured him that Montenegrin troops would not enter sanjak, but would advance towards Scutari and the south. My Russian colleague's source of information was the Russian military attaché at Vienna.

[42403] No. 454.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 9, 1912.*

I HAVE just seen King Ferdinand's "chef de cabinet." He stated that the position of His Majesty and of the Cabinet would be quite untenable unless there was war, and, under the circumstances, he considered that issue quite inevitable.

M. Dobrovitch further stated that the Bulgarian Government had been taken by surprise by the action of Montenegro (see my telegram No. 56 of yesterday's date), but he admitted that satisfaction had been caused by it in Bulgaria.

M. Dobrovitch's statements may be considered to represent King Ferdinand's views.

[42395] No. 455.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 9, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs told me unofficially this morning that he did not think that statement about reforms in Austro-[group omitted: ? Russian] note [group omitted: ? would] satisfy Balkan States, the undertaking to fulfil too vague [*sic*], and he thought that reply of the Balkan States would be that the Powers should state their intention more precisely. If the Powers agreed to do this,

it was probable that Balkan States would be prepared to talk. Servian Government was, however, still discussing with Sophia.

He said that hostilities between Turkey and Montenegro had begun this morning, but he did not think that other States would be drawn in now unless Montenegro got into difficulties. Montenegro had given notice of intention to declare war some days ago, and, when requested by other States to await result of negotiations with the Great Powers, had replied that she had been in communication with the Powers for months past.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[42392] No. 456.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, October 9, 1912.*

HOSTILITIES commenced this morning.

[42407] No. 457.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 529 of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he must consult M. Sazonof again before replying to your proposal regarding Crete.

[42072] No. 458.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 1013.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

CANEA telegram No. 142 of 7th October.

I think object of consuls-general might be secured if vessels were stopped on their way to Cretan ports and not allowed to enter unless their captains undertake not to embark Cretan militia.

I have requested Admiralty to instruct commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in above sense.

You should request Government to which you are accredited to send similar instructions.

(Repeated to Canea, No. 184.)

[41742] No. 459.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 494. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

M. CAMBON said to Sir A. Nicolson on the 2nd October that he wished to mention confidentially a proposal which M. Poincaré had submitted to M. Isvolsky, and which he (M. Cambon) had discussed with M. Sazonof. M. Poincaré's idea was that Russia and Austria should act as mandatories of Europe in endeavouring to calm the agitation in the Balkans; as if these two Powers were entrusted with such a mission it would keep them united, and avoid any danger of differences between them. M. Sazonof mentioned this to Sir A. Nicolson at the railway station on the 2nd October just before his departure, and said he liked the idea and intended to speak with M. Poincaré in regard to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 512).

[42145] No. 460.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 495.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

M. CAMBON informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd October that M. Sazonof and M. Poincaré had agreed upon the following formula to be submitted to the Powers.

Russia agrees to making, either with Austria-Hungary in the name of Europe or with all the Powers, a *démarche* at Sophia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinjé, to the effect that the Powers cannot admit a rupture of the peace, that they are decided to maintain the *status quo*, and to localise the conflict if it breaks out, and not to permit the States who have mobilised to cherish any hope of territorial aggrandisement.

M. Sazonof thinks that if this step is to succeed the Powers should be disposed to favour the realisation of reforms.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that he would transmit this communication to me. Personally Sir A. Nicolson did not admire the phraseology, as it stated that the Powers would not admit a rupture, and then said that if a rupture occurred the conflict would be localised. It was not, however, his place to criticise. M. Cambon observed that, in his opinion, the main object was to bring Austria and Russia together, and to let them speak in the name of Europe.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42147] No. 461.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 496.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

M. CAMBON came to see Sir A. Nicolson on the 4th October. His Excellency said that M. Poincaré was anxious to hear whether I approved of Austria and Russia being entrusted with a mandate to deal with the existing crisis and to endeavour to avert a conflict. Sir A. Nicolson asked M. Cambon whether such a mandate was to cover action or language at Constantinople as well as at the Balkan capitals. M. Cambon said he presumed that it was. Sir A. Nicolson observed that, speaking personally, he saw a great distinction between authorising the two Powers to speak or act on our behalf at the Balkan capitals and conferring on them the same authority to take similar measures at Constantinople. As regards the Balkans, Austria and Russia were more directly interested than other Powers perhaps, and Balkan interests were, in a sense, circumscribed and limited within a well-defined area. It would be quite another matter to empower two Powers to take similar steps with Turkey, which was, in a sense, a world Power, and whose influence stretched throughout the Moslem world. Our interests were as great as, probably greater than, those of any other Power at Constantinople, and, personally, Sir A. Nicolson would deprecate two Powers being given a blank cheque to speak at Stamboul in our name. Sir A. Nicolson said that I would have no objection to Austria and Russia taking, in the name of Europe, steps at the Balkan capitals with a view of keeping the peace; but that as regards steps at Constantinople Sir A. Nicolson must make reserves and consult me on the subject.

M. Cambon said that M. Poincaré was most desirous that I should agree to point 4 of his original proposals. M. Sazonof, although at Balmoral he had agreed with me in declining it, appeared to be now in its favour. Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon he would refer M. Poincaré's request to me, but that he doubted if I should be inclined to alter my opinion, as the moment was hardly opportune; and, moreover, the Turkish Government had asserted publicly that they had every intention of putting reforms into execution. If the Balkan States demobilised the position would be different, but Sir A. Nicolson was afraid any advice or pressure at Constantinople at this moment would be curtly rejected and resisted. The Turkish Government were well aware of our wishes as to reforms, and only two days ago Sir A. Nicolson had spoken to Towfik Pasha on the subject. His Highness had said that in view of Balkan menaces no Turkish Government could go further than they had already done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41972] No. 462.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Dering.

(No. 233.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A Nicolson on the 3rd October a telegram to the Italian representatives at the Balkan capitals impressing on the various Balkan Governments the necessity of keeping the peace. The Marquis Imperiali wished to show how desirous the Italian Government were that the *status quo* should not be disturbed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42148] No. 463.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

THE Greek Minister read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd October the two following telegrams:—

Firstly, that the refusal of the Turkish authorities to permit Greek vessels to pass through the Dardanelles, with the declared intention of requisitioning them was against all principles of international law and the rules adopted at international conferences.

Secondly, that the Turkish Government, contrary to all rules of international law, have refused to allow the departure of all Greek vessels from all Turkish ports. This was evidently a premeditated measure, and would certainly bring about a conflagration. It seemed impossible that the great Powers should admit that any State could take such measures which are piratical acts.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[43273] No. 464.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

AS Count Mensdorff came to see me to-day, I repeated to him what I had told the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires on Monday, the 7th instant, about M. Sazonof's visit, and assured him that I was quite convinced that Russia would make no forward movement if Austria-Hungary did not.

He said that he could not suppose that his Government for a moment contemplated making a forward movement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42072] No. 465.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea, regarding the possible blockade of the island of Crete.*

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the object desired by the consuls-general of the protecting Powers might be secured if vessels were stopped on their way to Cretan ports, and were not allowed to go into port unless their captains undertake not to embark Cretan militia.

* No 412

I am to request, if their Lordships see no objection, that orders in the above sense may be sent to the commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in Cretan waters.

The French and Russian Governments are being requested to send similar instructions.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[42447] No. 466.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 9, 1912.*

ON the Austrian and Russian Ministers making their representations yesterday, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs said that before replying he must consult with the other Governments to whom it was also made.

[42550] No. 467.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Cettinjé, October 10, 1912.*

MONTENEGRINS have occupied Bielopolje in sanjak. Attack on Tuzi continues, and strong force advancing on Scutari from Dulcigno.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[42549] No. 468.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 61. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 10, 1912.*

I HAVE seen the rough draft of the reply which the Balkan States propose to return to the representations made at Athens, Belgrade, Sophia, and Cettinjé by the Austrian and Russian Ministers.

In this document, which is short and statesmanlike, the Balkan States express their gratitude and high appreciation of the kind interest shown by the Great Powers in Macedonian affairs, and they refer to a note (the chief points of which were reported in my telegram No. 56 of the 8th instant) enclosed in their reply.

A paragraph has, however, been added to this note to the effect that not only must Turkey agree to all the terms laid down by the Balkan States, but that she must also reimburse the cost of mobilisation incurred by Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia.

In my opinion, the terms of the note have been designedly chosen so as to render them inacceptable by Turkey.

This note will, if possible, be sent to the Turkish representatives at Sophia, Athens, and Belgrade on Sunday, 13th October, and the reply to the Great Powers will be handed on the same day to the Austrian and Russian representatives.

On the 15th October the Bulgarian Government will follow up their note to the Turkish Government with an ultimatum demanding a reply within twenty-four hours. At the expiration of this delay Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia will simultaneously declare war upon Turkey.

According to secret information received here, it appears that the concentration of the Greek troops will not be terminated before the 23rd instant. On the other hand, that of the Servian and Bulgarian forces will be completed by the 16th instant.

[42540] No. 469.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Belgrade, October 10, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister, whom I saw the day before Austro-Russian communication was presented, appeared much upset; he said the situation was now out of the control of the Government, and if they endeavoured to demobilise there would be a revolution; consequently, he thought joint representations were now useless and did more harm than good, as they tended to weaken the influence of the Great Powers. Whilst M. de Hartwig had no option but to obey the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Minister told me confidentially that he thought he was evidently much annoyed at having to act conjointly with him, and he added that, as the Russian Minister had the same morning had a long interview with the Prime Minister, it was more than probable that he discussed the contents of the communication with the latter before it had been officially presented.

M. de Hartwig has been one of the chief promoters of the Serbo-Bulgarian *entente*, and has always encouraged Servia to look for support from Russia, and I regret to say that there is reason to believe that he is not at present acting altogether straightforwardly. Not unnaturally his position in the present crisis is a difficult one, and he appears to be overcoming the difficulty by officially carrying out his instructions, but privately encouraging Servia to think that she may count upon the sympathy of Russia, and, with regard to the declaration of the Powers that the *status quo* shall be maintained, that once the Balkan States have laid their hands on territory it will be impossible for Europe to dispossess them.

That this is not improbable is unfortunately shown by M. de Hartwig's record in Persia.

Probably, if it could really be brought home to the Servian Government and the Servian people that in case of war the Powers will not permit them to retain territory even for the purpose of extracting an indemnity or reforms from the Turkish Government, and that the Powers will show their displeasure by obstructing them in the negotiating of loans in other countries considerable effect might yet be produced.

[42551] No. 470.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 10, 1912.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he is telegraphing to French Ambassador to make an immediate communication to you to the following effect:—

Count Berchtold has received from Bulgarian Government a preliminary answer to Austrian-Russian communication. They say that term "prendront en main" is vague. They would wish to know what guarantee will be given that reforms in Turkish provinces will be carried out and what organ will superintend work.

Count Berchtold thinks that as the communications to the Balkan States and to the Porte were made on the initiative of the French Government, French Minister for Foreign Affairs should prepare a reply to Bulgarian Government.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs does not consider that it will be feasible for Ambassadors to discuss with the Porte the application of the law of 1880, which is of very great length and not entirely suitable to existing state of things in Macedonia. It will, he thinks, be necessary to have a conference of some sort, the commission of 1879 being defunct.

M. Cambon is to consult you on the subject.

[42553] No. 471.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 542 of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs is disposed to concur in instructions to naval officers in regard to stopping vessels conveying, or intending to convey, Cretan militiamen for service in Greek army, but he must consult French naval authorities.

[42477] No. 472.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 10, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 446 of 9th October.

Austrian Ambassador has received instructions, but French Ambassador is still without them, but has expressed willingness to sign text we all have at 6 o'clock if not otherwise instructed.

[42535] No. 473.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to joint communication to be made to Porte, the "Tanin," the organ of the committee, states that neither this nor any other Cabinet could give guarantee to carry out reforms in response to a note from the Powers, or recognise right of Europe to exercise direct or indirect control.

[42188] No. 474.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 10, 1912.*

THE Servian Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 7th October, and said that there had been a disturbance at Uskub and the windows of the Servian consulate broken. He was also instructed to inform me that he had heard from Belgrade that movements of Austrian troops were reported on the Servian frontiers on the Danube, the Save, and the Drina. He was informed in reply that we had heard of no movements on the part of Austria. The Servian Minister then asked if there was anything to tell him regarding the negotiations that were passing between the Powers. He said that it did not matter much what the Powers did if they did not insist on autonomy for Macedonia under the guarantee of the Powers, and even this might not completely satisfy Servia, since she would want to be satisfied as to the future of the sanjak. Although she was on good terms with her three allies, she would not shirk war alone against Austria and Turkey combined if there were any Austrian occupation of the sanjak. If Austria entered the sanjak war with Servia must ensue. Possibly this might be thought folly, but it took Austria a long time to subdue Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Servia could maintain a guerilla war for a long time. The Serbs had two objects in requiring the autonomy of Macedonia—the first being the amelioration of the condition of their compatriots there, and the second that once Macedonia became an autonomous province Austria's temptation to occupy it would be gone.

M. Gronitch was very vehement, and he made it clear that, in his opinion, Servia had far more to fear from Austria than from Turkey, and he was highly distrustful of the former Power.

[42588] No. 474 A.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 133.)
Athens, October 4, 1912.

Sir,

ONE of the results of the present crisis, whether it end in war or not, will be the removal of certain difficulties which since the revolution of 1909 have existed in the relations between the Royal Family and the army. Prince Andrew arrived two days ago from Corfu and lost no time in offering his services to the Minister of War in whatever form they might be useful, as a simple volunteer if required. M. Venizelos has promised that a Bill shall immediately be presented to the Chamber reinstating all the Princes in the army, and Prince Nicholas and Prince Christopher are already on their way back to Athens to follow the example of Prince Andrew.

Opinions here are still divided as to whether war can be avoided. The masses believe it to be certain, but there are some well-informed persons, among them the Italian, Bulgarian, and Servian Ministers, who think that action by the Powers at Constantinople to secure that reforms shall be effectually carried out may still avert the outbreak of hostilities. The Government are behaving as if they considered it inevitable. The exportation of live stock, flour, grain, forage, &c., has been prohibited. Mobilisation is being pushed forward with the utmost activity, and since the original decree reported in my telegram No. 45 of the 1st instant, fresh territorials and the conscripts of 1913 have been called up. Four destroyers just completed for the Argentine Government by Messrs. Cammell, Laird, and Co. were bought the same day that mobilisation was ordered. The price paid is said to have been 596,000*l.* These should by now be on their way out, together with the two destroyers recently acquired in Germany. The Greek Minister in London has incurred considerable displeasure by his action in connection with the purchase of the Argentine destroyers. For some reason unknown here he refused to sign the contract, and the money was finally paid direct by Messrs. Hambro and Co. Troops are being moved as rapidly as possible towards the frontier, but in comparatively small numbers at a time, so as not to attract attention. All the rolling-stock of the Thessalian and Pirœus-Frontier Railway Companies has been requisitioned, as well as every available horse and motor car in the country. In a few days Athens will be almost without wheeled vehicles and horses, and the garrison reduced to recruits and territorials. The Crown Prince, who has been appointed commander-in-chief, is said to be only awaiting the arrival of the King, which is expected on the 6th, to proceed to his head-quarters at Larissa, and he will probably be accompanied by at least two of his brothers and his eldest son, Prince George. These active preparations undertaken against the advice of all the Powers show that the formal declaration of war may come at any moment, though there is an evident wish here that the first step shall be taken by Turkey.

The financial side of the question does not appear to have yet been seriously considered. The Government have in hand from the proceeds of the loan of 1911 and from the surplus of last year some 2,500,000*l.*, perhaps not so much. That the amount is so large is only due to having avoided all expenditure on public works so urgently required as the Pirœus harbour improvements, railways in Thessaly, road-making, &c., for which the contract expressly stated that the loan was in part required. At the rate they are going this will quickly be exhausted. The balance still unissued is 1,600,000*l.*, but it may be doubted whether the bankers who hold the option will be ready to grant as favourable terms as last year, when already difficulty was found in placing the loan on the market.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

He said that he had had a conversation with M. Cambon, in which the latter had enquired why Servia, in the event of war, could not avoid entering the sanjak, since, according to the Vienna press, such action on her part would bring the Austrian troops across the frontier. He had replied that if Servia were at war with Turkey she must be free to enter Turkish territory where she chose, but if Austria carried out the threat foreshadowed in the Viennese press, war with Servia would ensue.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42622] No. 475.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 11.)

Sir,
Admiralty, October 10, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter, dated the 21st ultimo, which has been received through the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, from the commanding officer, His Majesty's ship "Diana," respecting affairs in Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 475.

Captain Hall to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

H.M.S. "Diana," at Suda Bay, Crete,
Sir, *September 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that no change has taken place in Cretan affairs this week.

2. The deputies elected to attend the Greek National Assembly have been going over by twos and threes in nearly all Greek steamers to Piræus. It is said that about eighteen have already gone. They are, however, travelling quietly as ordinary citizens, and it is impossible to stop them.

3. His Majesty's ship "Medea" sailed on Wednesday, the 18th instant, for Limassol, arriving there the following Friday morning.

I have, &c.
S. S. HALL, *Captain,*
Senior Naval Officer.

[42565] No. 476.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 10, 1912.*

INSTRUCTIONS contained in your telegram No. 529 of 8th October, respecting which I made a communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, appear to be superseded by a conversation which his Excellency tells me that Sir A. Nicolson has had with the French Ambassador, when it was agreed that in the existing circumstances it would not be advisable to warn Cretan Government that protecting Powers may have to reoccupy island.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that M. Sazonof was, when he left Paris, most unwilling to contemplate such a prospect as a landing and probability of conflict with Cretans. His Excellency also says that it would be very ill received in French Chambers.

[42635] No. 477.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 10, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, who returned this morning, has, since receiving Bulgarian reply, given up all hope of averting the war. He said Russian Ambassador was authorised to join in making communication to the Porte as soon as his colleagues received their instructions, but that nothing would come of it, and that war would break out Sunday or Monday. His efforts were being now concentrated on endeavouring to localise it.

He has instructed Russian Ambassador at Vienna to express hope that, even if Servians make false step in entering the sanjak, Austrian Government will keep their heads and not make equally grave mistake in occupying it. They would gain nothing by doing so, as, so long as Powers adhere to principle which they had laid down that there was to be no alteration of territorial *status quo*, Austria need not fear Servia would be allowed by Europe to establish herself there. If Servia attempted to do so at end of war, there would always be time enough for Austria to expel her, and her task would be an easy one, as Servia would be then exhausted. Russian Ambassador was instructed to give positive assurances that Russia would not intervene in the war if Austria abstained from taking any such action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned subject to German Chancellor. Latter seemed to quite understand Russian position, and Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that German Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed to give friendly advice in above sense. His Excellency, however, observed to me that Austria knows that Germany is so afraid of being isolated, and consequently so dependent on her, that Austria is not inclined to listen to German advice if it does not suit her interests.

I suggested that it might be prudent for Russian Minister at Belgrade to warn Servian Government not to enter sanjak, as, if they did so, they would find themselves confronted with Austrian army. His Excellency said he would speak to Servian Minister here. He added that Austrian occupation of sanjak would be breach of neutrality, which would inevitably entail Russian intervention. Would it be possible, in view of grave issues at stake, for us to give a hint to Servian Government of the danger of provoking Austria?

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me of the possibility of Europe intervening to stop war on the first favourable opportunity or after some decisive battle had been fought. I observed that in that case it might be advisable for the Powers to continue their present conversations and endeavour to elaborate settlement of Macedonian question that would be acceptable to Austria and Russia alike, as, otherwise, we should have no definite proposals to make to the two belligerents.

[42615] No. 478.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 362.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1013 of 9th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he must consult Minister of Marine as regards instructions to naval commanders.

He remarked, however, that an undertaking on the part of captains of Greek or Cretan vessels would not be much of a guarantee, and would hardly relieve us of the duty of searching vessels leaving Cretan ports. He was afraid that the one cruiser which Russia was sending could not help much to make a blockade effective.

His Excellency said that he trusted that you would not press idea of reoccupation of Crete, as he was most strongly opposed to it, and he did not believe that Emperor would consent to it.

[42624] No. 478 A.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 363.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 10, 1912.*

IN the conversation reported in my telegram No. 359 of 10th October, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs took exception to the statement made by Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Austrian Delegation with regard to Emperor of Austria's protectorate over Catholic Church in Albania, as contrary to the arrangement concluded between Austria and Italy on the subject of Albania.

On my enquiring whether he meant me to understand that he proposed asking for an explanation of this statement, his Excellency said that he would in the first place make enquiries at Rome.

[42562] No. 479.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 452.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

MY telegram No. 449 of 10th October.

Communication was made to Porte this evening.

[42563] No. 480.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 453.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

MILITARY attaché has received communication from Ministry of War stating that military attachés in Turkey will alone be allowed to follow operations attached to army of the east.

He has also been verbally informed that no other foreign officers will be allowed to follow operations, nor will anyone be allowed to accompany any of the other armies.

[42564] No. 481.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 454.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

MY telegram No. 452 of 10th October.

Austrian dragoman who presented communication was told by Minister for Foreign Affairs that, to-morrow being Friday, Cabinet Council could not deal with it till Saturday, but that if the Porte had objections to make it would reply, while if communication was not considered objectionable from point of view of Porte there would be no reply, which would be equivalent to a tacit acceptance of its contents.

[42666] No. 482.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 11, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from vice-consul at Uskub, dated 9th October:—

"Servians have pulled up 400 metres of railway between Ristovatz and Vranya.

"All the arms depôts in Albania have been opened. There seems to be no doubt that the Albanians will fight Montenegro and Servia with a right good will."

[42661] No. 483.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Belgrade, October* 11, 1912.

IN a conversation with the Roumanian Minister yesterday, the Russian Minister expressed considerable disappointment at M. de Sazonof's present policy. He said it was incomprehensible to him that Russian representatives should now be instructed to co-operate with their Austrian colleagues to repress a movement which Russia had been preparing and to which she had been looking forward for years past.

Servians openly affirm, and most of my colleagues seem convinced, that the present movement is not spontaneous on the part of the Balkan States, but has been fostered by the Pansluv organisation in Russia.

The helplessness in the present instance of the Servian and Bulgarian Governments, which are usually able to direct public opinion, and which themselves are not in favour of war, would be explained if the above surmise be correct.

[42565] No. 484.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 561.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 164 of 10th October: Reoccupation of Crete.

Sir A. Nicolson has no recollection of having stated that it was inadvisable to warn Cretan Government. On the contrary, he has always taken the line of emphasising necessity of giving a warning.

Subsequent events have, however, made blockade to prevent Cretan forces joining Greeks the most important matter.

[42738] No. 485.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 770.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1912.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me confidentially that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is informed that an important member of Turkish Government has said that if Powers stop Bulgaria from going to war Turkey would place in the hands of the Powers the execution of the reforms that are necessary.

I urged that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs should discuss this information with Russia; if Turkish Government could not say this officially now, they might be induced to say it if war went against them; and whenever they did say it officially Russia and Austria, if agreed, would be in a strong position to stop the war. The Balkan States would, after such a declaration by Turkey, be really making war not against Turkey but against the Powers.

Austrian Ambassador could not tell me name of Turkish Minister referred to. It seems too much to expect that Turkish Government could say this officially in face of popular excitement in answer to collective communication of Powers made yesterday, but I send it for your information in case future developments or information obtained by you make it opportune to make use of it later on.

[42635] No. 486.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1027.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 359 of 10th October.

You may, if you think it useful, inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have already impressed upon Austrian Ambassador here my firm conviction that if Austria makes no forward move Russia will not do so, and my earnest desire to see Russia and Austria keep in touch.

[42737] No. 487.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1912.

A STATEMENT appears in the "Times" to-day that, in authoritative Austrian circles, the failure of the European attempt to prevent war is attributed in large measure to the halting attitude of the British Government, which made it apparent that there would be no adequate European guarantee of the requested reforms in European Turkey.

I have shown this to the Austrian Ambassador. I have reminded him that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs made the same criticism on the phrase "prendront en main" as I had made; that I had waived this criticism within an hour of seeing the text of the formula, in order to avoid delay; that one of the

suggestions of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Government on the 5th–6th was that representations in Constantinople should be deferred until after the representations to the Balkan States; and that we had authorised our Ambassador on the 7th to join in a collective communication in Constantinople, which had not been made until the evening of the 10th, because the other Ambassadors were not all ready.

The Austrian Ambassador admitted that these were the facts.

I said that we could not be made the scapegoat in the European press for the failure of the Powers. If this were really attempted I should reply, not by inspiring our press, but by a direct statement in Parliament, and by laying papers. We had worked most sincerely for co-operation and peace, but, if there were to be recriminations, and the attitude of individual Powers when they were working together was to be singled out for reproach, we should have to look after our own interests.

The Ambassador said that he was sure that Count Berchtold, whose views on the points to which I had referred had been as stated, had never countenanced such a statement as that reported in the "Times." The "Times" correspondent in Vienna was active in collecting unfavourable information, and the authoritative circles referred to were probably somewhat vague, and not very authoritative.

I said that this might be so, but that Austrian circles more definitely authoritative might contradict the misrepresentation.

The Ambassador promised to report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once what I had said.

I said I was sure Count Berchtold had not countenanced the misrepresentation.

[42632] No. 488.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 500.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1912.

M. CAMBON informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 5th October that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople that Turkey would refuse to take into consideration an ultimatum from the Balkan States, but that she would be disposed to give to the Powers the most serious assurances in regard to the introduction of reforms. She was also decided to introduce the reforms laid down by the law of 1880, and was determined to increase considerably the number of deputies representing the different nationalities in the Chamber.

This announcement has encouraged M. Poincaré to propose, in agreement with M. Sazonof, that the Powers should inform the Balkan States and Turkey to the following effect:—

1. That they emphatically reprove any measure susceptible of leading to a breach of the peace.

2. That if war nevertheless broke out between Turkey and the Balkan States, they (the Powers) would not admit on the termination of the war (whatever the issue) any change in the territorial *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula.

3. That, basing themselves on article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers would take in hand, in the interests of the Christian populations, the realisation of reforms in the administration of European Turkey, it being understood that these reforms would not impair ("porter atteinte à") the integrity of Ottoman territory.

It goes without saying that this declaration reserves to the Powers the liberty to study the nature of the reforms.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that he would communicate the above to me. Sir A. Nicolson said that he would like, as a personal expression of opinion and with the sole desire to facilitate the acceptance by the Turkish Government of any communication from the Powers, to make one or two observations and ask for one or two explanations.

Sir A. Nicolson understood that the communication was to be collective. M. Cambon said that he believed collective as regards Constantinople: Austro-Russian as regards the Balkans. Sir A. Nicolson enquired whether 1, 2 and 3 were to be communicated simultaneously to the Balkan Governments and to Constantinople. M. Cambon said that he presumed 1 and 2 would be communicated to the Balkan

Governments, but that No. 3 would only be communicated when Turkey had accepted it. Sir A. Nicolson said that he asked this because if we communicated No. 3 to the Balkans it would hamper matters very much at Constantinople, and if the Turks refused to have anything to say to it, the Powers would cut a very poor figure in the Balkans.

As to the terminology and purport of No. 3, Gabriel Effendi had told the Austrian Ambassador that the Porte was prepared to give most serious assurances as to reforms, but apparently was not prepared to go further. The proposed communication went very much further, and even much further than article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, and so far as Sir A. Nicolson could see, effaced Turkey entirely and ignored her, and practically entrusted to the Powers themselves the duty of reforming Turkish administration, with Turkey having no voice in the matter. This was the largest demand which, so far as Sir A. Nicolson could recollect, had ever been made on Turkey. Sir A. Nicolson was only making these observations with a view of showing that he feared No. 3, as it was at present worded, had very little chance of being accepted or entertained by the Porte. It was in reality asking Turkey to abdicate in favour of the Powers, and imposing on the latter an enormous responsibility. M. Cambon said that M. Poincaré had intimated that he would be quite prepared to consider any amendment in the phraseology.

Sir A. Nicolson said that he hoped I should be in London on the 6th October, when he would submit to me the proposed communication. All Sir A. Nicolson had said was merely his personal opinion, and in no wise intended as carping criticism. We were as anxious as anyone that means could be found to preserve the peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[42746] No. 489.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, October 8, 1912.*

EARLY this morning the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ministers received instructions to make, in the name of the Powers, a declaration to the Montenegrin Government condemning resort to measures adverse to the maintenance of peace, and stating that, with certain reserves, the Powers undertook to take in hand the question of reforms in European Turkey. The King replied by recapitulating briefly his causes of complaint against the Turkish Government, and stated that the public feeling of his country obliged him to take action, though he was deeply pained at being unable to follow the counsels of the two Empires and of their Sovereigns.

As soon as the interview with the two Ministers was concluded, the King entered his car and left to join his troops at Podgoritza.

I enclose herewith the text of the two declarations.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 489.

Text of Declarations.

(1.)

LES Gouvernements russe et austro-hongrois déclarent aux États balkaniques :—

1. Que les Puissances réprouvent énergiquement toute mesure susceptible d'amener la rupture de la paix.

2. Que, s'appuyant sur l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, elles prendront en main dans l'intérêt des populations la réalisation des réformes dans l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe, étant entendu que ces réformes ne porteront aucune atteinte à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman. Cette déclaration réserve, d'ailleurs, la liberté des Puissances pour l'étude collective et ultérieure des réformes.

[43275] No. 488 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 508.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 11, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that M. Poincaré suggested a friendly enquiry by France and ourselves in Rome as to the Ægean Islands, with the view of impressing upon the Italian Government that the question of the islands was one which concerned all the Great Powers. He feared that, otherwise, the Italian Government might use the terms of peace with Turkey to constitute Italy a sort of special protector of the islands.

I said that I was reluctant that France and ourselves should do anything in Rome at this moment that would press Italy away from us towards the other Powers. A day or two now would decide whether the peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey were to succeed or break down. If they broke down, the question of the islands was not important for the present. If they succeeded, it would be on terms which were already arranged. Italy would then make them known, and would at once press for the recognition by the Powers of her annexation of Tripoli. Indeed the Italian Ambassador had already said as much to me. I supposed that we should all recognise the annexation, and then would be the time to say to Italy that, while we recognised her annexation of Tripoli, we must all take up the question of the islands, as it concerned the Great Powers as a whole.

M. Cambon entirely accepted this view.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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3. Que si la guerre vient néanmoins à éclater entre les États balkaniques et l'Empire ottoman, elles n'admettront à l'issue du conflit aucune modification au *statu quo* territorial dans la Turquie d'Europe.

Les Puissances feront auprès de la Sublime Porte les démarches dérivant de la précédente déclaration.

(2.)

SA Majesté, après avoir entendu lecture de la déclaration prescrite, nous a répondu comme suit :—

"Je regrette que l'intervention des Puissances se produise un peu tard. Voici deux mois que la note du Gouvernement monténégrin sollicitant cette intervention a été remise. L'Europe est restée muette et je me suis cru oublié. La Turquie nous a causé tant de torts depuis trente-quatre ans, et surtout ces dernières années. Les troupes turques ont occupé notre territoire et y ont établi des retranchements. J'ai protesté à maintes reprises, mais j'ai prêché dans le désert. Depuis longtemps le Monténégro demandait la jonction des routes et le desséchement du lac de Scutari ; rien n'a été fait jusqu'ici, et plusieurs villages de la Zeta sont inondés. Enfin et surtout les massacres de nos frères chrétiens sur les confins du Monténégro n'ont pas discontinué et m'ont frappé au cœur. En ce moment la situation du royaume est telle que, même si ses alliés se dégageaient vis-à-vis de lui—ce que je ne puis supposer un instant—l'état d'esprit de mon peuple m'obligerait à entrer en action. Vous me comprendrez. Je suis profondément peiné de ne pouvoir suivre les conseils des deux Empires amis et protecteurs, et surtout de leurs gracieux Souverains, qui ont toujours été si bons pour moi."

[42741] No. 490.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 201. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, October 9, 1912.*

I FEEL it is my duty to call your attention to the deep feeling of disappointment which has been aroused in this country by the apparent failure of M. Sazonof's visit to England to produce the decisive results which were expected of it in regard to the Balkan question. The publication of the official communiqué concerning the conversations at Balmoral was followed here by an outburst of resentment against England, and it is clear that Russian public opinion attributes, however unjustly, the abrupt aggravation of the Balkan crisis to the lack of support given to Russia by her partners in the Triple *Entente*. The attacks on England were begun by the "Novoe Vremya," which of itself need not be too seriously taken into account. But the same tone was soon adopted by all sections of the Russian press, and consideration must be accorded it when the "Golos Moskvy," hitherto the staunchest of the supporters of the friendship with England, has gone so far as to suggest the abandonment of the Triple *Entente* in favour of a rapprochement with Germany (see my despatch No. 200 of the 6th instant).

I do not desire to give undue weight to the utterances of the press in this country, but there is one question in Russia on which public opinion cannot be disregarded. In its Slav sympathies all Russia is united, and both the Emperor himself and his Government would be powerless in face of a truly national Pan-Slavist movement.

It is universally felt here that the seriousness of the situation in the Balkans was not realised at Balmoral, and that even when events rendered its gravity unmistakably evident, England was still averse to putting pressure on Turkey for fear of compromising herself in the eyes of her Mussulman subjects.

The sudden revulsion of feeling against England is all the more remarkable when the present mistrust is compared with the enthusiasm which preceded M. Sazonof's visit. But it would seem that popular confidence in England has been severely shaken, and a very widespread doubt has arisen as to the value to Russia of the existing *entente*. It is not easy to realise the sensitiveness of Russia on the Slav question. The recent

events in the Balkans have strung this sensitiveness to a high pitch of nervous tension, and the attitude of England will be closely watched during the present crisis. If it is felt that England is not to be relied on to support Russia in matters which affect the Slav interests and sympathies of the latter the prospects of the permanency of the good relations between the two countries will suffer a blow, the impression of which it will be extremely difficult to remove.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[42710] No. 491.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 432.)
Sir, *Paris, October 11, 1912.*

A DISTINCT tendency is observable in the French press to make His Majesty's Government responsible for the want of prompt and energetic action at Constantinople by the Powers when faced with the danger of an outbreak of war.

The "Temps" and the "Figaro" have more than once hinted that England is lukewarm in supporting efforts to obtain sufficient guarantees from Turkey that reforms for the Christian populations will be carried out.

The "Matin" of to-day's date accuses England more openly, and declares that if war break out it will be the fault of Europe, but that England will be chiefly responsible. It refers in this connection to Mr. Gladstone's championship of the Christian races under Turkish domination, and expresses surprise that England hesitates now to act energetically with a view to bringing to an end once for all the lamentable state of affairs in Macedonia.

The "Matin" observes that England's pretext for not pressing the Porte is a consideration of the feelings of her 80,000,000 Mussulman subjects in India, and that this attitude on her part may prevent the united action of the Powers at Constantinople, which alone is capable of averting war.

It states its opinion that the representations made to the Porte are too indefinite to satisfy the Balkan States

They are now known as the "English proposal," which the "Matin" characterises "vague et molle."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[42714] No. 492.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Paris, October 11, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 432 of to-day's date, reporting the tendency of the French press to throw the responsibility for ineffective action in the Balkans on to His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a leading article in the "Temps" which appeared this evening.*

The article refers to the criticism of England made by the "Matin," which I brought to your notice in my despatch above mentioned, and then proceeds to criticise British lukewarmness for reforms in Turkey under cover of a statement as to the alleged feeling in Russia on the subject.

Later on in the article it is stated that: "La Grande-Bretagne agit selon la conception momentanée de ses intérêts. La politique et le commerce britanniques en Turquie, en Chine, au Congo et ailleurs, jouent souvent de l'humanité avec un zèle un peu indiscret et trop bien rémunéré."

I have, &c.
F. BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[42765] No. 493.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 12.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, October 11, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated 11th instant, addressed to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 493.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Malta, October 11, 1912.*

MY No. 219: Measures of blockade in Crete in event of war.

Add instruction that vessels, especially Greek, may be stopped at discretion of commanding officers of His Majesty's ships on way to Cretan ports and not allowed to enter port unless their masters undertake not to embark Cretan Militia.

[42690] No. 494.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Corfu, October 11, 1912.*

THREE thousand four hundred troops in six Government transports embarked with horses this day under escort of torpedo-boat.

[42856] No. 495.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 12, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 161 of 10th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is strongly opposed to idea of a conference meeting at the present moment, as Servia is to declare war on Monday. In pronouncing himself recently in favour of a conference, he had contemplated it assembling at the first favourable opportunity to liquidate war and not during its actual progress. He thinks that Austrian proposal for some understanding would serve as a basis for discussion at the conference when it eventually meets.

His Excellency's personal opinion was that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in addressing himself to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had only intended to perform an act of courtesy, and to render an account of what he had done as one of the mandatories of the Powers. He is making further enquiries in Vienna.

He told me that Turkey had at the last moment declined to sign treaty of peace with Italy, and that he had considered this was madness on their part.

[42854] No. 496.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1027 of 11th October: Attitude of Austria.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is grateful for what you said to Austrian Ambassador. He told me that he was satisfied with reply to communication which the Russian Ambassador had been instructed to make to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram No. 359 of 10th October), and that he hoped that Austria would restrict her action to concentrating troops near frontier. He is impressing on Servian Minister here necessity of doing nothing to provoke Austria.

[42860] No. 497.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 12, 1912.*

SERVIAN division mentioned in my telegram No. 56 of 8th October is passing through Bulgaria in detachments by rail, and will join Bulgarian forces on the frontier.

The major portion of the Bulgarian head-quarters staff left unostentatiously this morning in direction of Philippopoli.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[42870] No. 498.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 65. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 12, 1912.*

THE following is a full translation from the French original of the reply of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian Governments, which will be handed to the Austrian and Russian representatives in the three Balkan capitals to-morrow evening:—

(R.) "The Bulgarian Government having taken note of the declaration that the Six Great Powers have, through the Austrian and Russian representatives, addressed to Bulgaria, and having come to an understanding with the Governments of the other Balkan States, express their gratitude for the interest displayed by the Powers in favour of the peoples of European Turkey, and for their promise to take in hand the realisation of administrative reforms on the basis of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.

"The Royal Government, however, in accord with the Greek and Servian Governments, estimate that, after the many promises of reforms so often and so solemnly given by Turkey, and which have been expressly recorded in international instruments, it would be cruel not to endeavour to obtain reforms more radical and more definite in favour of the Christian populations of the Empire, such as would veritably ameliorate their miserable lot if they were sincerely and integrally applied.

"For this reason, the Balkan States have considered it their duty to address themselves directly to the Government of His Majesty the Sultan, and to point out to them the principles on which the reforms to be introduced should be based, and the guarantees which must be accorded for their sincere application.

"They are convinced that if the Imperial Ottoman Government is willing to follow this course, order and tranquillity will be established in the provinces of the Empire and a firm peace assured between Turkey and the Balkan States, which have up to the present too often suffered from the arbitrary and provocative attitude that the Sublime Porte has adopted towards them." (End of R.)

The copy of the note to the Turkish Government will not, according to the latest decision of the three Balkan States, be enclosed in the reply to be handed to the Austrian and Russian Ministers.

[42861] No. 499.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 163 of 10th October.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested the French Minister of Marine to send instructions to the naval commander in Cretan waters to assist the British ship in preventing the Cretans from violating neutrality, helping the Greek army in case of war, and furthering the arming and dispatch of Cretan volunteers.

[42820] No. 500.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 542 to Paris of 9th October.

Senior British naval officer has received instructions in the sense indicated and is authorised to use force in the last resort.

My French and Russian colleagues are still entirely without instructions.

Cretan mobilisation is now complete, and the militia are only waiting for arrival of transport from Greece, which seems to be expected very shortly.

[42865] No. 501.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 12, 1912.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 363 of 10th October.

In discussing Balkan situation with secretary-general, I learnt that Russian and French Ambassadors at Vienna had asked Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to clear up some points in his speech to Delegations which appeared obscure. Secretary-general said that it did not refer to Austrian protectorate over Catholics in Albania, which was a recognised principle of ancient date, and to which Italy took no exception whatever. Count Berchtold's reference to Catholic protectorate caused Italy no uneasiness.

German Ambassador, whom I saw just previously, shrugged his shoulders when I asked if he thought, as I hoped was the case, that Austria and Russia were in perfect accord as regards localisation of any Balkan disturbances. Referring to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' speech to Delegations, his Excellency said that he knew of no special agreement between Austria and Italy that referred to Catholic protectorate in Albania. The only one, so far as he was aware, was a "hands off" agreement which dated from the time when Visconti Venosta was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Of this agreement Austria had reminded Italy at the beginning of the present war with Turkey.

I could not see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was again engaged with Austrian chargé d'affaires. Russian Ambassador left the secretary-general as I arrived.

[42853] No. 502.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 770 of yesterday.

The statement was, I gather, from the Austrian Ambassador, made to him by Kiamil; but it was evidently of a very vague character, and the Austrian Ambassador, after further consideration, was inclined to admit that public opinion (see my telegram No. 450 of 10th October) would be too strong for Government, unless it gains considerable strength, to take any engagement of so definite a character.

[42858] No. 503.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, October 12, 1912.*

I HAVE seen King of Greece. His Majesty sees no means of preventing war, which may begin any moment.

Crown Prince left for Larissa this morning. His Royal Highness's eldest son, who arrived yesterday, will join his father's staff in a few days.

There are 103,000 troops in Thessaly and 12,000 at Arta.

I asked His Majesty if he had heard anything of Turkish offers with a view to detachment of Greece from her allies. He said he had not, and that if any were now made they would be too late.

Chamber will probably meet next week, when question of Cretan deputies will arise.

[42859] No. 504.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 12, 1912.*

PRIME MINISTER has told my French colleague that the text of the note of the Balkan States to Turkey is not quite settled, but that it will demand effective control of the reforms by the Great Powers and the Balkan States. He said, however, that if the Great Powers succeeded in obtaining such control for themselves the States would be satisfied.

[42846] No. 505.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 274 of 11th October.

I have seen Minister for Foreign Affairs and discussed with him the statement made in yesterday's "Times." He told me that he had received a telegram from Count Mensdorff on the subject reporting his interview with you. Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that neither in Government nor in well-informed circles did anybody believe that you had impeded action in efforts to prevent outbreak of war in the Near East. He enquired of me whether I had any complaint to make as regards Austrian press. I told him that I had none, and I must say that I fail to find any anti-English current running in press here. "Times" correspondent admits this. I suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that he should seize the first opportunity of having an article inserted in some inspired Austrian organ asserting that no doubts could exist as to the loyalty of England to the maintenance of European concert in Balkan matters. He said that he thought he could see his way of doing something of the kind.

"Times" correspondent tells me that he did not mean to assert that any specific charges were being made here against England, but that he understood in the lobbies of the Delegations that it was believed that owing to our supposed pro-Turkish sympathies the Balkan States had become convinced that we would oppose introduction of effective control in Macedonia, and that this belief had driven them to decide on war.

[42867] No. 506.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 12, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he deeply regretted the language said to have been used by the Russian Minister of War against Austria the other day. He had not as yet received the actual text, but there could be no doubt as to the main sense of the speech. I gathered from him that the Russian Government had assured him that the opinion of the Minister of War in no way represented theirs. He said, nevertheless, that the use of such language by a man in so high a position would make it still more difficult to maintain good relations between the two countries.

His Excellency seemed to me, however, to wish to avoid taking any action which might raise a storm among public over Minister of War's speech.

[43274] No. 507.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 562.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 12, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador informs me that French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that a conference of the Powers should be announced at once if Turkish Government accept invitation already made to discuss reforms. He considers Austrian Government sure to agree to this, and is prepared to sound German Government.

If Turks do not agree to discuss reforms, French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Powers should take into consideration question of when developments of the war may make mediation opportune. His object is to preserve solidarity of Europe and prevent divergent interests from developing.

I have said that I entirely share his view as to importance of preserving solidarity of Europe, and agree with his proposals if other Powers will accept.

I have informed Russian Ambassador.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1029; Berlin, No. 279; and Vienna, No. 275.)

[42825] No. 508.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 563.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 542 of 9th October: Steps to prevent embarkation of Cretan militia.

Please hasten instructions to naval commanders.

British commander-in-chief has been forbidden to authorise use of force.

(Repeated to Canea, No. 185.)

[42738] No. 509.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 773.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 770 of 11th October.

Italian Ambassador has now independently given me privately same information, with the addition that Kiamil is Minister in question, and had expressed his intention of pressing his view upon Council of Ministers. I remarked that communication of the Powers provided an opportunity of expressing this view, if Turkish Government could do it in face of public excitement at Constantinople.

[42761] No. 510.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 480.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 12, 1912.*

TEWFIK PASHA showed to Sir A. Nicolson on 10th October a telegram from Gabriel Effendi, saying that the French and Russian Ambassadors had an interview with his Excellency and the Grand Vizier on the 7th instant for the purpose of urging the Ottoman Government to declare in precise details the reforms which they intended to introduce, in order that the Powers might make a communication of them to the Balkan States. The two Turkish Ministers said that the Cabinet were examining the Law of 1880; that they found that there were many valuable provisions in it; and that they would submit the reforms programme to Parliament for its sanction. The Ambassadors, they said, were quite at liberty to let this be known to the Balkan States.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1030), *mutatis mutandis*.

Tewfik Pasha added that, in his opinion, in view of the agitated state of the public mind in Turkey, it would be very difficult for a Turkish Government to go far at this moment in the direction of reforms or to give any positive engagements.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that the Ambassadors would present, he (Sir A. Nicolson) believed, their communication to the Porte that evening.

Sir A. Nicolson asked what number of Turkish troops his Highness believed were now in the Adrianople vilayet. Tewfik Pasha said that he heard they had at least 300,000 there, besides what were in Macedonia; in fact, Turkey would mobilise more men than she did in the Russian war. His Highness was quite confident that the Balkan States would be heavily defeated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42762] No. 511.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 502.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1912.

M. CAMBON called on 10th October and said to Sir A. Nicolson that he had a telegram from Constantinople to say that the French Ambassador was ready to present the collective communication, but that the others were not. Sir A. Nicolson said this was very strange, as we had quite contrary information; and Sir A. Nicolson read to his Excellency Sir G. Lowther two telegrams, Nos. 446 and 449, of 9th and 10th October respectively, which clearly showed that M. Bompard was without the necessary instructions, while all the others were ready. M. Cambon said that M. Poincaré had now telegraphed to M. Bompard to tell him to join in any step on which all his colleagues were agreed, and Sir A. Nicolson said that fortunately, by Sir G. Lowther's last telegram, the Ambassadors had anticipated this course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42871] No. 512.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 66. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October* 13, 1912.

THE Turkish chargé d'affaires will be given special facilities for telegraphing to his Government the note mentioned in my telegram No. 65 which is to be presented to him to-morrow evening the 13th instant. The following is a translation from the original French:—

(R.) In spite of the action taken by the Great Powers through the medium of Austria and Russia in the Balkan capitals, an action by which they promise to take in hand the realisation of reforms in the administration of European Turkey, the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia consider it their duty, however, to address themselves directly to the Ottoman Government in order to declare to them that radical reforms sincerely and integrally applied can veritably ameliorate the miserable lot of the Christian peoples of the vilayets of the Empire, can guarantee the order and tranquillity of Turkey in Europe and assure a firm peace between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States, towards which the Sublime Porte has too often adopted an arbitrary and provocative attitude which nothing justifies.

The three Governments, whilst regretting that the Montenegrin Government is unable, owing to events which have already occurred, to take part in this action, invite the Sublime Porte to proceed immediately, in concert with the Great Powers and the Balkan States, to the elaboration and introduction of the reforms in European Turkey, provided for in article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, in basing them on the principles of ethnical nationalities (autonomous administration of the provinces, Belgian or Swiss Governors-General, provincially elected assemblies, gendarmerie, free education, and militia), in entrusting the application of the same to a superior council composed of an equal number of Christians and Mussulmans, under the supervision of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and of the Ministers of the four Balkan States in Constantinople.

They trust that Turkey will be able to declare that she accepts these demands and will bind herself to put in execution within six months the reforms contained in the present note, and in the explanatory note annexed herewith, and that she will, as a proof of her assent, withdraw the mobilisation decree.

(P.) Another paragraph may be added to the above note to the effect that Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece demand the reimbursement of all the expenses they have been forced to incur owing to the mobilisation of the Turkish troops.

Up to the time of telegraphing Greece had not approved of this addition. However, the paragraph in question will probably be included in the ultimatum, if not in the above-mentioned note.

(R.) Annex to the note of the 13th October:—

1. Confirmation of the ethnical autonomy of the nationalities of the Empire with all its consequences.
2. Proportional representation of every nationality in the Ottoman Parliament.
3. Admission of Christians to all public offices in provinces inhabited by Christians.
4. Recognition, on an equal footing with Ottoman schools, of schools of all grades of Christian communities.
5. Engagement by the Porte not to endeavour to modify the ethnological character of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire by the transplanting of the Mussulman population.
6. District recruitment of Christians for military service with Christian "cadres," suspension of enlistment until after the formation of the "cadres."
7. Reorganisation of the gendarmerie in the separate vilayets of European Turkey under the effective command of Swiss or Belgian organisers.
8. Nomination in vilayets inhabited by Christians of Swiss or Belgian valis accepted by the Powers and assisted by general councillors chosen by electoral districts.
9. Creation at the Grand Vizirate of a superior council composed of Christians and Mussulmans in equal numbers to supervise the application of these reforms. The Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the four Balkan States at Constantinople will be commissioned to follow the operation and the labours of this council.

[42849] No. 512 A.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, October* 13, 1912.

MINISTERIAL decree declares Servian currency legal tender in Bulgaria.

[42852] No. 513.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October* 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 542 of 9th October to Paris.

If the captain of Greek steamer refuses to give required undertaking and persists in entering a Cretan port in order to embark Cretan militia, may not force be used to prevent him? I do not think that it is safe to rely entirely on bluff.

[42841] No. 514.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October* 13, 1912.

RUSSIAN Government expects Servia to begin the war to-morrow.

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[42842] No. 515.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 13, 1912.*

I LEARN from a good source that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is making to the Powers following proposals :—

If the Porte accepts collective note, a conference to assemble immediately to consider steps to be taken for instituting reforms.

If, notwithstanding acceptance by the Porte, war breaks out, the Powers to offer mediation.

If the Porte do not accept collective note, or mediation be refused by either party, Powers to await favourable opportunity during the war to offer mediation.

[42847] No. 516.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 13, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché has received reliable information to the effect that troops of 15th Sarajevo and 16th Ragusa corps have been gradually moved nearer the borders of sanjak and Montenegro. Trains of 15th corps are now being completed and made ready for any move necessary. Of 69 battalions in these 2 corps 29 are 700 strong and the remainder 550. Battalions in 7th Agram and 13th Temesvar corps are 550 strong. It is believed that units along the north Servian frontier have also been increased by moving others further inland to the border.

It is not known positively whether Montenegrin force in the sanjak near Berane consists of regular or irregular troops. The information given in this morning's "Zeit" that there is a strong Servian detachment near Raska, on north-eastern frontier of sanjak, is believed to be accurate. There is, however, no indication yet of any intention by Austria to intervene in the sanjak.

[42848] No. 517.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 13, 1912.*

SERVIAN Minister came to me this morning with the following information, which he assured me he had received from a very good source. It was to the effect that Germany had recently given Austria-Hungary to understand that she did not wish her to take any steps without consulting her in Balkan matters which might lead to complications with other Great Powers. The Servian Minister interpreted this to mean that Austria must not move against Servia in the event of a temporary occupation of the sanjak by the latter, but must await peace negotiations before bringing real pressure to bear at Belgrade to obtain evacuation of the sanjak.

I told Servian Minister that I had no confirmation of the report, but that I had reason to believe that Austria would do nothing precipitately, and I therefore hoped that Servia would give no cause for a rupture arising between her and her neighbour.

[42830] No. 518.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 13, 1912.*

I GATHER from Minister for Foreign Affairs that no decision was arrived at yesterday as to reply to be given to communication of Powers. Cabinet was not clear as to meaning of communication. They were at a loss to understand why an examination of reforms should be necessary seeing that the law of 1880 had been elaborated with the assistance of the Powers, and that present Government had expressed the intention of putting it into force; that they had even gone so far as to select Christian

persons who could fill some of the higher offices, and that the Government would be prepared to attach foreign advisers of different nationalities to the governors.

As regards "measures" to be taken to bring the reforms about, he declared that foreign control was absolutely inacceptable. Even if any Turkish Government could be brought to agree to it, it was impracticable, for the different local elements would necessarily come under the influence of one or the other foreign advisors, a system which would be found unworkable, as exemplified by old Condominium in Egypt.

I pointed out in a friendly spirit to his Excellency that the object of the communication was to try and prevent hostilities, and it was not a moment for discussing details, and I suspect that the object of the Turkish Government is to endeavour to gain a few more days to advance their mobilisation.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[42839] No. 519.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 13, 1912.*

THE King, whom I saw yesterday, appeared greatly perturbed by the news which had just reached him that at the last moment Turkish Government had raised difficulties, nature of which His Majesty did not know, and that rupture of negotiations with Italy was imminent. His Majesty said that during the present Balkan crisis he had strongly urged the Porte to make peace with Italy and detach Greece from the other Balkan States by the cession of Crete. His Majesty characterised Turkey's action in breaking off negotiations with Italy as mad, and, from the general point of view, most unfortunate.

His Majesty repeatedly expressed to me the hope that His Majesty's Government would see their way to exert friendly pressure on the Porte to repair its blunder and conclude peace with Italy forthwith.

His Majesty foresees that Italy will now, if peace is not made, prosecute the war with more vigour, and the Porte may have to close the Dardanelles. This, besides being disastrous to Roumania—who is already suffering greatly owing to Balkan crisis having produced a serious shortage of shipping for the export of grain—would provoke Russia, thus making localisation of the Balkan conflict very difficult.

[42852] No. 520.

Consul-General Whitehead to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 512 of 9th October to Paris.

If the captain of Greek steamer refuses to give required undertaking and persists in entering a Cretan port in order to embark Cretan militia, may not force be used to prevent him? I do not think that it is safe to rely entirely on bluff.

[42965] No. 521.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, September 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report the substance of a conversation which I had on the 24th instant with the Turkish Minister, Séfa Bey, who appeared much incensed at what he termed the far from friendly tone towards Turkey which characterised the statement on foreign relations made by the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Hungarian Delegation, and which had just appeared in the press telegrams from Vienna.

Denunciation of the Turks and of their methods is so general that it was not without interest that I listened to the "other side." The Minister at times exaggerated,

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while many of the things he said were platitudes, but his reasoning was often sound and savoured of unpalatable truth.

Séfa Bey demurred to Count Berchtold's allusion to the prevalence of an internal crisis in Turkey. He said there had been a crisis, but it was now over, and a new Chamber would probably meet in November. He maintained that the unrest in the provinces was now confined to a small portion of Northern Albania, and he ascribed its cause to the Catholic element in the district. He considered the passage in Count Berchtold's exposé, that "the unsatisfactory position in the provinces of European Turkey has not failed to cause a dangerous reaction in the neighbouring countries, and has placed the leading persons there face to face with a difficult task," was liable to be interpreted by Bulgaria and the other restless States as a justification of their attitude, and would act as an encouragement rather than a deterrent. He said that if Austria-Hungary and Russia really wished to do so they could stop the agitation in the Balkans immediately by firm action at Sophia and the other capitals.

I said that all the Powers were most anxious to avert a war and to see quiet and reconciliation re-established in the Balkans, as also to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Séfa Bey replied that he quite believed that Austria did not want war, but she wanted to keep up the spirit of unrest, so as to have the opportunity of intervening should she wish to do so. By fostering an agitation she also hoped to discredit Turkey as much as possible in the eyes of Europe. Under the régime of Union and Progress there had been a drawing towards Germany and Austria, but now, "under Kiamil Pasha," Turkey was again looking to her natural friends, Great Britain and France—especially Great Britain—and, added the Minister, referring to the Austrians, "Cela les exaspère."

I asked Séfa Bey why Turkey did not, of her own initiative, at once introduce into Macedonia such drastic reforms and guarantees as would afford satisfaction?

He replied that, in the first place, nothing would satisfy the Powers because Austria and Russia were not sincere, while, moreover, Turkey had not the means at her disposal to do all that would be considered necessary; and that, in the second place, nothing could possibly satisfy all the conflicting elements. He then asked me was I Irish!

Most probably the Turkish Minister is right, and that the utmost that Turkey possibly could do would only amount to "tinkering." The only solution likely to give comparative satisfaction appears to be the entire abolition of Turkish ascendency.

Séfa Bey is a keen apologist for his country, and maintained that the barbarities laid to her charge were mostly engineered from without. Even Great Britain was guilty in this respect, as the "Balkan Committee," no doubt innocently, did a vast amount of harm by encouraging the propaganda in Macedonia. If the Great Powers would give the Bulgars and their fellow agitators to understand that, in no circumstances, would they interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, and that, if the agitation continued, they could not count on any outside aid, but must settle with Turkey alone, rest and quiet would be re-established in a month.

To speak of "public opinion" in Bulgaria forcing on a war was rubbish. The war party consisted of the irresponsible Opposition, who when themselves in power had not dared to avail themselves of even more favourable opportunities than the present and to declare war.

He discoursed at great length to try and prove that oppression and massacre were foreign to the nature of his countrymen and opposed to the Mussulman religion, but I fear his assertions were not strictly based on historical facts. It would, he declared, be impossible to adduce an instance in Ottoman history of so-called massacres until the famous "Bulgarian atrocities," which for the first time alienated British public opinion, headed by Mr. Gladstone. Those atrocities were all engineered by the Russian consuls! Since then all excesses committed by the Turks were due to exasperation caused by the throwing of bombs, the murder of innocent persons, and so forth. Would not the people of any country commit excesses under such provocation, even the English? The Russians certainly did in the case of the Jews, and persons were frequently lynched in America. The priesthood of the various sects were largely the instigators of the troubles. The Emperor Selim I. had foreseen these troubles, mostly arising from a difference of creed, and had only been prevented from forcing all his subjects to become Mussulmans by the Sheikh-el-Islam of the time.

Finally, without directly alluding to Count Berchtold's proposals, the Minister said that Austria aimed at creating autonomous or quasi-autonomous districts, which, like ripe fruit, would drop off at the right moment.

It looks as if the expectations of pacification which prompted Count Berchtold to make his proposals were still far from being realised, and as if his appearance as a political search-light in the inflammable atmosphere of the Balkans were in danger of promoting rather than averting the dreaded conflagration. If Séfa Bey's language reflects the feelings of his countrymen, the Porte would appear to be more distrustful than ever of Austria's intentions, while dim visions of autonomy in the provinces of European Turkey have stimulated rather than allayed the impatience of the adjacent States. In spite of this, opinion here seems on the whole to be hopeful that war may be averted.

Mr. Bourchier, of the "Times," who has just paid a flying visit to Bucharest, tells me that the impression he has gathered is that, in the event of war, Roumania would not mobilise, unless specially ordered to do so from Vienna, as it is understood that Russia would immediately respond by throwing an equivalent number of men on to the Pruth.

I asked the Turkish Minister whether he had any news as to the prospects of peace with Italy, and he said that he supposed the unofficial negotiations were still proceeding, and that some means would be found of saving the *amour-propre* of both nations, and that the evil results for Turkey, for evil they must be, would be as small as possible.

In privately discussing the same topic recently with the Italian Secretary, who has been my colleague at other posts, he remarked to me that Great Britain and France had made a great mistake in showing such benevolent neutrality towards Turkey. Italy had been on the point of abandoning the Triple Alliance for the Triple *Entente*, but this impulse had received a great set-back. Italy was particularly aggrieved at the action of France, who had practically ignored the understanding ("convention"), whereby, in return for Italy's support at Algeciras, she pledged herself to back Italy's action in Tripoli. Italy had suffered many blows from Germany in consequence, and she now felt she had been the dupe of France. Italy was bound to take the steps she did in order to forestall another Power.

I have, &c.
J. G. T. VAUGHAN.

[42943] No. 522.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 106.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 5, 1912.*

THE sudden decision of the Turkish Government to hold manœuvres at Adrianople and the calling up of redif divisions was considered by the people here as a menace, and the statement made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, that the presence of large Turkish forces near the frontier would assist the Bulgarian Government to calm the agitation in this country, was taken by the Government as an insult. M. Gueshof at once instructed M. Saravof to ask the Porte for further explanations, and these being deemed unsatisfactory, the Cabinet decided late at night on the 27th September that mobilisation was necessary. The next day the Cabinet met again under the presidency of the King Ferdinand who approved their decision. The same day the Servian Premier arrived here incognito with General Putnik, the Servian Minister of War, and took part in the deliberations of the Bulgarian Cabinet. M. Pashitch wished to have the mobilisation delayed some days, but the Bulgarian Government urged that, for military reasons, this would be unwise, and the two Servian envoys returned by special train to Belgrade on the 29th. On the 30th, at 5 P.M., the Royal ukase was issued ordering general mobilisation to commence on the following day of all classes from the years 1886 to 1909, thus including all men from the ages of 20 to 46. Another ukase proclaimed the whole kingdom to be under martial law.

The announcement of the order for mobilisation was received with considerable enthusiasm by large crowds, which had been expecting the news since the morning. Processions were formed, and friendly demonstrations were made before the Russian, Italian, Servian, Greek, French, and British Legations. Similar demonstrations were made on the two following days by 4,000 or 5,000 Macedonians and Bulgarian students. On each occasion speeches were made, the respective National Anthems were played,

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and the deputations asked to see the foreign representative. So far as I was concerned, they were told that I was out.

The effect of the mobilisation was patent at once, and the routine of life was at once disorganised.

For want of men all Government offices, banks, and most of the shops are closed. Several newspapers have ceased to appear; there are no waiters in the restaurants or cafés, tramways have stopped running; there are no horses left in the cabs. The telegraph service is the only one to be kept in good order.

The most striking feature of the mobilisation was the immediate influx of peasants from all the villages in the district, who arrived in unceasing streams with their women and ponies. There was no confusion; all looked cheerful and full of confidence.

The enthusiasm displayed by all has been really remarkable, and none who have witnessed it can fail to admire the true patriotism of the whole nation.

King Ferdinand can at last be said to stand crowned in the hearts of his people.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[42944] No. 523.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 107.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 6, 1912.*

THE extraordinary session of the Sobranjé, which had been convoked for yesterday—anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria, four years' ago—was opened by King Ferdinand. His Majesty was greeted by loud acclamations, the like of which he has never before experienced. These were renewed at the close of the speech, which His Majesty, contrary to custom, delivered standing and uncovered.

The speech, a translation of which is enclosed, gives no reason for the order of general mobilisation, but merely requests the deputies to sanction the ukase issued on the 30th ultimo declaring the state of siege ("état de siège") throughout the country, and other legislative measures imposed by the difficult circumstances through which Bulgaria is passing.

These measures include:—

The opening of an extraordinary credit of 2,000,000*l.* for the army.

The sanction of a sum of 890,400*l.* to cover expenses already incurred by the Government.

A supplementary credit of 200,000*l.* to the extraordinary vote for 1912.

A supplementary credit of 134,844*l.* to the ordinary vote for 1912.

All the above credits are to be expended without the customary formalities, and will be subsequently verified by the Ministry of Finance.

Another Bill authorises the Minister of Finance to cut down expenses provided for in the estimate for the current year, and sanctions a reduction of 10 per cent. on officials' salaries under 96*l.*; 20 per cent. on salaries from 96*l.* to 192*l.*; 30 per cent. on all salaries above that sum. Moreover, the exemption tax paid by all those not fitted for military service is doubled.

A Bill presented by the Minister of War complements the Military Penal Code, and provides penalties, in accordance with article 28 of the Geneva Convention of 1907, for all persons ill-treating the wounded or making an illegal use of the badge of the Red Cross.

Upon meeting to-day, the Sobranjé began by passing, amid acclamations, the dispatch of a telegram of fraternal greeting to the Parliaments at Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinjé. The Royal ukase proclaiming martial law throughout the kingdom was then approved also with general acclamation and without discussion. A brief debate followed with regard to the Royal ukase ordering mobilisation.

In the course of the discussion, M. Gueshof laid stress upon the perfect correctness of the attitude adopted by the Bulgarian Government, who, he said, had even gone to the length of curtailing the grand manœuvres with a view to allaying every conceivable motive for anxiety on the part of their neighbours. Turkey had replied to this step by mobilisation, and had thus directly threatened their security. In view of this act of provocation, which nothing could justify, Bulgaria had no alternative but to modify

her own attitude and mobilise herself. The Government were fully alive to the extreme gravity of the decision they had taken and of the heavy responsibility thereby entailed in the eyes of the nation; but they found an all-sufficient consolation in the knowledge that the civilised world would give them credit for their unavailing efforts to maintain peace, in the sentiment of union with the other Christian Balkan peoples, who like themselves had exhausted all pacific resources, and who now saw themselves forced by this self-same Turkish mobilisation to similar decisions as themselves and above all they (the Government) found encouragement in the unanimous support of the whole people, who had manifested by the most admirable and striking demonstrations of patriotism that they were absolutely at one with the Government in the hope that a new dawn was on the point of breaking for their fellow-countrymen in Turkey.

In conclusion, M. Gueshof thanked the leaders of the Opposition for their support, and appealed to the members of the Assembly not to give the lie to the unanimity of the nation, in order that Bulgaria might advance firmly on her chosen path, and find the peace so urgently wished for—a peace which would be the reward of her great sacrifices and which would enable her to become a real factor in the progress and civilisation of the Balkans. The speech was greeted with loud applause and prolonged cheering from all parts of the House. M. Malinof, the Democrat leader, declared that his party would consent to whatever line of action the Government might take up, and that the latter had their entire confidence. M. Ghenadief, speaking in the name of the Stambouloviste, proposed that all Bills laid on the table by the Government might be passed without debate. M. Radoslavof, the leader of the Liberal party, added the assurance of his unreserved support. M. Tontchef, the leader of the Young Radicals, spoke in the same sense. All the speakers were loudly applauded.

A trifling incident was provoked by the Socialist deputy, M. Sakizof, who expressed himself against mobilisation, and for a moment the president was obliged to suspend the sitting. The Bill sanctioning the mobilisation ukase was then passed with acclamation. All the other Bills were similarly passed unanimously at the first reading.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 523.

Speech by King Ferdinand.

MM. les Députés,

LA mobilisation générale des forces militaires, provoquée dans le pays, a rendu nécessaire la proclamation de l'état de siège dans tout le royaume.

En vertu de l'article 73 de la constitution, vous êtes convoqués pour approuver l'oukase portant déclaration de l'état de siège ainsi que pour voter les autres mesures législatives imposées par les circonstances difficiles que traverse notre patrie.

Convaincu que, appréciant les intérêts suprêmes de l'État bulgare, vous accomplirez votre devoir, j'appelle la bénédiction de Dieu sur vos travaux et déclare ouverte la première session extraordinaire de la quinzième Assemblée nationale ordinaire.

FERDINAND.

[42945] No. 524.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, reporting on the mobilisation of the Bulgarian, Servian, and Greek armies and the effects of martial law in this country.

I also enclose copy of a despatch from the British consular agent at Rustchuk dealing with the effects of mobilisation in that town and a summary of the reports which have reached this legation up to date from Mr. Gillat-Smith, His Majesty's consul at Varna.

I have, &c.

COLVILLE BARCLAY

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Enclosure 1 in No. 524.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 6.R. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 4, 1912.*

MOBILISATION was ordered here as well as in Servia and Greece on the 30th September. All three countries are calling out the whole of their reserves. In the case of Bulgaria, it is possible to form a fairly accurate estimate of the number of trained men available, and I have worked them out to be as follows:—

Opichenie 2nd ban (men aged 45 and 46)	7,340
„ 1st ban (men aged 41 to 44)	20,040
Reserve (men aged 22 to 40)	283,190
Men at present serving	52,650
Total	363,220

There are, in addition to the above, many thousands of men who have not undergone training owing to having been exempted, and also of Macedonians. Of the latter fifty small bands, each of eight men, have been formed, and thirteen larger bands. These are being dispatched to Macedonia, where they are to adopt such measures as they are able to hamper the Turkish mobilisation. The remainder of these Macedonians are being organised here by General Velchef. It is hoped that about 20,000 of them will be formed into an infantry division, and a certain number are being incorporated into the regular army, in spite of many having received no previous training.

Bulgaria will probably put in the field:—

First line:—

Three cavalry brigades.
Nine divisions.

Second line:—

One brigade.
One division (Macedonian).

It is expected that mobilisation will be completed by the 8th and concentration by the 20th October.

The young men who should be called to the colours next year and the year after are also being called up for three weeks' training. It is possible that the best of these will be retained and the remainder dismissed. I believe that three or possibly four aeroplanes have been received by the army.

As regards Servia, I have not the data requisite for making an accurate estimate of the number of men available. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade recently stated they could probably not mobilise more than 175,000, and he would not be likely to under-estimate the number. I think, therefore, that 150,000 may be taken as a likely estimate of the number of men that Servia can place in the field. I am told by my Servian colleague here that it is intended to form ten divisions and a reserve division. This organisation sounds rather ambitious for the number of men that they would have.

As regards Greece, I see that His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Athens has recently given 120,000 as the number that she may be expected to place in the field, and other accounts name higher figures. When I was in Athens in June last I went into the question of the number of men available with a member of the French military mission. He told me that with the present recruiting law between 80,000 and 100,000 trained men would be available. I have nothing further to add to the remarks that I made in my despatch No. 30, sent to Sir Francis Elliot on the 20th June, 1912, regarding the preparations and organisation for war of the Greek army.

At the same time as mobilisation was ordered in Bulgaria the country was placed under military law ("en état de siège"), and a few remarks regarding the general and immediate results of the mobilisation may not be out of place. The military authorities have assumed control of the sale of foodstuffs. Bread being the chief article of food of the Bulgarian peasant, a guard has been put on all bakeries, and the sale of flour is forbidden. Bread is also only allowed to be sold to private individuals after the needs of the army have been supplied.

The tramways in the town of Sophia have ceased to run, and almost all cabs have been withdrawn from the streets owing to the horses having been requisitioned. The ordinary train service has been discontinued throughout the country, and during the first two days of mobilisation a great strain was put upon the railways. This was due to the arrival at various stations of thousands of reservists who happened to be living at a distance from the district in which they are being mobilised.

The banks and most of the shops have been closed, money cannot be obtained, and the military authorities are paying for the articles that they requisition by means of promissory notes and not in cash.

A strict censorship of the press has been established. No military information is allowed to be published, criticism of the Government or of the military authorities is forbidden, and also all articles which might be considered likely to excite popular feeling. As a result many newspapers have ceased to appear, it being found difficult to carry on journalism under such conditions.

The hospitals at Sophia have been emptied of all civilian patients, and 2,000 beds have been prepared for wounded men. The only movement of troops that have hitherto taken place have been that the cavalry have been sent to various places such as Yamboli, Stanimaka, and Kustendil in order to cover the mobilisation and concentration of the other arms. The railway battalion has been sent to railhead probably at Hermanli, and the guarding of the railways has been taken over by the Opichenie.

The trans-Balkanic railway connecting Tirnova and Stara Zagora was to have been completed by the end of the year. Working parties of soldiers have, however, now been sent to both ends of the line, and it is now to be finished by the middle of the present month to enable it to be used by the military authorities. The importance of this line is very great, providing as it does a second railway across the Balkans.

As regards the plan of operations no information is available. The opinions expressed by officers are extraordinarily optimistic, and appear to be made without much consideration for the delaying power of the Turkish army. There is no doubt that every effort will be made to hasten operations with a view to bringing them to a termination before the severity of the winter is felt, and before money, horses, and ammunition are expended. The chief objection to a winter campaign in Macedonia is the suffering that it will bring on the Christians in that country, whose villages will probably be burnt, and whose women and children will have to take refuge in the mountains. No one who has been here during the present week can fail to admire the way in which the call to arms has been answered, the quiet enthusiasm of all classes of the people, the efficient manner in which the influx of over 40,000 men has been dealt with, and the way in which the hardship and loss due to the dislocation of all trade has been borne.

It is certain that mobilisation even without war is an enormous expense and strain to a small country, and one which it would not lightly incur. Here it is also clear that it would be dangerous for the Government to oppose an enthusiasm which amounts to chauvinism, and war seems at the present time to be the only safety-valve for public feeling in Bulgaria.

I am informed at the Ministry of War that it is doubtful if any military attachés will be permitted to accompany the army in the field. If this proves to be the case I propose to proceed to Greece in the hope of accompanying the Greek army.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 524.

Mr. Tacchella to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 29.)

M. le Ministre, *Bourgas, le 2 octobre,* 1912.

LA mobilisation a mis la ville en complet bouleversement; tribunaux, douane, banques, mairie, &c., restés avec un nombre de fonctionnaires insuffisant, ont presque cessé de fonctionner. Le commerce paralysé, l'exportation défendue, notre port est resté sans portefaix, vu que la plupart étaient des Turcs de l'Asie Mineure, qui ont quitté la Bulgarie.

Les habitants turcs de notre ville partent en masse. Hier par le bateau russe sont parties plus de 200 familles, et par les prochains bateaux pour Constantinople partiront ceux qui restent.

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Hier sont partiés d'ici pour la frontière turque (vers Vassiliko) une centaine de comitadjis et Macédoniens armés des bombes pour mettre le désordre en Turquie.

Hier et aujourd'hui sont partis sept trains de réservistes pour rejoindre leur régiments, qui se trouvent à Yamboli, Sliven et Nova-Zagora.

Le 24e régiment d'ici jusqu'à demain soir sera complété. Manque de places aux casernes a placé les réservistes dans les écoles et les maisons privées.

J'ai, &c.
ATT. TACCHELLA.

Enclosure 3 in No. 524.

Summary of Reports received by the British Legation at Sophia up to date from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Varna.

THERE is now a large store of gunpowder at Varna ready for dispatch at any moment.

The regiment stationed at Varna and the reserves of that district are to be in readiness and on a war footing ready for active service at noon to-morrow, the 7th October.

Steamers are plying constantly between Varna and Bourgas, carrying troops in both directions to join their regiments. Others are arriving from Baltchik and Kavarna. Reserves from this part of the country who have to join units south of the Balkans are dispatched by sea from Varna to Bourgas, at which port they will entrain for the frontier at Harmanli or other destinations.

The smaller banks at Varna have received orders to send their money to Sophia. The manager of the National Bank expects to have to suspend payment shortly.

On the 3rd October 3,000 men left by sea for Bourgas *en route* for the Turkish frontier and 2,400 by rail for the interior.

The schools have been closed, and are being used as depôts. The French vice-consul is understood to have placed the French school provisionally at the disposal of the military authorities pending instructions from his legation.

As already reported by telegraph, the entrance to the harbour and Bay of Varna has been mined, and vessels arriving must anchor 3 miles off and hoist the pilot flag. They will be piloted in during the hours of daylight.

No unscreened lights, which could be seen out at sea, are permitted. Search-lights have been set up along the bay between the harbour and Galat point. A few small guns are in readiness.

The steam-ship "Michael" (Greek) arriving on the 3rd October reported that the Turkish authorities had seized fourteen Greek sailing-vessels on their way to Constantinople.

There are conflicting rumours of friction between Moslems and Christians in various parts of the district; but Mr. Gilliat-Smith believes them to be exaggerated, and is of opinion that, as in the town of Varna itself, so in the district, on the whole, perfect order has been maintained.

Sophia, October 6, 1912.

[42946] No. 525.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

Sophia, October 7, 1912.

Sir,

ON the receipt on the 30th ultimo of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 73, in case all other foreign representatives received similar orders, to urge the Bulgarian Government to take no steps for mobilisation or for moving troops to the frontier, I made enquiries, and found that none but the Russian Minister had received analogous instructions. As his were not qualified in any way, M. Nekludof asked to see M. Gueshof and delivered them to him. His Excellency replied that it was too late, that a Royal ukase ordering general mobilisation would be published simultaneously in a few hours in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, and that the matter now rested with the Minister of War to provide for the public safety. On the following day the French, Austrian, and German Ministers received similar instructions to mine, but,

in view of the reply that had been returned to M. Nekludof, they decided that it would be useless to convey them to their destination. On the 2nd October the Austrian Minister told me that he had had occasion to see M. Gueshof the evening before, and that he had *glissé* his instructions in the course of conversation. The same afternoon I saw M. Gueshof, and asked him what was going to happen now that the Turks had also ordered a general mobilisation. He said that things looked very black indeed. I advanced as a personal suggestion that it might perhaps be possible to relieve the tension by bringing about a gradual demobilisation on both sides. He said that he hoped those were not instructions from His Majesty's Government. I pointed out to his Excellency that I had particularly stated that the above was purely a personal suggestion of mine, but that I had received instructions like all my colleagues to urge the Bulgarian Government to take no steps for moving their troops to the frontier. He replied that no pressure, however strong, from the Powers would bring about demobilisation, it would only accelerate the outbreak of the conflict; moreover, in the present temper of the army and of the people, such a step would probably mean the dethronement of King Ferdinand. He maintained that if the Turks had not sent large forces to the frontier and called up redif divisions, Bulgaria would not have mobilised. She had been compelled to do so in self-defence. Both Servia and Greece had joined her; the three States were united in a common cause, and nothing would separate them. Things had gone too far now, and the Balkan States must obtain their demands. To my direct enquiry as to what these actually were I received no reply. I then said that I had heard it stated that the Balkan States wanted the application of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin and the appointment of foreign Christian valis, but if that was really their minimum there seemed to me but little chance of arriving at a peaceful solution. The Turks would not accord such demands, and the Powers were not prepared to enforce them upon Turkey. His Excellency replied that they would themselves endeavour to enforce their demands on Turkey. To this I pointed out that the number of men in the Balkan States was limited, whilst those of the Ottoman Empire were comparatively unlimited. I also pointed out the possibilities of danger arising from Roumania as well as from Austria. But his Excellency seemed to hint, as he had done before (see my despatch No. 100 of the 18th September), that there was no apprehension from either quarter.

M. Gueshof then spoke of the internal situation in Turkey. He said that he had that day received news from Monastir, the very place from which they had first heard of the movement against the Young Turks, that these were fast regaining the upper hand; that no Turkish Government would ever be strong enough, however willing it might declare itself to be, to carry out serious reforms. The present Turkish Government was doomed. He could not understand how Great Britain could pin faith in such a broken reed as Kiamil Pasha. He said that the language held by Russia at Sophia and especially at Belgrade had, after all the past encouragement which she had given them for solidarity, provoked unspeakable revulsion of feeling in the two countries. Bulgaria hoped, he concluded, that the present Government in England would remain faithful to the traditions of Mr. Gladstone.

The Servian Minister had held much the same language to me the day before, only more forcibly expressed. He said that should Russia carry out her threat of remaining passive whilst Austria marched into Servia, Servia would die fighting, and changing front would become one of the most faithful adjuncts of Austria. Servia's position was intolerable; it had to be settled once and for all. The moment had now come for Russia, France, and England to decide one way or the other; it was a case of propping up a Turkey which nothing could save from decomposition, followed by the inevitable advance of Austria to Salonica, or of supporting a solid block of friendly Balkan States, which Turkey herself would ultimately join, as a barrier against Austro-German expansion. The views of M. Spalaikovitch show the spirit of the leading factors in the present situation.

The French Minister carried out the instructions above referred to on the 3rd October.

I cannot help thinking that King Ferdinand, with all his shrewdness, would not have gone so far had he not been compelled to do so to save his Throne, and without having previously confided in the Emperor of Austria.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

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[42948] No. 526.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 111.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch No. 7 B from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, who reports that, while it is doubtful whether foreign military attachés and correspondents will be permitted to accompany the Bulgarian army in the field in the event of war, he is informed by the Turkish chargé d'affaires in Sophia that the latter proposes to urge his Government to consent to the presence of both military attachés and correspondents with the Ottoman army.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 526.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Mr Barclay.

(No. 7 B. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 7, 1912.*

THERE is reason to doubt whether military attachés and correspondents will be allowed to accompany the Bulgarian army in the field in the event of war.

Mukbil Bey, the Turkish chargé d'affaires, informs me that he has written to his Government to urge that a similar course should not be taken by them. His reason for so doing is that he thinks that the Turks will be accused of all kinds of malpractices, and that it is therefore desirable that independent witnesses should accompany the Turkish army. He also considers that the presence of foreign officers and correspondents would have a salutary effect by causing the officers of the army to be more careful that the laws of civilised warfare are strictly adhered to than might otherwise be the case.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

[42921] No. 527.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 7, 1912.*

SINCE last reporting on the situation in Servia, in my despatch No. 60 of the 26th ultimo, a very pronounced change for the worse in the direction of war has set in, and has developed with so much rapidity that, whilst little more than a week ago there seemed quite a reasonable prospect for a peaceful solution of the tension which had arisen between the Balkan States and Turkey, there is now scarcely any other prospect than that of war at any moment.

At noon on the 30th September the order for general mobilisation was signed by King Peter. The grounds alleged by the Servian Government for mobilisation are that Turkey was mobilising and that the Porte refused to deliver the Servian war material stopped in transit through Turkey, but the truth is that Servia has mobilised in sympathy with Bulgaria and in obedience to orders received from Sophia. Whether the blame for first commencing mobilisation lies with Turkey or with Bulgaria or Servia is difficult to decide. The Bulgarian and Servian Governments maintain that they became aware of the massing of Turkish troops near their frontiers, and that these operations had become a direct menace to their safety, which forced them to mobilise in all haste; whilst, on the other hand, the Turkish authorities maintain with equal decision that these movements were merely preparatory to manœuvres. The point, however, is now no longer of particular importance, except in so far as its elucidation might help to determine whether the present crisis is in effect due to chance or to a preconcerted plan on the part of Bulgarian and Servian Governments.

In previous despatches I have represented on more than one occasion Servia's attitude as being that she would not move except Bulgaria moved, that she was

endeavouring to exercise a restraining influence at Sophia, and that she would, so far as in her power lay, obey the wishes of the Powers, more especially those of Russia. This being the case, I must admit that, until matters took the present sinister turn, I was decidedly optimistic, and looked upon the agitation in Bulgaria and what little effervescence was apparent here as intended more for the purpose of putting pressure on the Powers than as a real movement backed by an intention to carry it to the end. So far as I am aware, most of my colleagues shared the same opinion, and even now that mobilisation is in full swing there are those who think that if only Russia and Austria would act whole-heartedly and energetically together the situation might yet be saved. I fear, however, that events have now gone too far for ordinary pressure to be of avail, unless, of course, accompanied by some promise to guarantee reforms by the Porte in accordance with the demands of the four Balkan States—a procedure which would probably necessitate inexpedient action at Constantinople. If Servia instead of Bulgaria were leader in this movement, I should scarcely hesitate to say that even at this late moment diplomatic pressure exercised by the Powers would be effectual, for, although mobilisation is proceeding, the Government are merely marking time, and still maintain the attitude that they are anxious to conform to the wishes of the Powers and not to precipitate a war, but they must follow Bulgaria's lead. If the truth were known, it is probable M. Pashitch and most of the members of the Government would be found very reverse of grateful to Bulgaria for leading them into this adventure, and there have been certain indications which convey the impression that they are looking to the Powers to furnish them with some means to retreat.

Whilst mobilisation could not fail to be accompanied by a certain amount of popular excitement nothing has occurred to mark anything in the way of national enthusiasm for the war. The only elements which manifest any real ardour are the army officers, the students, the Government employés and their class. It is by these that the few demonstrations such as they have been were organised. The reserves, although responding to the call to arms obediently enough, seem to do so with apathy, certainly without cheerfulness, and it is becoming evident that the bulk of the population is the reverse of carried away by enthusiasm for the war. I hear the troops are already undergoing considerable suffering owing to bad weather, want of tents, and insufficient transport and provisions. This will certainly not tend to raise their spirits. It is, moreover, remarkable that many among the better educated Servians hold the opinion that what with the danger threatening from Austria, and of being beaten by Turkey, Servia is marching to disaster.

It may appear strange that under circumstances such as these the Servian Government should have allowed matters to go so far, I therefore venture to submit an explanation as briefly as possible.

It is now universally accepted that a treaty of alliance was concluded, probably last spring, between Bulgaria and Servia, and seeing that Bulgaria had more than once resisted overtures from Servia for such a treaty, everything points to the probability that its conclusion in the present instance was due to the insistance of M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister at Sophia, backed by the influence of M. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade. In July last M. Milovanovitch, the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs, died, and was succeeded by M. Yovanovitch, who was not at all equal to the responsibilities of his position. M. Spalaikovitch, who is a hot-head and a great chauvinist (he was responsible for much of the trouble between Austria and Servia), but neither far-seeing nor dependable, here saw his opportunity. When the Kochana massacre occurred he found M. Yovanovitch, who besides being weak is very anti-Turkish, a willing listener to his ideas for joint action between the Balkan States. Count Berchtold's proposal and the alleged Sienitza massacre afforded M. Spalaikovitch still further opportunities of insisting on the necessity for acting in combination, and he succeeded gradually in leading M. Yovanovitch into a position from which he could not retire. When M. Pashitch came into office about a month ago the harm was already done, and he found Servia bound to follow Bulgaria no matter where she might lead. I have no hesitation in saying that had M. Milovanovitch lived he would, though bound to Bulgaria by treaty, never have permitted Servia to be forced into her present position, and consequently this crisis would never have arisen, since Servia has no real quarrel with Turkey, and the outcry about massacres, &c., is merely an attempt at justification.

The part played by M. de Hartwig in promoting the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, and the attitude he has adopted ever since his arrival here some years ago, namely, that Russia would never desert Servia no matter in what circumstances, has naturally placed

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him in an impossible position now when instructed from St. Petersburgh to use very determined language to the Servian Government in order to discourage them from following Bulgaria. I regret to say that I have strong reason to suspect that M. de Hartwig, instead of honestly making the best of an awkward situation, has overcome the difficulty by officially carrying out his instructions, whilst at the same time privately letting it be known that Russia never would and never could abandon the Balkan States, and that they need have no fear. It would, as is no doubt well known, not be the first time M. de Hartwig has acted in this manner during his diplomatic career. I am referring to his policy in Persia. Servians declare openly that M. de Hartwig is encouraging the war, and my French colleague and I noticed that when, together with the other representatives, we were instructed to make representations against mobilisation and movements of troops, M. de Hartwig seemed by no means best pleased with the idea of the *démarche*.

These circumstances, as also the fact that there has seemed to be no real whole-hearted co-operation between Austria and Russia, have produced an impression in Servia and doubtless also in Sophia, that the Powers are not united and that the Balkan States may profit by this disunion. The effect of representations by the Powers, which usually impress public opinion in these countries, has consequently been much discounted. M. Pashitch, himself, sees the danger ahead, and he would, I think, be glad enough to listen and act up to the pacific advice; but as things are going at present the situation is likely to get beyond his control, and he is, moreover, hopelessly in tow of Bulgaria, where it looks as though nothing could arrest the current towards war. At the same time it seems incredible that if the Powers, by some united *démarche*, could only cause the Bulgarian and Servian people to fully grasp the fact that they will not be permitted to expand territorially, and that, consequently, besides the chances of defeat they have but little hope of any benefit, they would still persist in forcing their Governments to war. Unfortunately they are at present still convinced that, notwithstanding all assertions to the contrary, they will succeed in retaining what they conquer.

For the sake of brevity I annex to this despatch some items of information in the form of disconnected statements.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Annex.

Items of Information.

The King is commander-in-chief.
Colonel Radivoi Boyevitch is Minister of War.
The Crown Prince commander of the forces.
General Radomir Putnik, formerly Minister of War, is chief of the staff.

First, second, and third bans of the reserve have been called out. There only remains one more ban available, comprising all men over 60. The number of troops Servia has put in the field is just over 210,000. The total number of modern rifles possessed by the Servian army is 175,000, the remainder of the men are armed with Berdan and Koka mausers. The number of field guns is some 210. The army is well supplied with ammunition.

It is impossible to get any reliable news as to movements of troops, but it is stated that two regiments of Servian cavalry are already in Bulgaria. Belgrade is now entirely denuded of troops except the Royal guard at the palace.

Bands have been formed and sent to the frontier; it is more than likely that fights between these and Albanian bands may be the cause of troops crossing the frontier and the outbreak of hostilities.

Transport and hospital arrangements appear very deficient, even cabs have been taken from the Belgrade streets. Reports from the interior represent a deplorable state of affairs. The army, on a peace footing, is about 5,000 horses short. Oxen will probably have to be used for part of the artillery and ammunition train.

All ordinary train communication with the interior and with Bulgaria has been stopped. The military authorities have taken over complete control of the railways. They have emptied trucks and vans containing goods, in many instances belonging to foreign firms, altogether regardless of damage caused. They have also detained

[42924] No. 528*.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 7, 1912.*

IN a recent number of the "Pesther Lloyd" in an article commenting upon the claims to autonomy put forward by the Serbs in the districts of Albania known as "Old Servia," there appears an estimate of the Serb population residing in those districts as compared with the Mohammedan population, which I venture to think may be of interest at the present moment.

This estimate is as follows:—

At Ipek: 18,000 Orthodox Serbs, 30,000 Moslems and Albanians.
Djakovo: 1,000 Serbs, 40,000 Moslems.
Prishtina: 18,000 Serbs, 41,000 Moslems.
Prizren: 16,000 Serbs, 72,000 Moslems.
Altogether 53,000 Serbs and 200,000 Mohammedans.

These figures are said to be taken from reports of foreign consuls, amongst which the Russian report laments the fact that the Serbs are being gradually driven out.

One comment of the "Pesther Lloyd" is to the effect that: "Servia consoles itself by asserting that a large amount of the Mohammedans were formerly Serbs. This may be true, but it is just those Serb renegades who carry on the war of extermination against the Orthodox Serbs, not because they are inspired with ardour for their new religion, but because Islam gives free rein to their spirit of tyranny, and hands over the defenceless Serb peasant to their sweet will."

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

numerous vans belonging to the Hungarian railways and used them for the transport of soldiers.

Eighteen truck loads of war material destined for Servia have been stopped by the Austro-Hungarian authorities at Bruck, on the alleged ground that train communication between Belgrade and Semlin is stopped, and that there is no room for freight cars at Semlin.

The funds which the Government have at their disposal for the war are estimated at about 80,000,000 fr. The daily expenditure is estimated for the first days at 2,000,000 fr.; it will probably fall to 1,000,000 fr. later on.

In discussing the King's address to the Skupshtina the leaders of all the parties declared to-day that there must be no retreat. The press, including even the Socialist newspapers, is unanimously for war.

[42923] No. 528.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 7, 1912.*

ON receiving the instructions contained in your telegram No 23 I immediately on the 30th September enquired of my Russian and French colleagues whether they had received instructions of a similar nature. My French colleague replied that he had none, but the Russian Minister said a telegram had reached him that morning directing him to make a representation against mobilisation, only unfortunately it had come just after the decree was already signed.

The folowing day the French Minister having received instructions, and the German chargé d'affaires having informed me that both he and the Austrian Minister were prepared on instructions from their Governments to associate themselves with us, it was agreed that we should all urge the Servian Government to avoid movements of troops and anything which might tend to precipitate hostilities or a rupture of relations with the Porte. This was accordingly done.

M. Pashitch appears to have given the same reply to all. He stated that the Government were anxious to conform to the wishes of the Powers, and, therefore, when M. de Hartwig had spoken he had at once telegraphed to the Servian Minister at Constantinople to remain at his post, though he had previously instructed him to leave at once when the Porte finally refused to deliver the Servian war material which had been stopped in transit. The Servian Government in order to obviate difficulties would not further pursue this quarrel with the Turkish Government. As regards the movements of troops, M. Pashitch said we could well understand that these were subject to military exigencies, and the Government could not hamper the military authorities in their dispositions for the safety of the kingdom. At the end of his interview with me, M. Pashitch said that the only means to avert war now would be for the Great Powers to put pressure on Turkey to promise the application of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty and the appointment of Christian governors. I replied that these demands appeared quite extravagant, and that if the Balkan States persisted in them no peaceful arrangement seemed possible.

As this was all that passed between M. Pashitch and myself, I was somewhat surprised when the German Minister informed me of a telegram he received from his Government, to the effect that the Servian chargé d'affaires at Berlin had stated that all the representatives of the Powers at Belgrade had made a representation urging the Servian Government not to recall their Minister from Constantinople and to abstain from moving troops towards the frontier, and adding that if the Servian Government would conform the Powers would guarantee reforms from the Porte.

The German, French, and Austrian Ministers deny having said anything of the kind, and it would, therefore, seem to be an invention on the part of the Servian Government.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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[42883] No. 529.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 831.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, relative to the possible outbreak of war between Turkey and Servia, and the attitude of the Albanians in that event.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 529.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Uskub, October 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 42 to 46 to His Majesty's Embassy, I have the honour to summarise herewith the situation up to to-day.

No one would infer from the appearance of Uskub town that a potentially hostile nation, with a frontier only 60 kilom. away, was calling out every man, trained or untrained, capable of bearing arms. The only signs of disturbance are the presence of uniformed redifs, and a possible increase in Moslem female passengers for Salonica. There is no reflection of the red-hot enthusiasm which, I hear, prevails on the other side of the frontier.

My colleagues and I have been somewhat exercised at the possibility of a massacre on the outbreak of war. But, with the reservation that the unexpected, and even the impossible, frequently happens in Turkey, I would express my opinion that the present temper of the Uskub Moslems is rather for a *sauve qui peut* than for a massacre. It seems at least possible that the Turks may abandon Uskub and fall back on the more defensible lines of Kyöprülü and Demir Kapu. In this case, or in case of a Turkish defeat, I think that there is little risk for the Christian population, though a Turkish success at the outset might lead to a massacre.

The position of the Christian villagers north of the Shar and Kara Dags is more precarious. The Albanians are indulging in their usual boastful temper in asserting that they are capable, by themselves, of repelling a Servian invasion. If they are in earnest in proclaiming their hostility, I fear that they will begin matters by a general massacre of the Kossovo Serbs. But Serbo-Albanian politics are an enigma, it seems even to the Albanians themselves, Nejib Draga having recently expressed, to a German journalist here, his astonishment that the Servian Government continued to supply the Albanians with arms.

There is, however, reason to believe that Isa Bolatin is in Servian pay, and I hear that last spring his two sons had a secret interview on the frontier with the Servian Crown Prince. If this is so (and I have little doubt that Isa Bolatin will knock himself down to the highest bidder), his recent protest against the calling out of the Kossovo redifs, "because it was unnecessary to coop them up in barracks while they would fight the Servians without compulsion," savours of high treason as much as of bombast.

The Servian authorities refuse to allow any trains to cross the frontier, and no mail-bags arrived from Servia yesterday. (I venture to point out that I am, in consequence, deprived of general European news at a moment when it is indispensable for a correct understanding of the situation.) And the Turkish Customs authorities have retired from Zibefche to Bukovtse, and have sent their wives and families to Uskub.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

P.S.—As I understand that postal communications at Mustapha Pasha are precarious, I have suspended the usual practice of sending copies of this direct to His Majesty's Embassy.

W. D. P.

[42886] No. 530.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 834.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 8, 1912.*

A STATEMENT appeared in the local press two days ago to the effect that in the event of the funds at the disposal of the Government being insufficient for providing for the expenses of a war, should such break out, the Government would take over the administration of the ceded revenues.

I understand that the President of the Council of Administration of the Foreign Debt, having called the attention of the Minister of Finance to this report, received an assurance that the Government did not have any intentions of taking such steps, and a statement to that effect was published in the paper.

To-day, however, the Minister approached the President asking whether it would not be possible for the bonds of the reserve fund of the debt to be temporarily handed over to the Government in exchange for Treasury bonds, but the President declined to consider the proposal and the matter dropped.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[42887] No. 531.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 835.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 8, 1912.*

THE Grand Vizier told me to-day that the decision arrived at yesterday to apply in substance the international agreement of 1880 for reforms in the European provinces of Turkey, based on article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin was the result of a study which had been proceeding for a month past. It would require considerable modification, as it was out of date; but at one time the "règlement," in a form modified by the instructions of the ex-Sultan, had actually been in force in the Adrianople vilayet, but after a year's experience the ex-Sultan has decreed its suppression.

His Highness said that yesterday the French and Russian Ambassadors had urged that the step should be taken. He said that it should in no way be regarded as a surrender to the demands of the Balkan States, though it would, he anticipated, call forth a violent opposition on the part of the committee leaders, and his Highness said the Government had already been threatened with the prospect of hostile demonstrations, and it had therefore been necessary to establish martial law in Constantinople and the neighbourhood.

The Government have also published an official statement explanatory of the decision now taken, of which I annex a copy.

The proclamation regarding the establishment of martial law is also enclosed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 531.

Newspaper Extracts.

(1.)

LES RÉFORMES DE ROUMÉLIE.

(Communiqué officiel.)

ON se fait une fausse idée des réformes qui sont actuellement étudiées et discutées par le Conseil des Ministres.

1. Les réformes à introduire ne sont qu'à l'étude.

2. Dans cette étude, on prend en considération toutes les lois et les projets élaborés à différentes époques.

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3. Il est évident que dans la rédaction du projet de loi relatif aux réformes on prendra en considération les intérêts politiques ottomans et surtout les dispositions de la charte constitutionnelle.

4. Le projet de loi qui sera rédigé sera soumis à l'approbation de la Chambre des Députés et du Sénat, conformément à notre charte constitutionnelle.

Il n'y a donc pas lieu pour la population de se laisser impressionner et surexciter par les informations fausses ou incomplètes.

(2.)

LE MANIFESTE DE LA LOI MARTIALE.

Emner Yaver Pacha, commandant du Ier Corps d'Armée, publie le manifeste suivant :—

Article Ier. Le Gouvernement a proclamé la loi martiale à partir d'aujourd'hui à 5 heures de l'après-midi dans Constantinople et sa banlieue.

Art. 2. L'autorité militaire est exercée par le commandant du Ier Corps d'Armée.

Art. 3. La publication de nouvelles concernant la mobilisation de l'armée ottomane et les mouvements militaires est interdite.

Art. 4. Il est interdit de faire des conférences, des meetings et des manifestations dans les rues et les places publiques.

Art. 5. Il est interdit de tenir des réunions secrètes et de se réunir d'une façon privée sans prévenir la direction générale de la police. (Il est permis de se réunir dans les clubs en prévision des élections.)

Art. 6. Les publications inconvenantes contre le Gouvernement actuel ou relatives à la politique intérieure et extérieure et les personnalités sont interdites. (La critique dans les limites de la loi sur la presse est exceptée.)

Art. 7. Il est interdit d'imprimer, de distribuer et d'afficher des annonces de nature à exciter les esprits relatives à la situation actuelle du pays et à la politique de l'Empire.

Art. 8. Il est interdit de tirer des coups de feu, de porter des armes sans autorisation, de faire usage d'explosifs et de pousser des cris dans les rues.

La loi martiale ayant été proclamée dans Constantinople et la banlieue comme il est dit à l'article Ier, il sera fait usage du pouvoir accordé aux autorités militaires par l'article 6 du décret sur la loi martiale, et les matières indiquées dans les articles ci-dessus sont absolument interdits.

Le 24 septembre, 1912.

[42892] No. 532.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 840.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on a journey to Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, prior to the order for mobilisation of Turkish forces.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 532.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 67.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have recently returned from a journey to Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, the principal object of which was to see the new railway, which was constructed for reasons of military utility and opened for traffic two or three months ago, and to ascertain to what extent its existence might modify the military situation as regards Turkish preparations for war against Bulgaria. I travelled from Adrianople to Kirk Kilisse by road, and returned from Kirk Kilisse by the new railway.

The total length of the new line is 45½ kilom., and it connects the important military centre of Kirk Kilisse (head-quarters of the IIIrd Army Corps), with the Ottoman Railway Company's main line, the junction station being Alpoullou (Alapio). It should be noted that this station is the same as that hitherto known as Baba Eski, which name is now given to a station on the new line. Some details of the line have been forwarded by me to the War Office, and need not be alluded to here. Suffice it to say that recent rains had injured the embankments to such an extent that the trains were taking five and six hours to cover the distance, and I was told that, owing to the completion of the line having been unduly hurried, the embankments had not yet had time to settle, and that more work would have to be done on them before the line could deal with heavy military traffic. I had a talk with Arif Bey, the chief of the staff of the IIIrd Army Corps, and he told me that the railway would not be used to any extent in the event of a mobilisation, the scheme of which had been worked out without reckoning on its aid, and that it had been decided not to change the scheme at present.

Incidentally I discovered that the troops at Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse were exactly as my reports have shown them to be, and that there was no truth whatever in the rumours as to Turkish war preparations in these centres.

At Kirk Kilisse the general commanding is an old friend of mine, and he very kindly arranged a small field day for me, so that I had a good view of the troops. The garrison consisted of six battalions (including two of the 3rd Nishanji Regiment), a cavalry regiment, two mountain batteries, regiment of field artillery, and train battalion. The remaining three battalions of the 7th division are at Firmovojik. The battalions here, as at Adrianople, being of four companies each, were from 700 to 800 strong, but there were a large number of recruits who had quite recently joined to replace the class which has just been dismissed.

New barracks have been built on the Bunarhissar road, about a mile out of the town—two blocks to hold a battalion each, and two similar blocks are to be built. Pipes are being laid from the large spring farther along the road for the water-supply of these barracks.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[42893] No. 533.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 841.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the state of affairs in the Scutari vilayet. I have had no other news on the general situation in Albania during the past week, but the Constantinople newspapers report that all the Albanians have made a "bessa" to fight as one man against the menacing Balkan States. It is scarcely likely that this can apply to the Christian Malissors.

It is significant that in a telegram from Janina, published in to-day's papers, it is stated that a patriotic manifestation held there in favour of war was confined to Mussulmans, Jews, and Kutso-Vlachs.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 533.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Salonica, October* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith an abridged translation of a letter published in yesterday's issue of the "Yeni Asr" from its correspondent in Scutari.

While regarding the state of affairs from a slightly different standpoint, the writer fully confirms the information given me by Mr. Summa, as well as his impression of the seriousness of the situation.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 533.

Substance of Letter published in the "Yeni Asr" of the 2nd October from its Correspondent at Scutari.

IN my last letter I said that severe fighting was still going on round Tuzi, which place was in danger of falling if reinforcements were not dispatched in time.

The first battalion of the 5th Regiment was hurried to its relief, and the officers and men of this battalion displayed such courage that a force of 3,000 Malissors and Montenegrins, which had advanced as far as Detchitch, was repulsed and compelled to retreat after suffering heavy loss; but the fighting was so severe that the majority of the non-commissioned officers of the battalion were killed, one entire squad were taken prisoners, one officer fell dead and three others wounded.

In the recent fighting round Tuzi nine officers have been lost. The loss in non-commissioned officers and men has not been definitely ascertained, but you may estimate it in proportion to that amongst the commissioned ranks.

The losses on the side of the Malissors and Montenegrins have been extremely heavy. According to reports received from our consulate at Podgoritza, that town is filled with wounded.

Yesterday the Scutari redif battalion was called to arms for the first time, and was sent to Tuzi 270 strong. Nevertheless, if the truth must be told, the native population of Scutari has not distinguished itself by its patriotism. Those who have distinguished themselves most have been the unfortunate Muhadjirs, whom the Scutarines neither allowed to participate in the elections nor in general condescend to regard as human beings. The patriotism of the citizens of Scutari does not go further than the defence of their own town.

The other day this was again attacked, though the insurgents were repulsed with considerable loss. Last night, about 9 o'clock, a fresh assault was made upon a company of infantry which was on outpost duty on the south-east of the town. A combat ensued which lasted three hours, and to which the noise of rifle and artillery fire gave the appearance of a veritable battle. The insurgents were finally repulsed without any loss on the part of the troops.

Three battalions of infantry have arrived, and further reinforcements are expected from Monastir and Janina.

Foreign propaganda is being actively carried on here, particularly by the priests.

The only possible remedy for the lamentable state of affairs existing here is the dispatch of an overwhelming military force. The establishment and maintenance of orderly government is not possible by any other means.

[42894] No. 534.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 842.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the mobilisation of the Turkish army.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 534.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 68.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to state that since I last reported on the military situation in my No. 65 of the 25th September, the political situation has become such that war seems inevitable. The Bulgarian and Servian mobilisations, ordered on the 30th September, undoubtedly took the Turks by surprise, and the position of the Turkish army on that day was much as I had reported it to be on the 23rd. The dismissal of ihtiyats and time-expired nizams was still continuing, and orders had even been given to disband the Ismid redif division, which was then at Rodosto. The news came just in

time to prevent this, and a ship-load of ihtiyat and time-expired which was just going off to the Black Sea was also stopped here.

Orders for a general mobilisation was issued on the 1st October. This covers all classes of reserves, including mustahfiz (men up to 45 years of age), in the Ist, IInd, Vth, VIth Redif Inspections, and, I understand, the redif divisions of Samsun, Trebizond, and Amasia. In other words, the mobilisation extends to the whole Empire, except Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

This is a very grave step, but it was hardly possible for the Government to do otherwise than to make this reply to the Bulgarian and Servian mobilisations. So many reserves have already been called out this year, thereby occasioning much inconvenience to the country as well as discontent amongst the men themselves, that any embodiment now without a war to follow will probably mean trouble. Popular opinion in the army is all on the side of war, and however anxious the Government might be to find a peaceful solution, it would now be extremely difficult for them to do so.

Owing to the dismissals before alluded to (at least 50,000 men have passed through on their way to their homes during the last two months), the nizam infantry in Europe did not amount on the 1st October to more than 140,000 men. Ten redif divisions of the 2nd Class were in the act of assembling as reported in my No. 66 of the 24th September, which might be supposed to add another 100,000, but these have had little training, are very short of officers, and their quality may be taken as poor.

It might be as well to add here that the various statements which have appeared lately in the English press as to the Turkish preparations, "concentrations on the Bulgarian frontier," &c., are absolutely without foundation or excuse. So far from the numbers stated being present, the Turkish position in Thrace, which would probably be the scene of the main operations, is, as shown in my No. 65, by no means an enviable one to be in when the country is on the brink of war, while the fact that men were still being dismissed and sent back to their homes in Asia Minor up to the end of September is sufficient to show that prior to the order for a general mobilisation nothing had been done which could fairly be described as indicating an aggressive intention.

In estimating the forces available or likely to be employed, it will be convenient to consider separately the districts of the Ist and IInd Army Inspections, which correspond geographically to Thrace and to Macedonia and Albania, especially as these districts will probably form two distinct theatres of operations.

In making these estimates I have, to avoid complication, considered only the infantry. The figures can only be approximate anyhow, and the distribution of the cavalry and artillery units have all been shown in my reports, and are known as accurately as possible at the War Office, so that the necessary additions can easily be made by those who are interested in doing so. In calculating the infantry at war strength, I have differentiated between the battalions which have four companies and those which have only three. It is true that the three-company organisation is for peace only, and that fourth companies should be formed on mobilisation, but the army is so short of officers, that I do not think this can be done, and I expect to see the majority of nizam battalions take the field with only three companies. As many reserve and retired officers as possible will, of course, be called out, but as the redif battalions are also very short of officers, they will not be sufficient to meet the deficiency. Many of these officers, too, can be of little use, and one of the greatest of the disadvantages from which the Turks will suffer will be the low average quality of the officers throughout all ranks.

Thrace.

The four nizam army corps of the Ist Inspection contain twelve divisions, 132 battalions. Omitting the 6th division, at Smyrna, there remain 122 battalions belonging to the eleven European divisions. On the 1st October seventy-one were available, distributed as follows:—

Constantinople	13
Dardanelles	20
Hadjeukioi	3
Chorlu, Vize, Serai	4
Baba Eski	1
Kirk Kilisse	6
Tirnovojik	3
Adrianople	13
Gumuljina, &c.	8
Total	71

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The remaining fifty-one were distributed as follows:—

Smyrna (2nd division)	10
En route (4th division)	7
From Albania (11th division)	10
Beirut (1st division)	10
Yemen	13
Syria	1
Total	51

Excluding the battalions in Yemen and Syria, there remain 108. Of these seventy-one plus seventeen (4th and 11th divisions) may counted as available on the 7th.

The 2nd division (ten) is expected to arrive from Smyrna about the 8th.

The 1st division (ten) is under orders to return, but its presence cannot yet be counted on.

Thus we have in Thrace by the 7th October eighty-eight, and by the 10th October ninety-eight, nizam battalions. There are also the fortress troops of Adrianople, the Ismid redif division, and the four European redif divisions which were called towards the end of September, while it is possible that some of the nearer Asiatic redif divisions will be arriving.

Battalions, except for those at Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, were at a very low strength. The first step is to bring them to war strength by the incorporation of reservists. Owing to a recent reorganisation, these reservists should all be found in Europe (six classes of ihtiyats and nine of redifs), where, precisely with a view to providing for the immediate mobilisation of nizam units, 1st class redif organisations have been suppressed. To complete the nizam units of the eleven European divisions, about 60,000 men are needed. Assuming that this number is available in Europe in addition to the four 2nd class redif divisions, and that they could be collected at their divisional centres in six days, we should have—

By the 7th October—		
At Adrianople—		
1 nizam and 3 redif divisions (say)	51,000	
Fortress troops	10,000	
At Kirk Kilisse: 1 nizam division and corps troops	9,000	
At Kirjali: 1 nizam and 1 redif division	16,000	
	76,000	
At Rodosto: 1 redif division	10,000*	
Elsewhere: Divisions 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11	54,000*	
	140,000	
By the 10th October—		
The Brussa, Kale Sultanieh, and Edrenit redif divisions (26 battalions) should arrive in Europe	26,000*	
The 2nd division should be at Constantinople	10,000*	
Total	180,000	

Of which 100,000* will be available for the concentration of the main army.

The above is probably a liberal estimate, as it presumes everything will have been brought to war strength by the dates mentioned. Further, the troops destined for the main army have still to be transported to the place of concentration probably the line Lule Burgas–Baba Eski–Uzun Kenpru). How much of this can be done during the six days allowed for mobilisation remains to be seen, but so far practically nothing has moved. The railway arrangements are said to be complete, but no serious movement from Constantinople will begin until the 7th at earliest. The question then will be how many trains can be run a-day. Great improvements are said to have been made recently in the railway mobilisation scheme, and it is asserted confidently by some (the Austrian military attaché among them) that twenty trains a-day will be run each way. I do not believe this, and if ten trains are run, or at any rate 10,000 men transported besides ammunition and other necessaries, I think it is the very most that can be hoped for.

Meanwhile, there should be no lack of sea transport, and Anatolian redifs should be arriving regularly at San Stefano and Rodosto from about the 15th October. Special arrangements are being made for the debarkation and entrainment of troops at San Stefano, and a Decauville trolly line is being laid between Rodosto and Muradli.

It is believed that the Bulgarians will complete their mobilisation on the 5th, their concentration three or four days later, and that they may cross the frontier on the 10th, and it is feared that they may break up the Turkish concentration by reaching the line Lule Burgas–Uzun Keupru on the 13th or 14th. If this were possible it will be seen from the above that the position of the Turks would be bad, as they cannot possibly be ready to meet the Bulgars on that line in the time. It is this possibility which makes the Turkish military authorities so apprehensive. As I have already reported to your Excellency, Abdullah Pasha, who will command the main army on this side, is very despondent. He told me that he sincerely hoped that war might yet be averted; that owing to the dismissal of so many men recently, and to the hopeless dislocation of the forces by the formation of the Smyrna and Dardanelles armies and by the expeditions to Albania, they were in an impossible situation; that battalions were mostly not more than 300 strong, and that it was impossible to mobilise or concentrate in time. I must say that I think all this is somewhat exaggerated. Though I do not know where the Bulgarian concentration will be, I presume it is at least four or five marches from the frontier. Then to move something like 200,000 men (and they will need all this to carry out an offensive campaign on this line), to get past Adrianople and reach the Turkish point of concentration will take at least ten days, and I do not see how any serious engagement can be expected before the 20th, even supposing that no time is lost in driving in the Turkish detachments on the frontier, in masking Adrianople, &c.

That the Turks are likely to start the campaign at considerable disadvantage from the point of view of preparation is, however, obvious.

Macedonia and Albania.

Nizam troops available on the 1st October (excluding those of the 1st Army Inspection, all of which it is intended to send back):—

	Battalions.
Of Vth Army Corps	32
„ VIth „ „	32
„ VIIth „ „	33
„ 22nd division	9
„ 23rd „	10
„ 24th „	10
Total	126

(About 70,000 men.)

About 60,000 wanting to complete to war strength. Same remarks apply as in case of 1st Inspection. There are in addition 127 redif battalions, but many of these in Albania only exist in a chaotic and disorganised state. 200,000 men should be available by the 7th October, though little will have been done towards grouping them or forming armies.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

[42895] No. 535.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 843.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on conversations with Turkish officers on probable course of events in case of war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure in No. 535.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, the gist of some conversations which I have recently had with various Turkish officers on the subject of the probable course of events in case of war.

In a war with Bulgaria there are two main lines of operation open to the Turks—an invasion of Eastern Roumelia viâ Adrianople, or an advance on Sophia from Uskub.

I gather that the plan of campaign hitherto favoured has been a vigorous offensive by a large army on the former line, while containing a considerable portion of the Bulgarian army by the threat of a force from Uskub. But Nazim Pasha strongly holds the view that everything should be subordinated to the direct advance on Sophia by the shortest road; and after he became Minister of War they had begun to alter the details of mobilisation and concentration to suit his ideas. However, sufficient progress had not yet been made with the new scheme (which is further unsuitable to the present occasion, as Servia will also be actively hostile), and the armies will be assembled in accordance with the old one.

Though there is now no question of being ready to take the offensive, the Turks will assemble their principal force in Thrace, and it is hoped eventually to invade Eastern Roumelia in overwhelming numbers on this side. Meanwhile they will be content merely to defend their frontiers against Servia, Greece, and Montenegro.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[42898] No. 536.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 846.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 442 of the 8th October, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the official text of the declaration of war delivered on the 8th instant by the Montenegrin chargé d'affaires.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 536.

Newspaper Extract.

LA GUERRE: C'EST LE MONTÉNÉGRO QUI LA DÉCLARE.—LA RUPTURE.

HIER, vers 10 heures, le chargé d'affaires du Monténégro s'est rendu à la Sublime Porte et a remis au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères le document que voici:—

"Je regrette que le Gouvernement Royal du Monténégro ait épuisé inutilement tous les moyens amicaux de régler à l'amiable les nombreux malentendus et les conflits qui se renouvellent constamment avec l'Empire ottoman.

"Conformément à l'autorisation de Sa Majesté le Roi Nicolas I, mon auguste Souverain, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence qu'à partir d'aujourd'hui le Gouvernement Royal monténégrin cesse tous les rapports avec l'Empire ottoman, laissant au sort des armes des Monténégrins la reconnaissance de ces droits depuis des siècles méconnus de ses frères dans l'Empire ottoman.

"Je quitte Constantinople.

"Le Gouvernement Royal donnera ses passeports au représentant ottoman à Cettigné.

"PLAMENATZ.

"*Constantinople, le 25 septembre* (8 *octobre*), 1912."

[42900] No. 537.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 848.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

THE news of the mobilisation of the Balkan States evidently came as a surprise to the Turks, and appeared to create a feeling of depression in the governing classes, who realised how unprepared Turkey was. Among the masses, however, it seemed to be easy enough to arouse a certain patriotic or perhaps rather anti-Christian feeling, sufficient to incite organised meetings to make noisy demonstrations in the streets and break the windows of the official residences of the representatives of the Balkan Powers, in spite of the efforts of the authorities to maintain order. Notwithstanding public declarations that all party animosity would be forgotten and that committee and *entente* would sink their differences in face of the common danger, it was noticeable that each party organised its own separate demonstration.

Mobilisation here appears to be proceeding successfully, though very large numbers of men liable for service have paid the exemption tax of £ T. 40. These were already estimated three days' ago at over 5,000. Christians are being called out as well as Moslems, and I hear that many of them are endeavouring to escape by going into hiding. The chief difficulty here appears to be to raise a sufficient number of horses, and carriages are freely stopped in the street and the horses carried off by the military authorities.

There are now not so many signs of enthusiasm as there were when matters first became critical, but this may be due to the state of the siege, according to which all public demonstrations are prohibited.

In thinking circles it is realised fully that war, even if successful, can bring no advantage to Turkey, but only great financial loss, but there are many, especially in military circles, who argue that nothing can be worse than the constant condition of vexatious irritation to which they are subjected by the Balkan States.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[42902] No. 538.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 850.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the Turkish preparations for war.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 538.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following information on the subject of the Turkish preparations for war.

The Minister of War, Birinji Ferik Nazim Pasha, will act as generalissimo and exercise supreme command, the direction of all the operations being conducted by a head-quarters staff at Constantinople under his orders. His chief of staff will be Ferik Hadi Pasha, with Mir Alai Pertev Bey as assistant.

As mentioned in my No. 68 of the 5th instant, there will be two distinct theatres of operations and two main army commands:—

(1.) The army of the east under Birinji Ferik Abdullah Pasha; chief of staff, Mir Alai Jevad Bey.

(2.) The army of the west, with head-quarters probably at Salonica, under Birinji Ferik Riza Pasha; chief of staff, Mir Alai Jemal Bey.

I take it that (1) will concentrate on the line Lule Burgas–Baba Eski–Uzun Keupru, covered by detached forces at Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse, and Kirjali; and I am told that (2) will comprise an army of the Struma, to concentrate at Serres and Demir Hissar, and an army of the Vardar, to concentrate at Uskub and Ishtip; also a smaller army on the Greek frontier, probably consisting of the 22nd and 23rd independent nizam divisions and of some local redif divisions under Liva Essad Pasha, in addition to the troops at Scutari in Albania and on the Montenegrin frontier. Ferik Zekki Pasha will command the army of the Vardar, with Kaimakam Halil Bey as chief of staff.

At Adrianople will be, besides the fortress troops, the 10th nizam division and the redif divisions of Adrianople, Baba Eski, and Gumuljina—ten nizam and thirty-one redif battalions. The whole force under the command of Ferik Shukri Pasha.

At Kirk Kilisse, the IIIrd Army Corps (7th, 8th, 9th divisions), under Liva Yussuf Kemal Pasha. Twenty-four nizam battalions.

At Kirjali, the 12th nizam and the Kirjali redif divisions, under Liva Yavver Pasha. Eight nizam and nine redif battalions.

There remain immediately available for the main field army the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 11th nizam divisions, the Ismid redif division, and the 2nd division, which is daily expected to arrive from Smyrna, to which may be added the corps troops of the Ist, IInd, and IVth Army Corps. Sixty-six battalions, of which ten redif.

The redif divisions of Brussa, Kala Sultanieh, and Edremit should be arriving in a day or two, and may also be counted—twenty-six battalions.

The 1st division is to be brought down from the Montenegrin frontier, but this move will probably now be countermanded.

Thus we have:—

Adrianople—	
41 battalions	41,000
Fortress troops	10,000
Kirk Kilisse: 24 battalions	20,800
Kirjali: 17 battalions	14,600
For main army: 92 battalions	83,600
Total	171,000

It is said that the field army is to consist of six army corps, or 200,000 men. If so, and counting the Kirk Kilisse Army Corps as part of it, another nine redif divisions are required.

Moves have so far been as follows:—

Practically the whole of the 10th division has moved out from Adrianople, and is now watching the frontier on a line from Chermen through Mustapha Pasha, Lefke, Mihalich, Demirkeui, to Vaisel, where it joins up with a similar line thrown out from Kirk Kilisse and probably extending to Tirnovojik. The 10th and 7th divisions are thus on outpost duty, and will probably fall back before a hostile advance on Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse respectively.

Meanwhile, the local redif division was completely assembled at Adrianople on the 4th and 5th instant, and various battalions of the Baba Eski and Gumuljina divisions are reported as arriving in the town, the garrison of which was on the 6th put at 23,000, including the fortress troops, and, of course, excluding those above mentioned as having moved to the frontier.

The 11th division has arrived at Demotika, where it will form a detachment to cover the left flank of the concentration.

The 1st regiment of lancers left Constantinople on the 5th and 6th by train for Kirk Kilisse, accompanied by Liva Salih Pasha, the Sultan's chief aide-de-camp, who will apparently command a cavalry division which is to be formed.

At the same time two cavalry regiments left Constantinople by road, destination unknown.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 538.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the dispositions on the frontier alluded to in my immediately preceding despatch are as follows:—

At Cherman and Mustapha Pasha: five nizam and three redif battalions, two squadrons cavalry, one field battery, and two batteries of 15-centim. howitzers.

At Lefke: the 1st and 2nd regiments of light cavalry with two batteries of horse artillery.

At Mihalich: one field battery and one squadron.

At Demirkeui and Vaisel: four nizam battalions, two batteries of 12-centim. howitzers, one field battery.

The 9th cavalry regiment appears to have moved from Demotika towards Ortakeui and Kirjali.

A battalion of 12-centim. howitzers has left Adrianople for Uzun Keupru or Demotika.

The 3rd engineer battalion has arrived at Kirk Kilisse.

The 3rd division has practically all left Constantinople for the front. The infantry were entrained yesterday and to-day, and the artillery left by road to-day.

The 2nd division has practically all arrived at Haidar Pasha.

The Brussa redif division is reported to have arrived at Rodosto, and the Ismid division to be at Chorlu.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[42929] No. 539.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 440.)

Sir, *Berlin, October 11, 1912.*

I THINK diplomats and newspaper correspondents in Berlin have equally felt that they were in a backwater during these last ten days of acute crisis in the Balkans. I have not myself been able to see Herr von Kiderlen, but he seems to have expressed to the French Ambassador his readiness to accept without discussion any form of words to which both Austria and Russia agreed for the communications which were to be made to the Governments of the Balkan States and to the Porte, and I am told that he has maintained his attitude of brusque indifference towards the Balkan representatives.

The German papers have been full of telegrams and articles on the situation, and I regret to report that they have not missed the occasion to make disagreeable remarks about the policy of His Majesty's Government. They quoted at length, and with obvious pleasure, the accusations published by the "Matin" and other French papers, to the effect that the action of the Powers was delayed and weakened by the hesitations and objections of the London Foreign Office, and somewhat biting remarks have been made as to your not having thought it worth your while to be in London at a moment of such importance. The "Kreuzzeitung" declares that England is pursuing a special policy of her own in Turkey. The "Germania" suggests that the entire "peace business," so far as the Powers of the Triple *Entente* are concerned, is a cleverly acted comedy, and that those Powers do not seriously desire to prevent the war, though they feel bound to pretend to. The "Frankfurter" repeats that the effect of the joint step of the Powers was enormously weakened by England's hesitation, and declares that it is believed in several European capitals that England is only pursuing her own special objects, and hopes to repeat the manœuvres which gave her Cyprus after the Russo-Turkish war, Crete, and in particular Suda Bay, being this time in her mind.

It appears to me strange—perhaps it is due to press solidarity or to gratitude to certain French papers for their attacks on England—that I have seen no remarks in the German press on the extraordinary indiscretion, presumably on the part of the French Foreign Office, which enabled the "Temps" to publish day-by-day all the details of the late negotiations, and which I suppose must have considerably discounted the effect of the representations by publicly warning the Balkan States beforehand of what was going to be said to them.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Apart from the attacks on England to which I have referred, the general tone of the German press is one of impatience and contempt for the failure of European diplomacy to take any efficacious steps, and, more especially, to take such steps in time. The writers, I think without exception, consider that there is no longer the faintest hope of averting general war in the Balkans. Some point out the wicked uselessness of the war, as the Powers are firmly determined to allow no alteration in the *status quo*, whoever may be victorious, and express their confidence that the war will be strictly localised, and that all danger of a European conflagration is already averted. Others, on the other hand, ask the pertinent question as to how the Balkan States, supposing they win, are to be ejected from the territory they will have occupied; and suggest that the present agreement among the Powers counts for little, and that the real danger will arise when the moment comes for settlement after the war.

As to Montenegro's action in commencing hostilities, there is much difference of opinion. Some say she was put up to declare war by Bulgaria, so as to have a *fait accompli* and an answer ready to give the Powers that the other three States cannot desert their ally. Others suggest that Montenegro was secretly encouraged by Russia, with what object is not stated. Others, again, accuse Italy, and I am told that somebody has started the theory that it was Turkey herself who bribed Montenegro to begin. On the whole, the most general and most reasonable idea here seems to be that King Nicholas feels sure that some Power or other, he neither knows nor cares which, will offer him an acceptable *douceur*, which will repay him for his trouble.

Since writing the above, I have read an article in yesterday's "Post," entitled "England as Incendiary," which is preceded by a note explaining that the writer is in the closest relations with diplomatic circles, and is thoroughly acquainted with the foreign politics of the last few years. The article is absurd, and fortunately, I fancy, nobody outside the Pan-Germans cares what the "Post" says, but I think it my duty to report it. The article asks who is the wire-puller in the present crisis, as it declares it to be certain that the four Balkan States would not dream of declaring war on Turkey of their own accord unless they were assured of the support of some Great Power. The obvious answer is Russia, but this answer is only partly true. Though it is Russia who has directly encouraged the Balkan allies, she herself is being pushed on by somebody else. The article then proceeds to explain that on three occasions in the last five years, in 1906, 1908, and 1911, Europe was on the brink of a general war, and that in each case it was England who was the incendiary in the desire to crush Germany by a coalition. In each case, however, the plot failed through the hesitation and refusal of Russia. Russia did not want to quarrel or fight with Germany, and, in any case, her mobilisation was such a slow operation that she would have time to see the results of the first battles on Germany's western frontier before committing herself. England, therefore, realised that she must first involve Russia in a war, and then, when it was too late for Russia to withdraw, England and France could join her. The only way to do this was by means of the Balkans, and British gold has been flowing freely in those regions. The trouble consequently began in the Balkans at the moment when M. Sazonof was packing his trunks for his journey to England, and the actual crisis began just as he was leaving English soil, after you, Sir, had succeeded in getting him to say that Russia could not stand by and see Austria and Roumania extending their influence in the European provinces of Turkey. Now, everything was going according to your calculations, and high praise must be accorded to the cleverness of your diplomacy.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[42984] No. 510.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 171.)

Sir, *Vienna, October 11, 1912.*

WITH reference to Mr. Russell's despatch No. 167 of the 3rd October, I have the honour to report that the discussion of the Foreign Office estimates by the Austrian Delegation in plenary sitting began on the 7th October and ended on the 9th October. The discussion took the form of a general debate on foreign affairs, and was naturally influenced by the critical situation in the Balkans, to the exclusion of other subjects. His Excellency Count Berchtold intervened twice in the debates, once on the 7th October in reply to a question as to mobilisation movements in Russia,

and again on the 9th October in answer to an interpellation with regard to Austria-Hungary's protectorate over the Albanian Catholics.

On the first occasion his Excellency stated that, while the announcements of the Russian test mobilisation movements were true, no apprehensions need be aroused thereby, as they had been arranged for so long ago as last spring. He observed that the common action undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Russia should be sufficient to dispel any such apprehensions.

Count Berchtold's statement in regard to Albania was longer and of considerable interest. He stated that the preservation of the traditional protectorate exercised by the Emperor-King over the Albanian Catholics was the object of the continual attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The excitement recently aroused in Albania by the Balkan situation had rendered the exercise of this protectorate a matter of some difficulty; but the Austro-Hungarian Government never failed to examine all incidents reported to them, and to discuss them most earnestly with the Porte. That these discussions did not always lead to a result with the desired promptitude was due to the peculiarly dilatory methods of the Turkish administration. Count Berchtold proceeded to point with satisfaction to a concrete instance of the success of his representations, namely, the recall by the Turkish Government of so high a Moslem official as the Cadi of Scutari, whose objectionable utterances in regard to the Albanian Episcopate and Austro-Hungarian policy had been the subject of frequent remonstrances by the Austro-Hungarian representative at Constantinople.

The exercise of this religious protectorate, Count Berchtold continued, led to repeated advice by Austria-Hungary to the Porte that they should adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Malissors, in order to restore normal conditions in Albania. He was happy to be in a position to state that the Porte had now definitely promised extensive concessions to these tribesmen in respect of military duty, taxation, and, in fact, of all their just demands. Kiazim Pasha had been sent to Scutari to put into force these concessions (to which the Porte had solemnly bound themselves); and it was to be hoped that they would result in the tranquillisation of the Catholic population of Albania. Count Berchtold's words were received with applause by the members of the delegation.

The remaining speeches consisted chiefly of a discussion of the general situation in the Balkans. The rapid changes in that situation have already rendered out of date much of what was said, and I shall not, therefore, trouble you with a detailed report of the debates. The representatives of all the various parties recognised the seriousness of the crisis in the Balkans, and their speeches for the most part showed entire appreciation of the responsible position at this moment of the Dual Monarchy and of her need to be prepared to deal with any situation that might arise. Party differences were for the most part forgotten in the endeavour to show that the representatives of Austria in the delegation were at one in their confidence in Count Berchtold's leadership, and in their determination to offer him their undivided support in any task which might confront him, an attitude of which his Excellency expressed the warmest appreciation at the close of his remarks on Albania. It was, he observed, of the highest importance that a State should have confidence in itself in face of difficulties. "But," he concluded, amidst loud applause, "I mean to place this self-confidence at the service of a policy devoted to the highest interests of the Monarchy and of the cause of peace."

A note of distinct pessimism sounded through the speech by the official reporter, the Marquis Bacquehem, who opened the debate. Though dwelling upon the efforts of the Powers to preserve peace, he was unable to conceal his doubts as to their ultimate success—doubts which were shared by all the subsequent speakers. Dr. Kramarz, who made what was perhaps the most interesting speech of the debates, expressed doubts not only on this head, but also as to whether Russia could possibly permit herself to prevent the Balkan States from reoccupying territory which had once been theirs. He protested against any adventurous policy by Austria, whose peoples he declared had no desire to extend their territories towards Salonica, but wished to see harmony established within their own borders, particularly in that unfortunate province, Croatia. The South Slav members spoke warmly in favour of the aspirations of the Balkan States, while the Social Democrats condemned a war whose only aim was territorial aggrandisement. The speakers in general showed little faith in the efforts of the Great Powers, and were somewhat contemptuous of the general rôle played by those Powers in the events which have led to the present critical situation.

At the end of the plenary sitting the Marquis Bacquehem summarised the debates, after first defending himself against an accusation of suppressing portions of Count Berchtold's

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remarks. Referring to the criticisms directed by certain speakers against the lukewarmness of Austria-Hungary's attitude towards Germany during the Morocco crisis, he observed that the attitude of the Dual Monarchy had never been mistaken in England or France, and that Austro-German relations were founded on complete intimacy and mutual confidence.

In reply to apprehensions expressed as to the loss to Austria-Hungary's trade involved by the warlike preparations in the Balkans, the Marquis Bacquehem observed that the Government would do their best to render these losses as small as possible, but that trade would naturally suffer severely from the closing of railways, the suspension of payment, and other exceptional measures. After referring with deep satisfaction to the improvement in Austro-Russian relations, he concluded by a eulogy of the manner in which the delegation had shown its unanimity in setting the interests of the country above party differences, and in displaying its confidence in the leaders of its foreign policy.

Hereupon the Foreign Office estimates were passed.

Before the Hungarian Delegation yesterday Count Berchtold made a short speech thanking its members for their approval of his policy as one that corresponded with the wishes of the country. He declared that all the efforts of this policy were directed towards the preservation of peace, and that the Dual Monarchy had taken part in every action which had had that object, such as that undertaken recently by the Great Powers. Count Berchtold concluded with the following words, which were received with great applause:—

"Our Balkan policy is not a policy of conquest, but this does not mean that we are not interested in the events occurring in the Balkans. We have in the Balkans vital interests, which we are determined under all circumstances to defend."

After a short debate, in which general satisfaction was expressed at the improvement in Austro-Russian relations, the Hungarian Delegation accepted unanimously the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[43159] No. 541.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, October 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 191 of 12th October.

Inspired leading article in the semi-official "Fremdenblatt" yesterday contained following passage, evidently inserted by order of Minister for Foreign Affairs, as result of conversation I had with him on Saturday. I think this shows how desirous he is to avoid any unfortunate polemics arising in the press as to the common action of the Powers in the Near East.

Passage is as follows:—

"Great Powers have drawn up a common programme; all the Great Powers have announced in an unequivocal form to the Balkan States that they would not tolerate any infringement of the *status quo*. The unanimity of the Powers has shown itself in this matter to be complete, and reproaches made against British Government have been recognised as entirely unfounded. England has repeatedly manifested her agreement with the other Powers in a manner which excludes the possibility of all doubt, and has proved that she is endeavouring to do all in her power to advance the cause of peace."

[43192] No. 542.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, October 14, 1912.*

BALKANS.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs has received French proposal for conference; but disapproves it, as he thinks that it would not prevent Balkan States fighting, and

would therefore put Powers in an undignified position. He thinks that the Balkan States will gain successes at first, as the Turks are always slow, but that the latter will gradually bring up overwhelming forces and gain the upper hand, and that that will be the moment for intervention.

He is absolutely assured that Austria-Hungary will not move, even if Servians invade the sanjak, although she will of course insist on their ejection at the end of the war.

The Austrian Ambassador, whom I saw for a moment, denies newspaper reports of Austro-Russian mutual suspicions.

[43186] No. 543.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinje, October 14, 1912*

MY telegram No. 34 of 10th October.

After severe fighting Montenegrins have captured Tuzi; road for advance on Scutari on eastern side of the lake appears to be open. On the western side they are operating against the fort at Tarabosh, which commands Scutari.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[42942] No. 544.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 13, 1912.*

I HEAR reply of Servian Government to communication of Russian and Austrian Ministers was handed in this evening. Briefly, it states that Balkan States cannot be satisfied with undertaking given by the Powers, that they demand appointment of Christian governors, that the reforms be guaranteed by the Powers and the representatives of the Balkan States at Constantinople.

Turkish Minister informs me that these demands have also been presented to him. No time limit mentioned for reply, but demobilisation of Turkish army is demanded.

[43170] No. 545.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, October 14, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State informed me that Turks have opened hostilities by attacking at Ristovatz this morning.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[43184] No. 546.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 14, 1912.*

YESTERDAY evening, at 8, Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a secretary to the Turkish Minister with a statement that, notwithstanding the intervention of the Great Powers, Balkan States thought it right to put directly before Turkish Government their demands for amelioration of condition of European provinces. They comprise reforms provided for by article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, based upon principle of ethnical autonomy (administrative autonomy of provinces, Belgian or Swiss Governors-General, elective provincial assemblies, gendarmerie, free education, militia), the application of them to be confided to a superior council of Christians and Mussulmans in equal numbers under the supervision of Ambassadors of the Great Powers, and of Ministers of the Balkan States at Constantinople. Turkey to undertake to put reforms in force within six months, and to demobilise. Heads of reforms stated in great detail in a memorandum annexed to the note.

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Turkish Minister accepted the note without reading it, and asked for facilities for telegraphing it *in extenso* to Constantinople. At 11 o'clock he returned it to Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating its contents were such as he could not transmit. It was immediately sent back with an intimation that Minister for Foreign Affairs regarded it as delivered, and it was a second time returned. At 8 o'clock Minister for Foreign Affairs, in presence of Prime Minister, handed to Austrian and Russian Ministers a note thanking them for their communication on behalf of Great Powers, and stating that Balkan States had nevertheless addressed a note to the Turkish Government, of which he gave them copies. My colleagues remarked that this communication should have been made through Greek Legations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, and they believed that those legations have been instructed accordingly. Chamber meets to-day.

[43185] No. 547.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 14, 1912.*

CHAMBER met this afternoon. About sixty Cretan deputies came early, and, overcoming the slight resistance of the police, took seats.

Vice-President read decree of mobilisation and a telegram of greeting from Bulgarian Sobranjé.

Prime Minister made a declaration. He said that mobilisation had been ordered in agreement with Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro because Turkey had mobilised. But the Balkan States could not now disarm until radical and guaranteed reforms were applied in European Turkey. The Turkish communication to the Great Powers was not sufficient; the Balkan States had therefore addressed direct to Turkey communication which he read.

He greeted the Cretan deputies, but said that in order to avoid complications the Greek Government recognised the existing *status quo* with exception that there should be one Parliament for Greece and Crete; deputies must, however, return to Crete and be properly elected. If war broke out definitive solution would be regulated by issue of war. Greece was peacefully disposed and would be glad if at the last moment Turkey would co-operate in reforms. If not, forces of the allies were sufficient for victory.

After a short suspension the Chamber adjourned because, as I was told, certain deputies refused to take hint to withdraw.

(Sent to Canea.)

[43169] No. 548.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 143 of 12th October.

French naval commander has now received instructions. My Russian colleague informs me that Russian ship "Oleg" expected to-morrow bringing instructions.

[43180] No. 549.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, October 14, 1912.*

PRESENT state of affairs may call for collaboration of consuls and naval commanders with a view to taking urgent measures. Am I to understand that instructions contained in your telegram No. 66 of 23rd July, 1909, concerning this matter still hold good, as well as authorisation to land a force in case of extreme necessity granted in your telegram No. 71 of 6th December, 1911?

My colleagues are telegraphing in the same sense.

[43187] No. 550.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 462.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Uskub:—

"Yesterday Montenegrins captured Bjelopolje."

[43188] No. 551.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 463.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 457 of 13th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that there was a rupture, due to misunderstanding on the part of Italians, but the matter had now been set right, and he expected the negotiations to be soon concluded.

[43189] No. 551 A.

Sir G. Loiether to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 466.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

CABINET has practically decided to remove ex-Sultan from Salonica in view of the possibility of that town being cut off from capital and risk of Albanian movement in his favour. It is not yet settled if he is to be sent to Broussa or brought here.

[43168] No. 552.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 14, 1912.*

NOTES were delivered last night. Russian Minister has let me have copies, so my telegrams Nos. 65 and 66 of 12th and 13th October need no longer be considered secret.

At last moment allies decided to enclose copy of note to Turkish representatives in the note to Austrian and Russian Ministers. Contents are as in my above-mentioned telegrams.

Telegraph line was cleared to allow Turkish chargé d'affaires to communicate direct with Constantinople.

[43158] No. 553.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 61, Secret, of 10th October, penultimate paragraph.

Ultimatum will be delivered to-morrow night or early Wednesday morning.

Hostilities will commence openly Friday morning, but large numbers of Bulgarian and Servian troops will cross the frontier on Thursday. Servian troops are passing through day and night for the frontier.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

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[43278] No. 554.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 565.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

MY telegram No. 562 of 12th October.
French Ambassador has made following proposal:—

"1. Si le Gouvernement ottoman accepte de discuter avec les Puissances les réformes à introduire dans la Turquie d'Europe, une conférence internationale se réunira immédiatement pour l'étude et l'application de ces réformes.

"2. Si le Gouvernement ottoman se refuse à la discussion et que la guerre éclate, les Puissances se concerteront aussitot en vue d'une médiation.

"3. Si la médiation réussit, la conférence internationale se réunira, dans le plus bref délai, pour l'étude et l'application des réformes.

"4. Si la médiation échoue, la conférence internationale se réunira de même pour prendre, à la fin des hostilités, les mesures que commandent le souci de la paix générale et l'intérêt commun de l'Europe."

I have replied that, for the Powers to offer mediation with the certainty that both parties would refuse, it would make the Powers ridiculous unless they were prepared to stop the war and impose mediation by force. I have therefore suggested "en temps opportun" at the end of the second paragraph, after word "médiation." With that addition I have agreed to the proposal recognising the great advantage of keeping the Powers in consultation.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 281; Constantinople, No. 777; St. Petersburgh, No. 1034; Vienna, No. 277; and Rome, No. 410.)

[43616] No. 555.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 572.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

IT appears that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would be prepared to accept proposals of French Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to a conference and mediation with following reservations:—

That, not being able himself to intervene at Sophia, he asks French Minister for Foreign Affairs to do so in order to induce Bulgaria to postpone hostilities.

As to mediation, M. Sazonof thinks a favourable moment should be awaited.

French Ambassador here was instructed to ask my opinion as to the step being taken at Sophia in above sense, and to say that if I were in favour of such a step the British and French representatives could be instructed to take it, and French Minister for Foreign Affairs would then ask Germany to associate herself in it.

I have replied as follows:—

In view of Bulgarian note to Turkey now officially communicated and also in view of the tone of Bulgaria's reply to Austrian and Russian communication, it is quite clear that steps taken at Sophia by two or even three Powers would now be quite ineffective, especially in view of the fact that Turkey has given no favourable reply to the communication of the Powers.

[43180] No. 556.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

CANEA telegram No. 146 of 14th October: Landing of troops in Crete.
Enquire of French (Russian) Minister for Foreign Affairs what are his views.

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1039).

[43360] No. 557.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.**

(No. 783.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

ENQUIRE of Government to which you are accredited whether they will permit British officers to accompany their troops in the usual way, as was done on both sides in Russo-Japanese war, and, if so, how many.

[43395] No. 558.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 784.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

WAR Office ask whether British officers employed with Turkish gendarmerie should be recalled in the event of war. What is your opinion?

[43631] No. 559.

Sir Edward Grey to Earl Granville.

(No. 510.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1912.

THE German chargé d'affaires came to see me to-day, and in the course of some general conversation I observed that, though I had asked him on the 7th to let me know whether the German Government agreed to the proposals which were being made, I had not heard anything from him since.

He replied that last week he had not heard anything from his Government sufficiently important to be communicated to me. They had just agreed to every proposal as it came along.

I said that various proposals had been made to me lately, all with the object of keeping the Powers together, and I was ready to agree to anything which would do that. It was most important that Austria and Russia should not fall apart.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42293] No. 560.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Highness's memorandum of the 8th October, informing him of the purport of a note presented to the Sublime Porte by the Montenegrin chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, in which the latter announces the rupture of relations between his Government and that of the Ottoman Empire.

Foreign Office, October 14, 1912.

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 232), Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 122), Sir R. Paget (No. 73), and Count de Salis (No. 124).

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[43199] No. 561.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 439. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, October* 13, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador was dining at my hotel yesterday, and I had some conversation with him after dinner. His memory is not good. He told me that war was inevitable, and that he had thought so all along. The essential thing now was to circumscribe it, and if the views and intentions of Austria were as pure and disinterested as those of Russia the fight would be limited to a contest between Turkey and the Balkan States and Greece. He hoped that neither side would be over-defeated or over-victorious, so that the Great Powers might, after a time, persuade the combatants to cease fighting and to listen to reasonable conditions.

M. Isvolsky went on to say that the two speeches at Vienna made by Count Berchtold and Dr. von Bilinsky had caused a disastrous panic on the Paris Bourse, and were calculated to do much mischief. They were not of a peaceful tendency. I suggested to my colleague that in constitutional countries when money was required for armaments and measures for self-defence it was generally necessary to sound an alarm in Parliament. M. Isvolsky continued to regret the tone of those speeches, which were certain to create distrust in Russia. He did not think that Count Berchtold had sinister intentions, nor had Baron d'Aehrenthal when M. Isvolsky had his interviews with him at Buchlau, but somehow he was pushed into the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Baron d'Aehrenthal had even assured him most solemnly, and, he believed, sincerely, that he regarded the sanjak of Novi-Bazar as properly divisible between Servia and Montenegro whenever the sick man's inheritance came to be distributed. If now for any reason or on any pretext Austro-Hungarian troops entered the sanjak there would be an outburst of public sentiment in Russia against Austria, the Catholic Austria regarded with hatred by the Russian people as the oppressor of the orthodox portion of the Slav subjects of the Emperor Francis Joseph. Such an event would be dangerous to peace between Russia and Austria. He trusted that the Austro-Hungarian Government would abstain from such a proceeding.

To-day M. Isvolsky renewed the conversation. He told me that the Russian Government expected Servia to begin the war to-morrow. It was to be hoped that the Porte would be persuaded to accept the Italian terms for a resumption of peace. He had the assurance of M. Tittoni that it was the Porte, and not the Italian Government, which had put forward fresh stipulations. The Turkish Government claimed that the conditions favourable to Turkey, such as the cessation of hostilities and the restitution of the Ægean Islands, should be carried out at once, and that the concessions to Italy should await confirmation by the Turkish Parliament. The Italian ultimatum would expire in two days' time, and unless the Porte gave way Italy would make some attack on Turkey which would complicate the Balkan difficulty. In these circumstances, the Italian Ambassador had made a suggestion and an enquiry at the Quai d'Orsay. He had enquired of M. Poincaré what would be the attitude of the French Government if Italy proposed an entirely fresh basis for the resumption of peaceful relations between Italy and Turkey, and asked the Powers to recommend the Porte to accept the offer by the Italian Government. The conditions might be that there should be no mention in the treaty of peace of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty in regard to Tripoli, but hostilities would cease, the Turkish troops would be withdrawn from Tripoli, and its acquisition by Italy would be recognised by the Powers.

M. Poincaré had, so M. Isvolsky was informed by his Excellency, replied that the French Government would act strictly up to the treaty engagements of France towards Italy whenever the proper time arrived for doing so, but unless he could be assured that the Porte would accept such conditions and wished for the intervention of the Powers in recommending their acceptance by Turkey, he could not take any step in the matter, and he must also be assured that the other Powers would be willing to join in the recommendation to the Porte.

M Isvolsky told me that M. Poincaré was about to consult you on the subject of the suggestion made by M. Tittoni. He requested me not to let M. Poincaré know that he had given me the information in regard to M. Tittoni's suggestion and the preliminary reply which the President of the Council had made to it.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[43398] No. 562.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 464.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 15, 1912.

PARIS telegram No. 145 of 2nd October.

Bulgarian chargé d'affaires received this morning telegram, *en clair*, stating note had been presented last night to Turkish chargé d'affaires at Sophia enumerating reforms considered necessary in Macedonia. These are: Administrative autonomy for provinces, Belgian or Swiss Governors-General, provincial electoral assemblies, gendarmerie, education, and militia. Note demands that application of these reforms should be entrusted to a council composed of Christians and Mussulmans in equal numbers under supervision of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and Ministers of the four Balkan States at Constantinople.

Ottoman Government are invited to declare acceptance of this demand, to carry out reforms within six months, and, in token of their consent, to demobilise at once.

In reply to Austrian and Russian note, Bulgarian Government have communicated a copy of above note to Austrian and Russian Ministers, explaining their reasons for approaching the Porte directly.

Same course is apparently being adopted at Athens and Belgrade.

[43341] No. 563.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 465.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 15, 1912.

MY telegram No. 459 of 13th October.

Following is substance of reply of Porte:—

Governments are reminded that Ottoman Government has already recognised necessity of introducing required reforms in vilayets of European Turkey.

Ottoman Government has contemplated these reforms with all the more eager conviction as it intends to apply them without any foreign interference, and it anticipates that their execution cannot fail to contribute to the prosperity and economic development of the country by assuring harmony among heterogeneous elements of these provinces.

If until now the various attempts at improving internal situation of these questions have not produced expected results, it has been due to the state of insecurity produced by all the agitators, of whose real object there can be no doubt.

The Ottoman Government none the less appreciates the friendly intention of communication of the Powers, whose efforts in the cause of humanity it had anticipated.

After referring to the fact that many articles of the Treaty of Berlin favourable to Turkey have not been carried out either in the letter or in the spirit, the Ottoman Government declares that it has of its own accord passed a resolution to present at next session of Parliament draft of law of 1880. The Powers may be assured that the Ottoman Government will see to its prompt and unscrupulous application once promulgated. It would be unfair to conclude from past negligence and hesitation, which belonged to another régime, that the constitution of Turkey is incapable of breaking with the errors of the past, and adopt [group omitted: ? ing] measures in the interests of the country and the population affected.

Contents of telegram No. 462 of 14th October would seem to preclude possibility of Porte's above reply forming at present stage any basis for future peaceful negotiations.

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[43220] No. 564.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

OTTOMAN Government have now received the note and notice handed to their representatives at Sophia and Belgrade, enumerating reforms demanded, and Cabinet has just met to consider terms of reply, of the nature of which there can be no doubt.

Similar note was handed to Turkish Minister at Athens, who regarded it as an impertinent communication, and declined to receive it.

(Repeated to Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens.)

[43358] No. 565.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

GREEK Minister to-day at 5 o'clock, under instructions, demanded order by which Greek merchant-vessels have been detained should be withdrawn within twenty-four hours. In contrary case, Greek Government would take such measures as it considered consistent with its dignity.

Referring to my telegram No. 467 of to-day, Greek Minister told me he had received no instructions to present note which had been handed in at Sophia and Belgrade.

[43366] No. 566.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 470.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 758 of 10th October.

Ottoman Government now require embassy sanction should expressly mention that correspondents will remain in Ottoman camp until the end of warlike operations, save in case of illness, and will not leave even in that case without leave of military commander.

I propose in future recommendations to mention that applicant has been warned that an undertaking to above effect will be required of him by military authorities, though I do not know whether this will satisfy military authorities.

[43382] No. 567.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 472.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica, dated 14th October :—

"Bulgarian bands have destroyed important bridge over the Bergallitza near Ishtib.

"Fighting with a numerous band is also proceeding, since 12th October, at Kriva in this vilayet."

[43378] No. 568.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 473.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica, dated 14th October :—

"Servian consul-general removed his mast and shield this afternoon. Serious fighting is reported from two points of the frontier.

"The village mentioned in my telegram No. 43 has been razed by artillery fire."

[43391] No. 569.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 475.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 784 of yesterday.

As British officers with Turkish gendarmerie were not withdrawn during war with Italy, I see no necessity for their withdrawal now, more especially as they are not employed in Macedonia, and are simply instructors. Their services could be retained in same way as those of the naval officers.

[43461] No. 570.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 477. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 15, 1912.*

IN view of the fact that the present relations between the Balkan States and Turkey may develop, as in the Russo-Turkish war, into a life and death struggle, it is possible that pressure may be brought to bear on the Ottoman Government to invite the Khedive to send a contingent of troops, as he did in 1876.

I presume that the neutrality of Egypt will be maintained in the event of the conclusion of peace with Italy and the consequent domination of the Ægean by the Greek fleet.

Whether the Egyptian troops would be of any value during a winter campaign in the Balkans is very questionable.

I would venture to suggest advisability of a decision being made by His Majesty's Government, in anticipation of the Turkish Government approaching us, as I have been warned that the question may be raised.

[43400] No. 571.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 368.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1013 of 9th October and 1039 of 14th October : Crete.

I have not yet succeeded in extracting a definite answer from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to-day that the establishment of a blockade might cause a rising in the island, and that we could not possibly shoot down insurgents.

The reason for our intervening on former occasions was to avert war between Greece and Turkey, but that reason no longer held good.

I explained the nature of instructions given to our naval commanders, and said that, as the protecting Powers of Crete, we had a certain responsibility in the matter. On my enquiring whether I was to understand that he would not take part in blockade, he replied in the negative, and finally promised to send me written reply to both without delay.

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[43402] No. 572.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 370.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 565 of 14th October to Paris.

Minister for Foreign Affairs adheres to the views reported in my telegram No. 364 of 12th October. The proposed conference would not produce the slightest effect at Sophia, as the decision of Bulgarian Government to go to war is now irreparably taken. He fully approves the amendment which you have suggested and thinks we should offer mediation at the first suitable opportunity, which, in his opinion, would be after the first decisive battle, and that if our offer is accepted conference should then meet. Meanwhile the conversations between the different Cabinets should be continued with a view to keeping the Powers in line.

His Excellency told me that the Austrian Ambassador, who returned from Vienna yesterday, brought him reassuring messages from the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that if the Austrian Government adheres to its present pacific intentions he had good hopes that war would be localised.

[43410] No. 573.

Sir E. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 104 of 13th October.

Vice-consul at Ragusa confirms information concerning strength of battalions of the 16th Army Corps at Ragusa. Information that the three-year service men have been recalled to the 3rd Gratz corps is confirmed. The twenty-one battalions of this corps are 400 strong each, including recruits.

Information that pontoon bridge to the island of Ostrovo has been replaced is confirmed. Order to reserve officers to register their addresses and hold themselves ready for service at short notice extends to all units.

Hungarian Delegations accepted budget proposals for the army amounting to about 5,250,000*l.*, and for the navy about 1,750,000*l.*, yesterday. Although no money is asked for new Dreadnoughts, I learn from a good source that two more will be built immediately, of which [group omitted: ? cost] will be covered by a credit to be demanded later.

[43197] No. 574.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 15, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Government received information this afternoon that a Turkish force, 500 strong, have attacked Bulgarian frontier-post south of Philippopoli, near Tchurkurki.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[43361] No. 575.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 70 of 15th October.

Cabinet sat late yesterday to discuss situation created by Turkish incursions over Bulgarian and Servian frontiers. Prime Minister informed his colleagues that the King was anxious to send Turkish chargé d'affaires his passports and declare war immediately without an ultimatum.

No decision was arrived at, but further meeting of the Cabinet was fixed for to-day. I am inclined to think that ultimatum will be handed in in accordance with programme formerly arranged.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[43368] No. 576.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 73. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 15, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister at Athens has telegraphed to his Government report of a conversation which he has just had with the King of Greece.

His Majesty stated that he had had an interesting conversation with the Emperor of Austria. His Imperial Majesty had commenced by expressing his great regret that Greece should have joined the Balkan Alliance. Would it not be possible for His Majesty to induce his Cabinet to keep peace? To this the King replied that he was unable to gauge national feeling until he arrived at Athens, but he would not fail to use all his influence in the cause of peace.

The Emperor, who had shown considerable annoyance in the early part of the interview, then became much more friendly, and he informed the King that he had explicitly instructed Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs not to engage Austria-Hungary in a war, as he did not desire such a calamity in his declining years.

This report from their representative at Athens has had considerable effect on the Bulgarian Cabinet.

[43406] No. 577.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 15, 1912.*

TURKISH chargé d'affaires has received communication from his Government instructing him to leave with his staff without delay. Ottoman Government have informed him that they do not propose sending a reply either to Bulgaria or to Servia, and that, as far as Greece is concerned, they have not received a note from that Government.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[43392] No. 578.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 14, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 14th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to explain Prime Minister's declaration in Chamber with regard to Crete. He said, under present circumstances, and in view of mobilisation, it was impossible for Greek Government to maintain their attitude of a few months ago, but that, in deference to wishes of protecting Powers, and in order to prevent Cretan question from being a cause of war, they had made least possible change in it, although they would have had support of their allies in demanding a definitive solution. They therefore announced that they recognised for the present the *status quo* (suzerainty of the Sultan, &c.) in every respect, except that after regular elections held in Crete under Greek law Cretan deputies should sit in Greek Parliament, and that order should be maintained in the island by the Cretan Government dependent on Greece. Guarantee for security of the Mussulmans would thereby be greatly increased. He quoted Eastern Roumelian precedent. He said he hoped that the Powers would appreciate moderation of the Greek Government in peculiarly difficult circumstances.

I said I doubted it, though I admitted that they could not have excluded the deputies now, as they did last June.

He said although Cretans would be not leaving Chamber to-day, they will not reappear in it.

(Sent to Canea.)

[43337] No. 579.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 15, 1912.*

GREEK Government addressed to Turkish Government yesterday ultimatum demanding the release of Greek ships.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[43342] No. 580.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 232 of 14th October.

Greek Government will not consider question of foreign officers until hostilities have begun, and will then be guided by opinion ofcommander in the field.

[43404] No. 581.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, October 15, 1912.*

APPROACHES to the Chamber were guarded to-day, and Cretan deputies do not appear. After declaration from Mavromichalis, Theotoky, and others that they support Government under present circumstances, Chamber proceeded to business.

[43196] No. 582.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 15, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 457 of 13th October.

Italian Prime Minister is reported to have said in a press interview on Sunday that the Ottoman Government, in accepting the Italian terms, had stipulated that the Italian Government should carry out their part of obligations, but that some delay should ensue before Turkey withdrew her troops from Tripoli and issued proclamation to the Arabs as arranged. Prime Minister is stated to have replied that this was unexpected, and that Italy could not agree. Her negotiators would wait till to-night for final answer from Constantinople. Italian Government had not made terms more arduous since the redif mobilisation.

There is no doubt, from what I have been told at the Foreign Office here, that Turkish new counter-proposals have tried the patience of the Italian Government too high, and that, unless Turkey can agree to the original terms taken by Reshid to Constantinople and the Turkish negotiators receive immediate instructions, the Italian representatives will leave Switzerland and the negotiations will be finally broken off (see my telegram No. 126 of 12th October, last paragraph).

Could your telegram No. 771 of 12th October to Constantinople be repeated to Rome?

[43413] No. 583.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, October 15, 1912.*

IDENTIC telegram:—

Mussulmans in various parts have expressed to us anxiety on account of the situation.

Should war break out between Turkey and Greece, and particularly if rigorous measures are taken to maintain neutrality of Crete, there will certainly be great excitement in the island. Declarations made yesterday by the Greek Prime Minister in the Greek Chamber and the admission of Cretan deputies are calculated to excite still further the Cretans and to diminish authority of the Powers over them. Under these circumstances it seems to us prudent to consider forthwith precautionary measures which it may become necessary to take with a view to assuring, as far as possible, the safety of Mussulmans, whose protection the four Powers have undertaken. This may entail, in our opinion, before long, their concentration in the principal ports, where parties on land would be necessary for their safeguard, as ships at this season cannot remain permanently at their anchorage.

If this eventuality is accepted by the protecting Powers, we suggest that it might be well, when notifying to the Cretan Government formal intention of the Powers to maintain neutrality of Crete, we should add if persons or property of Mussulmans suffer the victims will be indemnified at the cost of Cretans.

[43411] No. 584.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, October 15, 1912.*

ATHENS telegram No. 61 of 14th October.

Cretan Government have published a telegram received from the Greek Prime Minister and the Greek Cabinet, in which is quoted *in extenso* the part of his yesterday's speech referring to Crete. In conclusion, the Cretan Government is begged to "continue for the present to exercise the administration preparing to carry out the regular elections for the dispatch of representatives of the island to Greek Parliament, and, above all, caring for preservation of order and the protection of Mussulman population."

(Repeated to Athens.)

[43188] No. 585.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 790.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 463 of 14th October.

Italian Ambassador has received telegram to-day from Italian Government saying that Turkish delegates have reopened discussion of wording of firman to Arabs, which was originally suggested by Turks themselves and accepted by Italy. Italian Government has instructed its delegates that points already settled cannot be reopened, and unless accepted Italian Government must prosecute the war.

It seems disastrous for Turkey on small points at such a moment to destroy chance of peace with Italy, and you can express this opinion to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 416.)

[43637] No. 586.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1912.

TURKISH Government, through Turkish Ambassador, have expressed great anxiety as regards safety of Mussulmans in Crete. I cannot regard this apprehension as unjustified in present circumstances.

I assume best course would be for Mussulmans in event of danger to collect at some port, and for ships to repair thither, landing men and using force if necessary to protect life, but limiting these steps to this purpose. In this event, patrol of coast and other considerations would, if need be, have to be subordinated to emergency of protecting Mussulmans from massacre.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 581, and St. Petersburgh, No. 1017, with instructions to inform Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and ask their opinion.)

[43635] No. 587.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1912.

I TOOK an opportunity to-day of telling the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador how much I appreciated the reference to our attitude in the Balkan crisis that had appeared in the "Fremdenblatt."

The Ambassador had a copy of this with him, and remarked that it was quite explicit and favourable with regard to the British attitude.

I said that I had felt this in reading it, and that was why I desired to express appreciation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44659] No. 587 A.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 853.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the Council of the Ottoman Debt held on the 24th September last, showing the arrangements made for the second half of the current year with regard to the sinking fund.

It will be noted that the council decided, in view of the uncertain outlook for the coming half-year, and more especially on account of the difficulty of appraising the probable returns of the new war taxes, to limit their instructions to the banks to a period of three months, instead of issuing such instructions to cover the whole half-year as hitherto.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 587 A.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Meeting of Council of Ottoman Debt.

LETTRE du 8 (21) septembre, 1912, No. 189: La Division du Mouvement général des Fonds soumet à l'appréciation du conseil le compte de prévision pour l'amortissement de la dette convertie unifiée et des lots turcs pendant le second semestre de l'exercice 1328 (1912–13).

Il ressort de ce document que la somme à employer en rachats de titres de la dette convertie unifiée au cours du susdit semestre est :—

	£ T.
Pour le compte ordinaire, de	144,507·19
Pour le compte extraordinaire, de	132,961
Soit ensemble	277,468·19

Le montant à affecter aux rachats des lots turcs est de £ T. 113,976·28.

Les rachats de l'unifiée pourraient avoir lieu sur les places et pour les montants ci-après :—

	£ T.			£ T.
A Paris	92,484	effectives, soit par mois		16,414
A Londres	61,656	"	"	10,276
A Berlin	61,656	"	"	10,276
A Constantinople	10,276	"	"	10,276
Total	277,152			46,242

Quant au moment revenant aux lots turcs, il pourrait être réparti entre Paris, Constantinople et Berlin, conformément à la décision du conseil relatée au Procès-verbal No. 176 (21) du 7 (20) octobre, 1910.

Ladite division fait cependant observer que, vu l'état actuel des choses, il n'est pas possible de prévoir ce que réserve la période de l'année qui reste à franchir, surtout en ce qui concerne le rendement probable des nouvelles surtaxes (impôts de guerre), et propose en conséquence de limiter les ordres d'achats à trois au lieu de six mois.

Le conseil, partageant l'avis de la Division du Mouvement général des Fonds, invite celle-ci à limiter à trois mois les ordres qu'elle doit adresser aux banques pour le service de l'amortissement pendant le deuxième semestre de l'exercice 1328.

[43425] No. 588.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 854.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a warlike proclamation by His Majesty the Sultan. This proclamation has been communicated by the Imperial Ministry of War to all the military authorities.

The proclamation explains that, in spite of Turkey's well-known love of peace, her Balkan neighbours have come to an agreement to attack her European provinces, forgetting the prowess of Turkish arms in former years, and their recent heroic defence of Tripoli. Mobilisation has therefore been ordered, and the Ottoman people are called upon to shed their blood in the defence of their country.

I would draw attention to the statement contained in the proclamation to the effect that the reforms which the country needs are gradually being carried out as far as possible, which is hardly consistent with facts.

The issue of this proclamation at the present moment would appear inopportune, inasmuch as it will give the Balkan States an opportunity of saying that it was required to encourage the mobilisation of the Turkish army.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[43426] No. 589.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 855.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 12, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 452 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the communication addressed to the Porte by the Ambassadors of the five Powers on the subject of the reforms in Macedonia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 589.

Note addressed to Sublime Porte.

LES soussignés, Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie et d'Allemagne, ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs d'informer la Porte que les cinq Puissances prennent acte de l'intention publiquement annoncée du Gouvernement turc d'introduire des réformes, et qu'elles discuteront immédiatement avec la Sublime Porte, dans l'esprit de l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin et de la loi de 1880, les réformes que comporte l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe et les mesures propres à en assurer la réalisation dans l'intérêt des populations, étant entendu que ces réformes ne porteront pas atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman.

PALLAVICINI.
GERARD LOWTHER.
M. BOMPARD.
GIERS.
WANGENHEIM.

Constantinople, le 10 octobre, 1912.

[43434] No. 590.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Munich, October 14*, 1912.

THAT the German press should, as reported in my despatch No. 35 of the 11th October, have taken advantage of the present crisis in the Balkans to throw doubts on the good faith of the British Government, was only to be expected, but it may, at first sight, seem surprising that the allied Monarchy of Austria-Hungary should latterly have become the object of criticism almost as unfriendly.

Those, however, who read the German Liberal and Democratic papers regularly will have noticed that during the last year or two it has been their custom to vary the anti-British campaign by attacks on the policy of each of the Great Powers, with the single exception of Russia. Last year it was Italy who especially came in for criticism, and the energy with which her action in Tripoli was then denounced equalled, if it did not exceed, anything that appeared in our own press.

For the moment, their attention is turned to Austria. Already, Count Berchtold's speech at the opening of the Delegations was condemned as being unnecessarily alarmist and pessimistic; and, since then, his statement, that Austria has "vital interests in the Balkans which she is determined, under all circumstances, to defend," has been made the theme of indignant ridicule. The Social Democratic "Münchener Post" of Saturday asks against whom these threats are directed, and sarcastically comments on the danger of "the hemming in of Austria by Servia on the south." The real meaning, it says, of Count Berchtold's policy is to revive the Austrian claim to advance to Salonica, the road to which is barred not by Servia alone, but indirectly by Russia and Italy. Such policy, if persisted in, must inevitably involve Austria's German ally in a general European war. It is high time, it adds, that Germany should recover "the common sense of which Vienna has taken leave." The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" strikes a similar note, and insists that Germany has only secondary interests in the Balkans.

It is clear that, apart from the general German tendency to criticise the policy of their neighbours, there exists a real fear that the Empire may be dragged, in support of Austrian aggrandisement, into a most unpopular conflict with Russia, the Power, of all others, which it is the ambition of every German to see detached from France and England, and to gain whose friendship practically no sacrifice would be considered too great.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[43433] No. 591.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 443.)

Sir, *Berlin, October 14*, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 440 of the 11th instant, in which I had the honour to report the disagreeable remarks of the German press regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the recent Balkan negotiations, I think it my duty to address a further despatch to you without delay, recording a certain improvement in the tone of the press in the last three days.

The "Hamburger Nachrichten" of the 10th attached little value to the suspicions against England, and remarked that the villain of the piece would be unmasked before long. The "Frankfurter" of the same date declared that you, Sir, were probably convinced at heart of the need for a new régime in Macedonia, but that, in view of England's general position, it could not be considered her business to take the initiative against Turkey, though she would most likely gladly support any useful proposal from some other quarter. Your chief anxiety was the maintenance of peace amongst the Great Powers. A Berlin telegram in yesterday's "Cologne Gazette" remarks that certain French papers are trying to ascribe the blame for the probable failure of the action promoted by M. Poincaré to prevent war in the Balkans to the hesitating attitude of the British Government; "but this, in our opinion, goes too far," as the chief object of the measures taken and of the attitude agreed upon by the Powers has been attained, viz., that, even if the other Balkan States go to war, the conflagration should be prevented from spreading and drawing the Great Powers into direct participation; "the credit for this is certainly due to M. Poincaré."

Yesterday's "North German Gazette" observes that the steps taken by the Powers can no longer be expected to prevent the outbreak of war. The official replies from the Balkan States have, it is true, not yet been given, but Montenegro's action shows what the decision will be. It is of some importance to note that in M. Poincaré's proposal and in the consequent action of the Powers the outbreak of war was reckoned with from the first, and that therefore the object of the Powers from the beginning has been not only the problematic prevention of war in the Balkans, but more especially the warding off of the danger of the Great Powers being drawn in, and the determination which they have jointly announced that no alteration of the territorial *status quo* will be allowed is a guarantee of this.

The only reference which I have seen to the article in the "Post" which I summarised in my last despatch was in the "Germania," which described it as "notable and pretty convincing," and expressed the hope that Russia, helped by German and Austrian diplomacy, would see through English intrigues and take hurried steps to escape from the trap laid for her.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[43419] No. 592.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de transmettre, ci-inclus, à son Excellence, pour son information, copie du télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir de son Gouvernement.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 15 octobre, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 592.

Sublime Porte to Tewfik Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

LES Grandes Puissances ont eu, sans doute, connaissance de la note que la Bulgarie et la Serbie nous ont adressée par rapport à nos vilayets de la Turquie d'Europe et pour nous demander la démobilisation générale. Cette note ne méritant pas une

réponse de notre part, je viens d'inviter nos représentants à Sophia et à Belgrade d'y cesser toutes relations avec les autorités locales et de rentrer à Constantinople. Nous pensons que nos efforts pour le maintien de la paix seront appréciés par les Grandes Puissances, auxquelles ces petits États ont manqué de déférence en écartant leur médiation et en se permettant de se retourner vers nous sans tenir compte de l'existence de l'Europe.

Quant à la Grèce, nous n'avons pas encore reçu la note en question.

Sublime Porte, le 15 octobre, 1912.

[43541] No. 593.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence que les députés crétois ayant été admis à la Chambre hellénique, le Gouvernement Impérial a invité son représentant à quitter Athènes avec tout le personnel de la légation.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 16 octobre, 1912.

[43420] No. 594.

Note communicated to Great Powers by Sublime Porte, October 16, 1912.

EN réponse à la communication en date du 10 courant que leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie et d'Allemagne ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs de faire à la Sublime Porte, le soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a l'honneur de leur rappeler que, ainsi que leurs Excellences veulent bien le constater elles-mêmes, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a déjà reconnu la nécessité d'introduire les réformes que comporte l'administration des vilayets de la Turquie d'Europe. Il a envisagé ces réformes avec d'autant plus de conviction qu'il entend les appliquer en dehors de toute ingérence étrangère et qu'il prévoit que dans ces conditions leur exécution ne manquera pas de contribuer à la prospérité et au développement économique du pays en assurant dans l'esprit libéral de la constitution ottomane la concorde et la bonne harmonie entre les éléments hétérogènes qui composent la population de cette partie de l'Empire. Il est à relever que si jusqu'à présent les différents essais d'amélioration de la situation intérieure de ces provinces n'ont pas produit tous les fruits qu'on était en droit d'en attendre, une des principales causes de ce retard est incontestablement l'état de trouble et d'insécurité causé par les attentats de tout genre provenant de foyers d'agitation dont le but réel ne laisse aucun doute. Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman n'en apprécie pas moins l'intention amicale de la communication que les Grandes Puissances ont jugé à propos de lui faire en raison des circonstances présentes. Il s'associe de tout cœur aux efforts déployés par elles pour conjurer le danger d'une collision dont les conséquences entraîneraient fatalement de grandes calamités qu'il est du devoir du monde civilisé de prévenir par tous les moyens de conciliation. Le Gouvernement Impérial a sous ce rapport la conscience d'avoir pris les devants pour faciliter la tâche humanitaire des Grandes Puissances en présence du redoutable problème dont elles cherchent la solution. En effet, sans vouloir exciper du fait que maintes stipulations du Traité de Berlin ont reçu une exécution non conforme tant à la lettre qu'à l'esprit qui les avaient dictées et qu'ainsi les intérêts ottomans ont été gravement lésés en plusieurs cas, sans vouloir en particulier examiner jusqu'à quel point l'article 23 de ce traité a pu conserver plus que les autres articles une valeur actuelle, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il vient de prendre de son propre mouvement la résolution de présenter le projet de loi de 1880 dans tout son ensemble historique dès l'ouverture de la prochaine session à l'approbation du Parlement et à la sanction Impériale, conformément à la charte fondamentale de l'Empire. Les Grandes Puissances peuvent être persuadées que les autorités Impériales tiendront la main à la scrupuleuse et prompte application de cette loi

dès son promulgation. Il serait souverainement injuste d'inférer d'anciennes négligences et tergiversations plus ou moins systématiques et inhérentes à un autre régime que l'Empire constitutionnel ottoman d'aujourd'hui ne serait pas logiquement décidé et capable de rompre définitivement avec les errements du passé et de prendre occasion de certains doutes à cet égard pour chercher d'autres mesures que celles seules compatibles avec l'intérêt, bien entendu, du pays et des populations elles-mêmes.

[43417] No. 595.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Munich, October 14*, 1912.

STEPS preparatory to mobilisation are being taken in Bohemia. No signs of any measures of the kind here.

[43655] No. 596.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, October 15*, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 124 of 14th October.

Montenegrin Government much regret to be unable to give desired permission; they beg me to say that they would willingly grant it if it could be limited to British officers.

[43414] No. 597.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 476.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 15*, 1912.

TURKISH Government have instructed their Minister at Athens to leave, on account of the attitude of the Greek Government in the matter of the admission of Cretan deputies to the Greek Chamber.

Ottoman representatives at Sophia and Belgrade have been instructed to leave, as a reply to the communication from the Bulgarian and Servian Governments.

(Repeated to Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade.)

[43470] No. 598.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 479.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15*, 1912.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 365 of 6th September and my telegram No. 434 of 6th October.

As Cretan deputies are reported here to have entered the Greek Chamber, may I presume that the fate of Crete and the future status of the island will be decided by the issue of the war? I may be approached by the Turkish Government.

[43529] No. 599.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Munich, October 16*, 1912.

MY telegram No. 6 of 16th October.

Later information indicates that beyond warning reservists no further steps have been taken.

[43535] No. 600.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 16, 1912.*

CONCENTRATION of troops is not yet complete in Bulgaria, and is being carried out with great secrecy. Military attaché estimates that in a few days troops will be distributed approximately as follows: Towards Kustendil, one Bulgarian and two Servian divisions; in Maritza and Tundja valley, including detachments south of Philippopoli and at Pestera, eight divisions. There is also a garrison at Varna of 6,000 militia.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[43553] No. 601.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 16, 1912.*

RECALL of Turkish chargé d'affaires is considered by Bulgarian Government as a definite rupture of relations. A manifesto will be issued later to this effect, and war will commence on Friday.

The King of Bulgarians leaves shortly for head-quarters at Stanzagora.

It is expected here that Greece will declare war on the 21st October if her naval dispositions permit.

[43554] No. 602.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 16, 1912.*

MINISTER of Interior, together with a secretary, has left for St. Petersburgh. The chiefs of the Progressive and Young Radical parties in Servia, hitherto political opponents, will also leave shortly for that capital.

The object of these missions, which have been kept very secret, is to influence the Russian Government in favour of Slav nationalities, but their programme is not yet definitely arranged.

Minister of Interior is well known to the Emperor and will have private audience with His Imperial Majesty.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[43548] No. 603.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 16, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE (telegram No. 476 of 15th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has not received intimation of recall of Turkish Minister. He will decline to accept any communication from him. Balkan States had intended to demand to-day from Turkey reply to their note of 13th October within forty-eight hours, but, owing to march of events and recall of Turkish Ministers at Sophia and Belgrade, this ultimatum may not be delivered.

[43555] No. 604.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 16, 1912.*

TURKISH Minister leaves to-morrow with his staff, after entrusting archives to German Legation. After declaration of war Turkish consuls are to hand over protection of Turkish subjects to British consuls. Have you any instructions about this?

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[43536] No. 605.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 16, 1912.*

YESTERDAY about 150 Cretans, many of them students, left for Athens to volunteer for [group omitted: ? service] in the Greek army.

[43558] No. 606.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 565 of 14th October to Paris.

French Ambassador has made communication to Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to conference proposal, and he tells me that it was received amiably by Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has, however, reserved his official reply. German Ambassador has seen Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently, and, from the conversation which the French Ambassador has just had with the former, he gathers that there is very little hope that Germany and Austria-Hungary will accept the French proposal.

[43556] No. 607.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 16, 1912.*

UNDER instructions from his Government, Turkish Minister left Belgrade to-day with his staff.

[43392] No. 608.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 586.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 16, 1912.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 62 of 14th October: Cretan deputies to Greek Chamber.

Please ask French (Russian) Government for their views.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 290; Constantinople, No. 799; Rome, No. 422; Vienna, No. 286; Canea, No. 189; and Athens, No. 235.)

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1053).

[43876] No. 609.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 587.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1912.

IN reply to a request from French Ambassador as to my views about Crete, I have said that conclusion of peace between Turkey and Italy and outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey causes a very complicated situation. We cannot use force and sink shiploads of defenceless Cretans who insist on joining Greeks. On the other hand, we have no right to protect Cretans, who are going to make war on Turkey, from being attacked by Turkish fleet. But neither can we permit a reoccupation of Crete by Turkey.

I suggested, therefore, that our naval officers should be instructed to concert with consuls the measures to be taken to protect lives of Mussulman minority; that use of force should be limited to this object, which is our primary duty in interest of humanity, and that all other measures should be subordinated to it. If Turkey makes representations to us, we should inform her that we will protect Mussulmans on the island, but that she can take her own measures, short of reoccupation of the island, to prevent Cretans joining in the war.

You may also add, though I did not mention this to French Ambassador, that I presume future status of the island after the war will be matter for consideration by the six Powers in consultation with Turkey.

I shall be glad to know views of French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1055.)

43470] No. 610.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 804.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 479 of 15th October.

You may say, if approached by Turkish Government, that, in my opinion, future status of Crete after the war will have to be decided by all six Powers in consultation with Turkey.

[43461] No. 611.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1912.

TELEGRAM from Constantinople No. 477 of 15th October.

Please let me have your views as to the best way to answer Turkish Government as regards the neutrality of Egypt which it is necessary to maintain.

I think we had better say that breach of neutrality by Egypt would lay that country open to attack, and must therefore be prevented by His Majesty's Government, as we are bound, being in occupation, to defend the country from attack.

The adoption of this attitude prevented Egypt from suffering any loss during the war between Turkey and Italy, and we must continue it.

[43274] No. 612.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 509.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1912.

M. CAMBON asked me on the 11th October whether I had any news.

I said that my information indicated that Bulgaria would declare war next week, probably about Wednesday, the 16th. It was quite plain in my opinion that the facts of the situation were now what they had been for some weeks, ever since the Balkan States came together. These States had made up their minds that the use of force was absolutely necessary. If the Great Powers would not use force they intended to use it themselves, and nothing but the use of force on the part of the Great Powers would prevent them from doing so.

M. Cambon agreed, and then told me that M. Poincaré thought that a conference of Ambassadors might be useful to study the question of reforms. The Law of 1880 had more than 300 articles, and the whole subject required consideration.

I said that one great advantage of a conference would be that Russia and Austria would be kept working together. For this reason I should be favourable to it if all the other Powers would agree. If the answer of Turkey to the collective communication made yesterday, inviting her to discuss reforms with the Powers, was favourable, the proposal of a conference of Ambassadors might be launched at once. If Turkey's reply was unfavourable, it would perhaps be undesirable to launch the idea of a conference until after war had actually broken out. The meeting of the proposed conference could have no influence now on the question of peace or war, but after war had broken out it might enable the Powers to arrive at some conclusion as to what the settlement should be, and that would make it possible for them to intervene with effect to stop the war and impose that settlement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43595] No. 613.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, October* 6, 1912.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that it has been found necessary to prolong for three days more the period for the mobilisation of the Cretan militia, as distances are in many instances too great for the reservists to arrive at head-quarters within the three days orginally specified. It is anticipated that all in the island will have presented themselves by the 8th instant, as no disposition to shirk service is apparent.

I hear that in case of war the Greek Government will send one of the Greek Atlantic steamers to transport the Cretan contingent to Greece, but nothing is said publicly here on the subject.

Although the members of the Government, in their conversation with the consuls on the 1st instant, implied that the calling out of the reserves was a spontaneous act on their part, it seems more likely that the proceeding was prompted from Athens.

The newspaper "Syntagma," indeed, openly speaks of it as "ordered by the Greek Government," and when I drew M. Rangabé's attention to this statement he did not deny its accuracy, but only replied that the Cretan was the natural complement of the Greek mobilisation.

I have no detailed information regarding volunteer bands, though it is known that several are being enrolled. The "Students' League," of Canea, have telegraphically offered the leadership of theirs to a Prince Ypsilanti who resides in Vienna. The "Codrus" patriotic society is organising another in this district, and M. Calochorino reports similar preparations at Candia.

The local newspapers are naturally full of patriotic boasting and abuse of the Turks. M. Papadopetros, the president of the Revolutionary Assembly, has issued a manifesto to the Cretan people entitled "For Faith and Country" in which he calls on every Cretan capable of bearing arms to come forward for the defence of the fatherland menaced by the Turks, for if Greece is again worsted, "We shall see once more our bishops slaughtered, our clergy tortured, and our religion insulted, here boycotting of Hellenes, there persecution and illegal imprisonments, unheard-of injustices, brigandage, massacres, enslaving, violation of women and children, forcible conversions to Islam, and the other myriad horrors which accompany Turkish barbarism."

After more in the same strain calculated to excite the national and religious passions of his countrymen the worthy speaker adds, apparently as an after-thought, "In conclusion, I thing it necessary to recommend to you to respect in every way the life, honour, and property of our Mussulman fellow-countrymen."

In this district the Mussulmans have not at present expressed any apprehensions, but M. Calochorino reports that at Candia there are some indications of restlessness between the two elements, to which he and his colleagues have drawn the attention of the authorities and notables of the place, impressing on them the necessity of maintaining order.

MM. Michelidakis and Koundouros, on the 1st instant, solemnly assured my colleagues and myself that the Cretan Government would do everything possible for the protection of the Mussulmans.

Even should the outcome of the present crisis be peace, I fear that after this display of their military strength, the importance of which they are inclined to exaggerate, the Cretans will become more intractable than ever. Even the "Crete," usually the most moderate and sensible of the Canea newspapers, now goes so far as to advocate forcible resistance to any attempt at reoccupation and deprecates the departure of the militia so long as there is any risk of the protecting Powers taking such a step.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[43569] No. 614.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 137.)
Sir, *Athens, October 11, 1912.*

HAVING returned from leave late on the 7th instant, I called the next morning upon M. Venizelos, and had some conversation with him upon the present situation. I have had the honour to report the salient points of it in my telegram No. 54 of the 8th instant. What struck me most was the confidence with which his Excellency appeared to expect the four Balkan States to be more than able to hold their own at the beginning of a war, at least until Turkey could bring up reinforcements from Asia. Upon my showing some surprise at it, he said he understood that Major Tyrrell had lately brought back a similar impression from a visit to the Turkish head-quarters at Adrianople.

Later on the same day Baron Braun and Prince Demidoff, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Ministers, made on behalf of the Great Powers a verbal communication to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in the terms which I have the honour to enclose, adding that a similar communication was being made in the other Balkan capitals. M. Coromilas merely remarked that, since that was the case, he would make no observation until he had had the opportunity of consulting the other Governments; he did not, Baron Braun tells me, actually promise to return any reply at all, and up to the present he has not done so. The press, as was to be expected, comments unfavourably upon the vagueness of the promises with regard to the reforms to be introduced under article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, and sarcastically upon the solicitude of the Great Powers for the integrity of Turkey when it is menaced by others than themselves. It will indeed be hard to convince the descendants of those from whom the Turkish possessions in Europe were wrested by force of arms that, if they recover their inheritance by a successful war, the rest of Christendom will combine to restore it to the defeated barbarian.

M. Coromilas I have not yet been able to see, except for a few minutes at the station on the arrival of the King. All my colleagues represent him as being in an arrogant and chauvinistic frame of mind. His manner to the Turkish Minister some days ago was so offensive that the latter no longer goes near him. To me he plumed himself upon having given orders for the mutilation of Mukhtar Bey's telegram to and from Constantinople, and upon my remarking that it appeared to me a foolish and offensive proceeding, he justified it on the ground that the Turks had been the first to do it with his telegraphic correspondence with the Greek Legation at Constantinople.

Mobilisation goes on most satisfactorily, and I am told there are now altogether nearly 120,000 men under arms. The destroyers bought from the Argentine Government are to be manned with Greek crews and commissioned at Algiers, and war will doubtless not be declared until this has been done. I learn, however, that it will be impossible to procure torpedoes for them within less than eight weeks. I have the honour to request that this information may be kept secret.

The calm determination of the people, and the absence of noisy bombast, are very remarkable, and are particularly striking to those who witnessed their very different demeanour in 1897.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 614.

Austro-Russian Declaration to the Greek Government.

LES Gouvernements austro-hongrois et russe déclarent au Gouvernement Royal hellénique :—

1. Que les Puissances réprouvent énergiquement toute mesure susceptible d'amener la rupture de la paix ;

2. Que, s'appuyant sur l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, elles prendront en main, dans l'intérêt des populations, la réalisation des réformes dans l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe, étant entendu que ces réformes ne porteront aucune atteinte à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman ; cette déclaration réserve d'ailleurs la liberté des Puissances pour l'étude collective et ultérieure des réformes ;

3. Que, si la guerre venait néanmoins à éclater entre les Etats balkaniques et l'Empire ottoman, elles n'admettront, à l'issue du conflit, aucune modification au *statu quo* territorial dans la Turquie d'Europe.

Les Puissances feront collectivement, auprès de la Sublime Porte, les démarches dérivant de la précédente déclaration.

[43577] No. 615.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 176.)
Sir, *Vienna, October 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the correspondent of the "Reichspost" at Scutari telegraphed yesterday to this newspaper that the Montenegrin troops have been supported not only by the Catholic Albanians in the neighbourhood of Scutari, but also by those farther south. That the former should take the side of the Montenegrins out of gratitude for their assistance during the last revolt was, observes the correspondent, only natural; but the action of the more southerly tribes was quite unexpected.

The correspondent attributes their attitude to the brutal treatment which they suffered at the hands of the Turks on the latter's march towards Scutari a week ago. Essad Pasha, the commander of the redifs in the Durazzo sanjak, was obliged to pass with his first six battalions through Bregu and Mates, districts belonging to the Malissori. According to the "Reichspost" correspondent, the Turkish troops have reduced these places to heaps of ruins, burnt the churches, and massacred many of the inhabitants. The result of this brutality has been that the Turkish troops are now exposed to the attacks of Malissori tribes who, up to the present, had no intention of fighting on the side of Montenegro.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[43680] No. 616.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

TEVFIK PACHA présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de transmettre, ci-joint, à son Excellence, pour son information, copie du télégramme qu'il vient de recevoir de son Gouvernement.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 17 octobre, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 616.

Sublime Porte to Tewfik Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

LES Bulgares et Serbes se livrent à de fréquentes incursions sur notre territoire et ont provoqué déjà de multiples rencontres. Vu l'état de surexcitation qui règne, nous parvenons difficilement à retenir nos troupes. Cette situation ne pouvant durer longtemps, il y a lieu de relever dès à présent, auprès des cercles compétents, qu'en cas de continuation nos troupes seront obligées de refouler les agresseurs au delà de nos frontières.

[43682] No. 617.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) Confidential. *Paris, October 16, 1912.*

CANEA telegram No. 146 of 14th October, and your telegram No. 514 of 14th October.

I was received by Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening after he had seen Russian Ambassador, who had placed before him the views of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to Crete. They are that as soon as war is declared between Greece and Turkey protecting Powers shall withdraw from all active concern in Cretan affairs.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he does not go so far as to consider protecting Powers should entirely disinterest themselves in the question of Crete during war, but he feels that state of war between Greece and Turkey will create very difficult situation in regard to Crete, which is a part of the Ottoman Empire, and he is referring matter to law advisers of the French Government. Supposing that Greek and Turkish ships of war meet in Cretan waters, are the protecting Powers to prohibit hostilities, and are they to enforce such prohibition? Would they be justified in forcibly preventing Cretans from proceeding to Greece to join Greek army? Supposing the ships of war of the protecting Powers go to Cretan ports to protect Mussulmans in fear of massacre, and for that purpose land sailors, can this be done legally? His Excellency says that there would be great outcry in France if French soldiers and sailors were killed in defending Mussulmans against Christians. Further point would be as to the right of protecting Powers to prohibit or resist a landing of Greek troops in Crete.

I put it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, though Crete is a part of Ottoman Empire, it is in trust to the care (*en [? dépôt]*) of the protecting Powers, and that they could not leave Mussulmans in the island to be massacred by the Christians without taking such measures for their protection as you suggest; that if protecting Powers intimate at Constantinople and Athens that hostilities must be avoided in Cretan waters, neither Turkish nor Greek Governments could venture to add to their actual troubles by firing on a naval or military force of a protecting Power. I said that I did not think that you would at all be disposed to desert trust which England had undertaken with the two other protecting Powers. It would, I considered, be a failure of [? promise] towards the Sultan.

Minister for Foreign Affairs feels bound to pay some regard to the representations made to him by the Russian Ambassador on behalf of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he has not at all made up his mind, and I feel sure that he would be ready to defer to your views, excusing himself on their account from accepting those advanced by the Russian Government, unless the legal advisers of the French Government support them.

The Russian Ambassador appears to have argued that, as the German Government are to undertake to protect Ottoman subjects in the countries at war with Turkey, it would naturally devolve on Germany to see to the protection of Mussulmans in Crete, but such a theory could only hold good if Crete were occupied by Greek troops.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Minister of Marine and others of his colleagues are much opposed to taking any very strong measures in regard to Crete, particularly after the declaration of war.

[43564] No. 618.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 577 of 14th October.

In view of Russian representations in regard to Crete, reported in my telegram No. 171, Confidential, of to-day [group undecypherable] French Minister for Foreign Affairs defers replying to your suggestion concerning Samos until the question has been examined by legal experts.

[43563] No. 619.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 16, 1912.*

GREEK Minister at Constantinople has been instructed to leave.

Constantinople and Canea informed.

[43683] No. 620.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 17, 1912.*

CRETE.

In view of conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in my telegram, Confidential, last night, do you wish me to act immediately on instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 586 and 587 of 16th October?

French and Russian Governments are undertaking to protect Hellenic subjects in the Ottoman Empire during war.

In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 Russia undertook not to make Egypt the theatre of operations. Could we not require a like undertaking in regard to Crete and Cretan waters from Turkey and Greece?

[43688] No. 621.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 17, 1912.*

IN my telegram No. 68 of 16th October I stated on positive authority of colleagues that Greek Minister at Constantinople had been instructed to leave. This was not correct, but he will probably be recalled to-day if the Greek Government learn that Bulgarian and Servian Ministers are also recalled.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[43681] No. 622.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 17, 1912.*

TELEGRAM from Canea No. 147 of 15th October.

Subject to correction by His Majesty's consul-general, I apprehend real danger of attack by Cretans on any troops or seamen landed now, specially British.

(Sent to Canea.)

[43688] No. 623.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 71.) *Athens, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
MY telegram No. 67 of 16th October.
German consuls will protect Turkish subjects, except at Volo and Syra, where German consuls are Greeks.
(Sent to Constantinople.)

[43689] No. 624.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 82.) *Sophia, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
KING, accompanied by his staff, by a Servian officer of General Staff, and by M. Daneff, has left for Stara Zagora.
War will be declared to-morrow; general prayers will be conducted in the churches for success of arms of allies.
(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[43703] No. 625.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 38.) *Belgrade, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
YOUR telegram No. 73 of 14th October.
Servian Government has not yet come to any fixed decision, but Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that probability is that only military attachés will be allowed with Servian army.

[43706] No. 626.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 39.) *Belgrade, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
KING leaving for Nisch to-morrow, and has expressed desire that foreign military attachés should accompany him. I suggest that Major Thomson, now here and ready to start at once, should go as military attaché. Pray inform me as soon as possible if suggestion concurred in.

[43707] No. 627.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, October 17, 1912.*
WAR declared this evening.

[43699] No. 628.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 150.) *Canea, Crete, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
LAST night a Greek steamer came to Canea, embarked about 700 Cretan militia, and left for Greece immediately. Another Greek steamer took about 900 militia from Candia.

As instructions of British senior naval officer are to take no measures except in the event of war having actually broken out between Turkey and Greece, he was unable to interfere.
My French and Russian colleagues declined to join me in any action, but in any case I do not see what we could have done without the ships of war.
(Sent to Athens.)

[43714] No. 629.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 151.) *Canea, Crete, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 70 of 17th October.
I agree that there might be some danger of resistance to our seamen, particularly if part of militia are eventually prevented from leaving for Greece. In the absence of militia, danger should be but slight.
(Sent to Athens.)

[43690] No. 630.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 483.) *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
AGENCE OTTOMANE, Government official telegraph agency, announces this morning that hostilities have begun on Bulgarian and Servian frontiers, and that war with these two States may be considered to have virtually commenced since last night.

[43708] No. 631.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 63.) *Cairo, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.)
YOUR telegram No. 72 of 17th October.
Your proposed statement to Turkey re neutrality seems to me to meet the case in the best way. Kiamil Pasha's statement to the press that Egyptian neutrality prevented Turkey beating Italy has done some harm here, and is evidently an attempt to place the responsibility on the wrong shoulders.
The Khedive goes to Bucharest to-morrow on the way to Constantinople. With reference to your telegram No. 71 of 15th October, he has been told that the communication about the fort will be made by the Ambassador.

[43555] No. 632.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 236.) *Foreign Office, October 17, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
YOUR telegram No. 67 of 16th October.
British consuls may undertake protection of Turkish subjects.
(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[43681] No. 632.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 237.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 17th October.

I do not anticipate landing of any force unless it be to protect lives of Mussulman minority; and I hope this will not be rendered necessary.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 591, and St. Petersburgh, No. 1061.)

[43699] No. 634.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 190. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 150 of 17th October.

It is clear that none of the protecting Powers will use any force whatever unless it be to protect lives of Mussulman minority in Crete, and I am proposing that our action should be restricted to this object even in the event of war.

[43682] No. 635.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 592.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 16th October.

As Crete is *en dépôt* with the Powers, I think it would be illogical to abandon Mussulman minority to possible massacre without intimating to Turkey that we are abandoning Crete, and that Turkey is free to do what she likes as regards the island; and it would, even with such intimation, be conduct neither noble nor humane to abandon our trust altogether if we knew that in our absence Mussulmans could not in practice be protected by Turkey.

I am willing to confine our action to this object, and I would again suggest that instructions on this point should be sent as proposed in my telegram No. 587 of 16th October to consuls and naval commanders, and that Cretan executive should be warned of this, but informed that we shall not take any forcible action for this object so long as peaceable Mussulman minority are not endangered. M. Venizelos could also be informed.

It must be remembered that murders of Mussulmans in Crete would certainly provoke reprisals upon Christians in Turkey, for which we should then, in a sense, be responsible if we had abandoned Crete altogether at a moment when Mussulman minority were in danger.

If we can agree and concentrate on this one point, I do not think any other points need trouble us during the war as far as Crete is concerned. I should propose to discontinue patrol.

(Repeated to embassies, and to Canea, No. 192, and Athens, No. 239.)

[43683] No. 636.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 593.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 173 of 17th October.

You can act on my telegram No. 592 of to-day. I fear in reply to a request to leave Crete alone Turkey might ask whether we guarantee its neutrality, but I will join in request if Russia and France propose and desire to make it.

(Repeated to embassies, and to Athens, No. 240, and Canea, No. 193.)

[43749] No. 637.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)
Sir, *Munich, October* 16, 1912.

ON Monday last I was informed by a friend, who, like many Bavarians, is a considerable landowner in Bohemia, that he had just received news from his agent that the workpeople on his property who were reservists had been warned to report themselves to the military authorities. The measure, he explained, is a preliminary to mobilisation.

I have made further enquiries from a confidential source and learn that it is a fact that in some districts of Bohemia the reservists were last week warned to be in readiness, but that there has been no further development.

I am also informed confidentially—but I cannot vouch for the accuracy of my informant—that though Austrian mobilisation may at one moment have been contemplated, it has since been renounced in deference to representations from Berlin, to which also is to be attributed the recent semi-official statement respecting the sanjak which appeared in the "Neue Freie Presse."

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[43718] No. 638.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de communiquer à son Excellence le texte de la note verbale ci-dessous que son Excellence Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'Empire ottoman, vient d'adresser aujourd'hui même aux Légations Royales de Serbie et de Bulgarie:—

"La mobilisation générale et la concentration de forces bulgares (serbes) sur la frontière ottomane, les attaques journalières des fortins et positions tout le long de cette frontière, l'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures ottomanes et les exigences non moins inadmissibles et inconcevables ont rendu impossible le maintien de la paix entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie (Serbie), que le Gouvernement Impérial était désireux de conserver toujours. En conséquence, le chef de la Légation Royale de Bulgarie (Serbie) et son personnel sont informés qu'ils doivent prendre leurs passeports et quitter le territoire de l'Empire aussitôt que faire se peut."

Par suite de cette note verbale, Tevfik Pacha informe son Excellence Sir E. Grey que la Turquie se trouve à partir d'aujourd'hui en état de guerre avec la Bulgarie et la Serbie.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 17 octobre, 1912.

[43805] No. 639.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, a l'honneur d'attirer la haute attention de son Excellence sur l'admission des députés crétois à la Chambre hellénique et la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement d'Athènes de l'union à la Grèce votée par l'Assemblée crétoise.

Confiant dans les assurances répétées et formelles données au Gouvernement Impérial par les Puissances protectrices de la Crète, la Sublime Porte reste convaincue

que les Puissances dépositaires de l'Ile voudront bien protester contre un acte aussi arbitraire qu'illégal et contraire aux assurances données par le Gouvernement hellénique, et qu'elles ne toléreront pas un tel empiétement sur les droits de souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, empiétement qui constitue également un défi flagrant à la volonté des Puissances protectrices de les sauvegarder.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 17 octobre, 1912.

[43778] No. 640.

M. Gennadius to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

October 18, 1912.

Monsieur le Ministre,

IN accordance with instructions received from His Hellenic Majesty's Government I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Greece, in common with Bulgaria and Servia, addressed to Turkey, yesterday in the course of the afternoon, a declaration of war.

The motives for this step are set forth in a notification which I venture to hope I may be permitted to hand in person to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
J. GENNADIUS.

[44085] No. 641.

Formula communicated by M. Cambon, October 18, 1912.

1. LES Puissances se concerteront immédiatement à l'effet d'interposer en temps opportun leur médiation entre la Sublime Porte et les Gouvernements des États balkaniques.

2. Si la médiation réussit, les Puissances se concerteront pour l'étude et l'application des réformes à introduire dans la Turquie d'Europe.

3. Si la médiation échoue, les Puissances se concerteront pour prendre, à la fin des hostilités, les mesures que commandent le souci de la paix générale et l'intérêt commun de l'Europe.

4. Les Puissances s'accordent, d'ailleurs, à ne rien entreprendre qui soit contraire à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 octobre, 1912.

[43743] No. 642.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 481.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 17, 1912.

CANEA telegram No. 147 of 15th October.

Published message of Greek Government to that of Crete enjoining necessity for protecting Mahommedans would seem of a nature to remove grounds for their anxiety, and perhaps obviate necessity for measures contemplated by His Majesty's consul-general at Canea, which would necessarily involve us considerably at an inopportune moment.

It would seem to be inadvisable that Powers should go further than necessary as regards neutrality of Cretans.

My French and Russian colleagues share these views.

(Sent to Athens and Canea.)

[43796] No. 643.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 485.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 17, 1912.

BULGARIAN and Servian Ministers have been handed their passports and leave to-morrow. Greek Minister had sent message to Porte intimating that they [*sic*] would consider note from Greek Government as having been delivered, although Turkish Minister at Athens had declined to receive it. Minister for Foreign Affairs took act of this declaration, but did not send Greek Minister his passports, and stated to Bulgarian Minister, who went to bid his Excellency adieu, that note had not been received.

On demanding an explanation, Greek Minister was told that his case had not been considered at the last Council of Ministers, and that next meeting would deal with it. Grand Vizier told my colleague that passport had not been sent to Greek Minister as they still had hope of matter being arranged with Greece. But there is no indication of lines on which this could be done or where such negotiations may be proceeding. Nor is it considered possible that Greece may still be a free agent.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, and Sophia.)

[43897] No. 644.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 486.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 18, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 17th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me it is not present intention of the Turkish Government to give Greek Minister his passports.

(Sent to Athens.)

[43899] No. 645.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 487.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 18, 1912.

GREEK Minister made communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that, Porte not having replied to identic notes from the three States, and situation having been aggravated by stoppage of Greek shipping, and also further by rupture of diplomatic relations by Porte, Greece finds herself compelled to have recourse to arms and declares that state of war exists between the two countries.

(Sent to Athens.)

[43902] No. 646.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 373.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October* 18, 1912.

CRETE.

Following is substance of *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government received to-day:—

Russian consul-general at Canea has received instructions in sense of your telegram No. 1013 of 9th October. In view, however, of close relations between Crete [groups omitted: ? and Greece], Russian Government wish to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the prejudice of Cretan trade which would be entailed by complete prohibition to Greek vessels to touch at ports.

Russian Government consider moment inopportune for application of instructions of 1909 and 1911 to commanders of several stationnaires (see your telegram No. 1039

of 14th October) in view of general rising in the island which might be caused by landing of troops.

Russian Government wish to avoid all coercive measures against Christian population of the island and interference in internal affairs in accordance with the principle proposed regarding Samos (your telegram No. 1000 of 8th October).

Commander of Russian cruiser will be instructed to afford, as far as possible and in concert with his colleagues, protection to lives of Mussulmans in Cretan ports (see your telegram No. 1047 (to Canea No. 187 of 15th October)).

[43905] No. 647.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 376.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1053 of 16th October.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs said that question of Cretan deputies had no longer any importance now that war was declared.

[43906] No. 648.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October* 18, 1912.

MY telegram No. 373 of to-day.

I asked Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs whether instructions sent to commander of Russian cruiser authorised landing detachment of sailors to protect Mussulmans, and, his Excellency replying in the negative, I remarked that in that case I did not see how any effective protection could be given to them.

His Excellency replied that in his opinion rôle of the protecting Powers should cease with outbreak of war, though it might be resumed at end of war if the *status quo* in the island then underwent no change. He personally thought that we should press both the Cretan Executive and Greek Government to see that no harm was done to Mussulmans, and that if in spite of this their lives were in danger we should consider what further steps we could take for their protection.

[43907] No. 649.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October* 18, 1912.

IN course of conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, I observed that if eventual mediation of Powers was to be successful, it would be necessary for them to be in a position to give belligerents some idea of the lines which the settlement, which was to end war, would follow, as otherwise they might not listen to us. His Excellency agreed, and said that, though it would be impossible to draw up detailed scheme in advance, we ought, if possible, to agree on its general principles. Russian Government were anxious that French Minister for Foreign Affairs should initiate exchange of views between Powers on the subject, as any proposals which he might put forward would probably meet with a better reception than if they came direct from St. Petersburgh. He thought, however, that before they were officially submitted to Powers there should be a preliminary consultation between London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh, as, while most anxious not to emphasise division of Europe into two groups, it was most necessary that there should be no divergence of views between Powers of the Triple *Entente* in any discussion in which all the Powers were engaged.

[43915] No. 654A.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 18, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 593 of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs is absent from Paris until Monday. Political director has informed me this afternoon that his Excellency's views on the subject of Crete, subject to consideration of any weighty arguments that legal advisers may have to urge against them, are as follows :—

"Le Gouvernement de la république estime que les Puissances trahiraient le mandat qu'elles ont assumé vis-à-vis de la Porte si elles se désintéressaient actuellement de la Crète. La Porte serait en effet fondée à objecter que l'action protectrice des Puissances l'a empêchée de fortifier l'île et d'y entretenir une garnison.

"Le Gouvernement de la république est donc d'avis que les Puissances devraient maintenir une force navale dans les eaux crétoises pour représenter la continuité du mandat des Puissances. L'action pratique de cette force navale devrait se borner à la protection des musulmans."

[43894] No. 650.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 18, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 17th October.

Manifesto declaring war has been made public this morning. This is in lieu of ultimatum, which could not be delivered as the Turkish Legation is closed.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[43830] No. 651.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 18 1912.*

GREECE declared war last night simultaneously with her allies.

[43892] No. 652.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 18, 1912.*

PARIS telegram No. 173 of 17th October.

I think the Greek Government are alive to the advantages of the anomalous situation of Crete under the present circumstances, and are very unlikely to send troops there.

[43911] No. 653.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 18, 1912.*

DECLARATION of war terminates contract of British naval mission. Greek Government wish most of them to remain and resume after the war. Presume no objection, and that Commander Cardale's British half-pay begins to-day.

I believe same request has been made to French military mission.

[43912] No. 654.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 71 of 17th October.

Consul at Syra begs to be excused from protection of Turkish subjects, not having necessary time.

I am requesting him to undertake it pending reference to you. He is of course unpaid, and very busy as head of Eastern Telegraph Company.

[43916] No. 655.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris October 18, 1912.*

FOLLOWING proposals are to be submitted to you by French Ambassador. They have been drawn up by French Government in consequence of representations which have reached them from various quarters :—

"1. Les Puissances se concerteront immédiatement à l'effet d'interposer, en temps opportun, leur médiation entre la Sublime Porte et les Gouvernements des Etats balkaniques.

"2. Si la médiation réussit, les Puissances se concerteront pour l'étude et l'application des réformes à introduire dans la Turquie d'Europe.

"3. Si la médiation échoue, les Puissances se concerteront pour prendre, à la fin des hostilités, les mesures que commanderont le souci de la paix générale et l'intérêt commun de l'Europe.

"4. Les Puissances s'accordent d'ailleurs à ne rien entreprendre qui soit contraire à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman."

[44335] No. 656.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 65.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1912.

Sir,

THE Greek Minister came to see me to-day, and handed me the accompanying communication, which I told him I would have read in due course. I said that words were now no longer of any use.

The Minister observed that only the guns could speak now.

We then had some general conversation, in the course of which he asked me what was meant by "localising" the war.

I replied that the interpretation which I had placed on it was that the war must not spread so as to involve any of the Great Powers.

The Minister then showed me an extract from last night's "Pall Mall Gazette," containing detailed statements of the movements, present or prospective, of British ships in the Mediterranean, and the objects connected therewith. This, he said, obviously came from an authoritative source.

After reading it, I said that it did not come from me or from the Foreign Office. It seemed rather to have had a naval origin.

The Minister pressed me as to whether this statement had any bearing on the "localisation" of the war.

I told him that, when a few days ago the war between Italy and Turkey seemed likely to lead to more extended operations, I had expressed great anxiety to the Italian Ambassador lest the Straits should be closed, the grain trade being especially important at this time of year. This was the only thing which I had said that had any bearing upon "localising" the war in the sense which the Minister gave to the word.

The Minister asked for information as to the guarantees for the Ægean islanders.

I referred him to the terms of peace between Italy and Turkey that had appeared in the press, and said that I held the question of the Ægean islands to be one for the six Powers to discuss together, and I could discuss it with him only on the footing that Great Britain was one of those Powers.

As he seemed desirous of getting some indication of intervention on our part in a sense benevolent to Greece, I said that Greece was at war with Turkey; we would issue a proclamation of neutrality; and I could not promise any action which was inconsistent with that.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 656.

Memorandum communicated by M. Gennadius.

LA Légation Royale de Grèce est chargée par son Gouvernement de communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ce qui suit :—

L'anarchie qui règne en Turquie, et qui trouble si profondément le repos et la sécurité des pays voisins, s'était aggravée depuis quelque temps. Les Grandes Puissances ont jugé nécessaire de prendre en main la réalisation des réformes prévues par l'article 23

du Traité de Berlin. En réponse à cette dernière expression de la volonté collective de l'Europe, la Sublime Porte a eu recours à un procédé qui lui a servi plus d'une fois. Elle déclara qu'elle appliquera des réformes sérieuses, aussi bien en Turquie d'Europe, que dans ses provinces de l'Asie; mais qu'elle ne croit pas qu'une ingérence étrangère dans l'application sera profitable aux réformes.

Cette promesse du Gouvernement ottoman d'appliquer seul des réformes sérieuses a rencontré auprès de tout le monde la méfiance dont parlait le Comte Andrassy dans sa note du 30 septembre, 1875. Une des causes principales de cette méfiance, profondément enracinée, disait avec raison l'ancien Chancelier d'Autriche-Hongrie, doit être recherchée dans le fait que plus d'une mesure, annoncée dans les derniers rescrits du Sultan, a déjà été proclamée sans que le sort des chrétiens en ait éprouvé une amélioration sensible.

Depuis trente-sept ans les événements ont surabondamment démontré la justesse de ce jugement. Aussi les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie, ne pouvant plus tolérer les souffrances de leurs congénères en Turquie et une situation grosse de dangers pour leur avenir, avaient décidé de demander un contrôle efficace pour l'élaboration et la réalisation des seules réformes radicales capables d'améliorer le sort misérable des chrétiens, et la pacification de la Péninsule des Balkans.

Cette dernière tentative, dont la modération contraste avec l'attitude provocatrice de la Turquie, qui avait mobilisé sans motif sérieux contre les États balkaniques, ayant échoué, et la rupture des relations diplomatiques ayant été ordonnée par la Sublime Porte, les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie se sont vus, à leur grand regret, dans l'obligation de recourir à la force des armes.

La Grèce, se trouvant dès lors en état de guerre avec la Turquie, vient de lui adresser une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1er de la Convention relative à l'Ouverture des Hostilités du 17 octobre, 1907.

Le but qu'elle poursuit en déclarant la guerre, coïncide avec les intérêts de tous les peuples civilisés. Les étrangers résidant dans les provinces, dont la pacification permanente est l'objet de la guerre, ne pourront que profiter de cette pacification sous un régime d'ordre, de liberté et de progrès. Les intérêts des nationaux de tous les pays sont sûrs d'être protégés. La prospérité matérielle et le développement intellectuel sont certains d'être l'objet d'une sollicitude aussi constante qu'éclairée.

Aussi le Gouvernement Royal croit-il pouvoir compter sur les sympathies des nations amies, et il fait un appel pressant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de ne pas lui refuser sa neutralité bienveillante dans la lourde tâche qu'il vient d'assumer.

Athènes, le 17 octobre, 1912.

[44336] No. 657.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 33.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1912.

Sir,

THE Bulgarian Minister left with me to-day the accompanying communication.

I said that I would have it read in due course, and went on to say that words were no longer of use. As Bulgaria and the other Balkan States had taken matters out of the hands of the Powers and into their own, for the present there was nothing more to be said.

The Minister observed that the war was inevitable, because the action of the Powers in Turkey had not been stronger. He expressed a hope that massacres or the pillage of innocent people, such as had occurred on previous occasions in Turkey, might be prevented.

I said that we all hoped that innocent people would not suffer in this way. It would be very distressing if they did.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 657.

Memorandum communicated by Bulgarian Minister.

LA Légation Royale de Bulgarie est chargée par son Gouvernement de communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ce qui suit :—

L'anarchie qui règne en Turquie et qui trouble si profondément le repos et la sécurité des pays voisins s'était aggravée depuis quelque temps, les Grandes Puissances ont jugé nécessaire de prendre en main la réalisation des réformes, prévues par l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin. En réponse à cette dernière expression de la volonté collective de l'Europe, la Sublime Porte a eu recours à un procédé qui lui a servi plus d'une fois. Elle a déclaré qu'elle appliquera des réformes sérieuses aussi bien en Turquie d'Europe que dans ses provinces d'Asie, mais qu'elle ne croit pas qu'une ingérence étrangère dans l'application sera profitable à l'œuvre des réformes.

Cette promesse du Gouvernement ottoman d'appliquer seul des réformes sérieuses a rencontré auprès de tout le monde la méfiance dont parlait le Comte Andrassy dans sa note du 30 décembre, 1875 : "Une des causes principales de cette méfiance profondément enracinée," disait avec raison l'ancien Chancelier d'Autriche-Hongrie, "doit être recherchée dans le fait que plus d'une mesure, annoncée dans les derniers rescrits du Sultan, a déjà été proclamée sans que le sort des chrétiens en ait éprouvé une amélioration sensible." Depuis trente-sept ans les événements ont surabondamment démontré la justesse de ce jugement. Aussi, les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie, ne pouvant plus tolérer les souffrances de leurs congénères en Turquie et une situation grosse de dangers pour leur avenir, avaient décidé de demander un contrôle efficace pour l'élaboration et la réalisation des seules réformes radicales capables d'améliorer le sort misérable des chrétiens et la pacification de la péninsule des Balkans.

Cette dernière tentative, dont la modération contrastait avec l'attitude provocatrice de la Turquie, qui avait mobilisé sans motif sérieux contre les États balkaniques, ayant échoué et la rupture des relations diplomatiques ayant été ordonnée par la Sublime Porte, les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie se sont vus, à leur grand regret, dans l'obligation de recourir à la force des armes. La Bulgarie se trouvant dès lors en état de guerre avec la Turquie, vient de lui adresser une déclaration formelle, conformément à l'article 1er de la Convention relative à l'Ouverture des Hostilités du 27 octobre, 1907.

Le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie espère que le but qu'il poursuit en déclarant la guerre coïncide avec les intérêts de tous les peuples civilisés. Les étrangers résidant dans les provinces dont la pacification permanente est l'objet de la guerre ne pourront que profiter de cette pacification. Sous un régime d'ordre, de liberté et de progrès, les intérêts des nationaux de tous les pays sont sûrs d'être protégés ; la prospérité matérielle et le développement intellectuel sont certains d'être l'objet d'une sollicitude aussi constante qu'éclairée. Aussi, le Gouvernement Royal croit-il pouvoir compter sur les sympathies des nations amies et fait-il un appel pressant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de ne pas lui refuser sa neutralité bienveillante dans la lourde tâche qu'il vient d'assumer.

Légation de Bulgarie, Londres,
le 18 octobre, 1912.

[43950] No. 657 A.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 316. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, October* 14, 1912.

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's telegram No. 429 of the 4th October, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report which I have received from Colonel Granet, military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on subject of reported intention of Italy to land 30,000 men at Dedeagatch.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING.

Enclosure in No. 657A.

Colonel Granet to Mr. Dering.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, October* 6, 1912.

WITH reference to the reported intention of the Italian Government to land 30,000 men at Dedeagatch, I would submit that, in the first place, it is doubtful whether the Government would venture on such an important operation with such a comparatively weak force, and, secondly, that the present condition of the Italian army, since the release of the reservists of the 1888 and 1889 classes, renders any such enterprise out of the question. The infantry battalions in Italy consist almost entirely of recruits of the 1892 class, who have only undergone three weeks' training, and it is scarcely conceivable that the number of troops necessary for such a serious operation could be spared from the 90,000 or 100,000 in Libya and the Ægean. As an instance of the extent to which infantry battalions in Italy have been depleted to meet the calls made on them by the war, I may mention that I recently visited the 1st regiment of infantry at Conegliano, the colonel of which informed me that in the whole regiment he had only 150 trained soldiers, or 50 per battalion, the remainder being all recruits, and from information which I have received from other reliable sources there is no reason to believe that other infantry regiments are in a more effective condition.

I have, &c.
E. J. GRANET, *Military Attaché.*

[43979] No. 658.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 863.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 15, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 465 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of Porte's reply to the communication made by the representatives of the five Powers here.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 658.

Reply of Sublime Porte to Representatives of Great Powers at Constantinople.

EN réponse à la communication en date du 10 courant que leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie et d'Allemagne ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs de faire à la Sublime Porte, le soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a l'honneur de leur rappeler que, ainsi que leurs Excellences veulent bien le constater elles-mêmes, le Gouvernement Impérial a déjà reconnu la nécessité d'introduire les réformes que comporte l'administration des vilayets de la Turquie d'Europe. Il a envisagé ces réformes avec d'autant plus de conviction qu'il entend les appliquer en dehors de toute ingérence étrangère, et qu'il prévoit que dans ces conditions leur exécution ne manquera pas de contribuer à la prospérité et au développement économique du pays, en assurant, dans l'esprit libéral de la constitution ottomane, la concorde et la bonne harmonie entre les éléments hétérogènes qui composent la population de cette partie de l'Empire.

Il est à relever que si jusqu'à présent les différents essais d'amélioration de la situation intérieure de ces provinces n'ont pas produit tous les fruits qu'on était en droit d'en attendre, une des principales causes de ce retard est incontestablement l'état de trouble et d'insécurité causé par les attentats de tous genres provenant de foyers d'agitation dont le but réel ne laisse aucun doute.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'en apprécie pas moins l'intention amicale de la communication que les Grandes Puissances ont jugé à propos de lui faire en raison des circonstances présentes. Il s'associe de tout cœur aux efforts déployés par elles pour conjurer le danger d'une collision dont les conséquences entraîneraient fatalement de grandes calamités qu'il est du devoir du monde civilisé de prévenir par tous moyens de conciliation.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a, sous ce rapport, la conscience d'avoir pris les devants pour faciliter la tâche humanitaire des Grandes Puissances en présence du redoutable problème dont elles cherchent la solution.

En effet, sans vouloir exciper du fait que maintes stipulations du Traité de Berlin ont reçu une exécution non conforme tant à la lettre qu'à l'esprit qui les avait dictées et qu'ainsi les intérêts ottomans ont été gravement lésés en plusieurs cas, sans vouloir en particulier examiner jusqu'à quel point l'article 23 de ce traité a pu conserver plus que les autres articles une valeur actuelle, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il vient de prendre de son propre mouvement la résolution de présenter le projet de loi ile 1880 dans tout son ensemble historique, dès l'ouverture de la prochaine session, à l'approbation du Parlement et à la sanction Impériale, conformément à la charte fondamentale de l'Empire.

Les Grandes Puissances peuvent être persuadées que les autorités Impériales tiendront la main à la scrupuleuse application de cette loi dès son promulgation.

Il serait souverainement injuste d'inférer d'anciennes négligences et torgiversations, plus ou moins systématiques et inhérentes à un autre régime, que l'Empire constitutionnel ottoman d'aujourd'hui ne serait pas logiquement décidé et capable de rompre définitivement avec les errements du passé, et de prendre occasion de certain doute à cet égard pour chercher d'autres mesures que celles seules compatibles avec l'intérêt bien entendu du pays et des populations elles-mêmes.

Constantinople, le 14 octobre, 1912.

[44103] No. 659.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 19.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, October 19, 1912.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 18th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, referring to the situation at Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 659.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(No. 526.) *Malta, October 18, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) 4 P.

SENIOR naval officer, Crete, reports "Arkadia" (Greek) arrived from Candia and "Pineius" (Greek) from Canea on 16th instant at night; both left next morning 2 A.M., an hour before it was reported to me that troops were to embark. No Greek steamers at Canea now; one at Candia. Blockade established. Further attempts possible. 500 militia are waiting at Candia to embark on first opportunity.

[44133] No. 660.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

[By Post.]

(No. 174.) *Paris, October 18, 1912.*
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

THE political director informs me that M. Isvolsky asked M. Poincaré on the 16th instant to support at Athens a request made to the Greek Government by the Russian Government that Greece should not take any naval action against the Dardanelles, and that M. Poincaré consented on condition that the Russian Government would support a request by the French Government that Greece should abstain from any naval action against Turkey between Alexandretta and Beirout.

M. Isvolsky undertook to refer M. Poincaré's suggestion to the Russian Government.

[43995] No. 661.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 18, 1912.*

CRETE.

Russian Ambassador, who was taking leave of Minister for Foreign Affairs when I entered, asked me in the presence of latter whether I had come to speak about Crete. I said that I had intended to ask his Excellency whether, now that peace was signed, Italy would resume her activity as one of the protecting Powers. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had already announced his intention of doing so. Russian Ambassador then said that he had been instructed to ask what view his Excellency took of Anglo-French proposal to establish a kind of blockade of Crete and search all vessels coming and going to prevent Cretans joining the Greek forces or Greeks proceeding to Crete. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had expressed opinion that such a proposal was hardly practicable, and that he doubted whether public opinion in this country would approve of forcible measures with this object.

I said that I had heard nothing of such a proposal from you, and under the circumstances, I thought it opportune to outline views expressed in your telegram No. 592 of 17th October to Paris, namely, that activity of protecting Powers should concentrate on protection of Mussulman minority, and that no action should be taken unless their safety was endangered.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that in his personal opinion this was, under the circumstances, the only practical line to take, and he should advocate this attitude if a proposal to this effect was formulated.

[44112] No. 662.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 17th October.

Ministry of War cannot sanction despatch of cypher telegrams from the front, and state it is a matter for decision by the general staff in the field.

The military attaché hopes to keep in touch with the newly-appointed vice-consul at Philippopoli for transmission of all information by cypher.

He is writing privately to the Director of Military Operations on the subject.

[44118] No. 663.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 86. Very confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 19, 1912.*

I HEAR that the Greek fleet left yesterday, that their destination is the Dardanelles, and that they propose to offer all possible resistance to exit of Turkish ships.

[44101] No. 664.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica, 18th October :—

"Greek squadron reported this morning off Cassandra."

[44048] No. 665.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 19, 1912.*

ON receipt of news of declaration of war, "blockade" was instituted yesterday afternoon. A British man-of-war and a French man-of-war are off Canea, and a Russian and British off Candia.

(Sent to Athens.)

[44111] No. 666.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 19, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

British vice-consul at Candia reports that last night coasting vessel embarked for Greece body of volunteers and 300 militiamen in plain clothes.

[43915] No. 667.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 605.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 175 of 18th October: Crete.

This will meet my view.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1078, and Rome, No. 438.)

[44048] No. 668.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1912.*

LATEST suggestion is that operations of ships should be confined to protection of Mussulmans if lives of these are in danger. I am asking Admiralty to inform British naval commander that he should be prepared to restrict his action accordingly whenever French and Russian commanders are similarly instructed.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1080; Paris, No. 606; and Rome, No. 439.)

[44120] No. 669.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 495.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Adrianople this evening:—

"Mustapha Pasha has been occupied by Bulgarian troops. Turks retired after destroying two arches of railway bridge, not attempting to defend town.

"Head-quarters of 3rd Army Corps reported at Eski Poos, 12 miles north-west of Kirk Kilisse, 18th October."

[44121] No. 670.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 496.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 86 of to-day.

There is no indication here that Turkish fleet for the present is likely to move out of the Dardanelles. The only useful units are in Black Sea and that neighbourhood.

[44123] No. 671.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 498.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 20, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Abdulla Pasha and staff left for Baba Eski on night of 15th October. They were very confident and talked of taking the offensive, saying that they have reliable news that Bulgarian mobilisation has been a failure and of Bulgarian dispositions, which are bad, whereas their own mobilisation has progressed quicker than they expected.

"Mahmoud Mouktar Pasha left by same train to assume command at Kirk Kilisse.

"Though men are arriving from Asia very fast, they do so in no particular order, and units are all mixed. So there must be confusion at front and army corps are not not yet properly formed. For this reason, and because supply and transport arrangements are most inadequate, I do not consider that Turks can advance on a large scale nor take the offensive for some time. From seven to four 85,000 men left by rail from Constantinople, and 30,000 redifs by road from Redosto.

"Adrianople alone has preparations complete. Garrison of 35,000 and covering troops of 20,000. Estimated about 240,000 men in eastern theatre. Adrianople as above. Kirk Kilisse, 20,000; Kirjali, 15,000; Demotika, 10,000; and remainder from Chorlu to Uzun Keupreu. Figures include mustahfiz at Adrianople, and one mustahfi being formed at Kirjali.

"From western theatre no news of arrival of Asiatic redif units, but between 3rd and 14th railway took about 20,000 men up from Salonica.

"These probably include 13th division.

"Nineteenth division and two redifs assembling at Kumanova.

"Seventeenth division and two redif divisions assembling at Koupreulu.

"Adrianople reports unimportant engagement all along the frontier on 18th, and that Bulgarians occupied Mustafa Pasha on 19th.

"Salonica reports 12,000 Servians advancing on Prishtina."

[44127] No. 672.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 20, 1912.*

I HEAR on best authority that Bulgarian forces have arrived within 15 kilom. of Adrianople.

[44146] No. 673.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 112. Very Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, October 20, 1912.*

I LEARN from a very trustworthy and confidential source that Count Berchtold, who leaves to-night on his visit to the King of Italy, intends to discuss the question of Albania with the Italian Government. It will be proposed that if the status of

Albania undergoes a change as a result of the war, and it becomes necessary to introduce reforms there, the execution of these reforms shall be supervised by Austria-Hungary and Italy, who will mark out their respective spheres of influence in Albania. Austria-Hungary is to undertake the direction of the two northern vilayets and Italy that of the two southern ones: such, I believe, is the general plan of these proposals. The putting forward of such a scheme shows, I think, the anxiety of the Austro-Hungarian Government to do all that they can to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, at the close of the war, between the European Powers.

[44209] No. 674.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 307.) *St. Petersburgh, October 16, 1912.*

Sir,

THAT the combined efforts of the Powers should have failed to avert war in the Balkans has not taken the Russian public by surprise, as ever since the first order to mobilise was issued war was regarded as inevitable. Now that the die has been finally cast the question is being asked, Will the efforts of the Powers to localise the war prove equally unsuccessful, and will the statesmen who direct the foreign policy of the Triple *Entente* show greater skill in dealing with the European crisis, should it arise, than they have displayed in the handling of the Balkan problem? While the press has been very free with its criticisms, it has, with the sole exception of the "Novoe Vremya," refrained from putting forward any suggestions of its own for the guidance of the statesmen whom it has taken so severely to task. The "Novoe Vremya," however, rushes in where its more cautious contemporaries fear to tread, and declares that the fire that is smouldering at Vienna must be extinguished before it lights up a general European conflagration, and that in order to accomplish this the Powers of the Triple *Entente* must give the Austrian Government clearly to understand that there must be no military intervention on her part.

As I have already reported by telegraph, M. Sazonof has, through the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, given Count Berchtold the categorical assurance that if Austria will abstain from an occupation of the sanjak or of Servian territory Russia will not intervene in the war. The reply which he has now received from Count Berchtold is so far satisfactory that it gives M. Sazonof reason to believe that Austria will restrict her action to concentrating troops near the Servian frontier. For the moment, therefore, the efforts of the Powers to localise the war would appear to have borne fruit. Count Berchtold's assurances, however, can hardly be held to remove all danger as regards the future, and it is always possible that some frontier incident or some provocative action on the part of Servia may stir Austrian public opinion to such a pitch that the Government will find itself forced to intervene. On the other hand, were the Bulgarian arms to meet with any serious reverses, the Russian Government would equally be unable to maintain a passive attitude. If not as strong as at the time of the war of 1877, Russian sympathy with the Balkan Slavs is still a factor that must be counted with, and, when once fighting begins in real earnest, is certain to show itself in one form or another.

There is also always the danger that, before the war is over, there will be local massacres of Christians in Turkey, and incidents of this character will not fail to inflame public opinion in this country. Already a considerable number of volunteers have offered their services to the Bulgarian Legation, while arrangements are being made for sending medical assistance to the sick and wounded. But it is the press that this sympathy chiefly finds expression, where it takes the form of violent attacks on the present policy of the Russian Government. M. Sazonof is told that he ought to have seen that the only way to avert war was to insist both at Balmoral and at Paris on full satisfaction being given to the lawful demands of the Balkan States, and the fact that he failed to do so, and that war has ensued, makes the public slow to accept his assurances with regard to the policy of the Powers or to place much confidence in the lasting co-operation of Russia and Austria. No single journal has so far raised its voice in his defence, and a report—for which, however, I believe there is no foundation—is being persistently circulated that he will very shortly have to resign his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He himself professes to doubt the genuineness of the movement in favour of the Balkan Slavs, and speaks of it as a press campaign engineered by the opponents of the Government. The latter are no doubt making capital out of it, but M. Sazonof will, in my opinion, commit a great mistake if he continues to treat this movement as a negligible quantity, and, if he does so, he may even end by compromising his position. From the language used to me by the Emperor last winter, there can be no doubt but that His Majesty considers that Russian sympathy for the Balkan Slavs is a factor that even he must count with, while the tradition which he has inherited from his grandfather, the Tsar Liberator, as well as the influence of those members of the Imperial family who have contracted marriage with members of the Royal Houses of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro, may carry weight with His Majesty.

The scepticism displayed as regards the possibility of localising the war is not altogether to be wondered at when account is taken of the many conflicting interests which will have to be reconciled if an Austro-Russian conflict is to be averted. Even if Austria refrains from crossing the frontier during the earlier stages of the war, it is impossible to foresee what may happen when Europe decides that the moment has arrived for mediating between the two belligerents. Unless, as is hardly probable, the Balkan States suffer a crushing defeat at the hands of the Turks, they will not be satisfied with any settlement of the Macedonian question that does not realise the objects to attain which they are now appealing to arms. They profess, indeed, to have renounced all idea of territorial aggrandisement, but they have already mapped out their respective spheres of influence, and will demand that the territories comprised in these spheres shall form separate autonomous vilayets. This is a claim which Turkey will no doubt resist to the last, as she would regard it as the first step towards her eventual dismemberment. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that she is seriously worsted in the war, the claim is one which Russia could hardly refuse to support at a conference of the Powers. It was Russia who inspired the conclusion of the alliance between Servia and Bulgaria, and, though M. Sazonof has now told me that the text of the treaty was never submitted to the Russian Government, until it was already initialled in the form in which it was to be finally signed, and although the latter were careful to impress on the two contracting parties the fact that it must bear a purely defensive character they welcomed the arrangement, under which Servia and Bulgaria agreed to compose their long-standing differences by an amicable demarcation of their respective spheres of influence. In working for this alliance Russia believed that it would prove to be a docile instrument in her hands; and only two months ago M. Kokovtsof assured me that Bulgaria would never move until the Emperor of Russia said the word. The fact that she has now done so in spite of the utmost diplomatic pressure that Russia could bring to bear at Sophia, will, however, be forgotten if the war ends favourably for Bulgaria. The feeling of sympathy and pride which her victories would evoke in this country, provided always that she does not attempt to lay her hands on Constantinople, would render it very difficult for any Russian Government to join in depriving Bulgaria and her allies of the fruits of the war.

It is then that the co-operation temporarily established between Austria and Russia will be put to the test, as the former is not likely to accept a settlement of the Macedonian question that would erect a formidable barrier between her and Salonica. France, England, and Germany would no doubt lend their good offices for the purpose of effecting a compromise between the rival claims of the two Powers more directly interested; but the position of His Majesty's Government will be a very difficult one. Their attitude will be watched with jealous apprehensions both by His Majesty's Mahommedan subjects in India and by the Russian public. The former will expect them to throw the weight of their influence into the scales in favour of their coreligionists in Turkey, while the latter will look to England, as a member of the Triple *Entente*, to support Russia in advocating the cause of the Balkan Slavs. A leading Russian journalist recently told me that it was in order to secure England's co-operation with Russia in the Balkan question, whenever the crisis came, that his journal had consistently supported the idea of an Anglo-Russian understanding, and the ultimate fate of that understanding was now in England's hands. If, he added, England were to fail the first time that she was appealed to, to support Russia in a question in which she was so vitally interested as the present one, the understanding would lose all its value in the eyes of Russians.

In submitting the above considerations I have gone on the supposition that the fortune of war would be on the side of the Bulgarians, not because I think that this must necessarily be the case, but because I desire to draw attention to the difficulties with which we would be confronted, should it prove to be so. I would only add that if Europe is not to be taken a second time unprepared, when the time comes for convoking a conference to liquidate the war, it would seem urgently necessary that the

Powers should lose no time in considering between themselves how the conflicting interests that will then have to be reconciled can best be adjusted. Though it will no doubt be very difficult to formulate any precise proposals for a final settlement until after one or more decisive battles have been fought, we can hardly hope that our offers of mediation will be accepted by the belligerents unless we are in a position to indicate the general lines which that settlement will take.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[44215] No. 675.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 313.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, October 17, 1912.*

M. SAZONOF informed me on the 15th instant that he intended to publish an official communiqué in the press in regard to the situation in the Balkans. The communiqué appeared yesterday in the "Rossia," in the form of a leading article, a full summary of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

Little reference is made to the communiqué in to-day's press, but it will probably be discussed in more detail in the course of the next few days. The "Rech" is sympathetic, and attributes significance to the fact that the article was the joint work of M. Sazonof and M. Kokovtsof. It considers its publication was necessary in order to put an end to the alarmist rumours of a general conflagration in Europe. The evening edition of the "Novoe Vremya" was brief and sarcastic, while the "Bourse Gazette" is inclined to treat the communiqué with scepticism.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 675.

Summary of Leading Article in the "Rossia" of October 16, 1912.

THE leading article on the situation in the Balkans, published in the "Rossia" on the 16th October, states that events in the Balkans, as was to be anticipated, have found a most diverse, and it may be said contradictory, reflection in the various circles of Russian public opinion. If in a portion of the press attacks have been made on the Government for not conducting a policy based on sentiment and impulse, the Bourse has clearly and unmistakably expressed the opposite fear that Russia will surrender herself precisely to such a policy. Finally, doubt has been expressed in different quarters as to whether Russia will succeed in maintaining peace in Europe. Two elements are discernible among these conflicting currents which are contributing to the present political situation. First of these is the policy of Russia, her positive problems and the means for their realisation; and the second, the relations of the other great Powers in Europe to the crisis.

The seriousness of the present moment makes it obligatory to deal with both these points as fully as possible. As regards Russian policy, we cannot conceal from ourselves or from others, nor do we wish to, that the sympathy of Russia at the present moment is where it always has been—on the side of her kinsmen and brothers in religious faith. Only very impressionable or very ill-informed persons can talk of any indifference towards the fundamental covenants of our past. But sentiment and traditions, however respected, cannot be the sole factors in the determination of the course of policy which is the result of complex interests and conditions between which it is necessary to establish a perspective. Examining this perspective of our interests, first in importance is the vital need of all classes of the people, of all sides of our internal life for the maintenance of peace without detriment to our real interests, and in adopting this standpoint the Government feels itself solidly supported by an enormous majority of the Russian people, and no attacks by the press will disturb it.

In making the preservation of peace its chief aim the Government nevertheless understands that the wish alone is insufficient. But without undue optimism or exaggeration, it can be said that one of the most weighty pledges for the maintenance of peace in Europe is the fact that Russia is not only pacifically inclined, but represents in herself a very serious and inspiring force.

Russia's military strength is considerably greater than was the case on the eve of war in the Far East. A series of good harvests and other favourable conditions have not only increased the productive life of the country, but made it possible for our Ministry of Finance to regard the future with tranquillity, whatever unforeseen circumstances may arise.

Finally, the general political conjuncture could not be more favourable for the maintenance of peace in Europe than the present—a factor which cannot but be dwelt on in connection with the interests affected by the present crisis. For us it is of course of the first importance to know that of herself Russia is sufficiently strong to make her voice heard wherever it may be necessary, and this voice is sufficiently powerful to secure us from any actions infringing or opposed to our interests. But no less reassuring is the circumstance that the general political situation in Europe hardly gives any serious grounds for excessive fears in this respect. First of all, there is no need for us to insist on the strength and solidarity of the relations of Russia with France and England, constituting so inestimable a factor in the preservation of the general European peace. Its significance was correctly assessed by German official circles last summer after the visit of the Emperor William. We regard with similar lack of all suspicion the Triple Alliance, completing the balance of power in Europe. In particular, our relations with each of the Powers of which it is composed leave nothing to be desired.

We cannot but note with a feeling of profound satisfaction that at the very time the crisis in the Balkans began to become acute a common fear of war and a common desire to maintain peace formed the basis for a rapprochement and a frank exchange of opinions between the Cabinets of St. Petersburgh and Vienna. It is impossible to estimate the whole significance of this fact, both as regards the preservation of the general peace and from the point of view of those positive results which were obtained during the visit of M. Sazonof to London, Paris, and Berlin. Thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy supported so successfully by the initiative of the French Government, all the European Powers were united in recognising the two principles: one, the legality in principle of the desire of the Balkan States for reforms in European Turkey to be secured by new guarantees; and, two, the inviolability of the territorial *status quo* should war in the Balkans not be averted. The force of this statement is increased by the fact that it was presented to the Balkan States in the name of all the Powers by those most interested in the situation—Russia and Austria.

The "Rossia" goes on to say that it is true that the statement to this effect was made in the Balkan capitals, but maintains that it retains to an equal extent its significance for the two Powers which made it, and constitutes a fresh public confirmation before Europe and the Balkan States of the principles on which their policy is based. This fact alone should suffice to put an end to hints of bad faith which have of late been thrown at Russia and Austria, united in the common task of disinterested pacification. In the relations which have now arisen between the two Governments all who are interested in the preservation of the general peace of Europe, and, naturally connected with it, the localisation of the war, should see a true barometer as to the chances of the Balkan fire becoming a general European conflagration.

In conclusion the article says:—

"We are on the threshold of events in the Balkans the outcome of which no one can discount. We believe that the efforts of all the Powers will be directed towards the speediest possible cessation of bloodshed, both in the interests of humanity and peace and of the belligerent parties. We feel under the present circumstances that we are on firm ground in our relations with the Powers, and in the consciousness of our strength for the maintenance of which the necessary means can be found at any moment. Without holding any illusions as regards the seriousness of the situation we look soberly but boldly ahead, in the calm conviction that we possess the means and power to defend the national interests and prestige of Russia whenever occasion may arise."

[44170] No. 676.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(*No.* 447.)

Berlin, October 17, 1912.

Sir,

IN the course of a speech at a banquet given by the "Elders of Commerce" to the members of the Exhibitions Conference on the 15th instant, the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office referred to the crisis in the Balkans and stated that "we have all of us the firm and well-founded conviction that none of the States which are represented here to-night will be drawn in and directly involved." Much as everyone regretted, he added, the breach of the peace, and much as the Powers had laboured to prevent it, it had had to be regarded as possible for some time past, and the Powers had consequently had time to come to agreement for the localisation of the troubles; given the good-will existing on all sides it would certainly be found possible to prevent a spread of the conflagration, and to carry through in peaceful concord the task of resettlement which might be eventually necessary.

The "Cologne Gazette" of the 15th published an apparently semi-official telegram from Berlin, confirming the report that France had proposed the summoning of a conference at Constantinople, and adding that such a conference did not seem possible at the present moment, when war had begun and events were following each other so closely; but that France deserved gratitude for again taking a step which should contribute to keeping the Powers in continual contact not only at the present juncture but also for future eventualities.

Yesterday's "Frankfürter Zeitung" had a telegram, probably also inspired from Berlin, in which praise was also accorded to M. Poincaré for his action, but a good deal of cold water was thrown on the conference idea. Obviously no one could expect a conference to prevent the war, and it was indeed doubtful whether it was not better for the festering sore to be cicatrised by a surgical operation like war—after a little blood-letting the intervention of the Powers was more likely to be of use. Whether the exchange of views with that object could best be carried on through the ordinary diplomatic channels or by the rather out-of-date means of a conference was a question which must be most seriously weighed. The telegram concluded by remarking that, as the Powers had declared that they would allow no alteration of the *status quo* in the Balkans, and that they and not the belligerents would conclude the eventual peace, it was obvious that they must keep in continual contact with each other and prepare for joint action when the right moment came—when that moment would come and how the position of individual Powers might be affected by the events of the war were things which no one could yet foresee.

I have noticed no articles in other papers worth recording, but the views given in the above two telegrams represent very fairly what seems to be the general opinion of the press as well as apparently of the Government.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

[44376] No. 677.

M. Coromilas to M. Gennadius.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 21.)

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer, ci-après, le texte de la déclaration des Ministres de Grèce, de Bulgarie et de Serbie à la Sublime Porte :—

"Le soussigné, Ministre de Sa Majesté le Roi de Grèce, a, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'honneur de faire la communication suivante à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan :—

"La Sublime Porte n'ayant pas répondu à la note identique que les Gouvernements de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie ont eu l'honneur de lui adresser le 30 septembre dernier, et la situation, qui était déjà très grave, à cause de la saisie des munitions serbes et des bateaux grecs, faite par la Turquie au mépris du droit des gens, étant devenue encore plus menaçante par suite des attaques des avant-postes bulgares et serbes par des troupes ottomanes, et la rupture des relations diplomatiques

provoquée par la Sublime Porte en violation des principes internationaux, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Grèce se voit obligé, à son grand regret, de recourir à la force des armes, laissant au Gouvernement ottoman toute la responsabilité de la rupture des relations entre la Grèce et l'Empire ottoman. J'ai l'honneur d'informer le Gouvernement Impérial que, dès ce moment, la Grèce se considère en état de guerre avec la Turquie, et que, tenant ma mission comme terminée, je quitte Constantinople dans le plus bref délai."

COROMILAS.

Athènes, le 18 *octobre*, 1912.

[44278] No. 678.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Admiralty October 21, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of paraphrase telegrams, dated the 19th and 20th instant, respecting the situation in Crete.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 678.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, October* 19, 1912.

INFORM senior naval officer, Crete, that blockade orders in regard to Cretan militia proceeding to Greece are to be considered cancelled, when French and Russian commanders receive similar instructions. Protection of lives of Mussulmans in Crete is, in future, to be the sole object of operations of His Majesty's ships in Cretan waters.

Enclosure 2 in No. 678.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Malta, October* 20, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from senior naval officer, Crete:—

"'Hampshire' boarded two Greek vessels yesterday evening and to-day; obtained signed guarantees from ships' masters not to take militia on board."

Later report from senior naval officer, Crete:—

"Have just heard that 300 militia embarked at Candia in plain clothes. Rumour not credited by 'Weymouth,' who had kept look out with search-lights."

Admiralty telegram No. 242 received.

Enclosure 3 in No. 678.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Malta, October* 20, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer, Crete, reports arrival of "Nauplia" (Greek) from Piræus Guarantee obtained from ship's master. Naval officers of other protecting Powers not yet received instructions.

[44310] No. 679.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 499.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 20, 1912.*

MILITARY authorities attach no importance to fall of Mustapha Pasha and are very optimistic.

They consider it practically impossible for Montenegrins to take Scutari, and say that not more than 300 or 400 were captured at Tuzi. Military attachés warned unofficially to start on Thursday.

[44197] No. 680.

Vice-Consul Hadkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Mitylene, October 20, 1912.*

SIX Greek men-of-war are at island of Lemnos, demanding its occupation.

[44311] No. 681.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 20, 1912.*

I HEAR that transports with 2,800 troops have left to join fleet.

[44446] No. 682.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 21, 191*

LEMNOS occupied yesterday without resistance.

[44459] No. 683.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 21, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister has received instructions to concert with his colleagues with a view to strong recommendation to Greek Government, in their own interest, to take effective measures for the protection of Mussulmans in Crete.

[44460] No. 684.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 21, 1912.*

BY instructions from his Government, Russian Minister has asked Greek Government that they will not make the Dardanelles theatre of military operations. Austrian Minister has asked them to abstain from any action likely to induce Turks to close Dardanelles. To both Greek Government declined to give any guarantee. Italian Minister is making similar request to-day.

[44456] No. 686 A.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 503.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 21, 1912.*

TO-DAY a private and confidential message was sent to me by Kiamil Pasha. It was to the effect that he thought it desirable on humanitarian grounds that the war which had unfortunately broken out, despite the efforts of the present Ottoman Cabinet and the endeavours of the Powers, should be stopped as soon as favourable opportunities occur. Such an opportunity would occur when a considerable engagement on a large scale had taken place, and if the initiative, as he hoped, were to come from England it would enhance her prestige in the Moslem world and would be favourably received by all Mussulmans. Apparently his idea is based on the assumption that the Turkish arms will be victorious in the first decisive engagement. Kiamil Pasha said the Balkans had declared war in order to obtain autonomy, which was regarded by them as a stepping-stone to ultimate result in Eastern Roumelia. This was done in spite of the fact that the introduction of liberal and broad changes in administration of European Turkey had been determined on by the Cabinet. The Central Government, although the difference between contending parties was small, must stop short at the separation of the local administration from the Central Government. His Highness added, that before the present situation arose, he had the idea, in return for a general *entente* with Turkey, of allowing Greece to administer Crete. This problem, he thought, might still be dealt with on above lines at the conclusion of the war.

On the issue of the present struggle favouring Turkey such a solution must presumably depend.

[44401] No. 685.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché to the Director of Military Operations:—

"I am informed on good authority preparations are being made to disembark the Trebizond redif at Media, on the Black Sea coast, as part of a force to protect Turkish right flank. It may be intention of Minister of War to make an offensive movement in this direction."

[44422] No. 686.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 502.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 21, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"In army of the east the force at Adrianople is designated the 15th Army Corps. The 16th, 17th, and 18th Army Corps are being formed each of three redif divisions from Asia. It is reported that Bulgarians attacked Hasskeui on 20th October, and that Turkish advanced troops are retiring on Adrianople. Also that some Greeks have landed at Platamona and in Kassandra."

[44166] No. 687.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 21, 1912.*

ALL military attachés left for Stara Zagora this morning.

[44455] No. 688.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 21, 1912.*

TURKISH ships are bombarding Kavarna, north of Varna. This is reason for action taken by Bulgarian Government respecting the extinction of lights in Black Sea (see my telegram No. 4, Commercial, of to-day).

[44312] No. 689.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 4. Commercial.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 21, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Government have just informed me that in consequence of menacing attitude of Turkish fleet they purpose to extinguish lights in Black Sea as from to-night.

I am endeavouring to obtain further extension of time.

(Sent to Constantinople, Bucharest, and Odessa.)

[44457] No. 690.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 381.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 21, 1912.*

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 175 of 18th October: Crete.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs said that French formula quite met his views, but that he thought we ought to press on Greek Government and Cretan executive necessity of themselves assuring safety of Mussulmans.

[43907] No. 691.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1086.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 378 of 18th October.

I have told Russian Ambassador that I agree with this view of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have added that some real reform in Macedonia must be part of any settlement. It need not be inconsistent with integrity of Turkey, but Powers will have to make it certain that the old state of things in Macedonia does not recur. If, however, we are to co-operate with Russia as I assume we shall do in this object, it is essential that Russia should be very careful by her action in Persia, especially at such places as Meshed, not to give offence to Mussulman feeling in India.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 609.)

[44500] No. 692.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1087.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador having told me that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes there to be no threat of use of force in warning at Athens and Canea to protect lives and property of Mussulman minority in Crete, I have agreed to give warning without threat if any warning is now necessary. I informed Russian Ambassador that I accepted view of French Government as given in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 175 of 18th October with reservation that this was not a moment to spend time with law officers. We were to-day instructing our naval commander to confine action to protection of Mussulmans if required.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 610.)

[43708] No. 693.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 831.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

MY telegram to Lord Kitchener No. 72 of 16th October and Lord Kitchener's telegram No. 63 of 18th October: Egyptian neutrality.

If any further allusion is made to this matter, you should speak as proposed in my above-mentioned telegram.

[44501] No. 692*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1088.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

I HAVE informed Russian Ambassador that I spoke to Greek Minister on Friday, and have telegraphed to Athens and Constantinople to-day, deprecating any action that might lead to closing of the Straits to commerce.

Russian Ambassador informed me that M. Venizelos had replied to Russian Minister at Athens that Greece could and would do what Italy had not done as regards the Straits.

I said I regarded this news as serious, and should bring it before Cabinet to-morrow.

[44720] No. 693 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 833.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 247 of 21st October to Athens.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs in a friendly and unofficial way, and express hope that closure of Straits will not be contemplated unless urgently demanded by imperious necessity.

[44720] No. 693 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 247.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

YOU should take an opportunity of mentioning to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in a friendly and unofficial way that we hope naval operations will not be extended to the Dardanelles or their immediate vicinity, as, if the Turkish Government were compelled to close the Straits, the most serious detriment would be caused to neutral trade, and much irritation would arise here at such closure having been rendered necessary as a defensive measure.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 832.)

[43912] No. 693 C.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 248.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 18th October: Protection of Turkish subjects at Syra.

You should enquire of consul at Syra whether he can see his way to undertake this task as a favour; but if he still declines, the Porte must be informed that he cannot carry out this duty in addition to his other work.

[44789] No. 694.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 351.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador told me to-day that he was informing his Government of the statement attributed to Sir Fairfax Cartwright about Crete, which he assumed was untrue, and he asked me whether he might deny it categorically.

I replied that he might certainly deny that Sir Fairfax Cartwright had ever said what was attributed to him. I told Count Benckendorf that I happened, shortly before this lie appeared, to have said in the course of my communications with the French Government that I considered that the "status" of Crete after the war must be settled by the six Powers in consultation with Turkey, *i.e.*, the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Berlin. One of the things which I wished to have definitely settled as a result of this war was the question of Crete, in order that we might afterwards no longer be troubled with it.

The Ambassador asked whether we would have any objection to Crete going to Greece?

I replied that we should have no objection whatever, provided that it was fairly arranged with the consent of Turkey. I would make the same reserve about Crete as about the Ægean Islands: we did not wish it to pass into the possession of a great naval Power. Subject to this reserve, I wished to have nothing more to do with Crete.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44791] No. 695.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 352.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1912.

I SPOKE to the Russian Ambassador to-day about the way in which the Russian press was representing us as having obstructed M. Sazonof's policy in the Near East, through fear of offending Mussulman susceptibilities.

I said that, as the Ambassador would remember, I had not opposed any proposals which M. Sazonof had made; and, though I had spoken of the sensitiveness of Mussulman opinion, and had asked M. Sazonof not to make things difficult for us by action which must offend it, this had been in connection with Persia, especially the bombardment of the shrine at Meshed.

The Ambassador did not differ from anything which I had said, and observed that he had been present, and remembered very well that my remarks had applied to Persia. He said that the Russian press just now was attacking M. Sazonof, and he feared that there was a combination of the extreme Right and the Radicals to assail the Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43799] No. 696.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 487.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1912.

TEWFIK PASHA questioned Sir A. Nicolson on the 16th October as to the reports of a conference which were being circulated. Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness that the papers were attaching too much importance to, and exaggerating, a very natural and simple suggestion, emanating from Paris, that the Powers should keep in touch with each other and exchange views as the situation developed. His Highness knew, Sir A. Nicolson said, how desirous we all were that the scope of the war should be limited, and no better means for doing so could be found than that the Powers should keep up a friendly conversation among themselves.

Tewfik Pasha remarked that Kiamil Pasha had twitted him with his having always enlarged upon the friendly sentiments of England to Turkey, while if England

had not remained so passive as she had done, and if she had taken a more active part in keeping the Balkan States in order, the war would not have occurred.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that if we had initiated an active policy of that nature other Powers would probably have been energetic in another direction, and instead of a Balkan war having been hindered, a European conflict would have ensued. Tewfik Pasha agreed, but said it was of Kiamil's chaff.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43619] No. 607.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 511.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1912.

THE French Ambassador called at this Office on the 15th instant and left with Sir A. Nicolson a memorandum containing the four following proposals, which had been drawn up by M. Poincaré:—

"1. Les Puissances se concerteront immédiatement à l'effet d'interposer en temps opportun leur médiation entre la Sublime Porte et les Gouvernements des États balkaniques.

"2. Si la médiation réussit, une conférence internationale se réunira dans le plus bref délai pour l'étude et l'application des réformes à introduire dans la Turquie d'Europe.

"3. Si la médiation échoue, la conférence se réunira de même pour prendre, à la fin des hostilités, les mesures que commanderont le souci de la paix générale et l'intérêt commun de l'Europe.

"4. Les Puissances s'accordent d'ailleurs à ne rien entreprendre qui soit contraire à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et à l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44278] No. 608.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would now cause instructions to be telegraphed to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to abstain from any such measures as stopping the entry of Greek vessels into Cretan waters, and to confine action to the protection of the Mussulman population if, in the opinion of the consuls-general, their safety is at any time endangered.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[44479] No. 609.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 138. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 15, 1912.

AT the audience which the King of Greece did me the honour to grant me on the 12th instant His Majesty began by bitterly reproaching the protecting Powers for having brought about the present situation by not adopting his suggestions for a provisional settlement of the Cretan question. I said I did not see how such a settlement could have affected the question now at issue between Turkey and the Balkan States—the future administration of the European provinces—but he said the situation

would have been quite different if his advice had been listened to. Things had now reached such a pass that he did not see any peaceful way out.

I reminded the King that the Great Powers had declared that the Balkan States would not be allowed to profit by their victories if they were successful in the war. His Majesty said they would fight for what they had gained, and he could not believe that the Powers would combine to take it from them by force.

I told His Majesty that in the interests of peace it was unfortunate that his Department of Foreign Affairs was in the hands of M. Coromilas, who was very chauvinistic and arrogant, and had used such overbearing and rude language to the Turkish Minister that the latter did not go near him. His Majesty asked if it was a true story which he had seen in a paper, but which M. Venizelos said he had not heard of, that M. Coromilas had on one occasion said to Moukhtar Bey, "We are four to one against you," and I replied that I believed it was, although I had not heard it from Moukhtar Bey himself. The King then said that the latter was also out of place, being much more the agent of the Committee of Union and Progress than of the Turkish Government, and that it was a pity that the late chargé d'affaires, Ghalib Bey, had not been left here, in which I agree.

I enquired whether His Majesty had heard of Turkish offers alleged to have been made with a view to detach Greece from her allies. He replied that he had heard nothing of them, and that they would be too late if they were made now. Yesterday, however, M. Coromilas distinctly told me that he had been sounded on the subject more than once, and I have since heard from another source that the German and Austrian Ambassadors at Constantinople had worked actively with that object.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[44480] No. 700.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 139.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a note which the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs handed the day before yesterday evening, in the presence of the Prime Minister, to my Austrian and Russian colleagues, in reply to their communication of the 8th instant, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 137 of the 11th; and copies of a note which, in agreement with the Governments of Servia and Bulgaria, he sent on the same day by a secretary to the Turkish Minister, at about 8 o'clock in the evening.

Mukhtar Bey accepted the note without reading it, and, mindful of the difficulties he was experiencing with his telegraphic correspondence, asked that orders might be given that his telegrams should receive all facilities, as he wished to transmit the note *in extenso* to Constantinople. Three hours later, however, he returned it to M. Coromilas, saying that its contents were such as he could not possibly transmit. His Excellency immediately sent it back, with a note saying he regarded it as accepted, and shortly afterwards it was found pushed under the door of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Yesterday morning, by which time it was known here that the similar note addressed to the Turkish Ministers at Sophia and Belgrade had been accepted by them and forwarded to Constantinople, M. Coromilas telegraphed direct to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, telling him that he had addressed a note to Mukhtar Bey, who refused to forward it, and that if Nuradunghian Effendi wished to see it he should asked Mukhtar Bey for it.

My Austrian and Russian colleagues accepted the communication made to them, at the same time, however, telling M. Coromilas that it would have been more in accordance with diplomatic procedure if it had been made through the Greek Legations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

I asked M. Coromilas yesterday what grounds he had for supposing that Turkey would yield to the small Powers what she denied to the great ones. He replied that the small Powers wielded a moral and material force which the Great Powers did not. The latter were not united, the former were; that was one of the wonders of the Balkan alliance, of which he prided himself on being the author. He could not imagine the Great Powers going to war with Turkey for the sake of obtaining reforms for the oppressed populations; the Balkan States had mobilised for that purpose.

Further, whatever was the policy of the Governments of the Great Powers, he was convinced that public opinion throughout Europe would be on the side of the small ones, and would grow in intensity as the struggle went on. That was why he was not afraid of the threat of the Governments that the Balkan States would not be allowed to reap any advantage from a victorious war.

There can, I fear, be little doubt that the Turkish Government will, like their Minister here, regard the demands of the Balkan States as impertinent, and will reject them. Nevertheless, it appears from the statement of M. Venizelos to my French colleague, reported in my telegram No. 59 of the 12th instant, that the States would be prepared to waive their claim to an effective control over the reforms, provided they could be satisfied that the Great Powers will succeed in obtaining effective control for themselves. That, however, is a point of which it will be extremely difficult to convince them.

M. Coromilas informed me that he had that day addressed an ultimatum to the Porte demanding the release of the Greek ships improperly detained.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 700.

Greek Government's Reply to Austro-Hungarian Representations.

LE Gouvernement hellénique, ayant pris connaissance de la déclaration que les six Grandes Puissances ont, par l'entremise des Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Russie, adressée à la Grèce, et s'étant entendu avec les Gouvernements des autres États balkaniques, exprime sa gratitude pour l'intérêt déployé par les six Grandes Puissances en faveur des populations de la Turquie d'Europe et pour leur promesse de prendre en main la réalisation de réformes dans l'administration en s'appuyant sur l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin. Le Gouvernement Royal hellénique a néanmoins—d'accord avec ceux de la Bulgarie et de la Serbie—estimé que, après tant de promesses de réformes si souvent et si solennellement données par la Turquie et si expressément consignées dans des actes internationaux, il serait cruel de ne pas tâcher d'obtenir en faveur des populations chrétiennes de l'Empire ottoman des réformes plus radicales et plus définies pouvant réellement améliorer leur sort misérable si elles sont sincèrement et intégralement appliquées.

C'est pourquoi ils ont cru devoir s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan en lui indiquant les principes sur lesquels les réformes à introduire doivent se baser, et les garanties qu'il faudra accorder pour leur sincère application. Ils sont sûrs que, si le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman veut entrer dans cette voie, l'ordre et la tranquillité seront rétablis dans les provinces de l'Empire et une paix solide sera assurée entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques, qui ont eu jusqu'à présent trop souvent à souffrir de l'attitude arbitraire et provocatrice que la Sublime Porte a prise envers eux.

Athènes, le 30 septembre (13 *octobre*), 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 700.

M. Coromilas to Mukhtar Bey.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le 30 septembre* (13 *octobre*), 1912.

LE soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a l'honneur de prier son Excellence Moukhtar Bey de vouloir bien faire parvenir au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman la communication suivante ainsi que la notice ci-annexée :—

"Malgré la démarche que, par l'entremise des Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Russie, les six Grandes Puissances ont faite auprès des États balkaniques, démarche par laquelle elles promettent de prendre en main la réalisation de réformes dans l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe, les Gouvernements de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie croient cependant devoir s'adresser directement au Gouvernement Impérial de Sa Majesté le Sultan pour lui déclarer que seules des réformes radicales sincèrement et intégralement appliquées peuvent réellement améliorer le sort misérable des populations chrétiennes des vilayets de l'Empire, garantir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans la Turquie d'Europe et assurer une paix solide entre l'Empire ottoman

et les États balkaniques, envers lesquels la Sublime Porte a trop souvent pris une attitude arbitraire et provocatrice que rien ne justifiait.

"Les Gouvernements de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie, regrettant que le Gouvernement monténégrin ne puisse, à cause des événements survenus, prendre part à cette démarche, invitent la Sublime Porte à procéder immédiatement, de concert avec les Grandes Puissances et les États balkaniques, à l'élaboration et à l'introduction dans la Turquie d'Europe des réformes prévues par l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin en les basant sur le principe des autonomies ethniques (autonomie administrative des provinces, Gouverneurs généraux belges ou suisses, assemblées des provinces électives, gendarmerie, enseignement libre, milice) et en en confiant l'application à un conseil supérieur composé de chrétiens et de musulmans en nombre égal sous la surveillance des Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances et des Ministres des quatre États balkaniques à Constantinople. Ils espèrent que la Turquie pourra déclarer qu'elle accepte cette demande, en s'engageant à mettre à exécution dans un délai de six mois les réformes contenues dans la présente note et la notice explicative annexée et qu'elle voudra, comme preuve de son assentiment, rapporter le décret de mobilisation de son armée."

Le soussigné saisit, &c.

L. A. COROMILAS

Enclosure 3 in No. 700.

Explanatory Note annexed to the Note addressed to the Turkish Minister.

CONFIRMATION de l'autonomie ethnique des nationalités de l'Empire avec toutes ses conséquences.

2. Représentation proportionnée au Parlement ottoman de chaque nationalité.

3. Admission des chrétiens à tous les emplois publics dans les provinces habitées par des chrétiens.

4. Reconnaissance sur un pied d'égalité avec les écoles ottomanes de tout grade des communautés chrétiennes.

5. Engagement par la Sublime Porte de ne point tâcher de modifier le caractère ethnologique des provinces de l'Empire ottoman en y transplantant des populations musulmanes.

6. Recrutement régional des chrétiens pour le service militaire avec des cadres chrétiens. Jusqu'à la formation des cadres, suspension de l'enrôlement.

7. Réorganisation de la gendarmerie par vilayets dans la Turquie d'Europe sous le commandement effectif d'organisateurs suisses ou belges.

8. Nomination dans les vilayets habités aussi par des chrétiens de valis suisses ou belges agréés par les Puissances et assistés de conseils généraux élus par les districts électoraux.

9. Institution auprès du Grand Vizirat d'un conseil supérieur composé de chrétiens et de musulmans en nombre égal pour surveiller l'application des réformes. Les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances et les Ministres des quatre États balkaniques à Constantinople auront la mission de suivre le fonctionnement et les travaux de ce conseil.

Athènes, le 30 septembre (13 *octobre*), 1912.

[44482] No. 701.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October 22.*)

(No. 141.)

Sir, *Athens, October 15, 1912.*

THE Chamber met yesterday, the date which it had fixed for reassembling, when it adjourned in June. Sixty-five Cretan deputies arrived early in a body, and were stopped at the door until the orders of the acting President were taken: on his giving permission they entered the House and took seats. (There was no actual resistance on the part of the police, as I erroneously reported in my telegram No. 61 of yesterday.)

The acting President read the decree of mobilisation, and a message of greeting from the Bulgarian Sobranie, which was received with applause.

M. Venizelos then ascended the tribune and made the declaration, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation. He was listened to in an impressive silence, which was only broken by applause at the passages concerning Crete, at that which suggested the possibility of the union of the Balkan nations recovering what their dissensions had lost, and at the end.

The sitting was then suspended for a few minutes to give the Cretan deputies the opportunity of withdrawing; as they did not avail themselves of it, the Chamber adjourned until to-day. The Cretans were not at all satisfied with M. Venizelos' declaration, and a deputation of them who waited on his Excellency after the sitting received a severe castigation for their want of patriotism, and were told that a battalion which ought to have been sent to the frontier had been retained here on purpose to deal with them if they were recalcitrant. In the end, after discussion among themselves this morning, they decided to abstain from giving further trouble, and they did not present themselves at the Chamber to-day. The approaches to the House were strongly guarded, and force would have been used against them had it been necessary. In this M. Venizelos would to-day have had the support of public opinion, which unanimously approves his declaration and his action, but which would have been almost equally unanimous against him had he excluded the Cretans by force yesterday.

Shortly after the adjournment yesterday M. Coromilas called upon me to explain the Prime Minister's declaration, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 62. He said that under present circumstances, and in view of the mobilisation, it was impossible for the Greek Government to maintain the attitude they adopted a few months ago, and to exclude the Cretan deputies; but that wishing to defer as far as they could to the wishes of the protecting Powers, and to avoid making the Cretan question a cause of war, they had departed from that attitude as little as possible, although they would have had the support of their allies in demanding a definite solution. They therefore announced that they recognised for the present the *status quo* in Crete in every respect, including the suzerainty of the Sultan, except that after regular elections held under the Greek law Cretan deputies should sit in the Greek Parliament, and that order should be maintained in the island by a Cretan Government dependent on Greece, whereby the guarantee for the security of the Mussulmans would be greatly strengthened.

I said that I did not see how even "regular elections" could give the Cretan deputies a legal status in the Greek Parliament. He somewhat unconvincingly argued that as an internal matter it could be settled by regulation, and from the international point of view that the Eastern Roumelian deputies sitting in the Bulgarian Sobranie formed a close precedent. It was not worth while to point out to him how the analogy failed.

He said he hoped the Powers would recognise the peculiar difficulty of the situation in which the Greek Government were placed, and would appreciate the moderation they had shown. I said I doubted it, but I admitted that they could not have excluded the Cretan deputies by force now as they did last June.

He said that if there was war, the definitive solution of the Cretan question would be an indispensable condition of the conclusion of peace, not for Greece only, but for her allies.

The Turkish Minister addressed to M. Coromilas a strongly-worded protest against the action of the Greek Government with regard to the Cretan deputies. As I understand this protest reached the Ministry for Foreign Affairs within half-an-hour of the adjournment of the Chamber, it must have been prepared beforehand.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 701.

Speech of M. Venizelos on the Opening of the Greek Chamber, October 14, 1912.

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour also to announce verbally to the Chamber that by a Royal decree of the 17th (30th) September a general mobilisation of the army and navy has been ordered. We adopted this measure in agreement with the Bulgarian, Servian, and Montenegrin Governments, in reply to the movements of the military forces of European Turkey which had begun, movements which the Christian States of Eastern

Europe considered a menace to their safety. But once the Christian States had mobilised they thought it incumbent on them not to disarm before they had succeeded in imposing radical and real reforms in European Turkey, reforms guaranteed and capable of assuring a better life, and of improving the otherwise miserable fate of the Christians of the East. Before the allied States came to an agreement regarding the nature of the reforms which they were going to demand, the Six Great Powers, through the representatives at the capitals of the Balkan States of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of the Russian Empire, declared that they actively deprecated any measures which might lead to a disturbance of the peace, and that on the basis of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin they would undertake, in the interests of the inhabitants, the realisation of reforms in the administration of European Turkey, it being understood that these reforms would not affect the sovereignty of the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman dominions. Unfortunately, after so many promises so repeatedly given, but also as repeatedly broken by Turkey, after promises which were fortified by international acts, the Christian States of the Balkan Peninsula did not think they could content themselves again with the promise of reforms, and they considered that the scheme drawn up thirty years ago after the Berlin conference did not correspond to the new situation created after so many years. They also thought on this account that it was incumbent on them, after expressing their gratitude to the Great Powers for the interest once more shown in the Christians of the East, to address themselves, the Christian States of the Balkans, directly to the Ottoman Empire, in order to place before it the principles upon which they thought that the reforms to be introduced ought to be based and the guarantees which they thought necessary for their sincere application.

These reforms are the following:—

[M. Venizelos here read the nine heads comprised in the annex to the note of the Balkan States to Turkey.]

But while we decided upon the attainment of these radical reforms, which were the chief object of our care, it was clear that we could not allow the Cretan question to go by without special attention. Although, in arriving even at the radical solution of the Cretan question—in accordance with the unchangeable wishes of the Cretans—Greece would not find that she was alone to confront the contingencies which might arise from her action tending to this end, we considered that it was incumbent upon us to give an additional proof of our firm desire not to create fresh difficulties in the way of the common endeavour to maintain peace even at this eleventh hour—we considered that it was right to content ourselves, provided that things did not come to war, with a fresh temporary solution of this question. By this solution, while the international status of the island would be maintained in other respects unchanged, as it was created by the protecting Powers themselves until the date of the evacuation of the island by the international troops, in other respects the island would be administered essentially by Greece, and its representatives would be entitled to sit together with the representatives of the Greek kingdom in this national Chamber.

I therefore to-day welcome, in the name of the Greek people, the deputies of the sister island, and, while making an express declaration that Greece accepts in future the existence of one common Parliament for the free kingdom and the Island of Crete—(prolonged applause), I invite the Cretan deputies to return to the island in order to carry to their compatriots the fraternal greeting of the national representatives, and to see to the holding, as soon as possible, of regular elections, so that they may receive the wedding garment which will permit their entrance to these precincts. (Prolonged applause.) For, however indisposed I am in such important circumstances to allow myself to be hindered by formal impediments, unfortunately the election of representatives in Crete which has taken place is so remote from all the principles of our constitution that it would be impossible, without a real subversion of our affairs, to accept those who have arrived in such a way to sit together with us and vote valid laws.

It is superfluous for me to add that we content ourselves with this middle solution, as I have said, in order to avoid diminishing what are indeed but slender hopes of the further maintenance of peace, and that if war should break out, neither in Greece nor in Crete would public opinion be disposed to content itself with a middle solution, and the definite solution would then be settled by the result of the war.

Gentlemen, you are aware how sincerely both the Greek people and the present Government were devoted to the work of peace and how much we all wish that period of peace to be long, so that we may contribute therein to our internal reforms. Nor do

we or our allies and friends lose sight of the difficulties and dangers which we may meet in carrying out our common programme.

But the state of things had become intolerable not only for those of our race in Turkey, whose sufferings react on ourselves, but especially because of the conduct of the Ottoman Empire towards this free kingdom. There is no violation of international law which the neighbouring State has not employed against us. There is no need to remind you of the commercial boycott which lasted for a year and a-half; of the perpetual violation of the rights of our subjects which are assured both by international law and by conventions with Turkey; of the events of yesterday; of the troops in Samos who fired upon a merchant ship carrying a high official of the State; of the seizure but yesterday of our ships. If I mention these things I do it not to tell you that in the despair which this intolerable situation has created we have come to adopt the measures which we have adopted, and which it is well understood may to-morrow lead us to war. We have coolly calculated things, Gentlemen; against the difficulties and risks which we have not ignored we have to place the close union of the Christian peoples of the Illyrian peninsula, which is a real event in world-history.

And we are justified in believing that although, owing to their divisions, the peoples inhabiting Eastern Europe did not succeed in preventing their subjection five centuries ago, their sincere union to-day gives firm ground for the attainment by their own strength of the reform of Eastern Europe.

Gentlemen, even at this eleventh hour we would be glad if the neighbouring Empire would co-operate with us in this work of reform, and accord the necessary guarantees of the sincerity of her co-operation. We would thus avoid sacrifices and losses which it is impossible should not follow in the train of a war which will certainly be terrible. But if the neighbouring State refuses this co-operation, both the moral and material strength of the combination of the Christian peoples of the East is sufficient to assure victory.

It would be an omission on my part if I were not to announce at this moment all the joy which we all have felt in that the mobilisation of the army has been completed with such success that not only the strength which I mentioned in the Chamber on a previous occasion as capable of being put into the field in case of need was with the colours on the sixth day of mobilisation, but its assembly was assured two days earlier than was expected by all. But our navy is also ready—not only ready as regards the vessels which it formerly had, but our destroyer fleet has been reinforced by not only the arrival of the submersible, but by the addition of two destroyers which were recently ordered in the Vulkan yards.

I feel it my duty to offer my official thanks because the vessels were delivered a month earlier than the term agreed on, and to announce the purchase of four large newly-built ocean-going destroyers, vessels which are the strongest of their type in the Mediterranean.

By these vessels the strength of our destroyer fleet has been tripled. But in addition to this military force upon which Greece rests herself in the first place, the moral union which the Greek people and the Greek nation presents at this critical period of national life is an additional element of strength for the Government which to-day directs affairs.

The struggle, if it is not settled peaceably, the struggle if it is going to take a military form, will certainly be a struggle for our all, a terrible struggle. But with these elements which I have mentioned to you, with the confidence in our fleet and army, with the national unity with which the Hellenic nation appears at this critical juncture, I believe that Greece and the whole nation may look with confidence to the result of the present crisis.

[44521] No. 702.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 22.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, October 21, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 21st instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the situation in Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 702.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, October* 21, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer, Creto, reports "Nauplia" sailed last night for Piræus with about 400 militia and 200 volunteers in plain clothes and without arms.

[44522] No. 703.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 22.)

Sir, *Admiralty, October* 21, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 21st October, which has been sent (in cypher) to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 703.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, October* 21, 1912.

ORDERS for Cretan blockade are now cancelled, whether or no French and Russian Governments have issued similar orders. Instruct senior naval officer accordingly that Mussulmans in Crete are to be protected as far as possible if lives in danger, but that his action is to be confined to this purpose.

[44606] No. 704.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 22.)

Sir, *Admiralty, October* 22, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 21st October, 1912, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, at Malta.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 704.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, October* 21, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer, Crete, reports 1,000 men awaiting transport at Candia, and 1,000 taken on board by "Nauplia" all in plain clothes.

[44912] No. 705.

Note communicated by Bulgarian Minister, October 22, 1912.

LA Légation Royale de Bulgarie est chargée par son Gouvernement de communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ce qui suit:—

"Quelques navires de guerre turcs ont, sans aucun avertissement aux autorités locales, bombardé hier le port bulgare de Kavarna, qui est exclusivement commercial

et n'est nullement défendu. Ils ont démoli la douane et plusieurs magasins et habitations privés.

"Le Gouvernement Royal bulgare proteste contre cette attaque, qui constitue une violation flagrante des principes du droit international, proclamés par la Convention de La Haye concernant le bombardement, et consacrés, d'ailleurs, par la pratique internationale de tous les pays civilisés—acte inhumain, contraire à la règle élémentaire que la guerre est une lutte entre les forces armées des belligérants et non une violence contre les populations paisibles."

Légation de Bulgarie, Londres,
le 22 octobre, 1912.

[44641] No. 706.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 22,* 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 248 of 21st October.

I have received from consul at Syra letter stating real reason of his reluctance to undertake protection of Turks, namely, that his position as superintendent of the Eastern Telegraph Company will not allow him to mix in affairs either Turkish or Greek.

I think that objection is valid, and hope that Porte may be asked to make other arrangements.

[44621] No. 707.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 22,* 1912.

I HAVE acted on your telegram No. 247 of 21st October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had replied to Russian Minister that the Greek Government could take no engagement respecting Dardanelles. He added to me that if they were to do so it would only prolong the war. Representations against closing the Straits should be addressed to Constantinople, not Athens. It was unfair to deprive one belligerent of an effective arm.

But, he continued, only a Power with a large fleet could afford to risk danger of heavy loss in forcing a passage.

[44650] No. 708.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 22,* 1912.

I READ to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who returned from Poland to-day, paraphrase of my telegram No. 378 of 18th October. His Excellency said that he endorsed every word of what Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs had told me. I then communicated to him substance of your telegram No. 1086 of 21st October, pointing out how important it was if Russia wished us to co-operate with her on Balkans question, that she should do nothing in Persia that might possibly add to the difficulties of His Majesty's Government by exciting Mussulman feeling.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that no action of this kind was in contemplation, adding that Meshed was a question of the past.

His Excellency then said that he was most anxious that the Powers should intervene in the war at the first possible moment, and according to report just received from Russian Minister at Sophia that moment might present itself very shortly, perhaps within a week. He was, he said, in communication with French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject.

I asked if he had yet thought out any scheme of settlement, and, on his replying in the negative, I suggested that it might be well were he to draw up and submit to French Minister for Foreign Affairs a rough draft of minimum reforms required in that province that would serve as a basis of discussion. Otherwise if nobody took the initiative in the matter, the favourable moment would pass, and war would continue.

His Excellency replied that two draft schemes would really be necessary to meet the respective cases of Turkish or Bulgarian victory, and that he would at once discuss question with his expert advisers.

[44651] No. 709.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 22,* 1912.

BULGARIAN Minister, whom I met at Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day, appealed to me to support protest that his Government are making to Powers against bombardment of open ports by Turks as violating international law, and said that neutrality of Black Sea ought to be enforced.

I told him that I would repeat to you what he had said about bombardment of Kavarna and Baltchick, but that it was quite impossible to ask Turks to refrain from naval operations in the Black Sea.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I mentioned subject, said that nothing could be done with regard to neutrality of Black Sea, but that he was making strong representations at Constantinople against bombardment of open ports.

[44652] No. 710.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 22,* 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1088 of 21st October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had made strong representations at Athens against proposed action of Greek fleet, but that he did not see how we could prevent it if Greek Government persisted.

[44531] No. 711.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 504.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 21,* 1912.

MY telegram No. 492 of 19th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to appointment here of additional military attaché. He fears that Minister of War does not see his way to allow other officers to be attached to army in the field.

[44532] No. 712.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 505.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 21,* 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Porte now inform me in writing that, in view of furnishing suitable hospitality to officers, only military attachés can be received in Turkish camp.

[44533] No. 713.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 506.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Salonica to-day, No. 52 :—

"Greeks entered Elason without any serious opposition, which is expected in Sarandaporon defile.

"Troops also are being sent to Alghide for the purpose of protecting railway to Monastir. Greeks are believed to be in possession of Litohoron."

[44629] No. 714.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 507.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 503, Confidential, of yesterday.

"Tanin" this morning in a strong article declares that Turkey cannot brook mediation during Balkan conflict or intervention of Powers during or after it, also that Ottoman Government is now absolved from its engagement regarding draft law of 1880. This reflects the views of committee circles.

[44644] No. 715.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 509.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 833 of 21st October: Dardanelles.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks you for your message. He says that this corresponds with view of Turkish Government.

He would be most grateful if reply of Greek Government might be communicated to him. It must of course be made clear that Greek fleet must not come into too close proximity to Dardanelles, from which torpedo attack might be made, and which would possibly necessitate closing of Straits. He suggested that Greek Government might unofficially lay down zone within which they would not come.

He also hoped that Greek Government would be induced to limit blockade which could not be effective.

[44645] No. 716.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 510.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 22, 1912.*

CAIRO telegram No. 63 of 17th October: Egyptian neutrality.

Kiamil Pasha, in speaking to a member of this embassy yesterday, drew a distinction between the circumstances of the present war with Greece and the war with Italy.

In the latter case, his Highness stated, the neutrality of Egypt was of importance to England, since its violation might have placed His Majesty's Government in an awkward position, and even given rise to European complications. His Highness added that he quite understood His Majesty's Government's attitude in this instance, in assurance which would seem to prove that his late alleged statement to the press was not intended to put the responsibility for Turkey's defeat on England. On the other hand, Kiamil Pasha stated that he could not see how the above consideration could apply in the case of the present war with Greece, especially in the matter of the expulsion of Hellenic subjects from Egypt.

In reply, it was intimated to his Highness that if His Majesty's Government were to take action, which might be interpreted as intervention against Greece of the Power responsible for Egypt, it would be a temptation for other northern Powers to intervene, either in the Black Sea or in the North-West Balkans, for or against the other Balkan States.

[44646] No. 717.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 511.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs to-day said that Turkish Government were getting somewhat alarmed at the reports received from their consuls of military activity in the Kars district. Information did not seem very precise.

[44648] No. 718.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 513.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 22, 1912.*

IN reply to enquiry made of Ottoman Government in consequence of private applications, latter intimate that they will accept offers of gratuitous service from surgeons and nurses for Red Crescent establishments and military hospitals at Constantinople and Salonica.

[44634] No. 719.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 85 of 19th October.

In order to avoid useless information on war news, you may consider it advisable to inform Director of Military Operations that telegrams which are daily delivered to Reuter Agency here are official and are specially communicated by Bulgarian Telegraph Agency. They will contain all the information which it will be possible to obtain. The same information will be given to all military attachés and war correspondents by head-quarter staff. If any further news reaches me from other authentic sources I will not fail to telegraph it.

[44636] No. 720.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 22, 1912.*

I HEAR from a sure source that the Russian Minister, at the request of the Queen of Bulgaria, has addressed a telgoram direct to the Emperor of Russia, asking that steps should be taken to prevent Turkish ship from demonstrating on the Bulgarian coast. Her Majesty is especially indignant because shots were fired at the summer palace; they were, however, ineffective.

The above may be construed into an attempt to involve Russia.

[44604] No. 721.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 77 of 21st October.

Military attachés have as yet not been permitted to leave Belgrade, and Servian military authorities appear anxious to avoid their witnessing anything whatever for the present. They have been informed in all probability they will not leave for the front for ten days. No military news of any value or reliability obtainable owing to strict censorship.

[44642] No. 722.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, October 22, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that Reuter's report as to attitude of Roumania published in "Times" of 19th October is absolutely false.

His Excellency reiterated to me to-day what he had said on 4th October (see my telegram No. 5 of 4th October).

Minister for Foreign Affairs said also that "Times" correspondent at Sophia was mistaken in his telegram published in "Times" of 17th October, as Roumanian Government had in no way expressed approbation of the proposals in note of the allied States.

[44459] No. 723.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 21st October: Crete.

You should co-operate with your Russian and French colleagues, and Italian colleague if latter is instructed, in making communication. It would be well that it should be informal so as to attract little public attention.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 614; St. Petersburgh, No. 1092; Rome, No. 442; and Canea, No. 204.)

[44456] No. 724.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 840. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

KIAMIL PASHA should be informed privately that his message, reported in your telegram No. 503 of the 21st October, has been received, and that, on the occurrence of a favourable opportunity, his suggestions will be borne in mind by His Majesty's Government.

[44853] No. 725.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 244.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had written a private letter to the French Ambassador in Rome, expressing *prima facie* a favourable opinion on M. Poincaré's proposal respecting mediation in the Balkan War at an opportune moment and the desirability of the Powers keeping in touch, but he had deferred sending a final reply until he had had an opportunity of discussing the matter with Count Berchtold while the latter was in Rome.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44866] No. 726.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed with our suggestion that the action of the guaranteeing Powers in Crete should be confined to the protection of the Mussulman population, and that a warning should be given in Athens and Canea that the Mussulmans should be protected.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44912] No. 727.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Box-Ironside.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister handed to Sir A. Nicolson on the 22nd October a protest against the bombardment of Kavarna in the Black Sea, copy of which I transmit to you herewith.*

He said that he wished to take the opportunity of mentioning that the allusion to the "Cross and the Crescent" in the King of Bulgaria's proclamation had been misunderstood, and, if the full text were studied, it would be seen that there was no desire to excite religious feelings, and that all that was meant was that the "Cross and the Crescent" were symbols of Western and Eastern civilisation. Moreover, in time of war it was necessary to stir patriotic enthusiasm.

Sir A. Nicolson said he would read the text more carefully than he had done, though he must say that it had struck him that the phrase was not the most happily chosen, and that the Turkish Ambassador had called his attention to it yesterday.

M. Madjaroff said he only wished to mention the matter privately to Sir A. Nicolson.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44820] No. 728.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 354.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.*

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that the Cabinet had considered the question of the closing of the Straits, but that we felt it impossible to take anything more than diplomatic action before the Straits were actually closed, and, in any case, we must not be regarded as being committed to action other than diplomatic, even if they were closed. If the closing was a temporary result of some belligerent operations we might put up with the inconvenience, but if there was a prospect of their being closed for a long time, no doubt we must make some proposals for getting neutral commerce through at certain times.

The Ambassador again impressed upon me that the reply of M. Venizelos to the Russian Minister in Athens had been a refusal to give any guarantee as to the Straits, and a statement that the Greek fleet would succeed where the Italian fleet had not been able to succeed. He asked whether I could not agree to make a renewed representation in Athens as a result of this unfavourable reply.

I said that it was only yesterday morning that I had sent instructions to our Minister in Athens to speak on the subject. I must wait to hear what reply the Greek Government gave him. In the meantime, I had asked the Board of Trade for figures as to the value of our shipping and cargoes involved, so that if necessary I could strengthen my representation with this information. The next fortnight was the time during which it was specially important to keep the Straits open. If they could be kept open for that time, a great deal of shipping and a very large amount of Russian grain would have been cleared away.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[44697] No. 729.

Sir H. Box-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Sophia, October 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply of the Bulgarian Government to the joint representations made by the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ministers in the name of the Great Powers. This reply was handed to them late on the afternoon of the 13th instant.

* No. 705.

I also forward copy of the note addressed by the Bulgarian Government to the Turkish chargé d'affaires, which was presented at the same time, and of which a copy was enclosed in the communication made to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ministers.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 729.

Note communicated to Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ministers by Bulgarian Government.

LE Gouvernement bulgare, ayant pris connaissance de la déclaration que les six Grandes Puissances ont, par l'entremise des Gouvernements de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de la Russie, et s'étant entendu avec les Gouvernements des autres États balkaniques, exprime sa gratitude pour l'intérêt déployé par les six Grandes Puissances en faveur des populations de la Turquie d'Europe et pour leur promesse de prendre en main la réalisation des réformes dans l'administration, en s'appuyant sur l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin. Le Gouvernement Royal a néanmoins, d'accord avec ceux de la Grèce et de la Serbie, estimé qu'après tant de promesses de réformes si souvent et si solennellement données par la Turquie et si expressément consignées dans les actes internationaux, il serait cruel de ne pas tâcher d'obtenir en faveur des populations chrétiennes de l'Empire ottoman des réformes plus radicales et plus définies, pouvant réellement améliorer leur misérable sort, si elles sont sincèrement et intégralement appliquées. C'est pourquoi ils ont cru devoir s'adresser directement au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, en lui indiquant les principes sur lesquels les réformes à introduire doivent se baser et les garanties qu'il faudra accorder pour leur sincère application. Ils sont sûrs que, si le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman veut entrer dans cette voie, l'ordre et la tranquillité seront établis dans les provinces de l'Empire, et une paix solide serait assurée entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques, qui ont eu jusqu'à présent trop souvent à souffrir de l'attitude arbitraire et provocatrice que la Sublime Porte a prise envers eux.

Enclosure 2 in No. 729.

Note communicated to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires by Bulgarian Government.

LE soussigné, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes, a l'honneur de prier M. le chargé d'affaires de Turquie de vouloir bien faire parvenir au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman la communication suivante ainsi que la notice y annexée :—

" Malgré la démarche que, par l'entremise des Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Russie, les six Grandes Puissances ont faite auprès des États balkaniques, démarche par laquelle elles promettent de prendre en main la réalisation de réformes dans l'administration de la Turquie d'Europe, les Gouvernements de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et la Serbie croient cependant devoir s'adresser directement au Gouvernement Impérial de Sa Majesté le Sultan pour lui déclarer que seules des réformes radicales sincèrement et intégralement appliquées peuvent réellement améliorer le sort misérable des populations chrétiennes des vilayets de l'Empire, garantir l'ordre et la tranquillité de la Turquie d'Europe, et assurer une paix solide entre l'Empire ottoman et les États balkaniques, envers lesquels la Sublime Porte a trop souvent pris une attitude arbitraire et provocatrice que rien ne justifiait.

" Les Gouvernements de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie, tout en regrettant que le Gouvernement monténégrin ne puisse, à cause des événements survenus, prendre part à cette démarche, invitent la Sublime Porte à procéder immédiatement, de concert avec les Grandes Puissances et les États balkaniques, à l'élaboration et l'introduction dans la Turquie d'Europe les réformes prévues par l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, en les basant sur le principe des nationalités ethniques (autonomie administrative des provinces, Gouverneurs généraux belges ou suisses, assemblées des provinces électives, gendarmerie, enseignement libre, milice), et en confiant l'application à un Conseil supérieur, composé de chrétiens et des musulmans en nombre égal sous la surveillance des Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances et des Ministres des quatre États balkaniques à Constantinople.

" Ils espèrent que la Turquie pourra déclarer qu'elle accepte cette demande, s'engageant à mettre à exécution dans un délai de six mois les réformes contenues dans la note présente et la notice annexée, et qu'elle voudra comme preuve de son assentiment rapporter le décret de la mobilisation de son armée."

Le soussigné, &c.
IV. EV. GUÉCHOF.

Sophia, le 30 septembre (13 *octobre*), 1912.

Enclosure 3 in No. 729.

Explanatory Note annexed to Note addressed to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires.

CONFIRMATION de l'autonomie ethnique des nationalités de l'Empire avec toutes ses conséquences.

2. Représentation proportionnée au Parlement ottoman de chaque nationalité.

3. Admission des chrétiens à tous les emplois publics dans les provinces habitées par les chrétiens.

4. Reconnaissance sur le pied d'égalité avec les écoles ottomanes des écoles de tout grade des communautés chrétiennes.

5. Engagement par la Sublime Porte de ne point tâcher de modifier le caractère ethnologique des provinces de l'Empire ottoman en y transplantant des populations musulmanes.

6. Recrutement régional des chrétiens pour le service militaire avec cadres chrétiens. Jusqu'à la formation des cadres, suspension de l'enrôlement.

7. Réorganisation de la gendarmerie par vilayets de la Turquie d'Europe sous le commandement effectif d'organisateurs suisses ou belges.

8. Nomination dans les vilayets habités aussi par des chrétiens de valis suisses ou belges agréés par les Puissances et assistés de conseils généraux élus par les districts électoraux.

9. Institution auprès du Grand Vizirat d'un Conseil supérieur, composé de chrétiens et de musulmans en nombre égal pour surveiller l'application de ces réformes. Les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances et les Ministres des quatre États balkaniques auront la mission de suivre le fonctionnement et les travaux de ce conseil.

[44698] No. 730.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 114. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 16, 1912.*

ON my return to this capital on the 8th instant from the leave which you were kind enough to accord me, I called at once on the Prime Minister.

His Excellency admitted the gravity of the situation and the rapid development of warlike feeling since mobilisation. He assured me most earnestly that both he and His Majesty the King had used their utmost efforts during the last few weeks to dissuade the Cabinet from resorting to the critical step of mobilisation, but in vain.

M. Gueshof reiterated to me his great regret at the present unfortunate state of affairs. His policy had, he said, as I know, always been one of peace, and he hoped that His Majesty's Government would realise that the situation at this moment was extremely distasteful to him.

On my asking his Excellency why he had not resigned, he told me, in strict confidence, that he had three times offered his resignation to the King; it was refused on each occasion, with the remark that it would be extremely unpatriotic of him not to continue at the head of affairs at the present juncture. The Russian Minister had also urged him to remain in office, as he had his own colleagues. I have been able to verify the above from other sources.

The warlike feeling in Bulgaria, he continued, had been so strong during the last three weeks, that His Majesty had found himself on the horns of a dilemma. If he had refused to sign the mobilisation decree he would, declared the Prime Minister, have lost his Throne; if war should unfortunately break out, he would still doubtless risk it in case of a defeat of the allies, but he would then have acted in sympathy with

the Bulgarian nation, and his position, although extremely delicate, would be strengthened.

On the 8th instant the Prime Minister called upon me shortly after my Austrian and Russian colleagues had presented him their identic instructions. He told me that he had asked them to explain the meaning of the second paragraph of these instructions, namely, "that the Powers would take in hand ('prendre en main') the realisation of reforms in the administration of European Turkey."

Neither of the Ministers were able to enlighten him on this point, and they said that they would refer to their Governments for exact information respecting such reforms.

M. Gueshof further pointed out to them that their action had come very late in the day, but he thanked them for their communication, which he would not fail to bring to the notice of his colleagues. M. Gueshof added that the Bulgarian Government now found themselves in a position similar to that of the Russian Government in 1875. On the 13th March of that year, Lord Derby wrote as follows to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh:—

"In handing the draft protocol, the Count Schouvalof declared that in view of the sacrifices Russia had incurred, on account of the stagnation of industry and commerce, and of the enormous expenditure necessitated by mobilisation, Russia could not demobilise without obtaining some tangible results with regard to the amelioration of the lot of the Christians in Turkey. The Ambassador added that the Emperor sincerely desired peace, but not peace at any price."

The Prime Minister gave me the text of the above in French. Before leaving he told me, unofficially and privately, that he was afraid that war was now inevitable. He had, he assured me, done his very utmost to oppose the present issue, the enormous gravity of which he did not fail to realise.

On the same day, namely, on the 8th instant, I heard from an unexceptionable source that the note which the Balkan States intended to send to the Ottoman Government had been drawn up last week in Belgrade, and had been submitted to the King of Bulgaria on the 4th instant. His Majesty and the Bulgarian Government approved of it entirely; the Greek Government, on the other hand, had raised a slight technical objection to the wording, which was subsequently changed a few days later.

The Montenegrin Government gave *carte blanche* to the other three States respecting the contents of the note, and they eventually declared war on their own account on the 9th instant.

The military attaché has informed that the concentration of troops was proceeding even more rapidly than was generally expected, and that the Bulgarian army would probably be able to advance about the 16th instant. General Savof is to direct operations with the King as commander-in-chief of the allied forces.

On the 9th instant I had a long conversation with the King's "chef de cabinet." M. Dobrovitch stated that the war fever had risen to such a degree that the position of the King and Cabinet would be untenable unless war was declared; he considered it therefore to be quite inevitable. He declared that the action of Montenegro had taken the Bulgarian Government by surprise (see my telegram No. 56), but he admitted that it had caused satisfaction. M. Dobrovitch is extremely discreet and never gives information or expresses any views without His Majesty's authority, and I consider that the above may be taken as His Majesty's estimate of the situation.

Servian troops have been proceeding steadily, both by train and on foot, towards the Bulgarian frontier. They are concentrating for the most part at Kustendil, and they will co-operate with their Bulgarian allies.

On the 10th instant I had the honour to report respecting the reply which the Balkan States intended to make to the representations made at the capitals of the four Balkan States by the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Ministers, and at the same time I foreshadowed their programme. On the 12th instant I transmitted by telegraph full translations of the note which was presented to the Turkish chargé d'affaires on the evening of the 13th instant, together with the reply of the Bulgarian Government to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian, which was delivered at the same time.

The telegraph line to the Turkish frontier was cleared in order to permit of the Turkish chargé d'affaires communicating direct with Constantinople.

The major portion of the head-quarters staff of the Bulgarian army left on the 12th instant for Philippopoli, and Servian currency was made legal tender on the same day in Bulgaria.

On the 14th instant the Bulgarian Government received information that a Turkish force had attacked one of their frontier posts near Tchurkurki, to the south-south-west of Philippopoli, and it was also reported that certain Servian outposts had been attacked on the same day. These incidents will doubtless be seized on by both Governments to show that the Ottoman Government commenced hostilities whilst negotiations were still being continued. Personally, I do not regard them as more than the usual frontier incidents.

Late on the 15th instant the Turkish chargé d'affaires called and stated that he had received a communication from his Government instructing him to leave Sophia with his staff as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. He added that the Ottoman Government had informed him that they did not propose sending a reply to the Bulgarian or Servian notes, as they considered that these countries had shown lack of deference towards the Great Powers by failing to take their mediation into consideration, and that, so far as Greece was concerned, they had not even received a note from that Government. The Turkish chargé d'affaires and personnel of the legation left Sophia to-day, thus definitely causing a rupture of diplomatic relations.

On the 15th instant I received notice from Varna that in consequence of mining operations all vessels bound for that port must stop 2 miles from the mouth of the Kamchick and await instructions from the Government tug. This information I had the honour to telegraph to you, and it was repeated direct from Varna to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[44668]. No. 731.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 867.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, transmitting résumé of a letter from Vice-Consul Summa reporting further concerning events in Sentari vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 731.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Salonica, October 11, 1912.*

WITH further reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a résumé of a letter which I have to-day received from Mr. Vice-Consul Summa, bearing date 20th September, and relating to the events in the Scutari vilayet.

Mr. Summa's information is again borne out by the special correspondent of the "Yeni Asr" at Scutari, who takes an even gloomier view of the situation than Mr. Summa, and represents the Turkish losses in the recent fighting round Touzi as very considerable.

There seems to be no doubt that a considerable number of Montenegrins participated in all these recent combats, and though it is probable that the majority of these "Montenegrins" were Albanian Catholics resident on the Montenegrin side of the frontier, and owing allegiance to King Nikita, yet, as Mr. Summa points out, the Montenegrin authorities have these people well in hand, and could without much difficulty prevent their crossing the border in arms if they desired, and their failure to do so seems to indicate that at the date in question they already regarded the outbreak of hostilities as certain. I have since heard by telegraph from Mr. Summa that the Montenegrin consul and most of the Montenegrin subjects in Scutari quitted that place on the 8th instant, leaving the Russian consulate in charge of their interests.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 731.

Résumé of Despatch received from Mr. Vice-Consul Summa at Scutari under date September 20.

ON 23rd September a convoy of nine or ten barges, laden with provisions and ammunition and escorted by the small Lake steamer, with a detachment of the 2nd battalion of the 71st Regiment as guard, was dispatched to Helm, the nearest accessible point of the Lake shore to the Fouzi forts. Whilst threading their way through the narrow channel amongst dense reeds, by which the landing-stage of Helm is approached, these barges were suddenly attacked by a force of mountaineers, who had concealed themselves there to await their arrival. The steamer and the hindmost barge effected their escape, but all the rest fell into the hands of the assailants, who shot down such of the soldiers or boatmen as offered any resistance, but merely disarmed and released the remainder. A force of sixty men, dispatched by the vali in two other boats on receipt of this intelligence, returned without having encountered the enemy, but brought back some wounded men and a few corpses, one of which (a Mussulman Muhadjir from Kraina) had been somewhat mutilated. According to Turkish accounts, ten or twelve other corpses, which were buried near Grabojnitza, had been found similarly mutilated, and the greatest publicity was given to these statements with a view to exciting the animosity of the Mussulman townsmen against the mountaineers. It is quite possible that some cases of mutilation may have occurred, but it would not be unreasonable to regard them as a reply to the treatment of the Christian villagers of Barbeloushi and Haimeli, whose massacre and subsequent mutilation by regular troops were related in my despatch No. 121 of 19th September, and the endeavour of the Turkish authorities to utilise the incident as a means of still further inflaming Mussulman fanaticism is almost as much to be deprecated as the acts of savagery complained of.

The Montenegrin Government had recently placed with a firm at Venice an order for 400 tons of flour, to be delivered at Antivari in the course of October.

Prenk Bib Doda Pasha, at the date of Mr. Summa's despatch, was at Trieste. He had received a fresh invitation from the Ottoman Government to return to Constantinople, but was still unwilling to do so without the guarantee of one of the Embassies of the Great Powers. In the meantime he had dispatched his private secretary, Ibrahim Effendi, a Mussulman Tosk, to Oroshi to keep him informed of the course of events. The court martial at Scutari had immediately summoned this individual to appear before it, but the summons remained without effect.

The Cadi of Scutari, a particularly fanatical Tosk, whose hostile attitude towards the Malissores and their Austrian protectors was alluded to in my despatch No. 119 of 10th September, has been transferred to Bitlis, it is supposed in consequence of the representations of the Austrian Embassy.

[44670] No. 732.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 869.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting the application on the part of many of the German officers to go to the front with the Turkish army.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 732.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 73.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that many of the German officers have applied to go to the front with the Turkish army. In some cases the regiments which they have trained and were supposed to command have gone, and in others the training institutions which occupied their time, such as the schools of musketry and gunnery,

have temporarily ceased to exist, as all the officers and men are wanted for war. The Minister of War, probably with the object of keeping them here and giving them some nominal occupation, replied to the German officers by attaching them all to the central Head-quarter Staff, and there they remain for the present.

But some of them are seriously considering the question of resigning their position in the German army in order to participate in the war as Turkish officers. It has been reported that the German Government is encouraging them to do this, letting it be understood that when the war is well over no difficulty will be made about their reinstatement. Personal investigation inclines me to discredit this report. The German military attaché as well as some of the German officers themselves have been to me to find out what is exactly the position of British officers in the Turkish service in regard to war, and I gather from them that their own Government has taken no particular action, but that the Turks insist that before being allowed to take an active part in the operations the German officers must not only resign their positions in the German army, but also their German nationality, and must become Turkish subjects.

It is perhaps not quite correct to say that the German Government has taken no action, for the military attaché tells me that the German officers whose contracts expire on the 19th of this month have been informed that they should not leave Turkey on that date, as it would make an unfortunate impression; that they should not hurry out of the country, but should leave gradually, and one by one, in as unostentatious a manner as possible.

The fact remains that some of the German officers, including at least two of those whose contracts now expire, are anxious to go to the front, the only thing at present holding them back being the Turkish stipulation as to change of nationality; and I think that they are trying to get some sort of permission or assurance from their own Government which would neutralise this obstacle.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[44671] No. 733.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 870.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on a trip to San Stefano to see the troops there.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 733.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I went out to San Stefano on the 12th instant to see what troops were being disembarked and entrained there.

I found the place full of Anatolian reservists, waiting to proceed by train. These men had for the most part come to Haidar Pasha by the Anatolian Railway from all parts as far as Aidin and Nigdeh, though some had come from Kustamuni and Eregli by sea to Constantinople. Thence they are brought to San Stefano by night in the steam-boats of the Shirket Company, each boat taking about 400 men. I found that these were not redif battalions, but were all men of various other reserve classes intended to complete Nizam units. The Ihtiyats were well clothed, in the khaki service dress, and completely equipped, exactly like the men in the Nizam and Redif battalions. But there were also men of the Mu'lusiz (corresponding to the European 2nd class redifs) and Mustahfiz, who still had the old blue uniform. Many described themselves as volunteers.

Ammunition had not yet been distributed, but had been brought in cases from the redif depôts, where the men were equipped.

There appeared to be no officers in charge of these men, and no arrangements whatever seem to have been made for feeding them during the wait at San Stefano or

until they arrived at their final destination. They were in some cases given money to buy bread, but I was told that there was practically none to be had, as the bakeries in San Stefano were unable to keep pace with the demand.

The state of affairs at San Stefano was typical of the Turkish army. One was struck by the fine physique and workmanlike look of the men, and by their orderly behaviour, as they either strolled about the village until someone should tell them it was time to go, or sat patiently in little groups on the ground near the station, apparently quite unconcerned as to whether they would remain there all night or not. They did not know, nor appear to care, where they were going, nor who exactly they were going to fight, but they knew it was for war this time, and they required, or at least received, no supervision or attention.

A small permanent, and most insanitary, camp is pitched on the north side of the station, where, as the ship-loads come in and the trains refuse to go out, there must at times be some inconvenient overcrowding.

I found the two German aeroplanes (see my No. 60 of the 19th August) at the station, ready to be loaded on a train, and I met the German officer, Lieutenant Jannow, the peculiar circumstances of whose engagement by the Turkish Government were reported in the despatch above referred to. Lieutenant Jannow told me that he was taking his aeroplanes to Kirk Kilisse, and had been waiting a couple of days to entrain. He was still waiting, and it did not look as if he would get them off till the next day. He showed me the aeroplanes, each of which carries an observer, and is fitted with a case to hold three bombs in an upright position, base downwards. An aperture below each bomb is worked separately by a wire, which is actuated by the observer's foot, so that he can release any one of the bombs at the desired moment.

The other German aviator and two mechanics (also Germans) are going with the aeroplanes to Kirk Kilisse, also a Turkish aviation officer and four officers as observers.

I also met there Fessa Bey, one of the Turkish aviation officers, who told me that he was under orders to go to the Greek frontier with a Blériot monoplane, and a Bristol monoplane as reserve. He preferred these machines to the other makes which the Turks now have (see previous reports on the subject) on the ground of lightness, saying that it was impracticable to transport the other machines on the Turkish roads. His Blériot weighs from 280 to 300 kilog., and he says that he can dismount it for transport in twelve minutes, or put it together and get under way in twenty minutes. He says that he can rise to 1,000 metres in a minute, and can go over 100 kilom. an hour. He thus expected to be at a great advantage with the Greek aviators, who, he said, have Farman machines, which mount slowly and can only do from 60 to 80 kilom. an hour.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[44672] No. 734.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 871.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the mobilisation and concentration of the Turkish armies during the past week.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 734.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the mobilisation and concentration of the Turkish armies has been proceeding actively during the past week on the broad lines indicated in my despatches Nos. 68 and 71, though various details have to be corrected.

As the various operations of moving the divisions and regiments now in Europe

to their points of concentration, of bringing them to a war footing both with local reservists and with those from Asia, and of transporting the redif units from Asia have been carried on simultaneously, it is not yet possible to give an exact idea of the situation.

Details of the railway transport are wanting. During the earlier days the line was chiefly occupied by the transport of stores, ammunition, baggage, horses for the various staffs, &c. A good deal of artillery matériel has also been moved by rail.

On the 4th and 5th October the 1st regiment of Lancers left Constantinople in three trains—about 370 men and 470 horses. This regiment has since been reported from Kirk Kilisse.

On the 6th instant 150 officers, 672 men, and 698 horses left Constantinople. These figures include the head-quarters of a cavalry division. Liva Salih Pasha, who is to command it, has arrived at Adrianople.

From the 7th to the 10th inclusive some 30,000 men left Constantinople and San Stefano. These included ten nizam battalions from here, while about 10,000 must have been Anatolian ihtiyats.

It would appear that the local reservists were not sufficient to bring nizam units to war strength, but very little time has been lost in bringing over ihtiyats from Asia for this purpose. However, for this reason, the figures given on p. 4 of my No. 68 were by no means attained on the 7th October, and many of the men who have been passing through since that date are already included in those figures.

Army of the East.

One regiment (the 8th) of the 3rd division is still here.

The move of the 2nd division from Smyrna did not commence till the 8th, when the 4th regiment started, being followed on consecutive days by the 5th regiment and machine-gun companies, the nishanji battalion and divisional head-quarters, and finally the 6th regiment. The division completed its arrival at Haidar Pasha on the 13th. Average time of trains from Smyrna to Constantinople, forty-eight hours. The 4th regiment left here for Baba Eski on the 11th and 12th, the 5th regiment and the machine guns on the 15th, the remainder being timed to depart on the 16th and 17th. Of course these were not the only troops on the Anatolian Railway line on the days mentioned, as redif battalions were also being transported. The artillery of this division had previously arrived and been forwarded.

The 1st division may be counted as back from Albania and in Thrace, though I have certain news of only one of its regiments—the 3rd.

The 6th division (six battalions) is also to be brought over from Smyrna. For this move the new Soma–Panderma Railway will be used for the first time. It is now open as far as Susighirli, about 40 miles from Panderma. Though a two days' march thus remains to that port, this will relieve the traffic on the line viâ Afiun Kara Hissar, and should prove very useful for the present movements.

The Brussa redif division is probably all in Europe by now, as are various battalions of the Kastamuni, Eregli, Afiun Kara Hissar, Smyrna, and Ushak redif divisions, and probably others which have not come to my notice. The battalions are sent up to their various destinations as they arrive, some direct by train from here, some by sea to Rodosto, whence they are forwarded.

The Kala Sultanieh and Edremit divisions are apparently to remain at the Dardanelles to replace the nizam divisions guarding the Straits, and so will not form part of the army.

The Angora division is reported to be at Pavlokeui (on railway line, east of Lule Burgas); but this is probably an anticipation, as the first train only left Angora on the 9th instant.

Many divisions are short of battalions, which have been detached to the Yemen and other places. In order to bring every division to ten battalions and every army corps to thirty-three battalions, some redif divisions will be split up and their battalions distributed to fill the vacancies.

At Adrianople the concentration appears to be practically complete. Abuk Pasha, with the head-quarters of the IVth Army Corps, has left, and Shukri Pasha has arrived to assume command of the XVth Army Corps, which is apparently to be the designation of the divisions detailed for the defence of the fortress. Of those redif divisions (detailed in my No. 71) twenty-eight or twenty-nine battalions appear to be present (two battalions of the Chorlu regiment having been sent to Kirk Kilisse and a battalion of the Gumuljina division having remained at Kirjali), and the garrison was last

reported at 40,000. Four battalions of mustahfiz have been formed at Adrianople, each 850 strong. These are clothed in the old blue uniform and armed with Martinis. The European redif battalions, at least those of the 1st Inspection, are armed with the converted Martini.

Abdullah Pasha tells me that the IVth Army Corps will consist of the 11th and 12th nizam divisions and an Asiatic redif division, the place of the 12th division at Kirjali being taken by a division composed of mustahfiz and other reserve troops—probably bashi-bozouks of the neighbourhood, a formation to which the population eminently lends itself.

The Minister of Marine, Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, has been appointed to the command of the IIIrd Army Corps (Kirk Kilisse). Another general, Liva Salih Pasha, who was Minister of War in Hilmi Pasha's Cabinet in 1909-10, and who is now, I believe, Minister of Public Works, will act for him.

From Syria there is little news. As transport by sea is out of the question, and as the railway will for some time be fully occupied by the Anatolian redifs, Syrian troops can hardly be expected to arrive yet awhile. I am informed that twelve nizam battalions are being collected at Aleppo, of which six are from Damascus and two each from Beirout, Jerusalem, and Aleppo. We have news of the dispatch of the IInd/14th from Beirout and of the IInd and IIIrd/79th from Jerusalem. Another report states that the 8th nishanji regiment, a regiment of cavalry, and three redif regiments are under orders to proceed to Constantinople. Three redif battalions are reported to have started from Adana.

Army of the West.

The army of the Vardar is apparently to include the 13th, 16th, 17th, and 19th nizam divisions.

The following force has been assembled at Kumanova: The 19th division, less the 19th nishanji battalion, two battalions of mountain artillery, the 15th and 17th regiments of cavalry, the 7th Engineer battalion, the Uskub redif division, the Gilan redif regiment, and 2,000 volunteers. That is: twelve nizam and thirteen redif = twenty-five battalions; six field and six mountain = twelve batteries; ten squadrons; numbering, on the 9th October, 18,000, which shows that the battalions were still rather weak.

The remainder of the Prishtina redif division (seven battalions) was then on its way to Kumanova.

There were six nizam and two redif battalions at Bilach and one nizam battalion at Palanka, apparently detached from the above force.

The following troops have left Monastir for Perlepe, presumably for Keuprulu: The 17th division, three squadrons 6th cavalry regiment, and the 3rd horse artillery battalion (two batteries).

Seven battalions of the Monastir redif division, averaging 700, are now at Perlepe. The 18th field artillery regiment (three batteries) is already at Keuprulu.

The 13th cavalry regiment, which arrived at Monastir from Perlepe on the 9th, returned to Perlepe on the 10th, probably for Keuprulu.

The 26th cavalry regiment has left Salonica for the north, where a cavalry division is being formed under the command of Faik Pasha.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

P.S.—One battery of 15-centim. howitzers and two batteries of 10·5-centim. guns from the Dardanelles arrived at Adrianople on the 12th.

Two mountain batteries from the Dardanelles were forwarded from here to Gumuljina a fortnight ago.

We may take it that all the mobile artillery units which had been collected at the Dardanelles, Smyrna, and Salonica during the war with Italy are now back and available for the army. Three searchlights from the Dardanelles have also reached Adrianople.

The line of advanced troops thrown out from Adrianople, as reported in my No. 72, has been extended to Kurtkeui, 11 miles south-west of Mustafa Pasha, whither six redif battalions have been sent.

Cavalry head-quarters are at Mihalich, where are now at least six squadrons.

G. E. T.

[44699]

No. 735.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, His Majesty's military attaché at Sophia, reporting the concentration of the Bulgarian army during the last nine days.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 735.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 8 a. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, October 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that for the past nine days the concentration of the Bulgarian army has been proceeding without intermission. Secrecy has, however, been well maintained, and the present distribution of the troops cannot be accurately detailed.

The concentration of the army must be almost completed, and it is probable that the main body is south-east of Philippopoli with strong detachments towards Stanimaka and Pescera. The latter face passes which can only be used with pack transport. The troops that have passed through Sophia show that it is probable that the divisions from Rustchuk, Vratsa, and Plevna are with the main body, and its strength may be estimated as at least eight divisions.

Some Bulgarian troops are still covering Sophia, and it may therefore be fairly assumed that the 7th Division has not been moved from the neighbourhood of Dubnitza.

The Servian troops in the Struma Valley are estimated at two divisions. Less than half this force has passed through Sophia by train, the remainder having marched via Breznik.

If the above rough estimates are taken, we find that there are nearly 200,000 men south and south-east of Philippopoli, and 21,000 Bulgarians with 15,000 Servians in the Struma Valley. The Macedonian contingent is also believed to be in the Struma Valley and to number about 30,000 men. The concentration appears to be carried out to a large extent by march route, and six trains a day is about the average number that is being sent down the main line.

There remain nine reserve brigades of infantry with their artillery which are not accounted for, and they amount in round numbers to about 85,000 men. The opolchenie are distributed throughout the country on guard and convoy duties. There is also reported to be a garrison of 6,000 of these troops with a few marines at Varna.

An officer of the general staff told me to-day some of the rigid precautions that were adopted to ensure secrecy. Before concentration only two men knew the plan that was to be adopted in its entirety. When units leave their place of mobilisation either by road or train none is told their destination, the name of which is enclosed in a sealed envelope, to be opened by the commanding officer when he reaches a certain spot.

Officers and soldiers are discouraged from writing letters, but when they do so, the regulations regarding them are as follows:—

Private letters and telegrams sent from the seat of war may contain no information concerning (*a*) the movements and operations of troops; (*b*) their moral or physical condition; (*c*) the number of killed and wounded.

They may not contain any date or the name of the place from which they are written. As address, they may only contain the number of the regiment to which the writer belongs.

The letters of non-commissioned officers and men are censored by the squadron, battery, and company commanders. Those of officers by their commanding officer. Letters after being censored are sent open to the head-quarters of the army to which the men belong, where they are finally censored, closed, and dispatched without a post-mark being affixed. If considered desirable, letters may be delayed a fortnight before being dispatched.

These precautions have resulted in complete secrecy being kept regarding the concentration of troops. The inconvenience that they cause is cheerfully accepted by all classes of the population.

Secrecy has also been kept regarding any new formations that may have been added to the army, and the only reason to suspect that the reserve brigades are being formed into divisions is that the notice "staff of the Xth Division" is affixed to a building in Sophia.

I understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government intends to permit of the transit of warlike stores through their country. One of the factors which might have limited Bulgaria's power of carrying on a war of any duration is therefore removed, and the Minister of War has ordered all the motor lorries that are at present complete in the works of Messrs. Schneider at Havre to be sent to Bulgaria. The permission of the Austro-Hungarian Government will also admit of the delivery of 7,000 Howitzer 15-centim. shell, and of the 30,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition that have recently been ordered by Bulgaria from four firms in Austria and Hungary.

I attach a copy of the regulations under which war correspondents have to work. Complaints are made of the restrictions that they contain.

I have, &c.

F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[44675] No. 736.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 874.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the identic note, as officially communicated to the local press, which has been addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Bulgarian and Servian Ministers on the occasion of the return of their passports.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 736.

Note communicated to Bulgarian and Servian Ministers by Sublime Porte.

LA mobilisation générale et la concentration des forces bulgares (serbes) sur la frontière ottomane, les attaques journalières des fortins et des positions sur tout le long de cette frontière, l'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures ottomanes et les exigences non moins inadmissibles qu'inconcevables du Gouvernement bulgare (serbe) est rendu impossible le maintien de la paix entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie (Serbie), paix que le Gouvernement Impérial était désireux de toujours conserver.

En conséquence, le chef de la Légation Royale de la Bulgarie (Serbie) et son personnel sont informés qu'ils doivent prendre leurs passeports et quitter le territoire de l'Empire aussitôt que faire se peut.

[44676] No. 737.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 875.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 485 of yesterday, reporting that the Porte had handed their passports to the Bulgarian and Servian Ministers here. As the Ottoman representatives have been withdrawn from Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens, while the Greek Minister here is under orders to leave Constantinople, and, as stated in my telegram No. 483 of yesterday, the official Ottoman Agency has announced fighting on the Servian and Bulgarian frontiers and has styled these incidents a virtual declaration of war, the penultimate stage of the impending conflict between Turkey and the remaining confederated Balkan States would seem to have been reached. During the last two and a-half weeks—*i.e.*, since the beginning of the mobilisation in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, and Turkey's responsive mobilisation of

her forces in Turkey in Europe and Asia up to Sivas and exclusive of Mesopotamia—the internal situation has been subject to rapidly changing fluctuations corresponding in the main to the news from the European and Balkan capitals.

Before the general mobilisation orders of the Balkan States on the 1st October, the committee and its opponents were settling down to preparations for the approaching electoral struggle, which promised to be a fierce one, while the situation in Albania was very mixed after the recent upheaval in those parts. As soon, however, as the real intentions of the Balkan combine were realised, the committee leaders proposed that internal party strife should cease, a course to which their adversaries at once adhered, but not without searchings of heart. Hussein Jahid Bey, who had conducted the fiercest attacks on Kiamil Pasha, was, at the request of his Highness, released from prison, where he was undergoing a sentence pronounced by the court-martial. The leaders of the *entente libérale* and the Albanians, who were burning to pay off old scores against the committee, and especially the latter's methods during the last "elections," were loathe to see the sponge passed over the committee's misdeeds and errors, particularly as they maintained it was only such mistakes as the anti-Hellenic boycott and the repressive, if not brutal, methods employed in disarming the Bulgarians and assassinating their band-leaders, &c., that had wrought the "miracle" of uniting these rival, if not hostile, elements and States in common action against Turkey. It was further felt that the present liberally disposed Cabinet was thus made to suffer for the misrule of the committee régime. The Albanians, whom the repressive methods of the committee had united to overthrow and be revenged on that organisation, now saw themselves forced to allow their internal enemy to escape and to turn their attention to their external and traditional foes, the Greeks, Servians, and Bulgarians, who, they believed, were bent on dividing up portions of Albania.

Both the *entente libérale* and the committee organised patriotic meetings at the mosque of Sultan Ahmed, close by the Hippodrome, and rivalled one another in denouncing the Balkan States and their temerity. The Ententist meeting, which was very large and representative, afterwards marched to the Palace, making friendly demonstrations at the French and British Embassies and hissing at the Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian Legations on the way. The committee meeting, though more sparsely attended, contained more stalwart elements, including the porters, boatmen, and such like, who had been their instruments in the boycott, and made up for numbers by the fierceness of their oratory. One speaker referred to the coming war as a *jehad*, while another cried, "To the Danube! to the Danube!" On their way to the Palace they broke the windows of the Italian Embassy, the Greek consulate, and the Bulgarian Legation. The committee organs during the next few days contained imaginary accounts of Bulgarian massacres of Moslems in Bulgaria and Montenegro and fierce appeals to the religious passions and Genghizkhan instincts of the Turk, the object being to ensure that the war would be of so ferocious a nature as to strike terror into the enemy. The "Tanin" declared that as the Balkan joint communication raised the issue of Christian *versus* Moslem, the coming war would be a new crusade, but the tone of its publications and those of cognate organs are of the nature of incitement to a Crescentade. The immediate effect was to stimulate a nasty feeling among the lower Moslem classes, and when on the 6th October the Porte, on the rumoured advice of the French, Russian, and Austrian Ambassadors, announced its intention of applying to the provinces of Turkey in Europe reforms based on the draft law of 1880, a hostile demonstration, arranged by the committee, took place the following day outside the Grand Vizier's office. The leaders clamoured for war and protested against reforms "dictated by foreigners." The aged Grand Vizier, Sir Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, who attempted to address the crowd, was insulted and refused a hearing, while the windows of the Sublime Porte were smashed after the most approved methods of militant suffragettes. A similar demonstration of Kurdish porters and lightermen was arranged for the following day (Tuesday), but the authorities proclaimed the state of siege and posted cavalry and a battalion of infantry in the precincts of the Porte, while the declaration of war by Montenegro on the same day gave a more serious turn to affairs, and would-be demonstrators were told that, as they wanted war, they could proceed to the front.

When it became known that the five Powers were concerting to attempt to prevent the outbreak of war by promising the Balkan States to take in hand the application of reforms on the lines of the draft law of 1880 and thus intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey, all sections of the native Turkish press took up a hostile attitude towards the acceptance by the Porte of any intervention, which, as they rather logically asserted, was the outcome of the threats of the smaller Balkan States. They were

unanimous in declaring that war would be preferable to such a humiliation, the "Tanin" being so uncompromising and violent that the court-martial found it necessary to suspend it. When it was known that the Porte's reply of the 14th October to the communication of the 10th October of the five Ambassadors had rejected the principle of foreign intervention, the entire press, including the committee organs, approved the attitude of the Cabinet, and declared that war was the only honourable way out of the existing situation.

In the first days of October the higher military command, aware of Turkey's unpreparedness to meet the expected sudden attack from Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, was distinctly nervous and apprehensive, and, when the Porte on the 6th October announced its intention of applying reforms based on the law of 1880, there is no doubt that the calculation was that, should the Balkan States refuse to accept this as a solution, it would take them some days to communicate with one another and come to a decision, a delay which would give the Turkish War Office time to hurry up reinforcements and fill up gaps. As days were on and troops were dispatched to the front the Turkish mind became more at ease, and, when on the 14th October intervention was rejected, the Turkish military position had been so improved that in army circles the desire for war was freely expressed. It began to be felt that, even if Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece wished to compromise, Turkey must attack them, and to-day it is announced that the Ottoman forces have been ordered to take the offensive against Bulgaria and Servia.

The situation in many respects resembles that of 1875, and the struggle will no doubt be fierce and sanguinary. The Bulgarians, Serbs, and Montenegrins, the latter of whom still wear on their caps a black badge in mourning for their combined defeat at the hands of the Turks on the plain of Kossovo in 1389, are fighting a centuries-old issue, while the Turk, although the Balkan States have categorically declared that they seek no territorial aggrandisement, feels that the "rule of the Turk" in Europe is at stake.

The non-Turkish Ottoman elements naturally see matters from a different standpoint. The Arabs are feeling sore at the results of the Tripoli war, while, as I have said above, the Albanians have not forgotten their treatment at the hands of the committee. The Malissor Albanians have thrown in their lot with the Montenegrins. Some of the north-eastern Albanians, it is rumoured, may not offer a whole-hearted resistance to the Serb, who disclaims territorial designs and invites them to unite against the Turk to obtain an autonomy which will benefit Albanians as well as Slavs, while some of the southern Albanians may succumb to a similar propaganda by the Greeks. Ottoman Bulgarians, especially in Northern Macedonia, are reported to have taken to the mountains, partly to escape massacre and partly to be able to assist the Slav invader should the latter be successful. The Cabinet, realising that fierce passions are being let loose and to prevent untoward incidents, has issued instructions to all Ottoman authorities in Macedonia enjoining the protection of the non-combatant population, and prescribing that all aggressors should be court-martialled and condemned to death, but the native Bulgarians have little faith in the efficacy of such measures.

The Ottoman Greeks are practically all secretly disaffected, many have fled the country, and the authorities have aimed at forcing them to pay the military exemption tax rather than to serve in the army.

The Armenians are perhaps the least disaffected of the native Christian elements, but they have not forgotten the massacres of Adana in 1909, while many have lost hope and faith in the new régime, and would secretly welcome even Russian intervention, to which in the past they were so bitterly opposed on racial and national lines.

Of the non-Turk elements, the Jews are perhaps the most sincere well-wishers of the cause of the Turk. Salonica, the capital of the Committee of Union and Progress, is their main centre, and they are, perhaps not unnaturally, keenly opposed to any increase of Slav influence in those regions.

The native Christians, on the whole, feel that, if the Turk meets with serious reverses, there is danger of massacres; while, if he is victorious, he will become intolerably arrogant to their detriment.

As regards Turkish political parties and factions, the committee is in favour of the bold and extreme course. They feel that success may enable them to recapture the army and give them a new lease of power. Talaat Bey, ex-Minister, has joined the Adrianople forces as a volunteer, but it is generally believed that he has done so with the object of carrying on committee propaganda among the officers at the front. Djavid Bey, in his closing speech in the last Parliament, stated that the committee's greatest blunder when it was having "reactionaries" hanged in 1909 was to have let off those who were merely exiled or pardoned. Their opponents fear that the return

of the committee to power will mean an attempt to apply to Turkey the guillotine stage of the French Revolution. The non-committee Turks were sincerely anxious to avoid war, the issue of which, both internal and external, are uncertain, and only became keen on it when they realised that it was inevitable. It is generally felt that, should the war lead to another internal upheaval, it must result in a change of Sultan, and it was noticed when three days ago His Majesty proceeded to the War Office to say "good-bye" to the departing troops that his reception in the streets was distinctly cool even for an undemonstrative Oriental population. The diminution in the prestige and driving force of the Caliphate may be an important factor in what, to the mind of the Turkish soldier, is a holy war against infidels who not long back were his rayahs.

As regards Greece, the Turkish Cabinet had been hoping to detach her from her Balkan confederates, and it appears that even concessions in the question of Crete were contemplated, but Greece has gone too far, and the fate of that island would not seem to depend almost entirely on the issues of the conflict.

Even if the latter is localised, it would appear that it must eventuate in some radical change in the system of Government in the Ottoman European provinces. The populations of those provinces are European-minded and quite a century and a-half ahead of the Anatolian Turks. To bridge this gulf would require statesmanlike qualities of a higher order than the new régime seems able to evolve. The adoption of representative institutions implies an incompatibility of temperament, in any Ottoman Assembly, between the representatives of Turkey in Europe and those of the Asiatic provinces, while parliamentary institutions and the old conception of a State militarily ruled by a Moslem Turk are also incompatible. Either parliamentary institutions must be considerably curtailed or abolished, or the old stratocracy ideals as regards Turkey in Europe must disappear and that part of the Empire be accorded a special régime. The only alternative would seem to be the eventual dislocation of the European provinces, although the hope of the committee and others is that Turkey may crush Bulgaria and cripple her so as to gain a respite for at least a decade. The Balkan States have demanded an autonomous régime, and, on the whole, some measure of autonomy would seem indispensable in the interests of the Ottoman State. The history of the last century and a-quarter shows that every attempt to reform Turkey from without or to introduce reforms on Western lines have spelt upheaval and loss of territory, and it remains to be seen whether the present crisis may be tided over without similar results.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—Since writing above, the Greek Minister has delivered a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and has left Constantinople, his colleagues of the Balkan States having also left.

G. L.

[44677] No. 738.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 876.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 18, 1912.*

IN connection with the general mobilisation of the Turkish forces, an official communication has to-day been issued to the Constantinople press, to the effect that the Ottoman Government have decided not to call out those classes of non-Mussulman reservists comprised between the ages of twenty-nine and forty-five.

The communiqué adds that this decision has been come to by the Ottoman Government in deference to the representations of the Patriarchates and Chief-Rabbinate, and in consideration of the fact that these classes have never before been required to perform their military service.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[44693] No. 739.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October* 19, 1912.

I HAD the honour in my telegram No. 31 of the 11th instant to state that it is the impression amongst my colleagues, and that it is currently affirmed by Servians, that the present movement of the Balkan States is not spontaneous, but is instigated and fomented by Panslavist elements in Russia.

At a moment like the present every conceivable sort of theory is of course propounded in Belgrade, each based more or less upon conjecture only, but after taking into consideration certain appearances I am inclined to believe that the above-mentioned impression is, though not wholly, at least partially correct.

So far as I can gather there is no sufficient reason to believe that the movement was originated from outside. I explained in my despatch No. 62 of the 7th instant that the agitation for combined action against Turkey was probably commenced by M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister at Sophia, M. Tosheff, the Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade, and M. Yovanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but, on the other hand, when M. Pashitch came into office, there was as yet no overwhelming excitement even among the military party and Extremists, and it seems probable that when opposed by M. Pashitch's pacific ideas, the agitation might have failed had not Panslavist encouragement from Russia been invoked to its assistance.

Two features during the present crisis have been somewhat remarkable. In the first place, the Government are to all appearances going to war against their own desires, and, secondly, they are going to war in the face of strong remonstrances from the Russian Government. These circumstances alone, in a country where the Government is usually able to direct public opinion at will and without the least difficulty, and where orders from the Russian Government have hitherto been blindly and unquestioningly obeyed, almost force one to the conclusion that exceptional influences have been at work. It is likewise somewhat remarkable that whilst the Balkan States have themselves declared that they are not seeking any expansion of territory, and whilst the Great Powers have announced their intention that the *status quo* shall not be interfered with, every Servian now states with absolute assurance and conviction that Servia is about to reacquire her former possessions, that once she occupies territory no one can dispossess her, and that at the critical moment Russia will be found at her side. The extent of Servian aims and ambitions is shown in the enclosed map, which has been widely circulated.*

I have reported in my despatch above referred to upon the equivocal attitude lately adopted by M. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister. Since then, however, he has gone further, and has of late almost completely thrown off the mask. In a recent conversation with the Roumanian Minister, he expressed himself as disgusted with M. Suzonof's policy in repressing a movement to which Russia had been looking forward for years, whilst in speaking to myself a few days ago he enquired with considerable impatience how, if the Balkan States occupied territory, they were to be turned out, and who would undertake the task. It may perhaps be well to remember that M. de Hartwig has at various times been mentioned as a possible Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Under the circumstances, it is to be feared that, although the war seems for the present to be localised, should the arms of the Balkan States be successful against Turkey, the end of the war will mark the really dangerous moment for the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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* Not reproduced.

[44694] No. 740.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October* 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note on the credits approved by the Skupshtina on the 14th instant.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 740.

Special Credits approved by the Skupshtina on October 1 (14), 1912.

400,000 dinars for manufacture of war material at the powder factory of Obilitchevo.

2. 1,571,777 dinars for urgent requirements of the army.
3. 4,222,780 dinars for the purchase of reserve provisions and forage.
4. 8,629,850 dinars for urgent military purposes.

The Minister of Finance is further authorised to issue to the Minister of War the sum of 20,000,000 dinars for the purchase of provisions, forage, and other requirements, and, when necessary, another 20,000,000 dinars for the same purpose.

A credit of 200,000 dinars to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was also passed by the Skupshtina.

[44710] No. 741.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 37. Treaty.)
Sir, *The Hague, October* 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the proclamation of neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Servia on the one hand, and Turkey on the other hand, which was published in the Netherlands "Official Gazette" of to-day's date by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and of the Colonies, thereto authorised by the Queen.

I have, &c.
ALAN JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure in No. 741.

Extract from the Netherlands "Official Gazette" of October 22, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Justice, of Marine *ad interim*, of War, and of the Colonies, thereto authorised by Her Majesty the Queen, give notice to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe a strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Servia on the one hand, and Turkey on the other hand, Powers with whom the Netherlands are on terms of friendship, and that, for the maintenance of such neutrality, the following regulations have been laid down:—

ARTICLE 1.

No hostilities shall be permitted within the territory of the State, comprising the territory of the kingdom in Europe as well as the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, neither may that territory be used as a base for hostile operations.

ARTICLE 2.

No occupation by a belligerent shall be permitted of any part of the territory of the State, nor the passage by land through that territory of troops, convoys of ammunition, or provisions belonging to one of the belligerents, nor the passage of war-ships or of ships equivalent to war-ships of the belligerents through Netherlands waters situated within the territorial waters.

ARTICLE 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to or destined for the belligerents shall, on entering by land the territory of the State, be disarmed immediately and interned until the end of the war.

War-ships or vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to the belligerents, which, being pursued or having been defeated, seek refuge within the territory of the State, or which act contrary to the provisions of article 2, may not leave that territory before the end of the war.

ARTICLE 4.

Except in the cases provided for in articles 5 and 7, war-ships or vessels equivalent to war-ships of a belligerent shall, after having obtained the consent of the local authority, only be admitted into the territory of the State for twenty-four hours.

ARTICLE 5.

A prolongation of the period fixed in the preceding article shall only be granted on account of damage or stress of weather. The ship must depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at an end.

ARTICLE 6.

The maximum number of war-ships or of ships equivalent to war-ships of any one belligerent which may be within the territory of the State in one particular part of the world simultaneously is fixed at three. This number may be increased in cases of damage or on account of stress of weather.

ARTICLE 7.

The regulations relative to the limitation of the length of stay do not apply to war-ships and vessels equivalent to war-ships which are devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes.

ARTICLE 8.

When war-ships or vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to both belligerents are present simultaneously in the territory of the State, a period of not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departures of the respective enemies' ships.

The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival, unless the ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that a prolongation of the length of stay fixed by article 4 is permissible.

A war-ship or a vessel equivalent to a war-ship belonging to one of the belligerents may not leave the territory of the State until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant-ship flying the flag of the adversary.

ARTICLE 9.

In the ports and roadsteads of the State, war-ships and vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to a belligerent may only carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatsoever to their fighting force.

ARTICLE 10.

War-ships or vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to a belligerent may not take in provisions in the ports and roadsteads of the State beyond replenishing their supplies to bring them up to the peace standard.

Nor may they take in fuel beyond a quantity, which includes the supply still on board, sufficient to enable them to reach the nearest port of their own country.

Any such ship may not again be supplied with fuel until after the expiration of at least three months from the date of a previous replenishment within the territory of the State.

ARTICLE 11.

A prize may only be brought into the territory of the State on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions.

It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end.

If it does not, the order to leave at once shall be notified to it. Should it fail to obey, use will be made of the means that are available to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew.

ARTICLE 12.

It is forbidden to form corps of combatants or to open recruiting agencies within the territory of the State to assist the belligerents.

ARTICLE 13.

It is forbidden, within the territory of the State, to take service on board war-ships or vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to a belligerent.

ARTICLE 14.

It is forbidden, within the territory of the State, to equip, arm, or man for the service of a belligerent, vessels destined to be used for warlike purposes, or to send or to supply such vessels to that party.

ARTICLE 15.

It is forbidden, within the territory of the State, to supply arms or ammunition to war-ships or to vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to a belligerent, or in any way to help in the increasing of their crews or equipment.

ARTICLE 16.

Without the previous authorisation of the competent local authority, it is forbidden, within the territory of the State, to carry out repairs or to supply provisions or fuel to war-ships or to vessels equivalent to war-ships belonging to a belligerent.

ARTICLE 17.

It is forbidden, within the territory of the State, to assist in the dismantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to render them seaworthy, as also to buy, to receive in barter or as a gift, or to have in custody any vessels or goods being prizes of war.

ARTICLE 18.

The territory of the State includes the waters along the sea-coast to a distance of 3 sea-miles, of 60 to the degree of latitude, measured from low-water line.

In the case of bays such distance of 3 sea-miles shall be measured from a straight line drawn across the bay, as near as possible to the entrance, at the first point where the mouth of the bay does not exceed 10 sea-miles of 60 to the degree of latitude.

ARTICLE 19.

Attention is further drawn to articles 100 (1) and 205 of the Penal Code*; Indian "Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; article 7 (4) of the Law on Netherlands Nationality and Domicile; article 2, No. 3, of the Law on the Status of Netherlands Subject: articles 54 and 55 of the Surinam Penal Code; articles 54 and 55 of the Curaçao Penal Code.

The attention of masters, shipowners, and freighters is also drawn to the danger and loss to which they would expose themselves by not respecting effective blockade of the belligerents, or by carrying for those parties contraband of war or military despatches (unless in the regular postal service), or by performing other transport services for them.

Those committing such acts will remain liable to all the consequences arising therefrom, without being able to claim for themselves the protection or intervention of the Netherlands Government.

The Hague, October 21, 1912.

[44823] No. 742.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, October* 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 126 of 22nd October.

There is an Italian officer here, but neither he nor Austrian military attaché are allowed to accompany troops. Such limited facilities as they enjoy would be, of course, extended to British officers.

[44822] No. 743.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October* 23, 1912.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 510 of 22nd October.

I hope that question of Egypt's neutrality may soon be decided, as it is being much discussed here. If Egypt is not neutral, Khedive, who is now in Constantinople, would be unable to return by sea as he intends doing, and would therefore probably be favourable to neutrality.

[44763] No. 744.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 514.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 23, 1912.

FOLLOWING from military attaché to Director of Military Operations:—

"I was informed at the War Office to-day that Minister of War with headquarters staff leaves on Friday as a big action is approaching. Military attachés also will not go till Friday. Adrianople reports that Bulgarians were at Akbunar and Hademkeui at noon of 21st October, and Turkish troops north and west of Adrianople were falling back.

* Article 100 (1), Penal Code.—Any person shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years who, in case of a war in which the Netherlands are not involved, wilfully commits any act whereby the neutrality of the State is imperilled, or wilfully transgresses any special order for the maintenance of neutrality given and published by the Government.

Article 205, Penal Code.—Any person who, without the King's consent, enlists anyone for foreign service in war shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 3,000 florins.

Article 7 (4) of the Law on Netherlands Nationality and Domicile.—Netherlands nationality is lost by taking military or civil service under a foreign State without our permission.

Article 2 (3) of the Law on the Status of Netherlands Subject.—The status of Netherlands subject is lost by entering foreign military or civil service without the permission of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.

"Orders have been given to Abdulla Pasha to take the offensive. There are two army corps at Kirk Kilisse, and the 11th division is reported to have passed on the way to Havsareplon 21st October.

"Uskub reports Servian victory near Prishtina, and that a fight is proceeding near Zibefeste. Salonica reports on 21st October that Greeks entered Elassona without serious fighting, and are believed to be in possession of Litohorn."

[44824] No. 745.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 515.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 23, 1912.

FOLLOWING for Director of Military Operations:—

"Report from Adrianople, dated 22nd:—

"'Fifth division arriving by rail and being dispatched eastward with two infantry regiments and two howitzer batteries withdrawn from Kurtkoui Chormen.

"'Eleventh division at Skenderkebioi. Movements indicate battle between Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse. Fighting continued near Adrianople to the west.'

"From Salonica same date:—

"'Servians 10 miles from Prishtina. Bulgarians advancing Kresna defile and also threatening Devlen. Ativemka evacuated. Strong Greek force alleged to have reached Catarina.'"

[44641] No. 746.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 845.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1912.

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 71 of 17th October: Protection of Turkish subjects in Greece.

Consul at Syra, who is head of Eastern Telegraph Company, is unable to undertake protection of Turkish subjects owing to lack of necessary time.

You should inform Porte and express hope that they will make other arrangements at this place.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 253.)

[44851] No. 747.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Munich, October* 22, 1912.

A FEELING of profound uneasiness is discernible in the press and especially in the more democratic papers lest Austrian ambitions in the Balkans should end by embroiling this country with Russia. It is feared that the efforts of the more moderate elements there, notably those of M. Sazonof, to keep the peace will be compelled to yield before the eagerness of the Panslavs to come to the help of their racial brethren.

The Social Democratic "Munchener Post" of yesterday publishes a very strong article on the subject. It asks what is the Austrian "sphere of influence." Is it to be understood that it is no longer limited to the sanjak? If so, what are its boundaries? Austria poses as the mandatory of Europe, but she resigned that position as far as the sanjak is concerned in 1908. Aehrenthal was made a count when he dismissed "the promenade to Salonica" as an empty dream. What honours are to be heaped on the head of him who now holds open the road for that advance? Under Austrian rule the sanjak was the most backward and ill-governed province of the Turkish Empire and in it religious animosities were most acute. But it is to preserve the claim to continue

this misgovernment that Europe is being incited to a general war. Germany, in the opinion of the Ballplatz, or rather of the Belvedere, must take Austria's part however much she may dislike it! The Berlin Cabinet is said to be continually advising moderation at Vienna just as the French Cabinet is at St. Petersburgh. Both are reaping the same reward. The Panslavs abuse France for leaving her ally in the lurch. The patriotic press of Vienna punishes its German brother by a contemptuous silence. No one cares that appeals and warnings have taken the place of talk about "glittering armour." The alliance exists, and if Russia answers Austria's attempt to check the victorious Servians by advancing her own troops to the Galician frontier, that in the opinion of Vienna is a *casus foederis*, and Germany must act whether she wishes it or not.

"On one side," the article concludes, "we have the demented harrying of the Panslavists, and on the other the frivolity and arrogance of the Viennese Cabinet; is it not time that at least the German public should gather the courage, which is lacking in the Government, to tell Vienna and St. Petersburgh the truth bluntly?"

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[44961] No. 748.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 24.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, October 24, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 24th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to affairs in Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 748.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, October 24, 1912.*

SENIOR naval officer, Crete, reported yesterday: Have been informed 400 volunteers and 300 militia will be embarked at Candia to-day.

[44981] No. 749.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 519.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"I am informed by General Staff that Bulgarians were yesterday driven back—on west of Adrianople to [group undecypherable] -ikeui; between Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, northward to Vaisil.

"They admit Bulgarians have occupied Kirjali, Juma, Bala, Palaka, and that Servians have advanced to Boyanofcho, also that country between Struma, Mesta, is in revolt. They do not attach importance to Greek movement at Karina, saying that it is only bands and irregulars.

"They confirm capture of Elassona, but say that Greeks have suffered a reverse on Janina and other side."

Military attachés are to start to-morrow.

[43911] No. 753 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 623.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 75 of 18th October: British naval mission to Greece.

I am consulting Admiralty, but am disposed to think that the officers in question may be allowed to remain on a similar understanding and conditions to those prescribed in the case of the British naval officers similarly employed in Turkey, viz., that they take no part in hostilities, and that their services are not calculated to assist the belligerents in the present war.

You should enquire whether the French Government take a similar view in regard to their military mission.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 256.)

[44982] No. 750.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 520.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

RUSSIAN chargé d'affaires to-day, on behalf of Bulgarian Government, conveyed to Turkish Government message of protest against bombardment of Kavarna, which they maintain is a defenceless town.

[44968] No. 751.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 122 of 14th October.

In view of the difficulties of providing accommodation, Bulgarian Government regret that they cannot see their way to permit foreign officers other than the military attachés to accompany their troops.

[44909] No. 752.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 24, 1912.*

CROWN PRINCE occupied Serbidjo yesterday, capturing twenty-two guns and many stores. Bridge leading to Kozani occupied, and Turkish retreat cut off.

[45050] No. 753.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE impressed upon Greek Minister that our communication deprecating closing of the Straits was not instigated by Turkey, and that we had in fact made a simultaneous communication at Constantinople urging Turkey not to close the Straits unless absolutely compelled to do so as a defensive measure. Our sole motive was to safeguard the British commerce at stake, which was very valuable in cargoes alone, while the risk of loss to shipping was very serious also.

The Minister replied that, in his opinion, it was out of the question that Greece should attempt to force the Straits; she had not enough ships to sacrifice, and he did not see why his Government should not give an assurance to that effect. I said that such an assurance by his Government would show a consideration for neutral commerce that would have a most favourable effect on public opinion. The Minister said that he had recommended it personally to his Government.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 854.)

[44085] No. 754.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 518.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

M. CAMBON communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on the 18th October a fresh formula, copy of which I transmit to your Excellency herewith, drawn up by M. Poincaré, respecting the mediation of the Powers in the present hostilities in the Balkan Peninsula.*

M. Cambon said that this new formula had been drawn up in order to meet certain German and Austrian observations in regard to the inconveniences of holding a

* No. 641.

conference during hostilities, and that His Majesty's Government would observe that, in this formula, any allusion to a conference had disappeared.

Your Excellency should inform the French Government that I concur in this formula.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45163] No. 755.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

THE Austrian Ambassador mentioned the subject of Crete to me to-day.

I said that I was determined that, at the end of the present war, the question of Crete must be settled. It would be intolerable if, after all the trouble and anxiety connected with this war in the Balkans, we found ourselves still bothered with Crete. Personally, if that was still the case, I would go on strike, and refuse to have anything more to do with the island.

The Ambassador said that, happily, Austria was out of the matter.

I replied that it was quite time that Austria was in it.

The Ambassador observed that, of course, if the "status" of Crete was to be completely changed, Austria would have to be consulted.

I agreed, and said that, if after the war was over the protecting Powers threatened to abandon Crete altogether, this would mean a complete change in its "status," and the other Powers would thus be forced to take some notice of the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45162] No. 756.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

IN the course of general conversation to-day about the progress of the war in Turkey, the Austrian Ambassador touched upon the question of mediation.

I said that some severe fighting would have to take place before there would be an opportunity for mediation, and it would be very desirable if in the meantime Austria and Russia could agree on the general lines of a settlement. I felt that one outcome of the war must be some arrangement which would prevent a recurrence in Macedonia of the state of things which had existed under Abdul Hamid and under the committee.

The Ambassador said that he supposed the declarations recently made by the Turkish Government might form a basis for a settlement.

I replied that the disposition of the present Turkish Government was excellent, and their declarations might be used as a starting-point, but it would be necessary to be assured in some way that, if the present Turkish Government were displaced, things would not relapse.

The Ambassador asked me whether I thought that Austria and Russia should draw up a settlement together.

I answered that I thought it was very desirable that they should agree. If the Powers mediated between the Balkan States and Turkey without any agreement having been reached as to what the settlement should be, the next stage might have to be mediation by some of the Powers between Austria and Russia to try to reconcile their differences, and the net result would be a step backwards rather than a step forwards. Perhaps Austria and Russia could approach an agreement by finding out in the first instance what they were not prepared to agree to, and eliminating that.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44648] No. 757.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Army Council, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople* stating that the Ottoman Government will accept offers of gratuitous services from surgeons and nurses for Red Crescent establishments and military hospitals at Constantinople and Salonica. Sir E. Grey would propose, with the concurrence of the Army Council, to let the foregoing information be known in the press.

I am at the same time to refer to the urgent letter addressed to you from this department on the 17th October, transmitting copy of a letter from the British Red Cross Society respecting voluntary aid tendered from the United Kingdom to belligerents in South-Eastern Europe, and to request the favour of an immediate reply as to the views of the Army Council on the suggestion therein contained.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[45033] No. 758.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 25.)

Sir, *Admiralty, October 24, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 24th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to affairs in Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 758.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, October 24, 1912.*

"HAMPSHIRE" reports same instructions sent to captain of "Bruix" as in Admiralty telegram of 19th instant. Last night about 200 militia embarked at Canea; practically all gone now.

[44992] No. 759.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 521.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

MINISTER of War and head-quarter staff leave by train to-morrow. There is also extra traffic, probably in consequence of news from the front, and the military attachés have been informed they must wait till Saturday or Sunday.

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* No. 718.

[45076] No. 760.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 522.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Uskub reports that Novi-Bazar, Prishtina, and Gilan have fallen, and that Servians are now at Preshovo. Bulgarians have advanced from Palanka to Strachin. Turks will probably not defend Kumanova, which, Salonica reports, has already fallen. Bulgarians said to have taken Osmanieh and to be threatening the railway with a force of fifty guns, but Turks said to have retaken Juma.

"Salonica also reports Kozani taken by Greeks, but occupation of Katarina not confirmed.

"Montonegrins have taken Berana, Plava, and Gusinje.

"Following from Adrianople, 23rd October: Bulgarians attacked Marash position, held by three infantry divisions and two batteries of heavy field artillery, at noon on 22nd October. Fighting continued during night. Turks withdrew to-day. Believed that attack covered crossing of Arda by a Bulgarian division, whose objective Demotica. Heavy firing on north-west front of Adrianople fortifications, 8 P.M. to 9 P.M. 24th October: Bulgarians attacked west front at 4 this morning. Attack repulsed.

"I am informed on good authority Bulgarian army, estimated at 100,000, Ist, IIIrd, and IVth Army Corps, between Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse yesterday. Kirk Kilisse evacuated by Turks, who are falling back on line of Uzum Keupru–Lule Burgas."

[45000] No. 761.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 523.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

CONSUL-GENERAL at Salonica reports occupation of Lemnos by Greeks on 21st October.

[45079] No. 762.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 525.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 524, Secret, of to-day.

Vice-consul at Uskub reports in telegram, dated 22nd, just received, Turkish troops have been avenging their defeat at Kumanova on Christian population, and fears if it falls back on Uskub there will be a massacre. He adds that army may retreat on Kyoprulu, head-quarters of Vardar army.

[45114] No. 763.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, October 25, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires has just told me that his Government have learnt that Austria is mobilising her 15th and 16th Army Corps, latter at Ragusa, and that a considerable number of sailors have been sent to Budapest to organise Danubian flotilla. He attaches importance to this news being announced immediately after meeting between Austrian and Italian Foreign Ministers.

[45077] No. 764.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 249 of 22nd October: Military attachés.

Greek Government cannot obtain reply from Crown Prince, to whom decision has been left.

[45115] No. 765.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 25, 1912.*

THEIR Majesties the King and Queen, with Prince and Princess George, left for Volo yesterday in Royal yacht. His Majesty the King is believed to be going as far as Servidje, Her Majesty the Queen only to Larissa.

[45137] No. 766.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 25, 1912.*

CRETE.

M. Dragoumis has been appointed Governor-General, and will arrive there to-day.

I am informed that annexation immediately proclaimed.

(Sent to Canea.)

[45141] No. 767.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 251 of 22nd October: Protection of Mussulmans in Crete.

I have made communication as instructed. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Greek Government were penetrated with importance of protecting Mussulmans not only in Crete, but also in the newly occupied territory.

M. Dragoumis has full power and will entirely supersede the Executive Committee.

Minister denied that there would be formal decree of annexation

(Repeated to Canea.)

[45140] No. 768.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 528.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché to Director of Military Operations:—

"Attack referred to in yesterday's telegram on north-west front of Adrianople fortifications was made by 14,000 Bulgarians and extended to Marash. It failed everywhere. Bulgarian front now at Ak Bunar, Kemal, Kuyunli, and no attempt yet made to cross Arda.

"Reported from Uskub on 24th that Servians had taken Forisovitch, and that Turks were sending reinforcements from Uskub to Kachanik. Southern army, which had occupied Kumanova station, was in touch with Bulgarian Palanka army.

"An earlier telegram from same source said that battle had begun at Kumanova.

"Uskub also reports that army is discouraged and demoralised."

[45129] No. 769.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 25, 1912.*

FINANCIAL situation of the Government is becoming extremely precarious, and all its efforts to obtain immediate resources from outside have failed. Military exemption tax has only produced 800,000*l.* It seems impossible that salaries can be fully paid at the end of the month, and the feeding of the troops is difficult.

The Porte is seriously, though reluctantly, thinking of imposing, provisionally, extra 4 per cent. import duty, and I gather that they are about to address embassies on subject. Germany, Austria, and Italy are committed to agree if others do.

[45138] No. 770.

Consul Baldwin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Galatz, October 25, 1912.*

IT is reported on good authority that a considerable number of Russians calling themselves Bulgarian reservists, together with quantities of munitions of war, are passing up Hova on the way to Rustchuk.

This is stated to be taking place with the knowledge of Roumanian authorities.

(Repeated to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest.)

[45153] No. 771.

Mr. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Plovdiv, October 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING sent to His Majesty's representative at Sophia to-day, No. 2:—

"My telegram No. 1.

"News of Bulgarian successes confirmed. Kirk Kilisse taken by General Radko Dimitrief with several thousand prisoners and great quantity of military stores.

"Nevrokop taken by General Kovatchef. Details lack confirmation. It is expected that forces of General Ivanof and General Dimitrief will shortly join hands, and that communication between Adrianople and Constantinople will be cut, also that Bulgarian forces released by capture of Nevrokop will be directed towards Drama in order to cut communication between Constantinople and Salonica."

[45116] No. 772.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, October 25, 1912.*

SPEAKING to me yesterday of the situation in the Near East, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs insisted strongly on the necessity of the Great Powers keeping in close touch with one another, with a view to being able to act together without delay at the psychological moment. He laid particular stress on the advantage of frequent exchanges of opinion between England, France, and Germany, for if, as seemed not improbable, victory rested ultimately with Turks, the three Powers could by taking steps persuade Turkey not to press her victory too hard, and greatly facilitate matters for Russian Government.

They might, in fact, do by persuasion what Russia might otherwise do by force of arms. If, on the other hand, the Balkan league was victorious, they might, as the Powers least interested territorially, similarly use their influence to whittle down Balkan demands.

To all three countries it was of equal interest that neither Turkey nor Balkan States should be utterly ruined; it was therefore, he thought, a good opportunity for England and Germany to work together in conjunction with France, with whom Germany was now on excellent terms.

His Excellency added that of course there was nothing specific to be done at present, but that he was anxious you should know his views as to the advantage of the three Powers keeping in close touch.

[45152] No. 773.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 25, 1912.*

M. DRAGOUMIS, ex-Prime Minister of Greece, arrived at Canea this afternoon on a special steamer.

Decree of King of Greece appointing him Governor-General of Crete has been published here. I shall be grateful for instructions regarding my attitude towards him.

(Sent to Athens.)

[44990] No. 774.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, October 25, 1912.*

KIRK KILISSE has just fallen into the hands of the Bulgarians after desperate resistance.

[45142] No. 775.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 25, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 24th October.

Turks left at Kirk Kilisse one battery of quick-firing guns with ammunition and sixteen caissons.

Although many unconfirmed rumours are prevalent, no further official information is as yet to hand.

[45143] No. 776.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 25, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Adjutant-General informs me privately that he has heard that Moukhtar Pasha escaped from Kirk Kilisse with Turkish Prince at head of column of 2,000 men; he understands that army have taken station of Adrianople, 6 kilom. distant from town. Bulgarian forces are endeavouring to encircle that fortress.

[45602] No. 777.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 263.)
Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.

Sir,

I TOLD the German chargé d'affaires to-day that there was no truth in the statement as to Crete attributed to Sir Fairfax Cartwright. I also told him of what I had said to M. Poincaré: that the future "status" of Crete was a question for all the Powers in consultation with Turkey, *i.e.*, the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Berlin.

The chargé d'affaires asked me whether it was really true that we had no desire for anything in Crete.

I assured him that it was so. We should not like Crete to pass into the hands of any great naval Power; but, subject to that, all I desired was to have nothing more to do with Crete. The Powers must decide, after the war was over, what the "status" of Crete was to be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45603] No. 778.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 266.)
Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.

Sir,

THE German chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that he had sent reports of previous conversations to his Government, and he now had instructions to say that, in the view of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, England and Germany ought to keep closely in touch and proceed *pari passu*, if they could, in the present Balkan crisis. He would therefore be glad to have my views, and was ready to express certain views of his own.

I said that I quite agreed that we should keep closely in touch, and I would gladly know what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's view was.

In reply, the chargé d'affaires said that, in the first place, Russia and Austria should be allowed to lead the concert of Europe, as they were the parties most interested. In the next place, the present *status quo* should be maintained as far as possible.

I observed that I presumed this meant the territorial *status quo*, for there must be change of the *status quo* in Macedonia in the shape of reform.

Herr von Kühlmann said it was the territorial *status quo* that he meant, and he added that if Turkey had the best of the war it would be comparatively easy to secure this second condition.

I agreed that this was so, as it had become an axiom of European politics that Turkey was not to reoccupy Christian territory from which she had withdrawn.

The chargé d'affaires went on to say that the Chancellor thought that it would be more difficult to preserve the territorial *status quo* if the coalition met with success. He would be interested to know what I thought with regard to this.

I said that if the coalition met with success everything would depend upon Russia and Austria; they, with Roumania, could stop the war, and prevent any disturbance of the territorial *status quo*. But if there was complete success for the allies, so that they practically occupied Macedonia and Albania and right up to Constantinople, I did not see how any of the other Powers, except Russia and Austria and Roumania, were to turn them out.

I then told the chargé d'affaires that I welcomed both the fact that the Chancellor had made this communication and the substance of it. As far as it went, I was in entire agreement. I thought that the Powers ought to be ready for an opportune moment of mediation, and for this they must be agreed as to what form the settlement should take. An essential condition for such an agreement between the Powers was that Austria and Russia should come to an agreement. I had already put this view before M. Suzonof, and had suggested that Russia should make up her own mind as to the settlement which she would consider satisfactory, and that she should then come to an agreement with Austria about it if possible. I also showed Herr von Kühlmann the record of my conversation of the 24th instant with Count Mensdorff, and pointed

out that I had brought the same point to the notice of the latter, so that everything I had done this week had been in the direction to which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's communication pointed.

I went on to say that, since the news of the Turkish reverses, I had been reflecting on the possibility that if the Bulgarians won a big engagement at Adrianople the whole Turkish army might become disorganised, there might be a complete *débâcle*, and this would be followed by all sorts of unpleasant consequences. In this event the present Turkish Government, if they were not swept away, might make a sudden appeal to the Powers for mediation. Such an appeal would, I thought, be of no use in enabling the Powers to stop the war, unless it was accompanied by an intimation that the Turks put the settlement unreservedly in the hands of the Great Powers. I thought that they should do this if they appealed as the beaten party. This hypothesis was, however, an extreme one, and I did not mention it except as such; the result of the fighting during the next two or three days might be quite different from the result hitherto.

The chargé d'affaires asked me whether, in the event of such a collapse on the part of the Turks, we would disinterest ourselves in the question of Constantinople?

I replied that I did not think any Power could say that. I understood the Russian view to be that Russia could not allow Bulgaria to go to Constantinople, and that if the Turks were turned out of it she could not stand seeing anyone else there except herself. What she contemplated was that the Turks should remain there.

In conclusion, Herr von Kühlmann said that the Chancellor felt it would exert a great moral force if it were known that England and Germany were acting together, and I asked him to come again on Monday that we might discuss any further developments that had taken place in the situation by then.

I observed that France and Italy remained. The former was politically disinterested, as we were, in a Balkan settlement.

Herr von Kühlmann said that he did not suppose that the French view would differ from the one which we had been discussing, and that Italy did not appear as yet to have settled what her policy was to be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44086] No. 779.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 17.)
Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.

Sir,

THE Servian chargé d'affaires called at this Office on the 19th instant and left with me the document enclosed herewith, announcing the formal declaration of war on Turkey by the Servian Government.

I said that I would have it read in due course, and went on to say that as Servia and the other Balkan States had taken matters out of the hands of the Powers and into their own, for the present there was nothing more to be said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 779.

Note communicated by Servian Chargé d'Affaires.

LE chargé d'affaires de Serbie présente ses compliments à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères, et a l'honneur de l'informer qu'il a été chargé par le Gouvernement Royal de communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ce qui suit:—

"L'anarchie qui règne en Turquie et qui trouble si profondément le repos et la sécurité des pays voisins s'étant aggravée depuis quelque temps, les Grandes Puissances ont jugé nécessaire de prendre en main la réalisation des réformes prévues

par l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin. En réponse à cette dernière expression de la volonté collective de l'Europe, la Sublime Porte a eu recours à un procédé qui lui a servi plus d'une fois : elle a déclaré qu'elle appliquera des réformes sérieuses aussi bien en Turquie d'Europe que dans ses provinces d'Asie, mais qu'elle ne croit pas qu'une ingérence étrangère dans l'application sera profitable à l'œuvre des réformes. Cette promesse du Gouvernement ottoman d'appliquer seul des réformes sérieuses a rencontré auprès de tout le monde la méfiance dont parlait le Comte Andrassy dans sa note du 30 décembre, 1875 : 'Une des causes principales de cette méfiance profondément enracinée,' disait avec raison l'ancien Chancelier d'Autriche-Hongrie, 'doit être recherchée dans le fait que plus d'une mesure annoncée dans les derniers rescrits du Sultan a déjà été proclamée sans que le sort des chrétiens en ait éprouvé une amélioration sensible.' Depuis trente-sept ans les événements ont surabondamment démontré la justesse de ce jugement. Aussi, les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie, ne pouvant plus tolérer les souffrances de leurs congénères en Turquie et une situation grosse de dangers pour leur avenir, avaient décidé de demander un contrôle efficace pour l'élaboration et la réalisation des seules réformes radicales capables d'améliorer le sort misérable des chrétiens et la pacification de la péninsule des Balkans. Cette dernière tentative, dont la modération contrastait avec l'attitude provocatrice de la Turquie, qui avait mobilisé sans motif sérieux contre les Etats balkaniques, ayant échoué, et la rupture des relations diplomatiques ayant été ordonnée par la Sublime Porte, les Gouvernements Royaux de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Serbie se sont vus à leur grand regret dans l'obligation de recourir à la force des armes. La Serbie, se trouvant dès lors en état de guerre avec la Turquie, vient de lui adresser une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1er de la convention relative à l'ouverture des hostilités du 17 octobre, 1907.

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie espère que le but qu'il poursuit en déclarant la guerre coincide avec les intérêts de tous les peuples civilisés. Les étrangers résidant dans les provinces dont la pacification permanente est l'objet ne pourront que profiter de cette pacification. Sous un régime d'ordre, de liberté et de progrès les intérêts des nationaux de tous les pays sont sûrs d'être protégés. La prospérité matérielle et le développement intellectuel sont certains d'être l'objet d'une sollicitude aussi constante qu'éclairée. Aussi, le Gouvernement Royal croit-il pouvoir compter sur les sympathies des nations amies et fait-il un appel pressant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de ne pas lui refuser sa neutralité bienveillante dans la lourde tâche qu'il vient d'assumer."

Légation Royale de Serbie, Londres,
le 18 octobre, 1912.

[44571] No. 780.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 355.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on 19th October a telegram from M. Sazonof, recording a conversation which the latter had with the Greek chargé d'affaires in regard to the Dardanelles. M. Sazonof had pointed out, seriously, but in a friendly manner, that any attempts of the Greek navy on the Straits would not only be a risky naval measure, but would also possibly lead to the closure of the Straits to the grave detriment of neutral commerce, and especially of that of Russia. M. Sazonof would like the Greek Government to give assurances that they would make no attempt on the Straits or take any hostile action in their vicinity, as, if the Straits were closed, there would be the greatest discontent in Russia against the State who had provoked the closure. Moreover, he would like a positive assurance, as uncertainty as to whether the Straits would or would not be kept open to neutral ships was in itself and alone a serious hindrance to commerce. M. Sazonof made these observations very seriously, and said that Greece should not forget that Russia had taken charge of Greek interests in the Ottoman Empire during the war.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45333] No. 781.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 141.)
Sir, *Athens, October 17, 1912.*

SO well has the secret of the concentration of the Greek troops been kept, that even the military attachés have been unable to obtain information about it. All that is known is that there are over 120,000 men in Thessaly, and that the number will eventually reach about 140,000. The decree of the mobilisation of the army, dated the 30th September, summoned:—

1. The liability men of 1910 and 1911.
2. All classes of the reserve of the active army, except men whose service was deferred, and the exempted men of the classes of 1900, 1901, 1902, 1910, and 1911. These exceptions were cancelled on the 14th instant.
3. Of the territorial army, sergeants-major and sergeants of infantry, evzones and artillery of all classes, and corporals of the same arms of the classes of 1896, 1897, 1898, and 1899.
4. Privates of the territorial army of the classes of 1896, 1897, 1898, and 1899 of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th districts, and of the 8th annexe, except those regarded as suitable for the auxiliary services of the army.

A decree of the 1st October summons men of the territorial army in districts through which the Piræus-Larissa Railway runs; one class in Piræus and more numerous classes in more northerly districts, up to ten classes in Thessaly.

A decree of the 5th October permits the enrolment of volunteers; a later decree limits the permission to men already in Greece, the number of men who have presented themselves having proved embarrassing. America alone has sent 8,000 men, and could send up to 30,000, but they are not wanted at present, and the expense of bringing them is considerable.

A decree of the 7th October summons the classes from 1892 to 1895 of the territorial army in the 2nd recruiting district; and, finally, a decree of the 11th summons the remainder of the 1899 class of the territorial army.

The mobilisation has worked smoothly and expeditiously beyond all expectation, and the number of men who responded to the summons greatly exceeded the estimates. There are said to be enough Mannlicher rifles to arm 130,000 infantry.

Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness the Crown Prince commands the "Army of Thessaly," with Major-General Danglis as his chief of the staff. This officer is regarded by General Eydoux as the most capable of the Greek generals.

The "Army of Epirus" is commanded by Lieutenant-General Sapountzakis, who was chief of the staff to the Crown Prince in the disastrous war of 1897. Since then he has been employed in departmental work, and has had no experience in handling troops, and I cannot think his appointment a happy one. His army will, I believe, number 19,000 men.

Horses, mules, and motor-cars have been requisitioned throughout the country, and on the 2nd instant a decree was issued prohibiting the exportation of animals, cereals, and flour.

On the 30th September were also issued decrees mobilising the navy, and summoning all classes of the naval reserve, *i.e.*, all men born between the years 1879 and 1888. In consequence, more men have presented themselves than employment can be found for.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a list of the ships of the Greek navy now in commission, with the names of their captains.*

The "submersible" "Delphin" arrived from Toulon on the 5th instant; the six new destroyers, four British and two German built, are on their way out.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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* Not printed

[45215] No. 782.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 147.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 18, 1912.

IN conversation with M. Coromilas yesterday I expressed the fear that the coming war would be accompanied by shocking massacres by bands on both sides. He said he did not think so, except perhaps in the north of Epirus, where Mussulman bands of 200 or 300 men were already out devastating the Greek villages. He did not deny the existence of Greek bands, but said their activities would be strictly confined to harassing the Turkish communications. He added, however, that, as the Greek troops advanced, the whole country would undoubtedly rise against the Turks, and, if this is the case, I fear my forebodings are likely to be verified.

M. Coromilas said that Bulgarian bands to the number of 3,000 men had already crossed the Bulgarian frontier.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[45216] No. 783.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 148.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 18, 1912.

IN the Greek Chamber on the 15th instant the following telegram was read from the Cretan Assembly and received with applause:—

"First step gratifying. Common Parliament satisfies part of national desire. People prepared every sacrifice, awaits and prays for favourable solution of every question. We send heartiest brotherly greeting."

MM. Mavromichalis, Dimitracopoulos, Theotoky, and Aravandinos (Socialist) made declarations of their intention to support the Government in the present critical circumstances. MM. Rhallys, Gounaris, and Zaimis remained silent. A practical proof of the unanimity of the House was given in the election of the Government candidate for the presidency, M. Zavitsanos, by 144 votes out of 148.

A number of Bills were then brought in by M. Venizelos and other Ministers, and read a first time as urgent. The first was one restoring the Princes to the army with the seniority they would have possessed if they had continued to serve in it. Other Bills proposed to give power to the Government to decree a state of siege throughout the whole country, or in part of it, so long as the mobilisation lasts, and to proclaim a moratorium. Another postpones the holding of communal elections. Several Bills introduce modifications into the military and naval laws, and confirm a number of military and naval credits granted by Royal Decree.

On the following day Bills were introduced providing for the control of the prices of foodstuffs, and permitting the entry provisionally (*i.e.*, during the mobilisation) of cattle from abroad duty free. Another Bill provides for the engagement of a foreign organiser for the prisons. With the exception of the last, all the proposed legislation is connected with the impending state of war, and it is understood that as soon as these urgent Bills have been passed the Chamber will adjourn for two months.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[45217] No. 784.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 18, 1912.

IN submitting a naval Bill to the Chamber on the 15th instant, the Minister of Marine took occasion to speak of the progress made by the fleet in respect of both quantity and quality, and paid the following tribute to the British mission:—

"The training which has been carried out under the British naval mission, to the chief of which I publicly express my thanks for the admirable care and the interest which he has shown during recent circumstances in the Greek navy, has made good previous shortcomings. I repeat that it is to their work that it is due that the rapidity of fire of the old battleships has been increased fivefold, so instead of one shot in ten minutes it has reached one every two minutes—a result which has certainly been achieved by systematic work."

The success of Admiral Tufnell in overcoming the obstacles and jealousies which beset him during the first year has been remarkable, and has been achieved by tact and unostentatious hard work on his own part and on that of his staff. The murmurs and criticisms of a hostile press have been quite silenced, and the Greek officers have realised that their instructors were doing their best for them. On the other hand, they have not been slow to profit by the instruction, and Admiral Tufnell is proud of his pupils. He considers that in skill and efficiency the Greek officers are probably superior to their Turkish adversaries.

A religious service was held to-day on the "Averoff," after which the King wished God-speed to his fleet, which sailed shortly afterwards under the command of Rear-Admiral Coundouriotis, who was promoted to that rank to-day.

In the small hours of yesterday morning the two gun-boats "A" and "D" entered the Bay of Arta, passing under the guns of Prevesa unperceived.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[45220] No. 785.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 152.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission, reporting on the probable effect of the outbreak of hostilities upon the payment of interest of the bonds of the old Greek debt.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 785.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Athens, October* 18, 1912.

IT will probably be of interest to the holders of bonds of the old Greek debt to know how far the outbreak of hostilities is likely to affect the payment of interest as regulated by the Law of Control of 1898.

The assigned revenues most susceptible of being influenced by the war are those derived from stamps, salt, and the Pirœus custom-house. Of these the latter, being outside the arrangement by which any surplus over a fixed minimum (plus values) is applied to increase the interest and sinking fund of the bonds, may for the present be disregarded.

There remain therefore only the revenues from stamps and salt to be considered.

Owing to the closing of the Stock Exchange, the suspension of all legal proceedings and a general paralysis of business of almost every kind since the Mobilisation Decree, a considerable falling off of the stamp revenue is certain. Fortunately, however, the receipts during the first eight months of the year were so satisfactory that the inevitable reduction during the last four months will be to some extent discounted. Assuming that there will be a falling off of 50 per cent. during the last months of the year, the total realised should still be approximately 11,000,000 drachmas, or 1,000,000 drachmas above the estimate of the Law of Control, and equal to the average of recent years.

The revenue from salt will also be seriously affected by the war, owing to the number of agricultural labourers called under arms. From tobacco and cigarette paper the receipts are still below the minimum guaranteed by the law of the 3rd (16th) October, 1909, and the bondholders are not therefore directly interested in any

reductions which there may be in these revenues. The consumption of petroleum, matches, and playing cards is not likely to be affected to any appreciable extent. The revenue from emery is dealt with in a separate despatch.

The following Table shows the amount actually encashed from all the assigned revenues, except the Piræus custom-house, up to the end of August (o.s.) 1912 and during the last four months of 1911, together with a rough estimate showing what the total receipts for the present year may be expected to be, allowing for a 50 per cent. reduction from stamps and about 30 per cent. reduction from salt during the last four months:—

	First Eight Months of 1912.	Last Four Months of 1911.	Approximate Estimate, 1912.
	Drachmas.	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Salt	2,369,254	1,457,461	3,300,000
Petroleum	2,900,880	2,219,220	4,900,000
Matches	1,412,850	701,238	2,000,000
Playing cards	236,711	189,052	400,000
Cigarette Paper	1,994,666	997,334	2,992,000
Tobacco	4,951,666	2,497,334	7,452,000
Stamps .. .	9,105,506	3,926,443	11,000,056
Emery	663,691	322,095	800,000
Total	25,678,207	12,310,117	32,884,000

The estimate of the Law of Control for these revenues being 28,000,000 drachmas, this should give for division between the Government and the bondholders in 1913 a sum amounting to 3,984,000 drachmas. Of this roughly 50 per cent., or 1,992,000 drachmas, is the bondholders' share (60 per cent. of the balance, after deduction of 18 per cent. for working expenses, *i.e.*, exactly 49·2 per cent).

The profits from exchange are likely to be the same as last year, viz., in round figures 3,428,000 drachmas, the bondholders' share, and the interest on the sinking fund, all of which goes to the bondholders, may be calculated with tolerable accuracy at 940,000 drachmas. Thus, the total sum available for increasing the distribution of interest and redemption of the bonds of the old debt in 1913 should amount to 6,360,000 drachmas (1,992,000 + 3,428,000 + 940,000).

In 1911 the sum available from the receipts of 1910 was 6,264,118 drachmas, so that the distribution in 1913 should be about the same as in 1911, or even, possibly, a little higher, taking into consideration the reduction of the number of the bonds in circulation by purchase for the sinking fund, and at the following rates:—

	Per cent.
1887 4 per cent. monopoly	2·36
1893 5 per cent. funding	2·30
1881 5 " "	2·30
1884 5 " "	
1890 5 " "	
1889 4 per cent. rentes	1·92

The bondholders' share of the plus-values of the assigned revenue up to now has never been less than 1,000,000 drachmas, but even if there should be no surplus this year, the funds from profits on exchange and interest of the sinking fund, which will almost certainly amount to 4,368,000 drachmas, are sufficient to give a distribution of more than 2 per cent. on all the loans except the rentes (1889), which would get about 1½ per cent.

The above forecast presupposes that there will be no clandestine issue of paper money which would affect the rate of exchange. Against this the provisions of article 30 of the Law of Control should be an effectual safeguard, the more so as it could not be done without the connivance of the National Bank, which, owing to its own considerable gold liabilities, is itself interested in the maintenance of exchange at its present parity.

According to the latest balance-sheet of the National Bank, the metallic reserve in its coffers amounted on the 31st August (13th September) to 13,672,612 fr., while it held abroad at its disposal 109,021,418 fr., against a note issue of 61,778,578 drachmas forced currency on Government account, and an issue of 66,000,000 drachmas on its own account, less 26,798,876 drachmas held in reserve. These notes do not include the special issue of 40,000,000 drachmas, the amount up to that date authorised against

gold and exchange under the law of the 19th March, 1910. Including them the total amount in circulation on the 31st August, 1912, would appear to have been 140,979,702 drachmas, of which 40,000,000 drachmas against gold and exchange, and the balance in forced currency notes. Since that date a further issue of notes up to 20,000,000 drachmas for the purchase of gold and exchange has been authorised.

I have, &c.

HENRY BEAUMONT.

[45376] No. 786.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 26, 1912.*

ROME telegram No. 148 of 25th October.

Situation as regards 15th and 16th Army Corps remains the same as reported in my telegrams Nos. 104 of 13th October and 107 of 15th October.

Naval attaché learns from Admiralty here that nothing has been done as regards organisation of Danube flotilla beyond dispatch of a few sailors from Pola to Budapest to replace time-expired men.

[45377] No. 787.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, October 26, 1912.*

NAVAL attaché has arrived at Vienna, which seems to be the most central point for information; but, in view of reports that engagement between Turkish and Greek fleets is likely, he would be glad to know Admiralty wishes as to his future movements.

[45378] No. 788.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 26, 1912.*

I SAW Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning on his return from Italy.

He declared that he was very satisfied with his visit there, but he assumed attitude that nothing definite had been mentioned with regard to Balkan matters. He admitted, however, that the Albanian question had been discussed. From his language I gathered that he did not reject idea of creating under certain circumstances a principality of Albania either great or small under the suzerainty of the Sultan. He observed that both Greece and Montenegro would, however, stand out for a rectification of frontier at the cost of Albania at the end of the war. I could get no definite reply as to his Excellency's views as to the annexation of Scutari by Montenegro. With regard to sanjak, I enquired if he would object to its being merged into an Albanian principality. His reply was vague.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me that he thought the moment for mediation was rapidly approaching. On my enquiring whether he thought that Bulgaria would accept an armistice before the Turks evacuated Adrianople, he replied in the negative, but from his language I gather that he looks upon an evacuation as likely to occur at any moment.

Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that all the Powers still clung to the principle of maintenance of *status quo* at the end of the war. When I pressed him, however, he seemed to admit that it would be somewhat difficult to make the Balkan League entirely give up their conquests, and that they would probably insist on some rectification of their frontiers. He appeared to me also to have doubts whether Balkan League would accept more reforms in Macedonia under surveillance of Ambassadors at Constantinople.

[45368] No. 789.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 96 of 25th October.

It is stated here officially that Bulgarian losses at Kirk Kilisse were slight. Two Turkish columns were captured, as well as all the personal luggage.

The allies are most satisfied with the progress of the war up to date, especially at the result of the battle of Kumanova, where Creuzot guns did much execution. An officer present at the engagement states that Krupp's shells continually failed to explode.

A determined attack on Uskub is now in progress.

Consular agent at Rustchuk reports that a vessel arrived at that place yesterday from Russia, carrying 900 Bulgarian reservists, eight aeroplanes, and several officers on active list of Russian army.

[45369] No. 790.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 26, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Prime Minister informs me that he has just heard that Uskub has fallen; he has no details.

[45365] No. 791.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 389.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 383 of 22nd October.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that draft scheme of reforms referred to in my private telegram of 24th October is not yet ready, but that he hopes that it may be sent to London and Paris on 28th October.

Great difficulty has been experienced in elaborating one that is likely to prove acceptable to the Powers, Turkey, and the Balkan States. His Excellency could not tell me final form it was likely to take, but said that present idea was to secure large measure of self-government for the five vilayets of Adrianople, Salonica, Monastir, Kossovo, and Janina. It was not proposed to mention word autonomy nor to insist on valis being Christians. Valis, I gather, are to be figure-heads representing the sovereignty of the Porte, while the real powers are to be entrusted to the mutessarifs of the different sanjaks. Each sanjak is to have an assembly so as to admit of the population participating in work of administration. His Excellency said that he thought that it would be safe [*sic*: ? safer] to introduce self-government by sanjaks than by vilayets, as there would be less danger for Turkey in these smaller assemblies than in a large provincial one. It would also be preferable on ethnological grounds, as in certain districts in Kossovo vilayet majority is Albanian.

I remarked that while there was much to be said in favour of this idea, I rather doubted whether it would commend itself to the Bulgarians should they gain decisive victory over Turks.

[45357] No. 792.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 531. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 26, 1912.*

SEE my telegram No. 496 of 19th October.

The Ottoman fleet is, I understand, likely to move into the Ægean Sea as soon as it terminates the convoying of the transports in the Black Sea.

[45152] No. 793

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[*]

(No. 626.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 26, 1912.*

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 156 of the 25th October.

Pray enquire of Government to which you are accredited what attitude they propose to adopt. It appears to me as this act of the Greek Government affects materially the international status of Crete the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments should also be consulted. The Greek Government, I think, should be informed that any change in the status requires the consent of all the Powers. If our consuls report there is no danger to Mussulmans, we might withdraw our vessels and inform the Greek Government we will not intervene again on behalf of Crete. I should think that the utmost the consuls-general should do would be to have solely unofficial relations on matters of urgent business with new Government, and should in no wise recognise the new Governor-General.

[45050] No. 794.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 26, 1912.*

THE Greek Minister called on the 23rd October to associate himself, by orders of his Government, with the Bulgarian protest in respect to the bombardment of Kavarna.

He informed Sir A. Nicolson that the Russian, British, Austrian, and Italian representatives at Athens had made representations in regard to the Dardanelles. He read to Sir A. Nicolson the reply of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which you had already informed me in your telegram No. 85. M. Gennadius said that he was sorry we had taken up Turkish protests. Sir A. Nicolson told him that he was perfectly in error if he or his Government thought that the Turkish Government had prompted our representations. They had said nothing to us; but our observations or representations had been prompted solely and exclusively by the serious injury which would be caused to our commerce if the Straits were closed—and also even by the prevailing uncertainty as to whether the Turks might not be compelled to close them in self-defence. M. Gennadius said that his Government would not contemplate so mad an act as to attack or endeavour to force the Straits. They would not risk a vessel or even a torpedo-boat in making any attack on the Straits. It was a wild idea and it was quite out of the question. Sir A. Nicolson said that if his Government gave us assurances that they would not attack or attempt to force the Straits the situation would be greatly eased. M. Gennadius said he would urge his Government to do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45740] No. 795.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 524.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 26, 1912.*

M. CAMBON read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 26th October a telegram from M. Poincaré recording a telegram from M. Jules Cambon at Berlin, which reported a conversation of the latter with Herr von Kiderlen. The substance was much the same as that contained in Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 131 of the 25th October, but it was clearer in this respect, viz., that Herr von Kiderlen's idea was that France, Germany, and England should put their heads together and evolve some settlement likely to be satisfactory to the Balkan States, always keeping in view the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. When the three Powers had come to an agreement, Germany would endeavour to procure Austria's assent, and France and ourselves were to obtain that of Russia. At the same time Herr von Kiderlen saw no objection to our letting Vienna

[*] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1108) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 116).

and St. Petersburgh know that we three were examining the terms of a possible settlement. From M. Poincaré's remarks Sir A. Nicolson gathered that his Excellency is not enamoured of the proposal, as he had told M. Jules Cambon merely to tell Herr von Kiderlen that M. Poincaré was examining the proposal, and that he intended to consult London and St. Petersburgh.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that his personal opinion was that the proposed procedure was a very cumbrous and unpractical one. We had been of opinion that it was for Russia and Austria to take the initiative in drawing up a scheme of reforms as being the Powers most directly interested, and, in fact, a scheme was already on its way from St. Peterburgh. It would form a basis for discussion among all the Powers. It seemed to Sir A. Nicolson absurd for France, Germany, and England to draw up a scheme of reforms without the co-operation of the two Powers most directly interested, and then to endeavour by action at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to obtain the consent of those Cabinets.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45358] No. 796.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 532.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 27, 1912.*

SEE my telegram No. 524 of the 24th instant and your telegram No. 855 of the 25th instant.

(Secret.)

Yesterday a Grand Council of Ministers, lasting till nearly midnight, took place at the Palace to deliberate on the situation. The senators and high military officers attended.

According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who appears on Thursday last to have been rather overcome by the news of the panic among the Ottoman troops at Kirk Kilisse, the reports from the main army near Uzun Keupru since the arrival of the generalissimo, Nazim Pasha, are reassuring, and his Excellency recognises that any question of mediation is dependent on the issue of a decisive or semi-decisive battle in Thrace between the bulk of the contending armies. He admits the taking of Uskub by the Servians and of Kirk Kilisse by the Bulgarians, Mahmud Muktar having fallen back on Vize to await reinforcements by sea, but states that a great effort is to be made to recapture Kirk Kilisse.

[45359] No. 797.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 533.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 466 of 14th October.

I am informed that the ex-Sultan refused to leave Salonica of his own free wil and that the Government intends to remove him by force, but as Salonica Railway is reported to be cut at Xanti, his removal would seem hardly practicable.

[45360] No. 798.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 534.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

German Embassy stationnaire, at request of Ottoman Government, left for Salonica early this morning to convey ex-Sultan here.

There was a question of asking that British stationnaire should carry out this duty, but luckily this was avoided.

[45361] No. 799.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 535.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1912.*

THE Sultan late last night sent for Kiamil Pasha, and in view of critical situation practically ordered him to take Grand Vizierate. His Highness managed to defer deciding, and I am led to believe that he will make further efforts to avoid acceptance, at least until result of military operations is more defined, for, while fully realising the gravity of the situation, he thinks that change of Government now would only be construed by the enemy as an indication of weakness and confusion.

[45362] No. 800.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 536.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 27, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations :—

"No news being received now, and communication with Roumelia is suspended. It is doubtful whether Bulgarians entered Kirk Kilisse, and Turks claim to have re-established their lines, the gap caused by defeat of second division being filled by advance of the Ismid redifs.

"Yesterday they seemed pretty confident, and expected that Nazim Pasha will restore position.

"Head-quarters being changed from Lule Burgas to Chorlu.

"Eighty-five thousand men transported by rail from 15th October to 25th October inclusive, and most redif divisions mentioned in my despatches are now up.

"Yesterday trains were all destined for Cherkenkoui, which is said to indicate turning operation via Vize.

"Military attachés to start to-morrow (28th October)."

[45372] No. 801.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 27, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister informs me that he learns that Balkan States now look upon the result of war as certain. In the partition of Turkey in Europe which is to follow, Servia is to take the sanjak, Old Servia, and port of Medua on the Adriatic; Montenegro is to have Scutari, the surrounding territory, and a strip of littoral, Greece receives Epirus, Thessaly, and the rest goes to Bulgaria. The four States are to enter into offensive and defensive alliance for fifty years.

I could not ascertain from whom Austrian Minister had this information, but he assured me that his informant was absolutely reliable and it came from an official source. In any case it reflects the tone noticeable here at present.

[45370] No. 802.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 27, 1912.*

OVER fifty Turkish shells have been picked up at Kavarna which failed to explode.

The chief reason for defeat of Turkish troops up to date has been the failure of their artillery fire. This may account for fact that so many of their guns have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

Present plan of Bulgarian army, after encircling Adrianople, is to proceed southward to junction of Salonica and Constantinople Railway.

The capture of Uskub, which is expected to be shortly followed by that of Kuprulu, will leave Servian army free to support Bulgarian and Greek armies.

[45382] No. 803.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, October* 11, 1912.

ON the outbreak of hostilities against the Turkish Empire King Nicholas addressed a proclamation to his people, dated the 9th instant, the greater portion of which bears evidence of having been prepared by His Majesty himself. The language of the proclamation differs, nevertheless, to a considerable degree from the arguments employed in the reply returned by the King to the joint representation made by the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Ministers in the name of the Powers. On the last-mentioned occasion stress was laid on the grievances of Montenegro in connection with the state of affairs on the frontier and to the hostile attitude of the Porte in connection with matters of common interest, as well as to the feelings which the ill-treatment of the Christians in the neighbouring Turkish districts had aroused. In the proclamation there is no reference to the fruitless negotiations which preceded the rupture of peace. The nation is called upon to put forward its utmost efforts, not to revenge injuries suffered in the past by Montenegro, but to secure the freedom of their oppressed Serb kinsmen in the Turkish Empire.

A brief reference is made to the Malissors, who are described as fighting for liberty and for union with Montenegro. It may be remarked that throughout the spring and summer there was little sign of any close communication between the Montenegrin Government and the Albanians. But early in September some negotiations were evidently in progress, and a deputation, said to have been composed not only of the five principal divisions of the Malissors, but also of the kindred tribes known as the Shalja, Shoshi, and Pulati, were present for a few hours at least in Cettinjé, and were received by the Prime Minister and General Vukotitch. Little transpired here as to the nature of the proceedings, but it was rumoured that the parting was of a very cordial character, and a story, which it is difficult either to confirm or to contradict, reached me privately from Scutari that before their departure the chiefs had left in the King's hands a formal petition for incorporation into Montenegro. The language of the proclamation at least admits the conjecture that at a given moment the King may be able to produce some such document in support of a claim to the Malissor territory, which he may be able to occupy by force of arms. In any case, the principal objective of his military movements has hitherto been to drive the Turkish forces from the extreme north of Albania and to seize Scutari, a smaller army being detached on the eastern frontier to operate in Old Servia. In the execution of this project every moment was of importance, once the mobilisation was ordered, in order to anticipate the arrival of Turkish reinforcements in Scutari. There can, I think, be little doubt that the abrupt declaration of war was made in spite of the wishes of the three other Balkan States, which were still in negotiation with the Porte on the subject of reforms in European Turkey. It may be merely a coincidence that negotiations with the Malissors were apparently resumed immediately after the announcement of Count Berchtold's proposals; the sequence of events would seem to indicate that the suggestions of the Austro-Hungarian Government for restoring tranquillity in Albania—suggestions which have excited suspicion and alarm in this country—have served in some measure to hasten the outbreak of the present conflict.

I enclose herewith a translation of the proclamation. The allusion at the end of it is to a poem in which the King celebrates the ruined palace of the Nemanja at Prisrend. Some day, sword in hand, he is to drive the Turkish invader from it, and the Serb there shall again be a free man.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 803.

Proclamation by King Nicholas.

(Translation.)

Montenegrins:

THE lamentable appeals for help which reach us from our oppressed brothers in Old Servia are no longer to be borne.

Not only men, but women and helpless children are slaughtered there. Hungry, wretched, and plundered, the serfs are wandering in the mountains or round the ashes of their homes, calling to you for rescue and protection.

Duty and love of your race command you to hasten to the help of your brothers. I know well that with your inborn courage you would already have done so if you had not obeyed me and awaited the result of my peaceful efforts to protect the sufferers beyond the frontier.

My hopes of finding means of freeing the Serbs in Turkey without bloodshed have not been realised, so that, hard though it be to me to disturb the peace of Europe, no other course is left to me than to draw the sword, the sword which your fathers followed without fear at Vuchi-Dol, Nikshitch, Antivari, and Dulcigno.

Montenegrins:

Right is on our side and the die is cast. There remains what God and the fortune of arms will bring.

Follow me, soldiers, to reach out our hands to our brothers in misfortune, and to the noble Malissors who for two years past are fighting for their rights, for their freedom, and for union with Montenegro.

We are not alone. With us is God. With us are the Christian Balkan States with whom we are united in a common accord; an accord which I have always desired; an accord which since the invasion of the Asiatic conqueror has been awaited with yearning by countless generations of the Balkan peoples.

I have firm hope in the discipline and force of the sons of my former warriors, that nothing will be impossible to them, but that they will raise even higher the respect for their beloved country, and that the arms of Montenegro will shine with fresh brilliancy.

It is a bold step to measure ourselves with a great Empire, but worthy of my Montenegrins who undertake it for the sake of their kinsman. We shall be accompanied by the sympathies of the civilised world, of the Serb race, and of all Slavs. The armed hands of the Kings of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece are extended to us; in this sacred enterprise their peoples are united as brothers to us. We do not attack an Empire from presumption, but from the noblest of motives—to save from destruction our brothers on the far side of the frontier.

Montenegrins:

Hasten then with manly steps where there is suffering, oppression, and sorrow. Let the kinsmen of Old Servia see forthwith your banners. Let them say: Here are our brothers, here are our avengers; from Lovtchen and Kom, from Durmitor, the sons of Montenegro come to embrace us; we are no longer wretched, no longer slaves. There shall we meet our brothers from Servia, led by their King to deliver the oppressed.

With God's blessing, with the blessing of St. Peter of Cettinjé and all our saints, may we realise the dream of my youth when I sang that with arms in our hands we should march—

"There, there, to that mountain . . . ."

Long live Montenegro, long live the Balkan League!

NIKOLA.

September 26 (*October* 8), 1912.

[45453] No. 804.

Sir H. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 24. Treaty.)

Sir, *Brussels, October* 21, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a notice, published in the "Moniteur belge" of yesterday's date, declaring the neutrality of Belgium during the present war between Turkey and Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. Allusion is made to the perpetual neutrality of Belgium.

I have, &c.
H. H. VILLIERS.

Enclosure in No. 804.

Extract from the "Moniteur belge" of October 20, 1912.

LA Bulgarie, la Grèce et la Serbie se trouvant en état de guerre avec la Turquie, le Gouvernement rappelle aux nationaux que la Belgique est perpétuellement neutre et que tout acte contraire aux devoirs de la neutralité doit être évité avec soin.

Le Code pénal contient la disposition suivante, qu'il peut être utile de signaler à l'attention publique :—

"Article 123. Quiconque, par des actions hostiles non approuvées par le Gouvernement aura exposé l'Etat à des hostilités de la part d'une Puissance étrangère, sera puni de la détention de cinq à dix ans, et si des hostilités s'en sont suivies, de la détention de dix ans à quinze ans."

[45397] No. 805.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 877.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, containing extracts from a despatch received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Scutari referring to the recent events in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 805.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 140.)

Sir, *Salonica, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following items extracted from a report which I have this day received from Mr. Vice-Consul Summa, dated the 7th instant:—

Ibrahim Pasha having apparently been appointed to a military command in Upper Albania, his place as president of the commission dispatched for the purpose of studying the reforms to be introduced in the district of Scutari has been taken by Marshal Kiazim Pasha, a former vali of that province, who arrived in Scutari on the 5th, accompanied by Sadreddin Bey, formerly Ottoman Minister in Cettinjé, and an Albanian, named Haidar Bey, who had accompanied Hadji Adil Bey's commission in the spring.

Two days previously to the arrival of this commission, Essad Pasha Topdani had succeeded in reaching Scutari at the head of a force of about 3,000 men, composed of the redifs of Tirania and Durazzo, together with one battalion of Nizam from Monastir. According to Mr. Summa's information, considerable difficulty had been experienced in inducing these redif battalions, composed in any case almost entirely of men without any previous training or military discipline, to respond to the call to arms. So long, indeed, as it was thought that they were to be employed merely against the Catholic Malissors they positively refused to move, and it was only on being assured that the real object of the mobilisation was the imminence of war with Montenegro that they consented to be enrolled. As it was, however, Essad Pasha experienced considerable difficulty in reaching Scutari, his passage of the River Mat having been opposed by the Malissors established in Bregmatia, supported by a contingent of 200 or 300 Mirdites under the leadership of Nuu Djioni, brother of the acting chief, and two of his nephews, named Dod and Prenk Lesh Djioni. He was compelled to bring up his artillery, and the passage of the river was not effected without considerable loss on either side. As a consequence of this resistance, the Catholic Church of Bregmatia, together with the houses of some of the more well-to-do Christians of that region, is said to have been pillaged and burned by the Mussulman redifs, who offered their plunder openly for sale in the bazaars of Alessio and Scutari. According to Mr. Summa, the consequence of Essad Pasha's conduct in this matter will be a great

loss of the personal prestige which he hitherto held amongst his Albanian fellow-countrymen, who are now coming to regard him as sold to the Turks. Mr. Summa expresses the opinion, contrary to that of persons who are in touch with the Albanian Christians here, but which is apparently being justified by actual events, that the Catholic Malissors and others in the districts round Scutari will throw in their lot with Montenegro in its struggle with the Ottoman Government, the bitterness of the anti-Turkish feelings, inspired by the events of the past two years, having effaced the memories of their hereditary feud against their Slavonic neighbours. Even the Catholic clergy, who exercise a very decisive influence in political matters, are coming to the conviction that they would be better off under Montenegrin than under Ottoman rule. The Mussulman Albanians, on the other hand, in spite of the dissatisfaction aroused by the more recent developments of Ottoman rule under the Young Turkish régime, are prepared to fight to a man against absorption by Montenegro, but would, according to Mr. Summa, now accept any scheme of reform that promised to restore tranquillity to the country without sacrificing their national existence.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[45398] No. 806.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 878.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, reporting on the military situation there.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 806.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Adrianople, October 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following particulars with regard to the military situation here.

My despatch No. 60 described the situation up to and including the 5th instant, on which date the 10th nizam division was covering the front of this fortress from Chermen to Vaisal. The Adrianople redif division, less 3 battalions at Mustapha Pasha, formed the garrison of Adrianople.

On the 6th instant the Baba Eski and Gumuljina redif divisions commenced to arrive here, the last battalions of these arriving on the 10th instant. Two battalions of the Baba Eski division, those from Chatalja and Chorlu, did not accompany it here, whilst of the Gumuljina division 1 battalion, that from Kirjali, remained at its own centre. On the other hand, 2 battalions from Panderma and Brussa arrived here. Thus between the 6th and the 10th instant 20 battalions of redifs, averaging 1,000 men per battalion, were concentrated here and distributed to the different sectors of the fortress. Six battalions of the territorial force (Mustafiz) were raised here on the 10th October, the men composing them being drawn from the Maritza valley as far as Dedeagach, and from Adrianople itself. Owing, however, to a shortage of officers, the 6 battalions were subsequently compressed into 4 of 1,500 men each. This force is clothed in the cast-off black uniform formerly worn by the nizam, and is armed with Martini-Henry rifles, the redif divisions having a converted rifle, Mauser barrels and sights having been fitted to a Martini breech.

All men capable of bearing arms, Moslems and Christians alike, up to the age of 45, who are not liable for service in any other branch of the army, have been required to report for service in the Mustafiz. Not all those thus called up are actually required to serve, those who are not at present needed being ordered to hold themselves in readiness in case of necessity. Exemption from service is, of course, obtainable on

payment of the exemption fee. The service is extremely distasteful to Christians, large numbers of whom have deserted. Certain battalions of redifs have since their arrival here proceeded to points on the frontier.

Nizam battalions have been brought up to war strength since the 5th instant by the arrival of the requisite number of Anatolian ihtiyats.

I estimate the total number of troops covering Adrianople and in the fortress at 61,000, divided as follows :—

Cavalry division	2,000
10th nizam division	15,000
Adrianople redif division	10,000
Baba Eski redif division	10,000
Gumuljina redif division	8,000
Brussa and Pandermo battalions	2,000
Mustafiz	6,000
Adrianople fortress artillery	10,000

Of these 27,000 compose the covering force, and 34,000 the garrison of Adrianople fortress. As no additional troops have arrived during the last five days, it may be assumed that no more will be sent here.

I am informed that the troops covering Kirk Kilissé and in the town itself, which consist of the 7th division and certain redif battalions, number 17,000.

A concentration of troops has been proceeding for the past 10 days at Baba Eski, Pavlo Keui, Uzun Keupru, and Chorlu, but owing to the interruption of civil railway traffic between Adrianople and those towns, I have been unable to obtain trustworthy information with regard to the troops in those districts. I have reason to believe, however, that the 8th and 9th divisions are at Baba Eski, the 12th and 4th at Uzun Keupru, and the 11th at Demotika. The Ismidt redif division is believed to be at Chorlu and the Angora redif division at Baba Eski. The Kirjali redif division is at Kirjali, where there are probably at least 15,000 men, including Mustafiz.

It seems to be the general impression here that the Bulgarian line of advance will be through Mustapha Pasha or Demotika.

The supply and transport departments are, I understand, a source of much anxiety to Ferik Shukri Pasha, who is now in command here. Although all available transport has been requisitioned, it seems likely to prove inadequate for the needs of this section of the army should it be called upon to advance. Considerable difficulty is even now experienced in supplying bread to the troops of the 10th division, who are stationed near the frontier, some of these having been without bread for three days.

The amount of wheat and flour now in Adrianople is believed to be sufficient to feed the garrison and the town at the present rate of consumption for 17 weeks, but army contractors are not in a position to hand over their stocks to Government unless about two-thirds of their value is paid in cash, money having been advanced by the various banks here on the security of these stocks. Financial difficulties are beginning to make themselves felt. Officers have not been paid for the month of September, and contractors yesterday informed the military authorities that they would be compelled to cease supplies unless they were paid £T. 80,000 which is now due to them.

The hospital arrangements are, I am informed, on a wholly inadequate scale in view of the demands which would be made on them should war break out. Six divisional field hospitals have been formed here, of which two have been sent to Uzun Keupru. Civilian doctors are being attached as medical officers to redif units, though many of them have no surgical experience, and unqualified chemists' assistants are being appointed compounders, with the rank of second lieutenant. I am informed that there is a great shortage of hospital stores, although a limited quantity of these has recently been sent here.

Dr. Nouri Bey has arrived to make arrangements on behalf of the Red Crescent Society, but should Adrianople itself be attacked, or an important action take place in the neighbourhood, the need of assistance by foreign ambulances would be a very real one. I append hereto a statement showing the disposition of the 10th division and certain redif battalions attached to it.

I have, &c.

L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 806.

Distribution of Adrianople Garrison and Covering Troops, October 15.

Iskudere to Vaisal—

Cavalry division of 10th and 11th regiments.
1st and 2nd light cavalry regiments.
2 batteries horse artillery.

Kurtkeui to Chernen—

2 squadrons 9th cavalry.
2 batteries 15 cm. howitzers.
1st battalion 10th artillery regiment.
3 battalions 30th infantry regiment.
2nd battalion 4th Nishanji regiment.
3 redif battalions Adrianople division.
3 redif battalions Gumuljina division.

Iskudere—

3rd battalion 4th Nishanji regiment and M.G. company 10th Nishanji battalion.
1 battery field artillery, 10th regiment.

Kirechli Haskeui—

1st battalion 29th regiment.
1 battery field artillery, 10th regiment.

Demirkeui and Vaisal—

2 batteries 12 cm. howitzers.
1 battery field artillery, 10th regiment.
3 battalions 28th infantry regiment.
1st battalion 4th Nishanji regiment.

Marash (5 miles west of Adrianople)—

3 batteries heavy field artillery.
3 battalions Gumuljina redif division.

Adrianople—

Fortress artillery.
2nd and 3rd battalions 29th regiment.
10 battalions Baba Eski redif division.
7 battalions Adrianople redif division.
2 battalions Gumuljina redif division.
2 battalions Brussa redif division.
2 battalions Mustafiz.

[45401] No. 807.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 882.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 20, 1912.*

IT may be of some interest to summarise the accounts which have reached me from His Majesty's consular officers in various parts of the Ottoman dominions of the attitude of the population towards the war preparations.

In Constantinople itself, since the first excitement and the organised demonstrations which resulted in the breaking of the windows of the official residences and consulates of some of the Balkan States, there has been little show of enthusiasm. In a struggle such as the present the attitude of Pera can hardly be held to count, while Stamboul is not demonstrative, but the general impression so far is rather one of irritation at this fresh crop of troubles than of enthusiasm at the prospect of settling old scores. Among the better class of Turks the sentiment seems to be that the war cannot make things worse, and may, after all, make them better. The Sultan is a puppet, and not even an effective

one at that, whether as Sultan or as Caliph; the present Government is weak and inspires no confidence, and the Committee of Union and Progress has had its day—and its day has not been a glorious one for Turkey. War will at least put an end to the present intolerable state of things.

The Christian population, naturally enough, are endeavouring by every subterfuge to evade the call to arms, and I have reported in a separate despatch that this resistance has so far been successful that the Government have consented to reduce the age limit for service in the case of non-Moslem subjects. Instances of evasion of the mobilisation order on the part of Moslems has also come to my notice. In fact, it would seem that, in the capital at least, it is only in committee circles that their is any real enthusiasm for the war, and that that enthusiasm is largely based on the instinct of political self-preservation. At the same time, the Young Turk has travelled far since the days of talk of Ottoman brotherhood, and it remains to be seen whether his efforts to stir up the fanatical anti-Christian sentiments of the uneducated Mahommedans in the Empire will prove successful. This will naturally depend largely on the fortunes of the war.

I have dwelt at some length on the aspect of affairs in the capital as the state of feeling here is reflected, even more faithfully than I should have expected, in the accounts which I have received from the provinces, as will be seen from the despatch from Mr. Consul-General Lamb, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir reports that the Christians are fleeing in large numbers to the hills to join Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian bands. Gendarmes sent out to bring in Christian reservists have come into conflict with Christian villagers, while in many cases the Christian reservists who have been brought in have deserted and carried off their arms with them. A demonstration held on the 9th October was attended only by the lowest class of the population, who showed their patriotism by breaking the Exarchist archbishop's windows and beating his servant.

His Majesty's consul at Trezibond reports that meetings held there have been noisy, but that little real enthusiasm has been shown, while from Sunsun our consular agent reports that there is "no considerable ardour for the war."

From Adana I hear that large number of Christians are leaving for abroad, and that the warlike demonstrations there are not attended by any of the higher officials.

Similarly, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout writes that it is only the lower class of Moslems who take part in the warlike demonstrations, and that both Moslems and Christian young men are emigrating in large numbers to evade their military service. Many, especially Christians, are paying the exemption tax, and Mr. Cumberbatch remarks that martial ardour throughout Syria seems to be at a very low ebb.

Colonel Hawker, the British gendarmerie officer at Smyrna, wrote to inform me that a patriotic meeting had been organised there by the Committee of Union and Progress, and that exaggerated accounts of the enthusiasm displayed on that occasion had been published in the committee organs of the press. Colonel Hawker states that the proceedings were in reality very mild indeed, that there was very little enthusiasm displayed, and that the crowd was mostly composed of soldiers from the neighbouring barracks, who dropped in for a time and moved on when they had had enough of it. There was no important officials present.

From all these accounts it will be seen that whatever enthusiasm had been displayed has been of an exclusively Moslem and anti-Christian character. There has been no trace of national feeling anywhere, and the much talked of Ottoman nationalism, which in earlier days served the ends of the Committee of Union and Progress, seems to have been definitely discarded by them in favour of uncompromisingly anti-Christian attitude. In pursuance of their ends the committee press here has not hesitated to invent and publish accounts of outrages on Moslems in Bulgaria. The danger of this propaganda is obvious, and I cannot illustrate it more aptly than by enclosing copy of a despatch which I have to-day received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Panderma reporting lawless attacks which have been made on Christian Armenians at that place. The incident, I fear, is only too likely to be the first of many.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 807.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 137.)

Sir, *Salonica, October* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum concerning the mobilisation in this district, in regard to which I have transmitted direct to the military attaché such figures as I have been able from time to time to obtain.

In this memorandum I have alluded to the readiness with which the Mussulman population has responded to the call to arms. There have been no meetings or demonstrations in Salonica in favour of war, as seems to have been the case in many other towns, but there can be no doubt that the general feeling amongst the Turks is strongly in that direction. The army in particular has for weeks past been eagerly waiting for the order to march. The party of Union and Progress, which still numbers amongst its members the bulk of the Government employés, has various political reasons for desiring war, whilst the remainder of the Mussulmans are deterred by racial and religious pride from seeming to fall behind. The Christians, on the other hand, are naturally most reluctant to go to the front, and those who are unable to purchase exemption are deserting by the score. In the mainly Greek kaza of Kassandra nearly half the population is stated to have taken to the hills. The same is the case in the Bulgarian districts of Ishtib, Yenidjé, and elsewhere. Near the former place strong bands, most probably formed of these deserters, are reported to have destroyed several bridges (including one of considerable importance over the River Bregalnitza) on the road to Kotchana and Egri Palanka, over which the large force now concentrating at Kiuprulu would probably have to advance in order to meet a Bulgarian invasion from Kustendil. Another group of bands, numbering, it is said, over 200 men, endeavoured on Friday last to effect a rising at Kriva, in the Gumendja nahié of the kaza of Yenidjé-Vardar. The local gendarmes, supported by detachments withdrawn from the soldiers guarding the railway line, having proved unable to reduce them, 300 troops with a couple of guns were dispatched from here, which succeeded in destroying the village and killing, it is believed, most of the bandits after several hours' desperate fighting.

The economic results of the mobilisation are likely to be very serious. This district has been traversing a crisis prolonged over several years, which now bids fair to become acute. Complaints are already being raised of distress in the Mussulman quarters of the town, where nearly all the male population has been withdrawn from its ordinary avocations. The seizure of nearly all the able-bodied horses and other transport animals, together with enormous numbers of carts and other vehicles, has dislocated many trades and industries, and the military authorities are now preparing to appropriate all stocks of grain in merchants' hands. The stoppage of all transport of merchandise by rail is also a source of grave complications in the commerce of the place. The banks, which had for more than a year past restricted credits to the absolute minimum, finding themselves in the impossibility of replenishing their stock of gold, have been refusing every possible payment. Business is consequently at a stand-still, and the prospects of the coming winter are regarded with serious apprehension in commercial circles.

In the rural districts, where the shortage of labour had already begun to constitute a serious problem, the withdrawal of nearly all the able-bodied males, as well as the best of their horses and oxen, at the period of the winter sowings is also likely to have disastrous consequences as compromising next year's harvest.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 807.

Memorandum respecting Turkish Mobilisation in Salonica.

THE general mobilisation, for which orders were issued throughout the greater portion of the Hud Army Inspection during the last week in September, affected both Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans belonging to the four classes of 1305, 1306, 1307, and 1308; and all Mussulmans, whether "mufik" or "muinsiz" of the iltiat, redif, and mustahfiz. The latest date at which it was permissible for the men to report

themselves was the 8th October; but it was publicly notified that they should come in without waiting for the issue of the personal summons, and that no excuse would be admissible after the date fixed. The Mussulmans appear to have responded readily, the non-Mussulmans, on the other hand, most unwillingly, to the call to arms. Of the latter some 600 paid the exemption tax in Salonica, and 700 in Cavalla (to mention only two of the more important centres), the sums collected as "bedel-i-nakdi" in these two places amounting to over £T.50,000. Of the Christians enrolled large numbers have everywhere deserted, either before or after having received their arms, and gone to join the nearest band. Thus in one place it is related that out of 600 Bulgars, who were let out of barracks after receiving their uniforms (but not their rifles), no more than seventeen returned. At another centre eighty Greeks deserted with their rifles and all.

By the 6th October it was officially declared that the mobilisation of 112 out of the 121 redif battalions nominally existing in this inspection was completed, as well as that of 107,000 mustahfiz. By this I understand it to be meant that these battalions, though obviously not at their full war strength, had assembled at their respective centres, received their arms and equipment, and been reported as at the disposal of the General Staff. The deficiency of nine battalions from the nominal strength of the inspection is accounted for by the non-completion of the division of Scutari in Albania, of the ten battalions allotted to which only four as yet have even a paper existence, while in point of fact no more than one battalion could be put in the field. This battalion, 270 strong and composed mainly of muhadjirs, had been armed and dispatched to the Montenegrin frontier in the course of last month.

The forward movement of troops from Salonica commenced on the 8th October, on which day some 2,300 men were dispatched to Kuprulu. Up to date (the 14th October) over 18,000 men have been forwarded to that place irrespective of the 17th division, which is proceeding to the same destination by road from Monastir viâ Perlepe. The strength of the battalions seems to vary from something over 500 up to 750 men.

The mobilisation of the mustahfiz does not appear to have been universal. It does not at least seem to have extended to the Janina division, for, writing on the 9th October, Mr. Conemenos informs me that no definite orders on the subject has as yet reached Prevesa. The mobilisation in general appears to have been much less actively pushed in the district adjoining the Greek frontier than in any other portion of Macedonia. Hussan Tahsin Pasha, to whom the command of that section has been entrusted, with his centre of operations at Ziskata, appears to have been told that he must rely practically upon the resources of his own division, strengthened by the reserves called under arms, the numbers of whom were estimated at some 20,000. Writing, however, on the 7th, the acting vice-consul at Janina informed me that barely 1,000 of these men had come in. In every respect the defence of the Greek frontier seems to have been the last matter to receive the attention of the General Staff, and it was not until yesterday (the 13th October) that any important movement of troops was noticeable in that direction.

In the last two days about 1,600 men and 300 horses have been sent to Sorovitch, whence they will presumably take the direction of the frontier.

On the other side the Greeks are reported to have collected 20,000 men at Kalabaka, and 8,000 more at Arta under General Saboundzaki. At the latter place important stores of provisions have been accumulated, being mostly brought by sea. On the 6th October a Greek hydro-aeroplane (?) was sighted from Prevesa manœuvring over the Ambracian Gulf.

Enclosure 3 in No. 807.

Vice-Consul Summa to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 19.)
Monsieur, *Panderma, le 10 octobre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire part d'un incident qui a eu lieu à Michalitch et d'un autre arrivé aujourd'hui même à Panderma.

Le nommé Carabet, âgé de 50 ans, s'étant permis une plaisanterie à des femmes turques, celles-ci ont fait des plaintes à leurs maris, lesquels ont soulevé la foule, et après avoir brutalisé l'individu l'ont livré à la police.

Le commissaire, qui est aussi un Arménien, n'ayant pas eu en mains un mandat

d'arrêt, a cru bon de laisser Carabet en liberté après l'avoir maintenu pendant quelques heures.

Le lendemain, le meneur de la révolte, Arap Ali, rassemblait 300 à 400 personnes et se rendait à la demeure de Carabet. Après l'avoir assommé de coups ils l'ont reconduit à la prison, où il se trouve dans un état désespéré. Le commissaire de police a aussi été maltraité et obligé de s'aliter. La foule s'est ensuite rendue devant la demeure de Salmassian Effendi, notable arménien, en vue de lui faire subir le même sort, mais des gens plus sensés sont intervenus pour empêcher le mal, et Salmassian a pu se sauver et se réfugier à Brousse. Ils ont aussi attaqué la demeure du fils et en ont brisé toutes les vitres.

L'évêque arménien, dont le siège est à Panderma, s'est rendu immédiatement à Michalitch et, après avoir fait une enquête, a communiqué les faits au Vali de Brousse et au patriarche à Constantinople.

Voici ce qui s'est passé à Panderma aujourd'hui :

Dans la boutique du nommé Ketcherdji Zigran se trouvait le beau-père de celui-ci ainsi que Zagiun Migherditch et Yémistchi Arsin.

Un individu s'est présenté demandant au nommé Zigran la somme de 70 piastres qu'il prétendait avoir à recevoir. Ce dernier lui répondit qu'il ne se connaissait pas une pareille dette et qu'il n'avait qu'à faire ses réclamations au tribunal. A cette réponse l'individu s'est jeté sur Zigran, et cette altercation ayant rassemblé une foule énorme, les quatre Arméniens ont été assommés à coups de bûches de chauffage. Le nommé Zigran est parvenu à se sauver, mais quelques instants plus tard la police mettait la main dessus et l'amenait en prison. Le beau-père de celui-ci se trouve dans un état désespéré et peut-être même est-il déjà mort.

Cet incident a provoqué une panique, à la suite de laquelle toutes les boutiques arméniennes et une partie des boutiques grecques ont été fermées.

A cause de la mobilisation il se trouve à Panderma plusieurs milliers de soldats venant de l'intérieur pour leur embarquement et tous ces gens-là ne sont soumis à aucune surveillance. J'ai visité le caïmacan et lui ai recommandé de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faire maintenir l'ordre, et j'ai eu la promesse qu'il ferait le nécessaire.

J'ai, &c.
N. SUMMA.

[45460] No. 808.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 71.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October 22*, 1912.

IN Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 101 of the 12th instant, I notice a statement to the effect that according to the "Times" correspondent in Vienna there exists an impression in Austria-Hungary that "owing to our supposed pro-Turkish sympathies the Balkan States had become convinced that we would oppose the introduction of effective control in Macedonia, and that this belief had driven them to decide on war."

If, as stated by the "Times" correspondent, this impression exists, it is an entirely erroneous one.

You may possibly have noticed in the press that on the day the mobilisation decree was issued, a demonstration took place before the British Legation in Belgrade. As this so-called demonstration was got up by only about 100 students and street arabs I did not attach any importance to it, but subsequently, on enquiring the reason of it from Servians, I was informed that the opinion prevails in Servia that Great Britain is in favour of the war and on the side of the Balkan States.

I need scarcely say that whenever opportunity offered I have done my best to disabuse Servians of this idea, and have represented to them that we have very great interests in seeing that Turkey is not molested and the present *status quo* not interfered with, but they appear to hold to their opinion with considerable tenacity, their line of argument being that on account of the not too friendly feeling between England and Germany, we are only too glad to see the check to the advance of Germanism towards the East which this movement of the Balkan States offers.

I gather that in Bulgaria also there is an impression that Great Britain is morally backing up the Balkan States, as about a fortnight ago M. Toshell, my Bulgarian colleague, in an argument with me concerning the rights and wrongs of Bulgaria's

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action, said, "But there are many currents in England which have much sympathy with us." M. Tosheff's opinion, however, is based rather on manifestations of sympathy by the Balkan Committee and others than upon any political reasoning.

(Copy sent to Vienna.)

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[45461] No. 809.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 22, 1912.*

DURING a conversation which I had with the Minister President this afternoon, his Excellency said he had good reason to believe Austria had no intention of interfering with any operations Servia might find it necessary to carry out in the sanjak. For the moment the Servian troops sent in that direction would maintain a defensive attitude, but as there were large bodies of Turkish troops at Sienitza and Novibazar, and as it would be impossible for the right wing of the Servian army to operate further south with these troops in its rear, it would probably become necessary to assume the offensive and to occupy Novibazar. (I am inclined to think that this information is incorrect, and that Novibazar is merely held by Arnauts.)

In speaking of the future M. Pashitch assumed a somewhat uncompromising manner, and did not attempt to hide that, regardless of the declaration of the Powers concerning the maintenance of the *status quo*, the Balkan States are bent on territorial expansion. When I enquired whether this meant that Servia, in case successful, would endeavour after the war to retain any territory she might occupy in the sanjak during the war, he replied that this would depend on circumstances, and was a point which would not be settled between Servia and Austria-Hungary alone, but by the Great Powers. He added that if Austria was merely seeking a commercial outlet through the sanjak, some arrangement might be devised to suit her needs whilst leaving Servia in possession of the territory, the population of which is Serb, and which should, therefore, rightly belong to Servia.

I understand from some remarks recently made to me by M. d'Ugron, my Austrian colleague, that whilst M. Pashitch may be correct in thinking Austria will not intervene in the sanjak during the war, it would be well the Servian Government should realise that Austria cannot and will not tolerate Servian retention of any part of the sanjak after the war. The Austrian apprehension is that were this permitted Servia and Montenegro would soon join hands, and with Bulgaria at their back would constitute a Slav combination extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. Such a combination, besides blocking the Herzegovina frontier and shutting Austria out from access to the Ægean Sea, would, through ceaseless intrigue and agitation, become a menace to Austrian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighbouring provinces. At a moment like the present, when the presence of Panslavist influences in the Balkan States is very apparent, the danger for Austria is by no means negligible.

(Copy sent to Vienna.)

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[45440] No. 810.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Bucharest, October 22, 1912.*

THE papers this morning announce M. Carp's resignation of the leadership of the Conservative party.

The retirement of M. Carp should tend to facilitate the fusion of the Conservative Democrats, M. Take Jonesco's party, with the Conservatives, which King Charles, in his desire for the simplification of political strife, has long been anxious to bring about. At one moment the negotiations for this fusion, which I reported in my despatch of the 10th instant to be actively proceeding, seemed to be on the point of breaking down, as the combination which it was desired to achieve—M. Carp as Prime Minister, with M. Take Jonesco as Minister of Interior—was found to be impossible, the latter making

conditions which M. Carp found himself unable to accept. M. Take Jonesco was unwilling to take office on the Conservative side unless more normal relations could be brought about with the Opposition. It will be remembered that the latter abstained from attendance in Parliament during the greater part of last session, the rough handling of the notorious tramway question by M. Carp and M. Marghiloman, the then Premier and Minister of Interior respectively, being largely responsible for the Opposition's boycott. The tenure of office of the Cabinet of M. Maioresco, who succeeded M. Carp as Prime Minister, has been marked throughout by a bitterness of recrimination on the one side and the other in the press and in public meetings unusual even in Roumanian political life, where amenity is always conspicuously absent. It is not forgotten that on one occasion M. Carp, who, though no longer Premier, is, of course, at the back of the present Cabinet, denounced M. Bratiano, the leader of the Liberal party as a thief ("spoliateur") in a debate in the Senate on the tramway question.

M. Take Jonesco, realising doubtless that his position as a leading member of a Cabinet presided over by M. Carp, would mark him out as a target for all the animosity now raging in the Liberal party, and all the more so as he has so recently been that party's ally, insisted that, before taking office under M. Carp, the latter should make the *amende honorable* to the Liberal party, and publicly retract his vituperation of M. Bratiano. This M. Carp refused to do, and for the moment there seemed no hope of the fusion of the two branches of the Conservative party.

M. Carp's effacement, whether due to pique or to a desire not to stand in the way of the fusion so much desired by his Sovereign, has now removed the hitch in the negotiations which are believed to-day to be very near a satisfactory conclusion.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[45409] No. 811.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 891.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, reporting on the recent operations of the Bulgarian and Turkish troops and on the situation at Adrianople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 811.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Adrianople, October 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of your Excellency the following particulars of the situation here:—

According to the statement of the vali, hostile operations commenced before daybreak on the morning of the 18th instant, on which day small bodies of the opposing forces came into contact with one another at numerous points near the frontier, the chief of which were Selbikin, Lefke, and Lahana Pashakeui, where a portion of the independent cavalry of both sides met. The Bulgarians evidently took the offensive, for all the above encounters took place on Turkish territory. On the other hand, the troops at Kirjali crossed the frontier and occupied what the vali describes as an important position. Mustapha Pasha, which had been held only by an infantry battalion, was evacuated on the 18th, the bridge being blown up. I hear, however, that this operation was only partially successful, and that comparatively little repair will suffice to again render it passable. On the 19th instant the Bulgarians occupied Lefke, on which date the 11th division from Demotika moved to Ortakeui, the three battalions of the Xanthi redif regiment being also moved there from Adrianople.

During the night of the 19th–20th a small Bulgarian force, which I estimate from accounts which reach me at 2,000 men, surprised a Turkish outpost at Haskeui and compelled the battalion of the 29th regiment, together with a battery of artillery, to retire on the Karahamza Chiflik, which position they were reported to be holding on

the afternoon of the 20th. Bulgarian troops were also reported at Hadikeui, a station midway between Adrianople and Mustapha Pasha, at noon on the 20th. Early this morning a number of troops, said to be a portion of the Turkish force which on the 18th instant was holding the Kurtkeui–Chermen line, came into the town in considerable disorder and clamouring for food. The 11th division also marched in here this morning and is leaving immediately for Havsa, where, I believe, are the head-quarters of the IVth Army Corps. These facts justify, I venture to think, the belief that the Turkish advance forces are falling back on the main body.

The Turkish population of this town have been much perturbed by the arrival of the inhabitants of those villages between Adrianople and the frontier which have been occupied by the Bulgarian troops. Their uneasiness has not been allayed by a notice which was issued yesterday by the military authorities directing all indigent persons and old people to at once leave the town, together with those persons who were unable to provide themselves with supplies for two months. Large numbers are endeavouring to leave by train, but the accommodation at the disposal of the railway authorities is exceedingly limited and by no means equal to that required. The majority of the non-Moslem population who are in a position to do so have already left the town. Excellent order is being maintained, and the notice referred to above seems to have been issued with the express object of reducing the number of persons for whom the military authorities would otherwise be compelled to find means of subsistence in the event of the town being besieged.

My Greek and Bulgarian colleagues left on the 19th instant, their respective interests being taken charge of by my Russian colleague.

Considerable pessimism prevails among the Turkish official classes here, who express great disappointment that the Turkish army has not yet assumed the offensive.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON,
Major.

[45462] No. 812.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith translation of the proclamation issued by King Peter to the Servian nation from Nish on the 18th instant.*

A good deal of capital has of late been made by the Servian Government out of "the cruel and intolerable sufferings of their brother Serbs in Turkey," but the fact remains that until two months ago the relations between the Turkish and Servian Governments were, if not cordial, at least altogether friendly. It was one of the main principles of the late M. Milovanovitch's policy to keep on good terms with Turkey so as to ensure for Servian commerce the freedom of the Salonica route and some measure of independence from Austria. Indeed, M. Milovanovitch is supposed at various times to have meditated a Serbo-Turkish alliance as offering to Servia the best protection against both Austria and Bulgaria, and as being the best guarantee of her existence, but Russian opposition to this project was too strong.

The Sienitza massacre and the sufferings of the Serbs generally are therefore mere pretexts put forward to justify an aggression which first and last is due to nothing but desire for territorial conquest. The mind of the Servian people is at present fired with this idea alone.

It would, of course, be useless to pretend that Serbs have not suffered cruelties at the hands of the Turks and Albanian Moslem population, or that the Turkish administration is even passable, but the question is whether the wrongs committed have not been to a very great extent exaggerated, and also whether a very much better state of affairs prevails in outlying parts of Servia. It certainly seems very doubtful whether, supposing Servia to be successful in occupying the regions which are here designated as Old Servia, the Servian administration, with only a weak army at their disposal, will be able to keep under an unruly Moslem population, a task which was not easy for the Turks themselves. In my despatch No. 65 of the 7th instant, I quoted some statistics showing that the Moslem Albanian population in Old Servia is four times more numerous than the orthodox Serb population, and it is not to be supposed that the

* Not printed.

Moslem population would submit tamely to Christian rule. A somewhat curious comment upon the lamentations concerning the sufferings of the Serbs in Turkey is furnished by the fact that Servians are now complaining bitterly that the Albanian bands which have recently inflicted such severe losses on the Servian troops were composed of Serbs (probably converted to Mohammedanism).

To explain the observation I have made above concerning the condition of affairs in outlying parts of Servia, I venture to quote below statistics collected by the Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and published in the Servian press on the 20th September last, according to which between the years 1906 and the present day, therefore in the course of six years, the following crimes were committed to the detriment of Serbs in Turkey:—

436 assassinations, 261 attempted assassinations, 289 cases of brigandage, 293 thefts, 229 cases of holding up to ransom, 160 cases of brutal ill-treatment, 213 assaults, 31 cases of arson, 10 cases of profanation of sacred objects, 146 cases of illegal detention, 33 cases of rape.

On the other hand, in Servia proper, according to statistics furnished by the "Cour de Cassation," there occurred between the 1st January, 1910, and the 1st January, 1911, therefore in the course of one year:—

850 assassinations, 939 cases of wounding, 240 cases of brigandage, 2,093 cases of theft, 69 cases of rape, 54 cases of unnatural offences, 618 crimes committed by functionaries in the exercise of their official duties.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[45474] No. 813.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Sophia, October 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Varna, reporting on the demonstration made by the Turkish fleet off that port and along the neighbouring coast.

From subsequent telegraphic reports received from Mr. Vice-Consul Gilliat-Smith, it would appear that the Turkish ships bombarded Kavarna on the 21st instant, burning down the landing-stage and the customs-house. The Royal palace at Euxinograd, as well as the barracks and sanatorium, situated some 2 miles distant, were also bombarded on the same day; but with what result it is not definitely known. The Turkish ships are reported to have left the same evening.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 813.

Vice-Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Varna, October 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram of this afternoon and to report that at 7 A.M. this morning firing was heard in the direction of Euxinograd. It lasted over a quarter of an-hour, and consisted of about fifty shots. Later on two men-of-war and two torpedo craft were seen cruising across the bay at a distance of about 8 miles from the coast in the direction of Galata point, round which they disappeared, soon to return, however, and to recross the bay at the same distance, until they were again opposite Euxinograd, where they stopped and still are stationed.

They are said to be Turkish war-vessels. All my colleagues, with one exception, are convinced that they are men-of-war of the Turkish fleet. The authorities say they do not know.

Having no means of checking information or of ascertaining the truth, the weather not being clear enough for me to distinguish the flags under which they are sailing, I have the honour to submit that these vessels may be Russian. A telephone

message was received at Varna yesterday afternoon stating that Russian men-of-war were seen off Kavarna, cruising in a southerly direction at about 3 P.M. The Russian vice-consul is at great pains to impress upon me the fact that they are not Russian vessels. Considerable numbers of troops are apparently withdrawn from the vicinity of Euxinograd. I believe it is a fact, although it is denied in many quarters, that the shots fired were blank shots. It is said that they were fired against the Bulgarian torpedo craft which were hugging the shore along the coast at daybreak, but, if so, none of these shots either hit the torpedo craft or the shore, nor was any splash noticeable in the water, although many people are making statements to the contrary.

However, the Red Cross flag is now hoisted over the hospital, the port is said to be closed, and the Austrian Lloyd steamer, due at 8 A.M. this morning, after waiting some time beyond the mine field, steamed away presumably to Constanza.

I have also the honour to report that Mehmet Bey, the Turkish consul, left for Constantinople yesterday afternoon.

I have, &c.
BERNARD GILLIAT-SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 813.

Vice-Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 39.)

Varna, October 20, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the opinion prevalent in many quarters here at the time of the recent demonstration, namely, that the battle-ships were Russian, appears to have been wrong. The battle-ships in question are said to have been "Torgud" and "Barbarossa," of the Turkish fleet.

They appeared again towards mid-day to-day at a great distance from Varna, and it was therefore impossible to ascertain whether they were accompanied or not by torpedo destroyers.

Their object is said to be blockade, and not bombardment.

The port is closed, the lighthouse on Galata point is not lighted at night, and also the town is very dark, all the more noticeable lights being extinguished.

Perfect order reigns in the town, but many people are leaving for the interior.

I have, &c.
BERNARD GILLIAT-SMITH.

[45476] No. 814.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)

Sophia, October 23, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 114, Confidential, of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that the Bulgarian Government decided to consider the recall of the Ottoman chargé d'affaires as a definite rupture of relations, and, as Moukbil Bey left the same evening with his staff, a manifesto was issued to the nation instead of an ultimatum being presented at the legation. Copy of this manifesto is enclosed herewith. It was affixed to all the public buildings in Sophia and the leading towns of Bulgaria, and His Majesty the King read it in the presence of the Bulgarian generals on his arrival at head-quarters at Stara Zagora.

The publication of this manifesto on the 18th instant was considered as a declaration of war.

The Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople was instructed to inform the Porte of this issue of the manifesto, to ask for his letters of recall, and to leave the capital immediately.

On the morning of the 18th instant a solemn service was celebrated in the cathedral of Sophia: there were present Her Majesty the Queen, the President of the Council, the Bulgarian Ministers, and the Greek and Servian Ministers.

The Metropolitan Archbishop prayed for the blessing of God on the arms of the allied forces. After the usual prayers for the King and Queen of Bulgaria and the members of the Royal Family, the benediction of the Almighty was also invoked for the Royal Families of Servia, Greece, and Montenegro as allies, and, lastly, separate

[45475] No. 813 A.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 118.)

Sophia, October 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the ordinary session of the Sobranjé, which had been fixed to take place on the 28th October, has been postponed until the 14th December.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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prayers were recited for the Emperor and Empress of Russia as protectors of the Slav nations. This is the first occasion on which prayers have been offered in Bulgarian churches for the Greek and Servian Sovereigns.

A similar service was held at Stara Zagora in the presence of His Majesty the King, the young Princes, the generals, and the head-quarters staff.

Immediately after the conclusion of the service M. Gueshof addressed a telegram to the Presidents of the Councils of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro informing them of what had taken place, and expressing the wish that the work now undertaken would be pushed to a successful and glorious conclusion.

On it becoming known that the Ottoman Government had declared that the identic note of the three Balkan States did not merit a reply, a communication was made to all the foreign newspaper correspondents in the capital, copy of which I have the honour to forward.* The last paragraph is to the effect that it is ridiculous that a Government which since the Crimean war had constantly trampled on its engagements made with the Great Powers, on whom it depends, should now accuse the Balkan States of wanting in respect towards their protectors.

I was able to report to you in my telegram No. 79 that M. Ludskanof had left for St. Petersburgh, and that a mission would in all probability shortly leave Belgrade in order to influence the Russian Government in favour of the allied corps and to obtain assistance for the wounded. The arrival of this mission was reported by the "Neue Freie Presse" some days later.

On the 17th instant I was approached by one of the American missionaries and by General Demetrief, adjutant-general of the Bulgarian army, who informed me that, in case the Red Cross Society should decide to come to Bulgaria, there were a considerable number, both of Americans and English-speaking Bulgarians, who would be glad to assist the society in any way possible. I promised to bring their kind offer to the notice of His Majesty's Government.

On the 19th instant I was informed, most confidentially, that the Greek fleet had left for the Dardanelles and that they intended to offer all possible resistance to the exit of Turkish ships from the straits.

On the 20th instant I heard from the vice-consul at Varna that two men-of-war, said to be Turkish, had demonstrated yesterday 8 miles off the coast, but that they had left without inflicting any damage.

The result of the first battle is awaited here with intense anxiety, but with some confidence. A leading Bulgarian statesman informed me that the general staff believed that it would take place in the neighbourhood of Kirk Kilissé, a small town to the east of Adrianople, situated between that fortress and the sea. He added that it was the intention of the Bulgarian head-quarters staff to seek out the Turkish army and to proceed to an immediate engagement.

The British consular agent at Rustchuk wrote that a mass meeting was held in that town on the 18th instant. The leading orators inveighed against the Great Powers and condemned their policy, and stated that, whilst pursuing their own policy, they were indifferent to the atrocities committed in Macedonia. After the speeches the crowd made ovations before the prefecture, and the Russian consul appeared on the balcony and expressed his good wishes for the success of the arms of the allies.

The above is the first action, as far as I know, taken by a Russian official in Bulgaria showing active sympathy with the Slav cause.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 814.

Manifesto.

SA Majesté le Roi a adressé le manifeste suivant à la nation :—

"Bulgares,

"Au cours de mon règne de vingt-cinq ans j'ai toujours cherché, dans un paisible travail de culture, le progrès, le bonheur et la gloire de la Bulgarie. Et c'est dans cette direction que je voulais voir marcher constamment la nation bulgare.

* Not printed.

"Mais la Providence en a jugé autrement. Le moment est venu où la race bulgare est appelée à renoncer aux bienfaits de la paix et à recourir aux armes pour la réalisation d'un grand problème.

"Par delà de Rilo et les Rhodopes nos frères de sang et de religion ne furent pas heureux jusqu'à ce jour, trente-cinq ans après notre libération, d'acquérir une vie humaine supportable.

"Tous les efforts faits pour atteindre ce but, tant par les Grandes Puissances que par le Gouvernement bulgare, ne purent pas créer des conditions permettant à ces chrétiens de jouir de droits et de libertés humains.

"Les larmes de l'esclave balkanique, les gémissements des millions de chrétiens ne pouvaient pas ne pas ébranler nos cœurs, cœurs de leurs congénères et coreligionnaires qui sommes redevables de notre liberté et notre vie paisible à une grande libératrice chrétienne.

"Et la nation bulgare s'est rappelée les paroles prophétiques du Tsar Libérateur: 'L'œuvre sacrée doit être menée à bout.'

"Notre amour de la paix est épuisé. Pour secourir la population chrétienne opprimée en Turquie, il ne nous reste plus d'autre moyen que de nous tourner vers les armes. Nous voyons que c'est par ce seul moyen que nous pourrons lui assurer la protection de la vie et des biens. L'anarchie dans les provinces turques a menacé même notre vie nationale. Après les massacres d'Ichtip et de Kotchana, au lieu d'accorder justice et satisfaction aux éprouvés comme nous l'avions demandé, le Gouvernement turc ordonna la mobilisation de ses forces militaires. Notre longue patience fut aussi mise à une rude épreuve.

"Les sentiments humanitaires chrétiens, le devoir sacré de secourir ses frères lorsqu'ils sont menacés d'extermination, l'honneur et la dignité de la Bulgarie m'imposèrent le devoir impératif d'appeler sous les drapeaux les fils préparés pour la défense de la patrie.

"Notre œuvre est juste, grande et sacrée.

"Avec une foi recueillie dans l'appui du Très-Haut, je porte à la connaissance de la nation bulgare que la guerre pour l'acquisition de droits humains pour les chrétiens en Turquie est déclarée.

"J'ordonne à la brave armée bulgare de marcher sur le territoire turc! A nos côtés et avec nous combattront dans le même but contre l'ennemi commun les armées des États balkaniques alliées à la Bulgarie: la Serbie, la Grèce et le Monténégro. Et dans cette lutte de la Croix contre le Croissant, de la liberté contre la tyrannie, nous aurons les sympathies de tous ceux qui aiment la justice et le progrès. Fort de ces sympathies, que le valeureux soldat bulgare se souvienne des actes héroïques de ses pères et de ses aïeux et de la vaillance de ses maîtres libérateurs russes et qu'il vole de victoire en victoire.

"En avant, que Dieu soit avec nous!"

[45410] No. 815.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 802.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the departure of Abdullah Pasha and Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha for the scene of operations, and commenting on the confidence felt by Turkish officers generally that the Bulgarian mobilisation has been a failure.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 815.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Abdullah Pasha left for Baba Eski last night, and that Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, the newly appointed commander of the IIIrd Army Corps, went with him. There was a large crowd of officers at the station to see them off, the general tone of the assembly being cheery and confident.

I had last seen Abdullah Pasha on the 11th, when I found him cheerful, and in a frame of mind very different from that which I reported to your Excellency on the 3rd instant, the reason for the change being that the Turkish mobilisation was going quicker than he had expected, and that the situation, about which he had been so pessimistic, was, he thought, saved. In another five days he thought the Bulgarian chances would be gone.

Last night, at the station, I found him even more confident. He said they had certain news that the Bulgarian mobilisation had been a great disappointment, as well as reliable information of the Bulgarian dispositions, which were very bad. They had two divisions strung out along the frontier and inadequately supported, and, so far from anticipating the attack which he had feared, he now expected to take the offensive. It was the same with all to whom I talked. Mir Alai Shukri Bey, who was a short time ago military attaché in Sophia, told me that the Bulgarians had now 86,000 men west of the Tunja and 64,000 east of it, with two weak divisions at Philippopoli.

It appears to me that the Turks cannot possibly take the offensive yet, and that they will make a grave error if they alter their plans now with this object. They are probably badly informed about the Bulgarian dispositions, and I cannot believe that Bulgaria would have brought on this war without being pretty sure of her mobilisation arrangements and of her degree of readiness on the declaration of war. Whereas, in spite of the numbers of Turks passing over from Asia, it is evident from the odd redif battalions which pass through that hardly any Asiatic division can yet be fully formed with its component parts, ready to be put into line of battle as a complete unit in its proper place in the general scheme of the army.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[45411] No. 816.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 803.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on number of men sent by rail from Constantinople and San Stefano.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 816.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a statement showing the number of men who have passed on the railway from Constantinople and San Stefano to the front between the 6th and the 14th. These are additional to the moves of cavalry on the 6th, reported in my No. 75. In addition to these, about 30,000 redifs have been sent up by road from Rodosto.

It is impossible to determine the exact destinations of the trains or to say what units they contained, and these figures are only given for what they are worth.

There is little system to be observed in the order in which troops arrive and are dispatched. The trains are fearfully overcrowded, some of them taking nearly 2,000 men. Arrangements for the comfort of the troops *en route* are very deficient, and they are often without their daily ration. At Uzun Keupru a few days ago some famished soldiers fell upon a gang of railway workmen and took their food, while I am informed that the state of the men waiting at San Stefano is now deplorable.

No traffic is reported on the Salonica Junction Railway, and with the exception of 1,000 men said to have been for Monastir, the figures in the annexed statement relate entirely to the army of the east.

Traffic returns from Salonica show that about 6,000 men and 45 wagons of artillery from all directions were directed on Keuprulu between the 3rd and the 8th.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 816.

STATEMENT respecting Traffic reported on the Oriental Railway Line, October 6 to 14.

Date.	Number of Trains.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
October 6	5	80	4,750	100	..
„ 7	2	15	250	480	..
„ 8	5	350	4,000	..	24
„ 9	9	165	16,000	170	18
„ 10	6	145	8,000	48	36 18 (machine)
	27	755	33,000	798	..
„ 11	10	..	16,340	..	..
„ 12	8	..	12,800	..	..
„ 13	10	318	14,400	..	..
„ 14	10	213	8,560	..	..
Total	65	..	85,100	..	..

The destination between the 11th and the 14th was given for the most part as Kirk Kilisse.

These trains also transported:—

78 guns and 18 machine-guns, as above,
6 automobiles,
19 field ovens,
50 truck-loads of artillery ammunition,
40 truck-loads of small-arm ammunition,
50 truck-loads of provisions,

besides truck-loads of petrol, boots, clothing, tents, stretchers, medical stores, engineer tools, &c.

[45412] No. 817.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October 28.*)

(No. 894.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 866 of 16th October, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this Embassy, reporting on seizure of forty-four wagons containing Servian war material, which has arrived at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 817.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a train of forty-four wagons containing the Servian war material seized by the Turkish Government has arrived at Constantinople. Abdullah Pasha told me that this seizure meant a loss to the Servians, and an addition to the Turkish army, of thirteen quick-firing field batteries complete with ammunition. From the detailed list supplied by His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Salonica it would appear that this statement is roughly correct, there being fifty-two guns and

considerable quantities of ammunition. But the sights and other fittings do not appear to be quite complete for thirteen batteries. This haul might prove very useful to the Turks, who have several officers acquainted with the Creusot material; but before making use of it time would be required to form the personnel of the batteries and instruct the gunners, while the question of horsing all the batteries which they already possess is a difficult one.

I have, &c.
C. E. TYRRELL.

[45413] No. 818.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October 28.*)

(No. 895.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, forwarding an epitome of the traffic on the railways in the western theatre.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 818.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith an epitome of the traffic on the railways in the western theatre, which I am enabled to do from some returns which Mr. Laub, His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, has very kindly sent me:—

To Kouprulu.

Between the 3rd and the 8th—			
From Salonica	4,800*		
By the Junction Line viâ Karasuli	600		
		5,400	
From the 9th to the 12th—			
From Salonica	8,899		
By the Junction Line viâ Karasuli	1,101		
		say 10,000	
On the 13th and 14th—			
From Salonica	1,880		
By the Junction Line viâ Karasuli	800		
		say 2,700	
On the 15th—			
From Salonica	1,520	1,520	
		19,620	

Or, roughly, 20,000 men (of which some 3,000 are reported as coming by the Junction Railway, and 1,000 from Prishtina, and the remainder from Salonica), over 500 officers, 3,000 horses, and 270 wagons described as "artillery."

Early in the month the following moves also took place:—

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Machine-guns.
From Perlovich to Kouprulu ..	38	1,579	135	4
„ Mitrovitza to Uskub ..	63	1,250	235	1 companies

These were probably connected with the reintegration of units of the 1st and 11th divisions, and nothing to do with the concentration at Kouprulu.

* 1,000 of these were from Prishtina.

In the direction of Monastir and the Greek frontier, the following moves are reported between the 3rd and the 15th:—

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.
From Gevgheli to Karaferia	25	675	310
„ Demir Hissar to Monastir	..	1,280	..
„ Salonica to Monastir	..	520	..
„ „ Sorovich	..	1,600	..

And on the 16th, from Salonica to Sorovich, about 2,500 men and 400 horses.

The move reported as from Demir Hissar to Monastir is probably that of two battalions of the Drama Redif Division.

Four battalions are reported to be on the railway line to guard it:—

One from Gevgheli to Kenprulu.
„ „ Karaferia.
Two from Monastir to Karaferia.

These can hardly be nizam battalions, which are all pretty well accounted for. They may be redif battalions, but they are more likely to be collections of Mustaphiz, of spare reservists, or even of volunteers.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[45414] No. 819.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 896.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 869 of the 17th October, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the subject of German officers in the Turkish service taking part in the war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 819.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my No. 73 of the 14th instant on the subject of the German officers in the Turkish service taking part in the war, I have the honour to report as follows:—

1. *Major von Hochwechter.*—Has gone to the front to be attached to Abdullah Pasha's staff. This officer is not one of those officially sent here under the auspices of the German Government. He is no longer in the German army, and came out here privately and on his own account to enter the Turkish service, having made a purely private and personal contract with the Turkish Government, by whom he is considered as a Turkish officer pure and simple. He has been at Damascus for more than two years, where he has done a good deal of work, nominally as instructor of cavalry, though he appears to have rendered considerable service to the Turks in reorganising and instructing the troops generally. At the same time I am told that he is in constant communication with his own Government, which he keeps informed of everything going on in his view.

2. *Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossow.*—Is an instructor at the Staff College. Contract still running. Has resigned his position in the German army, and also his German (Bavarian) nationality, in order to go to the war with the Turks. Having done this, he went up to the front as a Turkish officer, though he has not officially become a Turkish subject.

3. *Lieutenant-Colonel Veit.*—Was commanding the 1st Regiment of Lancers. His contract expired this year, and has not been renewed. He has no wish to go back to Germany, and, besides resigning his position in the German army, he has definitely become a Turkish subject. Is reported to have left last night for Kirk Kilisse to serve in his old regiment. Has now the status of a Turkish officer, but told the Turks he required no pay. He is a queer man, and has had some domestic trouble in Germany, and I should not be surprised if he did not become a Mussulman as well as a Turkish subject.

The above (and Lieutenant Jannow, reported in my No. 74 of the 14th October) are the only German officers that I know of who have actually gone to the front. But Colonel Baron Bopp and Major Back will probably do so. The former is also one of those whose contract with the Turkish Government expired this year, but he had already left the German army before coming here, although he is one of the officers officially lent. The latter has his contract still running, and he tells me that Veit and von Lossow were precipitate in renouncing their nationality, as this now appeared to be unnecessary, and that he himself expected to be told merely to resign his position in the German army temporarily, so that he could go as a Turkish officer, which he would remain only for the duration of the war.

I have &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[45415] No. 820.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 897.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 24, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, forwarding a résumé of events in Western Albania, and a distribution of troops at present in Western Albania.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 820.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 22, 1912.

THOUGH events in Western Albania have attracted little notice of late, the fact that the Turkish troops in that region have for some time past been fully occupied by the Mirdites and Malissors is likely to have a considerable influence on the earlier course of the wars that have now broken out. Firstly, the Montenegrin advance on the side of Scutari has been much facilitated; and secondly, the absence from its place of the Elbassan redif division, which should have been immediately available for the force on the Greek frontier, will be seriously felt there. Further, two nizam divisions (the 17th and 18th) have been depleted of some of their battalions to assist the 24th division at Scutari, and are therefore only partially available for the concentration on the Vardar.

I have the honour to submit a résumé of events in Western Albania, and to annex a distribution of the troops at present locked up there.

The trouble began in July when the whole of Albania was rising against the Government of the Committee of Union and Progress. The 4th nizam division, which had been hurriedly sent up from the Dardanelles to Monastir to deal with Tayyar Bey's revolt, having proved no more effectual for that purpose than the local troops had been, was dispatched to Firaun and Koritza to keep the Albanians quiet. When, on account of the strained relations with Bulgaria, it became desirable to restore the position in Thrace, the 4th division returned to Monastir prior to coming back to its own place, and the 17th and 18th divisions were drawn on to replace its battalions in Western Albania.

On the 10th September Dechich was attacked by the Albanians of the Gruda clan. The garrison apparently could not be relieved from Scutari, which was itself in a state

of chronic siege, and on the 18th it was reported to be hard pressed, though it finally only fell shortly before the Montenegrins captured Tuzi.

On the 17th September 3,000 ihtiyats from Durazzo were called out to reinforce Scutari, and on the 19th all classes of redifs were embodied. At the same time the command of the troops at Tirana was conferred on Essad Pasha Topdan, the well-known Albanian deputy, who is a man of great local influence.

On the other side, Prishtina and Mitrovitza redifs were called out to complete nizam units, but the Prishtina men declined to come out if it was to fight against the Malissors.

Essad Pasha started from Durazzo on the 24th September with four nizam battalions (II/50, I/51, II and III/54) and a machine-gun company, four redif battalions (Durazzo, Kavaya, Tirana, and Kroya), and two battalions of volunteers, but some delay was caused by the attitude of the Mirdites, through a part of whose country the road from Durazzo to Scutari runs. They offered to let Essad Pasha through, but would not allow his troops to go with him. However, this obstacle appears to have been surmounted, whether forcibly or otherwise there is no news, for the above force is reported to have reached Scutari on the 3rd October.

The position on the 10th October was as shown on the accompanying dislocation forms:—

	Battalions.		Remarks.
	Nizam.	Redif.	
At Alessio and Medua ..	2		And a machine-gun company.
At Kroya	1	..	
At Elbassan	1	3	
At Tirana	2	1	
At Durazzo		2	
In Mirditia	3	..	And a machine-gun company and quick-firing mountain battery.
In Scutari	8	8*	
Abou Tuzi	6	..	And an o.p. mountain battery.
	20	17	

* Presuming that the four local redif battalions are embodied.

There is in Scutari a squadron of the 6th cavalry regiment, which was sent from Monastir, and a battery of the 12-centim. howitzers. Whether this last is one of the Monastir batteries, or whether it has been specially formed out of surplus matériel, is not clear. There are also three battalions of fortress artillery. The place is said to be very strongly fortified, with a well chosen perimeter of about 25 kilom. in extent, and an armament of about seventy heavy guns. The commander of the 24th division, Hassan Riza Bey, has the reputation of being one of the very best and most capable soldiers in the Turkish army. Though I have never met him personally, he is most highly thought of by Englishmen who have done so. He was for a long time chief of the staff at Adrianople, where, under the old régime, he had the rank of ferik, and was afterwards Nazim Pasha's chief of the staff at Bagdad.

The 72nd regiment was specially reinforced and formed into six battalions, so that the whole force from Elbassan to Scutari was thirty-seven battalions, five machine-gun companies, ten batteries, and a squadron—about 30,000 men and 42 guns, exclusive of the volunteers and the fortress artillery.

In spite of the categorical reports from correspondents at Cettinjé, they still insist at the Ministry of War here that the prisoners taken at Tuzi only amounted to a few hundreds. They admit that it was a mistake to leave anyone there after the fall of Dechich, but say that after the Albanians had occupied the direct road to Scutari, the bulk of the men there effected their retreat safely by Vranj, only leaving a small garrison in the place.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[45418]

No. 821.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 900.)
Sir,

Constantinople, October 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 472 and 473 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica respecting the encounter which recently took place at Kriva between a Bulgarian band and the Turkish troops.

I have, &c.
GERALD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 821.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 139.)
Sir,

Salonica, October 16, 1912.

THE following particulars are published here concerning the incident at Kriva, alluded to in my telegrams Nos. 43 and 45 of the 14th instant, and, though I am unable to control their exactitude, I think they are probably in the main correct:—

On Saturday, the 12th instant, information reached the mudir of Chomendje that four Bulgarian bands, numbering together about 200 men, had united their forces in the neighbouring village of Kriva, and were endeavouring to persuade the inhabitants to rise against the Government. He proceeded at once to the spot with such gendarmes as he could collect, but was unable to enter the village, from the houses of which the bandits opened fire upon his escort, several of whom were wounded. He was shortly after joined by the kaimakam of Chevgheli, who arrived on the scene with more gendarmes and a number of soldiers drawn from the detachments guarding the railway line. A lively fusillade was kept up till far into the night and resumed in the morning of the following day, in the course of which a further force of 300 men and two guns arrived from Salonica. The officer in command is said to have granted a delay, within which the inhabitants were called upon either to surrender the bandits or to send out the women and children and other non-combatants preparatory to a bombardment of the village. The guns were brought back to Salonica on the 14th, and I learn from a competent source that the village had been practically destroyed. It has, however, been impossible so far to obtain any definite information concerning either the fate of the inhabitants or the casualties on the side of the troops, though it is officially declared that every effort was made to secure the removal of all non-combatants amongst the former prior to the final attack.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[45443]

No. 822.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 81.)
Sir,

Bucharest, October 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 72 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that criticisms of the passive attitude of the present Government in the face of the war in the Balkans still continue in the Opposition press, but hitherto there has been noticeable in these criticisms a lack of precision as to any alternative attitude, and their tone has lacked that ring of sincerity which would lead one to believe that if the Liberals came into office to-morrow they would be in favour of any more active policy. Yesterday, however, there appeared in the Opposition papers a communiqué (enclosed herewith*) of a somewhat more precise character, condemning the inertia of the Government and advocating the taking of such measures on the frontier as common prudence demands in view of the reported landing of Turkish troops at Kavarna, some 20 miles distant from the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier.

* Not printed.

This Opposition pronouncement has evoked a counter-communiqué in the Government organ, "La Politique," of to-day, twitting the Opposition on the lack of precision which characterises their criticisms of the Government's policy, and challenging them to declare openly whether it is mobilisation that they want. The communiqué asserts that the frontiers are better guarded to-day than ever, and, as regards the charge of inertia, points out that Roumania has nothing to gain by bluster.

It is with some diffidence that I trouble you with these party pronouncements, for it is of course the King who directs the foreign policy of this country, and the Opposition's criticisms will have to be of a very different character before I shall believe that the Liberals are really any more desirous to interfere with their Sovereign's wise direction of foreign affairs than are the present Government.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[45463] No. 823.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October 24, 1912.*

THE Servian Government organ, "Samouprava," of the 23rd instant, publishes a leading article stating that it sees with interest and satisfaction that since the war began the European press is gradually changing its tone and is now coming round to the point of view of the Balkan States. This change it says is due to the fact that the anxiety caused at the beginning of the crisis that the Balkan war would bring about a general European war is now gradually subsiding and that as the war progresses the hope that it will be localised in the Balkans gains strength. It goes on to say that the greater part of the European press now begins to sympathise with the struggle of the Balkan States for the liberation of their oppressed brothers, and that their liberation is altogether legitimate and that it will be a gain to European civilisation. One of the principal signs of this, it considers, is the tone now adopted by the Austro-Hungarian press. Both in Austria and in Hungary the struggle of the Balkan States is now commented upon with greater justice: "And when the press of the neighbouring monarchy becomes thoroughly convinced that the Balkan nations, while struggling for the freedom of their own homes, fully and seriously understand their duty in respect of the rights of others—and we on our own part will do everything to strengthen this conviction—then will all those elements which have given rise to anxiety entirely disappear. The adjustment of the Balkan political conditions, peace and justice, is so manifestly favourable to the economical and political interests of Austria-Hungary that the monarchy, in her very own interests, would have many a reason to effectively help its realisation.

"We confidently expect such a turn in the public opinion in the neighbouring monarchy, and we are thoroughly convinced that it will not only help the improvement of the political situation in the Balkans, but also help to realise the wish of the Great Powers and the whole of the civilised world, viz., the introduction in European international affairs of those elements of justice which are the surest guarantee for peace. In this direction Austria-Hungary would surely reap the greatest benefit, and would furnish to the world a fresh proof of her love for peace. In so far as the Balkan nations are concerned, they would never forget such a service."

M. d'Ugron, my Austrian colleague, whom I saw yesterday, attributed the tone of this article to a sense of the wholly helpless position of Servia *vis-à-vis* of any action Austria might now take, but it rather appears to be an attempt of the Servian Government to feel their way respecting the question of the sanjak, and perhaps also to let Russia understand that, failing Russian support, they are willing to come to terms with Austria.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[45464] No. 824.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Belgrade, October 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a report which Major Thomson, military attaché to this legation, is addressing to the Director of Military Operations at the War Office.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 824.

Report by Major Thomson.

General Situation.

THE positions occupied by the Servian troops in the evening of the 22nd instant were given in my telegram No. 1 sent this morning. This information has appeared in the press and is probably known to you already, but it is now officially confirmed and may be accepted as accurate.

The Appendix attached to this report shows the "ordre de bataille" of the Servian forces, which are organised in four armies, described respectively as Nos. 1, 2, 3, and the Ibar army.

The positions mentioned in telegram No. 1 as having been already occupied by the Servians indicate the continuance of a converging movement on the part of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies with Skoplje (Uskub) as the point of concentration. The Ibar army is operating in the direction of Novi-Bazar, and as stated in the telegram, fighting took place a few miles north of that place on the 22nd instant. The 1st army is advancing by road and rail from Vranya viâ Kumanovo on Uskub; the absence of any news as to the operations of this army may be attributed to the slowness of its advance, caused by the fact that the Turks in their retreat on Uskub destroyed several railway bridges, thus delaying rail transport, while the road is in such bad condition that ox transport only can be used. The 2nd army is on the road between Kustendil and Kumanovo; its advanced troops are said to have reached the latter place, while the main body has reached the neighbourhood of Ratibus. The 3rd army moving from Nish by the road leading through Prokuplie has already occupied Prishtina, it is probable that this army is moving in two columns of which the left column is directed on Katchanik (on the railway between Uskub and Prishtina), but has failed to reach that place so far on account of the difficult nature of the country, which facilitates delaying tactics by small forces of the enemy. It may be concluded that the engagements hitherto reported have consisted principally of encounters with Turkish frontier posts and bands of Arnauts; but the losses of the Servians have, nevertheless, been considerable. The War Office admit to 1,200 casualties and this is probably an underestimate. It is significant that already 2,000 men of the last reserve have been dispatched by train from Belgrade to the front to make good the wastage of the past few days. A big battle is contemplated on or about the 30th instant in the neighbourhood of Uskub.

The rôle of the Ibar army is not yet apparent, as there are no regular Turkish troops in the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. This army is based on Kralievo.

The War Office in Belgrade has no control over the operations, which are directed from army head-quarters either at Nish or Vranya. Communication between armies being maintained in some instances by wireless telegraphy.

Mobilisation.

2. Mobilisation was completed in three weeks exactly. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ban's were mobilised simultaneously, and a very high percentage of men joined the colours, many of them bringing horses and carts. No delay occurred in the assembling of personnel, but the limited railway accommodation retarded concentration, which was commenced prematurely before divisions were fully equipped with transport, &c. The following units have been formed:—

One cavalry division, 1st Ban.
One cavalry brigade, 2nd Ban.
Five infantry divisions, 1st Ban.
Five infantry divisions, 2nd Ban.
One infantry division, surplus reservists, who are being held back as the last reserve mentioned in paragraph 1.

The territorial designations of the divisions are given on p. 14 of the "Handbook," and are referred to in the "Ordre de Bataille." In addition to the above, a large number of men (stated in some quarters to amount to 60,000) were rejected as medically unfit, but are liable to be recalled in case of need.

As a basis for estimating the total forces available, the following data form a general guide:—

A cavalry division of the 1st Ban consists of 3,000 sabres, two 4-gun batteries horse artillery.

A cavalry brigade of the 2nd Ban is a unit formed in mobilisation only, but may comprise 1,500 sabres.

In a 1st Ban infantry division there are 16,000 rifles, 300 sabres, 36 guns.

In a 2nd Ban infantry division there are, at most, 12,000 rifles, 200 sabres, 8–12 guns.

Taking the division of supplement as containing 15,000 rifles, it will be seen that the Servians have put into the field a total force of—

7,000 sabres.
155,000 rifles.
220–240 guns.

This force is well equipped with Mauser rifles and Q.F. Schneider–Creusot guns. There are said to be available in Servia 1,300 rounds of small-arm ammunition per rifle, and at least 1,000 rounds per gun.

The 3rd Ban is not organised in units. The men belonging to this ban take over the duties of frontier guards during mobilisation, and are usually drawn from villages in neighbourhood of their posts. They are armed with converted Koka–Mauser rifles, which are fitted with bayonets about 3 feet long. No men of the 3rd Ban are included in the four armies which have taken the field.

Personnel.

3. The following information regarding some of the higher leaders has been furnished by the Austrian and Russian military attachés in Belgrade, both of whom have been there for a considerable time and are in a position to know.

Army Head-quarters.—General Putnik, Chief of the General Staff. An elderly man, who looks older than he is; possesses ability, but is rather old-fashioned in his ideas; he relies to a great extent on Colonel Mishitch, his assistant, who is described as both capable and energetic.

1st Army.—The Crown Prince is a young man with little knowledge of his profession and is a figurehead.

Colonel Boyovitch, his chief of staff, has had considerable experience of foreign manœuvres, and commanded a cavalry division during Servian manœuvres.

2nd Army.—General Stepanovitch is described as of no use at all, but details are lacking.

3rd Army.—General Yankovitch is said to be the best of the Servian generals; he has been ten years on the retired list. Colonel Peshitch, chief of the staff to the 3rd army, is a very useful officer.

Ibar Army.—General Zhivkovitch is an energetic man, who will take a risk, and does not mind heavy losses. He was concerned in the regicide plot.

As regards the rank and file, the 1st Ban are fairly well trained troops, especially the infantry, and, although the expansion on mobilisation is considerable and officers are scarce, the men of this ban may do good work.

The units of the 2nd Ban are raised on mobilisation from cadres of insignificant size; in some cases there are no cadres at all. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men meet each other for the first time on mobilisation, and from all accounts are

equally ill-trained. The "Ordre de Bataille" shows that the armies are composed of a mixture of the two bans, which would seem a desirable arrangement under the circumstances.

The men of the 3rd Ban are little better than armed peasants, but are brave, and have taken their share in the recent frontier fighting, many of them being among the wounded now arriving in Belgrade.

The Turks.

4. The only information available in Belgrade as to the Turkish troops is that given by the "Times" military correspondent in the "Times" of Monday, the 21st instant.

With these figures as a basis of comparison, the account given by a colonel of the Servian General Staff was not without interest. This officer stated that there were 40,000 Turks in and around Uskub, that 90,000 reinforcements might arrive there by the end of the week, which would leave the Servian army with a considerable numerical superiority, the only set-off against this being that Uskub was strongly fortified. The Servians evidently expect the Turks to act on the defensive.

It is regretted that no more information can be given at present, but the strictest secrecy is maintained, and, what is far more annoying, the highest officials deal in intentionally misleading statements even in their intercourse with the Ministers of foreign Powers.

C. W. THOMSON, *Major, General Staff.*

British Legation, Belgrade, October 25, 1912.

APPENDIX.

"*Ordre de Bataille*," *October 22, 1912.*

Head-quarters Staff (now at Vranya).

Commander-in-Chief, King Peter.
Chief of General Staff, General Putnik.
Assistant Chief of General Staff, Colonel Mishitch.

1st Army (moving south from Vranya on Kumanovo).

General Officer Commanding, the Crown Prince.
Chief of Staff, Colonel Boyovitch.

3,000 sabres.
8 squadrons divisional cavalry.
44,000 rifles.
80–84 field guns.
8 horse artillery guns.

One cavalry division, 1st Ban.
Two infantry divisions, 1st Ban (Morava and Danube divisions).
One infantry division, 2nd Ban (Danube).

2nd Army (moving east from Kustendil on Kumanovo).

General Officer Commanding, General Stepanovitch.

1,500 sabres.
3 squadrons divisional cavalry.
16,000 rifles.
36 guns from Servian army.

One cavalry brigade, 2nd Ban.
One infantry division, 1st Ban (Timok division).
Some Bulgarian troops, probably one division.

3rd Army (moving south from Prishtina on Uskub (Skoplje).

General Officer Commanding, General Yankóviteh.
Chief of Staff, Colonel Peshitch.

5 squadrons divisional cavalry.
28,000 rifles.
44–48 guns.

One infantry division, 1st Ban (Shumadia division).
One infantry division, 2nd Ban (Morava division).

Ibar Army (in Novi-Bazar).

General Officer Commanding, General Zhivkoviteh.

5 squadrons divisional cavalry.
28,000 rifles.
44–48 guns.

One infantry division, 1st Ban (Drina division).
One infantry division, 2nd Ban (Shumadia division).

The positions of the 2nd Ban divisions from the Timok and Drina districts have not yet been located.

[46094] No. 825.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 454a. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, October 19, 1912.*

IN the course of my conversation with the Imperial Chancellor, which I have had the honour to report in my immediately preceding despatch, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke of the Balkans, and regretted that it had not been possible to prevent the outbreak of war. As, however, war had begun, he was convinced that it must be allowed to take its course, and, brutal as it sounded, he hoped it would be very severe and very bloody, and that a hard winter would make it worse. I said I gathered from that that he thought the moment for intervention would not come before the spring, and he said he was sure it would not. I asked if it were not possible that a decisive battle might be fought soon. He said yes; a so-called decisive battle might be fought very soon, but the Bulgarians would win it; and it would not really be decisive, as the Turks would retire to some practically impregnable position and sit and wait there with Oriental patience till they were ready to deal effectively with their enemies. His opinion was that the Powers must not intervene till both sides had suffered very heavily and things were pretty evenly balanced, so that both would be ready and glad to accept mediation. I asked if he thought there could be any question of intervention by force, and he said most decidedly not; we must wait till our peaceful mediation could be accepted. I said I was not suggesting it as probable, but was there not the possibility that his calculations might be upset either by the Bulgarians being even more successful than he expected and advancing so far that they would have to be stopped by Europe, or by the Turks winning the first decisive battle and smashing their enemies in three or four weeks? He considered both hypotheses entirely out of the question.

The important thing for the Powers, he said, was to keep in continual contact with each other, and above all to keep quiet. He was convinced that there was no danger at all of either Austria or Russia moving unless we—England, France, and Germany—set them going by some false move. I asked if he meant that we must keep in continual contact but avoid too many proposals, and he said that was just what he did mean. I then asked if I was right in gathering that he thought M. Poincaré was being a little too active, but that he would not allow, and said that M. Poincaré had shown very useful zeal and had deserved well of Europe. I said I supposed Germany could exercise very beneficent influence on Austria, and France and perhaps ourselves

on Russia. At first, by mistake, I used the word "pressure" in German, which he objected to, but when I corrected it to "influence" he agreed.

He said he did not see that the interests of any of us need clash. Of course, as regards England, there were Suda Bay and the Dardanelles. I jumped at that, and said he surely did not imagine that we wanted to take Suda Bay; we should no doubt object to any other Great Power having it, but I was certain that we had not the smallest idea of taking it ourselves. He said he did not mean that we actually meant or wanted to take it, but that it was always agreeable to any Power to extend its possessions. I assured him that he was entirely mistaken so far as we were concerned. I did not take up his murmured hint of the Dardanelles, and the matter dropped.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[45431] No. 826.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 461. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, October 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the day following my return to Berlin I called upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and had some conversation with him on the subject of the war in the Near East. His Excellency said that, personally speaking, he had no particular preference for any of the combatants, and that, as far as his sympathies were concerned, it was a matter of indifference to him which side gained the victory. From a political and international point of view, however, he was inclined to think that if ultimate victory rested with the Turks the problems left at the close of the war would be easier of solution. The States forming the Balkan league would doubtless look, each one of them, for some addition of territory, and if they gained a decisive victory it would be difficult for the Powers to insist upon the exact *status quo*; whereas the Turks knew very well that they would not be allowed any increase of territory in Europe, and would therefore be more easily restrained from pressing their victory beyond the danger point of forcible intervention.

In any case, he hoped that the Great Powers, especially England, Germany, and France, as the Powers least directly interested in the Balkan States, would keep in close touch with one another, so that, when the time came for mediation or intervention, they could act without hesitation or delay. His Excellency thought that rapidity of action on the part of the three Powers would be especially useful and advantageous in the case of the Turks being victorious—a result which, notwithstanding the latest news from the seat of war, seemed by no means improbable. Should the Bulgarians be badly beaten, it was most probable that strong pressure would be brought to bear upon the Russian Government by Russian public opinion to step in and save their Slav brethren from destruction, and if warlike intervention took place it was impossible to foresee where the war would stop. Bearing this great danger in mind, he felt that England, Germany, and France, acting together, could under the above circumstances render the greatest service to the Russian Government in particular and Europe generally by using their united influence to incline the Turks to moderation, and thus effect by persuasion what Russia would probably only be able to do by force of arms. Should, on the other hand, the Balkan league gain the victory, England, Germany, and France were, from their geographical position, clearly indicated as the Powers who could most naturally and disinterestedly intervene for the purpose of whittling down such demands as might be put forward by the Balkan belligerent States.

His Excellency said that of course there was nothing to be done at the present stage of the war, and the belligerents must be left to fight it out until something of a decisive nature happened; but he hoped that I would bring his ideas to your notice and tell you how important he thought it that the three Powers should keep in close communication with one another and freely exchange their views. The relations between Germany and France were so good at the present moment that he thought the French Government would gladly act in accord with the Imperial Government in this crisis, and he hoped he might say the same of Great Britain. The three Powers were, it was true, competitors in finance and trade in the East, but it was to their common interest that none of their customers should be irretrievably ruined; therefore the

moment was most opportune for them to act together. His Excellency also laid stress on the good effect which common action between England and Germany would have upon Anglo-German relations, and pointed out that a period of loyal co-operation at a critical moment in international politics would draw public attention away from questions where the two countries did not see eye to eye, and, once the crisis successfully passed, would have created an atmosphere in which it would be far easier than heretofore to make such questions matters of friendly discussion and arrangement.

I told his Excellency that I would convey his message to you, and that I was sure you would appreciate the friendly language in which it was couched.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[45424] No. 827.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, October 27, 1912.*

I LEARN at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, as in case of the Turco-Italian war, Roumania will make no formal declaration of neutrality.

[45379] No. 828.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 27, 1912.*

CRETE.

Your telegram No. 626 of 26th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that the withdrawal of the ships of war would have the appearance of recognising and confirming step taken by Greece in appointing a Governor-General, and that the best way of reserving the future would be to keep ships there as a sort of protest that, notwithstanding the proceedings of Greece, protecting Powers maintain their attitude. He considers that Greek Government should be warned that protecting Powers make all reserves and do not recognise any change in the status of Crete without the consent of the Powers, and that Germany and Austria should be informed of what has passed.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees with your view as to the relations of the consuls with Governor-General appointed by King of Greece.

His Excellency says that, in his opinion, to withdraw altogether from Crete in present circumstances would have appearance to Turkey of a breach of faith on the part of the protecting Powers towards the Sultan.

[45534] No. 829.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October 27, 1912.*

AT request of Minister for Foreign Affairs I went to Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 10·30 to-night to see his Excellency and the Russian Ambassador.

Minister for Foreign Affairs described proposals made to French Government and to His Majesty's Government in regard to war in the Balkans, and stated that he is of Sir A. Nicolson's opinion that this attempt on the part of Germany might result in the constitution of a new group and the isolation of Russia. It would therefore be advisable that England and France should together reply ("répondre d'un commun accord") at Berlin that they are of opinion that in the present circumstances no Great Powers can be excluded from conversations. Russia should therefore be effectively consulted, and not merely be informed.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that a mediation should be attempted immediately after the next decisive battle.

Russian Ambassador is to ascertain whether Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs

[45444] No. 827 A.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bucharest, October 27, 1912.*

ON more than one occasion I have received assurances from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there is no intention on the part of the Roumanian Government of effecting mobilisation, but that, so long as agreement exists between the Great Powers, they will shape their policy in accordance with that of the Powers and will keep quiet.

On the other hand, and in spite of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that preparations for mobilising were being made, as I reported in my telegram No. 7 of the 22nd instant, signs are not wanting of a quiet activity, the object of which evidently is to facilitate the task of mobilising speedily, should the situation render such a course necessary.

Possibly the Government of this country are not very confident that Russia and Austria will continue to act in concert. Military preparations on the part of Russia in Bessarabia appear to be suspected by the military authorities here. These preparations were described to a friend of mine by a Roumanian officer as tantamount to mobilisation. The officer in question is on the staff of the Prince of Roumania, and his duty is to keep himself abreast of Russian military activity.

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will undertake to make such a proposal to the Powers, and, if he would prefer that France should take the initiative, Minister for Foreign Affairs will do so.

Isvolsky is also to ask Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to sound Bulgarian Government as to their willingness to accept mediation, the language of Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a newspaper correspondent published in the "Temps" giving ground for supposing that he would favour such a step on the part of the Powers. Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that the Turks would welcome it.

[45633] No. 829 A.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, October 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 623 of 24th October: British naval mission in Greece.

French Government concur in your views. French military mission has been already authorised to remain at Athens under similar conditions.

[45613] No. 830.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, October 28, 1912.*

MY Russian colleague informs me that he is transferred to Constantinople, and ordered to leave Crete as soon as possible. A vice-consul is coming to take charge here.

[45577] No. 831.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 28, 1912.*

PORT of Bourgas has been mined, and consequently closed for the present.

Austrian Legation have received news that a considerable force of Bulgarian troops have arrived at Drama, and that their immediate destination is Cavalla. Above is not improbable in view of information contained in telegram from British vice-consul at Philippopoli of 25th October that troops had already arrived at Nevrokop.

[45505] No. 832.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 28, 1912.*

RUMOUR is current here that the Roumanian Government purpose giving orders for mobilisation.

I mentioned the matter to Roumanian Minister last night.

He told me that the only step taken so far was that an order had been issued that no goods traffic would be allowed for the present.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[45599] No. 833.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 103. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 28, 1912.*

BABA ESKI was captured last night, and all communication is now cut between Adrianople and Constantinople. A military train has just been captured which was proceeding to Adrianople.

Ishtib and Kuprulu have been evacuated by Turks.

A portion of Servian and Montenegrin armies have effected a junction south of Novi-Bazar. Military news previously sent by me is confirmed.

[45629] No. 834.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 28, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

(Very Confidential.)

Lake Bourgas has just been captured.

A whole Servian division freed after the battle of Kumanova has been hurried up to Mustapha Pasha and is now being rapidly entrained to join Bulgarian troops. The combined forces will march straight to attack Chatalja lines. It is not expected that allied forces will meet with any serious resistance before arriving at latter place.

[45624] No. 835.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 28, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 102 of to-day.

Secretary-General at the Foreign Office declared to me to-day that he knew of no order for the prohibition of goods traffic having been issued. In answer, however, to my enquiries as to prospect of mobilisation, he did not deny that it might be impending. I reminded him of Minister for Foreign Affairs' repeated statements to me that Roumania had no intention of mobilising; and his manner rather confirmed than refuted a statement made to me this afternoon by a prominent member of the Liberal party that partial mobilisation was decided in principle at the first meeting of the reconstructed Cabinet to-day.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[45612] No. 836.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 537.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 529 of 25th October.

The intention is to utilise 4 per cent. increase as guarantee of loan.

The Turkish Government have now applied to National Bank for loan of 2,500,000*l.*, without mention of security.

Request referred to London.

[45625] No. 836 A.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October 28, 1912.*

THE Khedive, in a telegram to the Prime Minister, suggests that relations should be broken off with allied Balkan States now at war with Turkey. The Ministers are of opinion that Moslems everywhere would view with favour rupture of relations, particularly with Greece, and are anxious to have a decision on the matter. It would be sufficient that official relations should be broken off with Greece, in accordance with precedent of 1897 war, and it would not be necessary to make Greek representative leave the country.

Now that Turkey is in difficulties, it would not look well if neutrality were declared by Egypt. If, therefore, no decision has yet been arrived at in regard to neutrality, I think it would be best to adopt course suggested above.

[45116]

No. 837.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 134 of 25th October.

I entirely reciprocate view of Minister for Foreign Affairs that Powers generally and Germany, France, and ourselves should keep in close touch. German chargé d'affaires was informed by me on Friday of my views and told me those of the German Chancellor, and I expressed to him willingness to keep in touch.

[45534]

No. 838.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 631.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 184 of 27th October.

French Ambassador gave me similar communication. I informed him that German chargé d'affaires had told me of desire of German Government to keep in touch, and that German view was that Austria and Russia, as being most interested Powers, should lead the concert, and that there should be as little disturbance as possible of territorial *status quo*. I reciprocated these views, but said that public opinion here would not join in turning Balkan States by force out of what they proved able to conquer unaided. I suggested that Russia and Austria should agree, if possible, as to the maximum advantage they would concede to Balkan States if the latter entirely defeated Turkey, which was not yet certain. French Ambassador said that France and ourselves might communicate in this sense at St. Petersburgh and Germany at Vienna, and I agreed.

If war goes rapidly and decidedly in favour of Balkan States, Russia and Austria could, if agreed, propose some settlement to Balkan States as basis of mediation. If Turks ask for mediation as beaten party, they would have to do so on condition of placing settlement unreservedly in the hands of the Powers.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1122.)

[45534]

No. 839.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1123.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.

MY telegram to Paris No. 631 of to-day: Balkans.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[45926]

No. 840.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 271.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.

I TOLD Herr von Kühlmann again to-day that I was anxious to keep in touch with the German Government with regard to the Balkan war, as the German Chancellor desired. Herr von Kiderlen had also approached France, and had told your Excellency that he thought France, Germany, and England should keep in touch. The news of Balkan successes still continued. As the Chancellor had said, Austria and Russia must lead the Concert of Europe. They could not lead unless they were in agreement, and it would be desirable that they should make up their minds, on the assumption that the Balkan States were going to win, what was the maximum disturbance in the territorial *status quo* that Austria and Russia would regard as reconcilable with their interests.

Herr von Kühlmann suggested that it might be possible to invite the Balkan States to say what was the minimum which they would accept.

I observed that this might be a very useful suggestion, and if the Balkan States had a great victory in Thrace, and the Turks were completely beaten, Austria and Russia might follow up the step which they had taken together before the war by asking the Balkan States to formulate their minimum demands. This was, however, all on the assumption that the Balkan States would be victorious; everything would be changed if the Turks won a big battle.

Herr von Kühlmann asked me about our attitude.

I said that I was sure that British public opinion would not be a party to any attempt to turn the Balkan States by force out of territory which they actually conquered by their own arms; and we had not sufficient political interest to insist upon interfering in the results of the war. Austria and Russia might feel differently, and that was why it was essential to promote agreement between them.

Herr von Kühlmann asked me whether what I had said about our attitude would apply even to a conquest of Constantinople.

I replied in the negative, saying that a change in the ownership of Constantinople would be a large European question.

I concluded by remarking that this was all I could say at the moment. There might still be Turkish successes which would give the problem quite a different complexion. All we could do for the present was to discuss possibilities, and I was giving him my views as a contribution towards keeping in touch with each other.

In the course of the conversation, Herr von Kühlmann said that Austria would probably want to make some reserves about the sanjak and about the way to Salonica not being completely closed; Albania, too, could hardly be absorbed; Albanians, both Christian and Moslem, would combine against Serbs, but Albania might become an autonomous unit of some sort. This would still leave a great deal of Macedonia for Bulgaria and Servia. He asked me whether we should object to Bulgaria getting to the Mediterranean.

I said I saw no reason why we should, as far as ourselves were concerned, make any reserves.

Herr von Kühlmann made it clear that in these suggestions respecting the settlement he was speaking his own personal opinion only, and I said that I was doing the same, as I had not consulted my colleagues on these points.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45666] No. 841.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 157.)

Sir, *Athens, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report by the British delegate on the International Financial Commission on the present financial situation in Greece, with special reference to the means at the disposal of the Government for carrying on the war with Turkey.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 841.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Athens, October 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some notes on the present financial situation, from which it may be seen how far this country will be able to support the drain on its resources which will be caused by the war with Turkey.

At the beginning of the year M. Coromilas, then Minister of Finance, was able to announce that he had in hand a sum of approximately 3,000,000*l.* from the proceeds of the loan of 1911 and the surplus of that year and the year before. The estimates for the present year, as reported in my despatch No. 5 of the 3rd April, owing to the heavy naval and military expenditure for which large extraordinary grants were voted, anticipated a deficit of 1,570,314*l.*

In spite of rigorous economy, and, above all, the avoidance of much-needed expenditure on works of public utility, such as the Piræus harbour and custom-house, roads, railways, &c., specified in the loan contract as among the objects for which it was issued, it is doubtful whether the actual figures of national revenue and expenditure will be much more favourable than was foreseen when the estimates were framed. Increase of revenue and economies in expenditure may, however, reduce the deficit by some 200,000*l.*, or perhaps even 300,000*l.*

Since the opening of the Chamber on the 14th instant the following supplementary credits have been voted:—

	£
Ministry of Marine and National Fleet Fund	1,093,817
Ministry of War	1,276,000
Ministry of Finance	660,000
Various	110,534
Total	3,140,351

bringing the total ordinary and extraordinary expenditure up to 10,475,000*l.*, against revenue, including extraordinary, estimated at 5,764,746*l.*

It is clear from the above figures that, assuming the Treasury balance at the beginning of the year to have amounted to 3,000,000*l.*, the Government will have, before its close, to find a sum of not far short of 1,700,000*l.* to meet expenditure which has already been voted. The supplementary credits will, however, evidently be insufficient to carry on the war, which is calculated to be costing about 30,000*l.* a-day, for more than a few weeks, and as there is no military war chest and no further fund beyond the reserve already mentioned upon which the Government can draw, the time cannot be far off when a loan or financial operation of a similar kind will become imperatively necessary. In my despatch No. 9 of the 18th instant I gave some figures showing that the reserve of the National Bank, in cash or immediately negotiable securities, amounted in round figures to 122,000,000 fr., of which 40,000,000 fr. is, or should be, immobilised against note issue under the law of the 19th March, 1910. The bank is therefore in a position to come to the support of the Government by temporary advances which, at the outside, may be estimated at 3,000,000*l.*

Although the comparative prosperity of the country during the last two years has increased the national wealth, it is at least doubtful whether any strictly internal loan of considerable amount can be raised here. The assistance of foreign banks or groups would almost certainly be required. For this purpose the surplus of the assigned revenues may be offered as security. The amount available can be estimated from the following figures:—

The total produce by all the assigned revenues, including the Piræus custom-house, in 1911 was 61,763,494 drachmas (2,179,540*l.*).

And the payments into the Treasury effected during the same year by the International Financial Commission, after meeting all charges due, was—

30,796, 525 drachmas (1,231,860*l.*) (see Annex 23 of the Commission's report for 1911).

Other charges secured on the surplus revenues and not controlled by the Commission are:—

1. Interest and redemption of the National Defence Loan of 1907, 48,000*l.* gold.
2. Interest and redemption of the two Thessalian Agricultural Loans of 1907 and 1909, 1,000,000 drachmas paper (40,000*l.*).
3. Since 1911, interest and redemption of the 1911 loan of 4,367,000*l.*, estimated at 200,000*l.*

The total charges on the assigned revenues may therefore be given as between 1,500,000*l.* and 1,600,000*l.*, leaving a surplus in ordinary years of between 900,000*l.* and 1,000,000*l.*

It would appear to be advantageous both to the holders of the old bonds and to the Greek Government if the conversion and consolidation of the six loans contracted between 1881 and 1893 could now be effected in combination with the issue of a new loan. The bondholders would be guaranteed against the possible reduction of the rate on interest payable during the next two years as a consequence of the war, and would receive an immediate increase of, say, ½ per cent. over this year's distribution, a result which could only be reached after ten or twelve years under existing conditions, and

which might dispose bankers interested in the old bonds to subscribe to an issue of new bonds in excess of the amount required for conversion.

The operation would be of the following nature:—

The present outstanding nominal capital of the six loans is, in round figures, 20,000,000*l.* A conversion loan of 14,000,000*l.* at 4 per cent. would be sufficient to give the bondholders an immediate increase of interest of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. If, instead of issuing bonds of the nominal value of 14,000,000*l.*, the Government issued a consolidated loan of 20,000,000*l.*, secured as a first charge on the assigned revenues, they would receive in cash what was realised by the balance of 6,000,000*l.* above the amount required for conversion, or about 4,800,000*l.*, assuming an issue on a 5 per cent. basis, *i.e.*, at 80.

The only persons who would have any cause of complaint at such an operation would be the holders of the loans referred to above, which form a second charge on the assigned revenues, against which the new loan would be a first charge. My impression is that nothing in the contracts of the four loans in question prevent it, and the margin of revenue over charges upon it would not be reduced by more than between 300,000*l.* and 400,000*l.*, *i.e.*, roughly to 600,000*l.*

The operation might have the further advantage of not being in violation of the strict laws of neutrality.

By article 29 of the Law of Control, the issue of Treasury bonds by the Greek Government is limited to 10,000,000 drachmas. It would place the Commission in an embarrassing position if we were asked to consent to an extension of this right, and it will, I think, be more advantageous to the bondholders for a new loan of definite amount and at a moderate rate of interest to be issued than for us to assent to the principle of enlarging the limit of issue of Treasury bonds.

I would be glad to receive any observations on the questions raised in this despatch.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[45671] No. 842.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 41. Confidential.)
Sir, *Munich, October 26, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 42, of the 22nd October, I have the honour to report that the Social Democratic "Münchener Post" of last Tuesday published a violent article (translation enclosed) attacking Russia, and recommending an understanding with France and England in order to unite the proletariats of the three nations in a fraternal bond of union.*

The "Münchener Post" has always been more or less anti-Russian, as it is the nature of Social Democratic journals to be, but has not within my recollection hitherto expressed itself so strongly as on the present occasion. Future generations may possibly see the day when the proletariats of England, France, and Germany will be linked together in eternal amity, but anyhow the prospect is at present so remote that it cannot be taken seriously even by the most visionary. The writer's object is evidently rather to attack the Prussian electoral system and the policy to which it gives rise, which he fears may cause Germany to become involved in a European war, than really to advocate utopian schemes.

It is curious to note that anxiety as to Russian action is also noticeable in the National Liberal press. The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," of the 24th, without, however, specifically mentioning Russia, comments with sympathy on M. Poincaré's efforts to preserve the European peace, and quotes Count Berchtold's visit to Italy and that of the Marquis di San Giuliano to Berlin as a proof and warning to the world at large of the close connection still subsisting between the Powers of the Triple Alliance.

Two years ago the press of all shades was full of the Potsdam interview, of the assurances that had then been given to Germany, and of the wedge that had there been

* Not printed

driven into the Triple Entente. During the following eighteen months the German papers attacked Italy, Austria, France, and of course England, but never Russia. With the failure of the Imperial interview at Port Baltic to provide any tangible result, a subtle change was noticeable, and Russia's growing intimacy with Great Britain and France has sometimes formed the subject of rather acrid comment.

It is remarkable that at a moment when German diplomacy is professing to play only a secondary rôle the anticipation of war should be so general in the country. In the debate in the Landtag on Friday last that anxiety was very apparent and the Social Democratic member, Herr Müller, less pacific than the writer in the "Münchener Post," took occasion to endorse the assurance of another member of his party, Herr von Volmar, that in the hour of need Germany might count on the support of all her sons. Dr. Casselmann, the Liberal leader, while proclaiming the desire of South Germany for peace, emphasized the unconditional fidelity to one another which would animate every party without distinction if in spite of the efforts to preserve peace the Empire were to become involved in a European war.

In previous despatches I have ventured to express the conviction that in Germany public opinion would generally welcome a rapprochement with Russia and that hardly any sacrifice would be considered too great to attain it. Although Russia has hitherto turned a cold shoulder to German advances, those who hope to see more friendly relations established have not lost heart. They know that some of the Grand Dukes and many high Russian officials are favourable to Germany, and argue that it is quite possible that the next turn of fortune's wheel will bring them into power. The feeling was much in evidence the other day when it was rumoured that M. Sazonof had fallen under the Emperor of Russia's displeasure.

All the official information to which I have had access suggests, indeed, that there never was a time when the ruling powers in Russia were less inclined to curry favour with Germany or to forget the affront inflicted on their country in 1908. None the less, I am confident that the Germans have not given up hope. The disintegration of the Turkish Empire is now proceeding apace, and the scramble for territorial spoils in which Germany is not interested may be expected to leave her a *tertia gaudens* able and willing at the right moment to throw her sword with decisive effect into the scale, and not necessarily on the side of Austria. When that time comes, Russia may well ask herself whether the unnatural alliance with republican France and the understanding with democratic England have not served their turn, and whether for the future an alliance with the armies and fleet of autocratic Prussia would not prove a better investment.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[45641] No. 843.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 459.)
Sir, *Paris, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Temps" of the 27th October, containing the account of an interview with the Bulgarian Prime Minister, referred to in my telegram No. 184, Confidential, of yesterday's date.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 843.

Extract from the "Temps" of October 27, 1912.

LA GUERRE D'ORIENT: DÉCLARATIONS DE M. GUÉCHOF.

M. GUÉCHOF, Président du Conseil des Ministres, interviewé, a déclaré que l'importance de la chute de Kirk-Kilissé est démontrée par ce fait que les Turcs y avaient rassemblé leurs meilleures troupes et leurs généraux les plus capables. S'ils n'ont pu se maintenir dans cette puissante forteresse, ils pourront, par la suite, difficilement résister au sud. Le Ministre a ajouté:—

"Aussi les meilleurs amis de la Turquie seraient-ils aujourd'hui ceux qui lui donneraient le conseil de ne pas poursuivre une lutte sans espoir, et, en vérité, le plus tôt serait le mieux.

"Tous les amis de l'humanité doivent juger sévèrement ceux qui prétendent que cette guerre est une guerre d'extermination. Les quatre États balkaniques chrétiens n'ont pas l'intention d'anéantir la population turque de ces territoires européens.

"Si les Grandes Puissances désirent sincèrement la pacification de la péninsule balkanique, la paix peut être conclue très prochainement."

[45626] No. 844.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 538.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

AN official telegram to-day states that 7th division has reoccupied Kirk Kilisse. This division appears to have been on the right during the fighting on 23rd October, and to have retired through Kirk Kilisse on Bunarhissar, but it appears to me doubtful whether the Bulgarians occupied the former place.

[45627] No. 845.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 539.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 28, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations :—

"All traffic beyond Chorlu is suspended by order of Nazim Pasha, with a view to correcting present state of confusion and restoring order on railway. Owing to arbitrary and threatening behaviour of officers, several stations beyond Chorlu had been completely abandoned by railway employés."

[45839] No. 846.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 542.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 535 of 27th October.

I hear that, as the result of pressure from the Sultan and the Imperial Princes, Kiamil Pasha's reluctance to accept post of Grand Vizier is being overcome.

[45773] No. 847.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 29, 1912.*

MILITARY attachés learn that it is the 60th regiment of three battalions and not (as reported) the 99th regiment which has been moved from Vienna. A well-founded but not entirely confirmed report states that it is now in Croatia on account of unrest there. Only one division of the 3rd corps (Graz) is at increased strength. Persistent reports are being received concerning movements of troops in Galicia, of which details are lacking. Russian military attaché considers reports credible, though denied officially. A report considered credible states Chief of Staff again pressed for sanction to mobilise three army corps, but the Emperor refused.

Successes of the Balkan States, and especially those of Servia, have come as a great surprise to the Austro-Hungarian War Office, and their attitude toward the situation is likely to be altered accordingly.

[45634] No. 845 A.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, October 28, 1912.*

TO-DAY in village near Suda a Christian rural guard shot dead a Mussulman and wounded his wife. There is no private motive known for the crime, which may have been prompted by excitement produced by the report of massacres in Macedonia.

Assassin has fled. Two gendarmes were in the house for his protection, but he imprudently went out without them.

[45783] No. 848.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 29, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 28th October.

Government press announce that at a Cabinet meeting yesterday, presided over by the King, it was decided that there was no reason for any mobilisation.

[45837] No. 849.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, October 29, 1912.*

GAZETTE announces meeting of Parliament for to-morrow. I understand that it will be dissolved forthwith in view of the recent reconstruction of the Cabinet.

[45833] No. 850.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, October 29, 1912.*

ROUMANIAN press gives prominence to a speech delivered to the Cabinet by the King on 27th October, when the Ministers took the oath.

The King welcomed the Cabinet with particular satisfaction, as enjoying that support of public opinion which was needed for the important decisions which must be taken in the present grave circumstances. Since the outbreak of war all eyes have been turned on Roumania, who has acquired fresh prestige in view of the important rôle she will have to play.

"Let us therefore abandon internal discussions, and attend to the political situation of the country. The situation is very difficult, but no matter what may be demanded our military force is in a condition to meet them."

[45838] No. 851.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 29, 1912*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially this afternoon that Roumanian Government would probably in the next few days move one regiment cavalry and one infantry to the eastern part of the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier.

His Excellency said that bombardment of Kavarna by Turkish ships had caused an influx into the Dobrudscha of Bulgarian refugees and that this was likely to recur in view of possible landing of Turkish troops. The projected movement of troops was on this account. It was virtually a police measure, all the more necessary owing to there being no natural frontier between the Dobrudscha and Bulgaria.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[45820] No. 852.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, October 29, 1912.*

I HEAR that the King of Servia has received a telegram from the Czar congratulating him on the success of the Servian arms.

[45848] No. 853.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 94 of 24th October.

Is there any reply about Red Cross? French, Austrian, German, and Hungarian missions have arrived.

Red Crescent may wish to know that a considerable number of Turkish wounded are here and at Philippopoli.

[45849] No. 854.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 104 of 28th October.

A train containing flour and provisions for Adrianople was captured yesterday.

(Confidential.)

Military council have been discussing plan of campaign. There is some talk of a portion of the army endeavouring to proceed to Rodosto and co-operating with Greek fleet; the other plan is that mentioned in my telegram above mentioned, and this they seem at present the most likely to adopt.

They have received information that efforts will be made to land a large Turkish force on the Black Sea coast between Cape Kuri and Bourgas; this force would then endeavour to relieve Adrianople.

[45843] No. 855.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1123 of 28th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated contents of your telegram No. 631 of 28th October to Paris, expressed great satisfaction at language which you had held to French Ambassador.

As regards question of Austria and Russia leading the concert, his Excellency said that he had consented to act with Austria as the mandatory of Europe in the representations made to Balkan States, and had, in consequence, exposed himself to violent attacks in Russian press. He could not tranquillise public opinion by proclaiming that his motive in so acting was to neutralise any possible intervention on Austria's part, and he would therefore prefer that French Minister for Foreign Affairs should continue to take initiative in the future. He would gladly continue his conversations with Austria in private and endeavour to come to an understanding with her, but he did not wish to advert to the fact that Austria and Russia were going hand-in-hand.

Bulgarian Minister, whom he had sounded on subject of intervention, now held a very different language to what he had done at the beginning of the war, and his Excellency was convinced that Balkan States would only accept mediation on the condition that the territorial *status quo* should be modified. Programme of reforms which he had telegraphed to London and Paris could therefore only now apply to those portions of territory with a Christian population which were left to Turkey. He feared that Bulgaria would demand accession of territory on lines of Treaty of San Stefano, subject to satisfaction of Servian claims in Kossovo vilayet. He had warned Bulgarian Minister that in event of Bulgarian aggrandisement both Austria and Roumania would demand compensation. Minister had replied that he thought Roumania would be satisfied with Silistria. Minister for Foreign Affairs doubts this, though he thinks that it may be possible to overcome Austrian opposition by promise of free commercial access to the Adriatic. It will be more difficult, he fears, to obtain consent of Germany.

[45625] No. 854 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 28th October.

In my telegram to you, No. 72 of 16th October, I stated that Egyptian neutrality must be maintained, and that we must adhere to the attitude adopted in the Turco-Italian war. I thought, therefore, that it was understood that Egypt was to remain neutral. We do not propose to issue any proclamation or public declaration of Egyptian neutrality. The Egyptian Government could not break off relations with Greek representative without departing from neutral attitude, and such a course should be deprecated. The observations on this subject which were made to Kiamil Pasha, as recorded in Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 510 of 22nd October, repeated to you, might, if necessary, be impressed on Egyptian Government.

I cannot see what reason we could give why Egypt should not follow her own precedent of the Turco-Italian war.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 881.)

[45844] No. 856.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1114 of 28th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke on the subject of Constantinople telegram No. 529 of 25th October, said that it would be quite impossible for Russia to consent to extra 4 per cent. import duty at the present moment.

[45845] No. 857.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 395.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1108 of 26th October: Crete.

Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes to send me definite answer to-morrow.

On my informing him of views of French Government, reported in Paris telegram No. 183 of 27th October, he said that if France and England decided to leave their ships in Cretan waters Russia would probably leave hers also. He wanted, however, to be done with intervention in Cretan affairs as soon as was possible.

[45739] No. 858.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 29, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires communicated to Sir A. Nicolson, on the 25th October, the paper of which I transmit a copy to you herewith. M. Gronitch assured Sir A. Nicolson that the information was quite trustworthy and accurate. He communicated it to Sir A. Nicolson merely *à titre de renseignement*. He added that, though not instructed to do so, he wished to state positively that he knew for a certainty that if Austria-Hungary endeavoured to intervene in the sanjak the Servian troops would resist her. This had been definitely decided upon by his Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 858.

Note communicated by M. Gronitch.

L'AUTRICHE-HONGRIE a mobilisé le XV^{e} Corps d'Armée à Saraïevo et le XVI^{e} Corps d'Armée à Raguse. Des troupes ont été envoyées à Vichegrad et à Chajnitche ; une brigade a été disloquée à Fotcha et tout est prêt pour la marche en avant.

Sept bataillons d'infanterie et un bataillon du génie ont été envoyés en Bosnie, où deux classes d'officiers de réserve ont été appelées. Tous les jours quatre trains remplis de troupes sont dirigés sur Uvatz.

Cinq cents marins ont été envoyés de Pola à Budapest pour la flotille du Danube.

Légation de Serbie, Londres,
le 25 octobre, 1912.

[45768] No. 859

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 501.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 29, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador stated on the 28th instant that his Government were contemplating provisionally increasing the customs duties by 4 per cent. The customs duties would at the conclusion of the war revert to their present rate. He asked if his Government had as yet officially informed us of the above. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the negative, and added that he was afraid that we should be unable to agree.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45856] No. 860.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 461.)
Sir, *Paris, October 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your telegram No. 626 of the 26th instant and my telegram No. 183 of the 27th instant, to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing me of the views of the French Government with regard to the dispatch of M. Dragoumis to Crete and the relations to be established between him and the consular representatives of the Powers in the island, the maintenance of the ships of the Powers in Cretan waters, and an eventual reference to Germany and Austria-Hungary on the subject of the status of Crete.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 860.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

A LA date d'hier, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu entretenir le département des diverses questions que pose la nomination par le Roi Georges de Grèce de M. Dragoumis en qualité de Gouverneur général de la Crète et faire connaître quelles sont à cet égard les vues de Sir Edward Grey.

En ce qui concerne l'attitude à prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à La Canée vis-à-vis du nouveau Gouverneur, le Foreign Office est d'avis qu'il n'y a pas lieu de reconnaître le nouveau Gouverneur général, et que les consuls des Puissances devraient se borner à entretenir avec M. Dragoumis des relations non officielles et limitées à l'expédition des affaires courantes. M. Poincaré partage sur ce point l'avis de Sir Edward Grey, et le consul général de France à La Canée a reçu des instructions en ce sens.

La note de l'Ambassade britannique se réfère en outre à la question du maintien des stationnaires dans les eaux crétoises. D'après la note de son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie, rapprochée de l'entretien confidentiel de M. Paul Cambon avec Sir Arthur Nicolson, le retrait par les Puissances protectrices de leurs navires de guerre ne porterait pas atteinte à la sécurité de la population musulmane pas plus qu'il n'exposerait l'île à un débarquement des troupes ottomanes. Cette mesure aurait, par contre, l'avantage de ne pas rendre les Puissances complices de la violation des droits du Sultan.

M. Poincaré reconnaît avec le Gouvernement Royal que la sécurité des musulmans crétois peut être considérée comme pleinement assurée du moment que le Gouvernement hellénique se porte garant du maintien de l'ordre ; mais, selon le Gouvernement de la république, une mesure aussi radicale que le retrait des navires de guerre risquerait d'être mal interprétée et d'être présentée comme l'abandon définitif des droits souverains du Sultan, cette souveraineté étant symbolisée par le drapeau ottoman qui flotte sur l'île de La Sude et à la garde duquel ont été préposés les stationnaires des Puissances. Il serait préférable, semble-t-il, de maintenir provisoirement l'état de choses existant de manière à pouvoir aborder, au rétablissement de la paix, le règlement définitif de la

question crétoise sans que les Puissances protectrices aient paru abandonner une partie du mandat qu'elles ont reçu du Sultan en 1897.

A ce titre il paraît à M. Poincaré comme à Sir Edward Grey qu'il y aura lieu, lorsque cette question se posera, de faire appel à l'Autriche-Hongrie et à l'Allemagne pour son règlement. On peut appréhender, au contraire, qu'une démarche prématurée ne présente que de médiocres chances de succès et n'ait pour principal effet de faire attacher à la nouvelle violation du *statu quo* crétoise commise par la Grèce plus d'importance qu'il ne convient de lui en accorder, étant données les assurances que le Gouvernement hellénique a pris soin de faire transmettre aux Puissances protectrices en même temps qu'il leur notifiait l'envoi en Crète de M. Dragoumis.

Le Gouvernement de la république a pris acte de ces assurances en faisant d'ailleurs toute réserve sur la nomination par le Roi de Grèce du Gouverneur général de l'île de Crète.

Paris, le 28 octobre, 1912.

[47381] No. 861.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, October 30, 1912.

LES Puissances reconnaissant que l'heure approche où elles pourront exercer leur médiation entre les belligérants de la Péninsule balkanique, et continuant de placer au premier rang de leurs préoccupations le maintien de la paix européenne, déclarent qu'elles s'appliqueront à leur œuvre commune dans un esprit d'absolu désintéressement.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 octobre, 1912.

[45840] No. 862.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 544.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 29, 1912.*

TELEGRAM from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, dated 26th October, just received, states: "General collapse; situation here very critical."

Another telegram from him, dated 28th October, states: "Situation deplorable; Turkish troops completely routed everywhere; demoralisation complete; growing anxiety among Europeans."

Another telegram, dated this morning, states: "Karaferia surrendered last night."

Under the circumstances it would seem desirable that head-quarters of "Medea," or one of His Majesty's ships at Crete, should proceed immediately to Salonica. One ship at latter [? former] place should keep up appearance of not recognising alteration in *status quo*.

[45841] No. 863.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 29, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"In the last two days four trains have left Constantinople. Orders from Minister of War to suspend all traffic for twenty-four hours in hope of clearing block on the line. Every station from Spartakule to Chorlu is blocked by troop trains waiting to proceed, and all available engines have been sent up to assist in clearing. Military attachés are still here. They are to go by first train, which cannot start before noon on the 30th.

"Two thousand reservists from San Stefano have marched, and a redif regiment will start by road to-morrow."

[46021] No. 864.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 548.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 30, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Salonica, dated to-day:—

"Deputation of British colony urgently solicit dispatch of British man-of-war for protection of interests."

[46022] No. 865.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 549.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 30, 1912.*

KIAMIL PASHA has been named Grand Vizier, and has selected Cabinet, which awaits approval of the Sultan.

Minister for Foreign Affairs remains the same.

[45987] No. 866.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 78 of 29th October.

I have informed the Prime Minister of your decision and the [group omitted: ? reasons] rendering it necessary for Egypt to remain neutral, and have asked him to telegraph to the Khedive, who has, according to local press, given out in Constantinople that Egypt would not remain neutral.

The Khedive is now, I believe, at Bucharest, on the way to Trieste, where he intends to embark for Egypt, arriving here on 4th November.

[46148] No. 867.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 108. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 30, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 104 of 28th October.

One of the Ministers informs me Constantinople is now cut off entirely from Salonica, Adrianople, and rest of Turkish Empire in Europe.

The débris of the Turkish army of Vardar which operated against Servians has retired in direction of Monastir. Bulgarian army has captured about 48 guns, and Servian about 130 up to date. There was a small engagement at Ovche Haveya, where Turks gave way, leaving large amount of ammunition and stores in hands of victors.

Speaking generally, demoralisation has set in in Turkish troops in Macedonia.

[45988] No. 868.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 30, 1912.*

I HEAR from good source that in the event of Balkan States' ultimate victory Roumania's demands would be rectification of Dobrudsha frontier, razing of fortifications of Silistria, and freedom to fortify both sides of bridge over Danube on Constanza line. My informant gave me the impression that these terms had been arranged with Bulgaria before outbreak of war.

[46018] No. 869.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Bucharest, October 30, 1912.*

PARLIAMENT met to-day. Proceedings merely formal. Decree was read dissolving Chamber and ordering new elections.

[46008] No. 870.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 626 to Paris of 26th October.

Prime Minister to-day spontaneously broached the subject of Crete, and said that governor had been appointed in pursuance of his declaration in the Chamber (see my despatch No. 141), and that Greek Government had no intention whatever of changing the international status of Crete without the consent of the Powers.

(Sent to Canea.)

[46009] No. 871.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 30, 1912.*

CANEA telegram No. 158 of 28th October.

Prime Minister tells me that Governor-General intends not only to punish assassin, but to pay blood-money, according to Mussulman law, to the family of the victim.

(Sent to Canea.)

[46016] No. 872.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, October 30, 1912.*

CROWN PRINCE entered Verria yesterday morning, cutting railway communications between Monastir and Salonica.

[46025] No. 873.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 30, 1912.*

FROM a conversation I had this morning with a well-informed person I have obtained following information with regard to the views held here as to the Near Eastern crisis:—

A change appears to be taking place as to the views held in official circles with regard to the meaning of the *status quo*. The principle of its maintenance is still held officially, but new interpretation is beginning to be given as to the meaning of the phrase. *Status quo* is now said to signify maintenance of a state of equilibrium between interests of the Great Powers and of the Balkan States in the Near East, and not merely territorial integrity. Events are succeeding each other so rapidly that it is being recognised here that the Powers will be compelled to accept new situation and to realise that wishes of Balkan States will have to be taken into greater account. I gather that little objection is likely to be raised here to reasonable territorial alterations. There seems to be a disposition at present even to admit a Servian aggrandisement, and utmost conciliation will be shown her, but I am told

information of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is that Servian pretensions are growing excessive, and possession of this information probably explains Prime Minister's words in Parliament yesterday that Austria was peacefully disposed, but would not buy peace at any price. Austria seems disposed at present to concentrate her attention on safeguarding her economic rather than her so-called political interests in the Balkans and keeping open the road to Salonica for trade. I believe now Austria would admit retention of Scutari by Montenegro and of Janina by the Greeks. As to the Albanian question, I understand that little anxiety is felt, as it is said that Italy and Austria by their arrangement have laid down basis of an amicable understanding as to their spheres of influence.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is very reserved in expressing his views as to what should be done in the present crisis, but the Russian Ambassador, who saw him yesterday, tells me his impression was that Minister for Foreign Affairs favours direct negotiations being carried on between the Balkan league and Turkey as soon as an armistice can be arranged. Russian Ambassador thinks that if general outline of peace conditions can be arrived at rapidly between belligerents, Germany might then not object to taking part in conference called to ratify and correct peace conditions. All the information in my possession tends to make me believe that Austria will not advise Roumania to mobilise, but will probably support Roumanian claims to compensation if Bulgaria should acquire much new territory.

From a good source I learn that unofficial negotiations are being carried on between Servia and Austria with a view to seeing whether they cannot come to terms amicably. Russian Minister at Belgrade came to see Russian Ambassador here a few days ago. Russian Ambassador told me that he had advised him to use his influence at Belgrade to counsel moderation.

[45978] No. 874.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 526.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

M. CAMBON informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 28th October that a French naval division would be sent to Beyrout and another to Syra.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46526] No. 875.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 536.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

M. CAMBON showed me to-day the following formula, on which M. Poincaré wished to have my opinion. If I was favourable to it, he would suggest it in St. Petersburgh:

"1. Les Puissances interviendront collectivement auprès des États belligérants afin qu'ils suspendent les hostilités.

"2. La souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan sera intégralement maintenue à Constantinople et aux environs.

"3. Pour les autres parties de la Turquie d'Europe, le statut national, politique ou administratif sera modifié, selon les régions, et de telle sorte que les intérêts de tous les États en cause soient impartialement équilibrés.

"4. Afin de régler, dans un esprit de parfaite entente, ces diverses questions, les Puissances se réuniront sans retard dans une conférence où seront également conviés les États belligérants et la Roumanie."

Having read it, I said that I was sure we should be prepared to agree to it, and I thought that it would probably meet the Russian view as well.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[45840] No. 874 A.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 636.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 544 of 29th October.

In consequence of this information, one or more of His Majesty's ships will proceed to Salonica forthwith for protection of British subjects if necessary.

Inform Government to which you are accredited.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 883, and Athens, No. 264.)

[45848] No. 874 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 105 of 29th October: Red Cross Mission.

Red Cross state they are making every endeavour to raise funds to dispatch mission with personnel of eighteen to Bulgaria at earliest possible moment, and state that a further communication on this subject may be expected in a day or two.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 310), Sir R. Rodd (No. 151), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 1136), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 312).

46850] No. 876.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 250.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador spoke to me to-day with some anxiety as to the Balkan situation. He said that under no circumstances must there be war between the Great Powers.

This sentiment I cordially endorsed.

He then gave me his personal sketch of a settlement, which was that Salonica should be neutralised and made into a sort of Tangier; the rest of Macedonia should be divided between Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria; but the sanjak and Albania should be autonomous units under Turkish suzerainty. Italy could never tolerate that another Great Power should come into possession of Albania.

I said that I hoped for an agreement between Austria and Russia, but I did not know what the Austrian views were. Perhaps the Italian Government had obtained some information as to them during the meeting with Count Berchtold.

The Ambassador observed that the meeting took place ten days ago, and circumstances had changed since then.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[45840] No. 877.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the accompanying copy of a telegram, No. 544 of the 29th October, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the critical situation at Salonica.[b]

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the requirements of the international situation would be served by the retention of a single ship in Cretan waters for the present; and I am to request that, in view of the serious news from Salonica, at least one of His Majesty's ships should, if the Lords Commissioners see no objection, be dispatched to Salonica with the utmost expedition.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[46042] No. 878.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 158.)

Sir, *Athens, October* 24, 1912.

UNDER the law just voted, which permits the proclamation of a general or partial state of siege and the total or partial suspension of articles 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, and 95 of the Constitution, an absolute state of siege has been proclaimed in the frontier districts, and a partial state of siege in Athens and the Pirœus, domiciliary visits and other exceptional measures being permitted in those towns.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

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[b] No. 862.

[46043] No. 879.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 159.)

Sir, *Athens, October 24, 1912.*

THE law permitting the reinstatement of the Princes in the army or navy was gazetted on the 21st instant. It sanctions their immediate promotion if any of their former junior officers have been advanced in rank. Their future seniority, as regards service and commands, is to be regulated on the same basis as that of other officers.

In consequence, Prince Nicholas has been promoted to be major-general and appointed to the staff of the Crown Prince, Prince Andrew to be lieutenant-colonel and appointed to the 3rd regiment of cavalry, and Prince Christopher to be captain in the 1st infantry regiment. They all left for the front on the 20th instant, without waiting for the law to be gazetted.

Prince George has been too long away from the sea to be able to receive employment with the rank that he holds, that of vice-admiral. It is a bitter disappointment to him, for which he holds the Powers responsible.

Princess Andrew, who is working with the greatest energy to establish hospitals at the front, left for Larissa with her husband and brothers-in-law. In consequence of the rapid Greek advance she is reported to have pushed on to Elassona on her errand of mercy. Princess Nicholas, who is organising hospital trains between Larissa and Athens, has also gone up in order to superintend the beginning of the service and the establishment of road-side auxiliary stations.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[46045] No. 880.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 162.)

Sir, *Athens, October 25, 1912.*

HAVING received from the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs a circular notice that military attachés requiring information should apply to Lieutenant-Colonel Contoyannis at the office of the general staff, I called this morning upon that officer, who is an old acquaintance, and asked him if, now that hostilities had begun, he could tell me anything of the composition of the Greek armies in the field. He replied that he had strict instructions not to give any information of that nature, nor to communicate anything beyond the published bulletins. The object of referring the military attachés to him is therefore probably merely to relieve the Ministry of War of their importunities.

I regret that I cannot supply His Majesty's Government with detailed news of the progress of the Greek operations, but must confine myself to sending from time to time a diary of the war, culled from the official bulletins. The occupation of Serfidje offers a convenient opportunity of sending the first instalment.

I have been told by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the instructions to General Sapountsakis, commanding the army of Epirus, are not to attempt any forward movement at present.

Diary of the War, October 18–24.

(Statements within brackets [ ] are additional to the official bulletins.)

October 18.—Five divisions crossed the frontier in the morning [before daybreak], penetrating Turkish territory without opposition. The first division advanced to a position 3 kilom. north of Tsaritsena, the second to Skomba, the third to Domeniko, the fourth to Vlakhoyanni viâ Elevtherokhori, the fifth to the second line as far as Derveni

Dated from Tyrnavo.

DANGLIS, *Chief of the Staff.*

October 18.—Nothing took place to-day.
Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 19.—After four hours' fighting, the 1st division, aided by the 2nd, drove the enemy out of very strong positions near Elassona and occupied that town. The Crown Prince directed the operations in person. His eldest son received his baptism of fire. Details of casualties not yet to hand, but they are not heavy.
Dated from Tsaritsena.

DANGLIS.

October 19.—Two battalions with two mountain batteries crossed the Arta bridge without opposition, and occupied the heights of Grimbovo.
Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 20.—A body of the enemy, composed of infantry and artillery, was dislodged from its position near Elassona and has retreated to the Sarantoporos defile, where the enemy appears to be concentrating. We have occupied the heights to the north of Elassona.
Dated from Lygaria.

DANGLIS.

October 20.—We are concentrating on the Grimbovo–Kostani line. The enemy are concentrating near Strivina, a short distance from Grimbovo.
Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 21.—(Notice issued by the Ministry of Marine.) It is officially reported that the Greek fleet has occupied Lemnos.

October 21.—The enemy who were holding Diskata have been beaten by the evzones, and have fallen back on Servia. Our loss insignificant.
Dated from Tsaritsena.

DANGLIS.

October 21.—The Turks left two ammunition waggons and 1,000,000 Mauser cartridges at Elassona. Quantities of tents, clothing, blankets, and entrenching tools are found abandoned on the road. Our casualties: On the frontier and at Elassona, 2 officers and 15 men killed, about 65 wounded. At Diskata: 1 captain and 1 corporal killed, about 10 men wounded. In the cavalry brigade: 4 killed, 2 wounded.
(Forwarded from) Larissa.

DANGLIS.

October 21.—The heights above Grimbovo towards the Kommonzades pass and the heights of the Xeroyuni occupied.
Dated from Grimbovo.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 22, 3 P.M.—We attacked the enemy in strong positions in the Sarantoporos pass at 10 A.M. Fighting continues.
Dated from Hadji Gogo Khan.

DANGLIS.

October 22, 9·30 P.M.—Fighting interrupted by darkness. Our troops have approached the enemy's position and maintain their ground.
Dated from Delenitsa.

DANGLIS.

October 22.—A reconnaissance from Khalkiades towards Kalogero bridge drew fire from the enemy's artillery. Two casualties.
Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 22.—Kastro, capital of Lemnos, occupied without bloodshed after a short fight. The governor, three officers, and forty-two men taken prisoners.
Dated from Lemnos.

COUNDOURIOTIS, *Rear-Admiral.*

October 23.—The enemy, with twenty-two battalions and six batteries, defeated by our army's fierce attack yesterday, abandoned his positions and is retreating on Servia. General pursuit ordered. Casualty list later.

Dated from Hadji Gogo Khan.

CONSTANTINE.

October 23, 8·40 P.M.—Our army is pursuing the enemy through all the Kambounian passes towards Servia (Serfidje). The Turkish army is breaking up. We have captured twenty-two field guns with their ammunition waggons, a large number of transport waggons, and quantities of stores.

Dated from a khan to the north of Vigla.

CONSTANTINE.

October 23, 9·30 P.M.—The Turks had severe losses. We have taken many prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel. Two evzone battalions, under Colonel Constantinopoulos, attacked two battalions of Turks near Rakhelidanon and scattered them.

Dated as above.

DANGLIS.

October 23.—I have occupied Kiafa and the Kountsades pass as far as the village of that name, also the villages of Khalkiades, Georgitsa, Bliska, and Plisoi. Artillery duel continued. One killed, nine wounded.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

October 24.—(Notice issued by the Ministry of War.) A later telegram from the staff of the Thessalian army reports that the 4th division has occupied Servia and the Haliakmon bridge leading from Servia to Kozani. The 5th division, with two battalions of evzones and the cavalry brigade, is on the Haliakmon plain near Zagoulda, where there is a ford. The Turkish troops before abandoning Servia murdered seventy unarmed Christians of the town, including the priest.

October 24.—Casualty lists not yet ready. Prisoners to the number of about 600 being sent back to Elassona. The Crown Prince entered Servia to-day amid enthusiastic cheers of the army and Christian inhabitants. The Mussulman families have abandoned the town. To-day the seventy civilians and five priests slaughtered by the Turks were given an imposing funeral, the Crown Prince and other Princes attending. The army occupies the town and the valley of the Haliakmon.

Dated from Servia.

DANGLIS.

October 24.—Indecisive fighting all day yesterday in the Kountsades pass. At night the Turks made a sudden attack in superior force and dislodged the two companies holding the pass and the first heights of Kiafa. Fighting continued all night, and the enemy was driven out by a counter-attack with severe loss. Our losses: one officer and three men killed; one officer and forty men wounded. Turkish losses: seventy killed and ten prisoners; number of wounded unknown. Fighting continues to-day.

Dated from Arta.

SAPOUNTSAKIS.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[46046] No. 881.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Athens, October 26, 1912.*

I CALLED yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to execute the instructions contained in your telegram No. 251 of the 22nd instant, to make a strong but informal representation to him of the expediency, in the interest of the Greek Government itself, of taking effective measures for the protection of the Mussulmans in Crete. I was preceded by the Russian and Italian Ministers, and I believe my French colleague will take similar action to-day.

M. Coromilas assured me that no one was more convinced than the Greek Government of the necessity for them of protecting the Mussulmans, not only in Crete, but in the districts occupied by the Greek forces in Macedonia. As regards Crete, he trusted that the measure just taken in the appointment of M. Dragoumis as Governor-General would be regarded by the Powers as an earnest of the intentions of the Greek Government. He would supersede the existing Executive Committee, and take the whole administration of the island into his hands.

I said I could not suppose that the Powers would be pleased with this proceeding, which was equivalent to annexation, even if no proclamation of annexation were issued. I did not think it likely that the consuls would be authorised to enter into official relations with M. Dragoumis. I regret to say that the expression which crossed his face indicated as clearly as if he had put it into words the reply, "I do not care whether they do or not."

Acquiescence appears to be the only course open to the Powers, since the course of the war happily indicates that annexation is a foregone conclusion.

I have the honour to transmit a copy of an official notification of the appointment of M. Dragoumis, which was put into my hands yesterday evening as I was on the point of starting for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 881.

Official Notification of Appointment of M. Dragoumis.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de communiquer à Sir Francis Elliot que M. Étienne Dragoumis, ancien Président du Conseil, a été nommé par décret Royal en date d'hier Gouverneur général de Crète. Il prendra en main le gouvernement de l'île en y établissant une administration régulière.

Le Gouvernement Royal est persuadé que les Puissances envisageront favorablement cette décision, qui consolidera l'ordre en Crète, en y assurant le bien-être de tous ses habitants sans distinction de religion.

M. Coromilas saisit, &c.

Athènes, le 12 (25) *octobre*, 1912.

[46052] No. 882.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Belgrade, October 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report addressed by Major Thomson, military attaché, to the War Office on the progress of the war.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 882.

Report by Major Thomson.

1.—*Corrections in "Ordre de Bataille."*

IN continuation of my report of the 27th instant.

A slight alteration in the "Ordre de Bataille" is necessary, viz.:—

The First Ban division (Drina district) is not with the Ibar army as stated, but forms part of the first army under the Crown Prince. The two missing Second Ban divisions have now been located. Both these divisions are with the Ibar army, which

is consequently composed entirely of Second Ban troops. The rôle of the Ibar army is to pacify and restore order in the sanjak of Novibazar.

There are said to be two Bulgarian divisions with the second Servian army, but this is by no means certain; if only one division is present it contains three brigades, or 24,000 rifles, which means that the affiliated reserve brigade has been incorporated. This has been done in the case of several Bulgarian divisions, and has given rise to their being described as army corps in some of the English newspapers.

2.—*Present Position of Servian Army.*

As mentioned in my telegram No. 2 of even date, the Servians are now concentrating four divisions between Uskub and Kratovo. All these divisions belong to the First Ban and have the following territorial designations: Morava, Danube, Drina, and Timok. The remaining First Ban division (the Shumadia) is moving down the railway from Prishtina to Uskub. A few days will elapse before any big move is made; apparently the intention is to advance with the First Ban divisions in front, the available Second Ban divisions following behind as reinforcements or to replace wastage. This arrangement fits in with the views hitherto held at the War Office as regards the employment of Second Ban troops.

Large numbers of troops from the Third Ban are being sent across the frontier; these men will be employed to protect the line of communications and to occupy villages in the conquered provinces.

3.—*General Situation.*

The Servians are greatly elated with their successes and seem more disposed to send their military attachés to the front. The Russian military attaché was informed yesterday that we might be allowed to leave Belgrade in a few days' time.

Though in no sense desiring to discount the recent Servian victories, it should be borne in mind that hitherto only small bodies of regular Turkish troops have been encountered. Zekki Pasha is considered even by Servian officers to have acted wisely in retreating from Uskub, where, owing to the delay in arrival of Turkish reinforcements, his position was most dangerous, since he might have found himself isolated and surrounded by greatly superior forces. He has now escaped from a trap and can fall back on the reinforcements, which are still stated to amount to 90,000 of all ranks, probably 70,000 rifles. These figures are only approximate.

C. B. THOMSON, *Military Attaché.*

Belgrade, October 28, 1912.

[46051] No. 883.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 186.)

Sir, *Vienna, October* 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the semi-official "Fremdenblatt" publishes a leading article to-day in which an attempt is made to define the meaning of the term "*status quo*" in the Balkans as it should be interpreted at the present moment. Until now the point has been severely left alone, and it is, I think, only due to a generally expressed desire for some authoritative explanation that the present article has been published.

After laying stress on the unanimity prevailing among the Great Powers as evidenced by the recent speech of the French Prime Minister and the assurances of statesmen of the other countries of the Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* the "Fremdenblatt" proceeds as follows:—

"The principle of the *status quo* has evoked of late a volume of violent censure. We believe that this adverse criticism is due to a mistaken conception of the term '*status quo.*' It has been looked upon as merely an expedient of diplomacy intended to dissipate momentary difficulties. Such a narrow significance must, however, not be ascribed to the principle of the maintenance of the *status quo.* In the Balkan Peninsula there are not only the interests of the Balkan States for which they have just cast their swords into the scales, but also the very important interests of the European Great Powers and of Roumania. The undisturbed continuance of these European interests

in the Balkans forms the *status quo* for which Europe is contending. With all the sympathy, therefore, which the Balkan States have justly earned by their manly and vigorous attitude in the war, European interests in the Balkans cannot and must not be forgotten."

It will be observed from the above that the term "*status quo*" in this obviously officially inspired article is being employed with regard to interests only and not, as has hitherto been customary, to territory. It would seem to indicate that the idea prevalent here is the maintenance of an equilibrium between the interests of the Powers and those of the Balkan States in the Near East.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[46135] No. 884.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 187.)

Sir, *Vienna, October* 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Austrian Prime Minister made the following statement on foreign affairs in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies to-day:—

"On the 22nd October interpellations were addressed to me from several quarters of the House respecting hostilities in the Balkan Peninsula and their effect on the general international situation.

"In reply to these enquiries, I desire to draw attention to the declarations made by authoritative personages during the last session of the delegations, which showed that our foreign policy, in harmony with the traditions so firmly held to during past decades, is also at the present moment of a peaceful character. (Applause.)

"The Austro-Hungarian monarchy gave a proof of its peaceful tendencies in its endeavours to prevent the outbreak of hostile complications in the Balkans.

"In face of the situation created by the opening of hostilities, the directors of our foreign policy will use every endeavour, in close association with our allies and in constant agreement with all the other Powers, to co-operate at the appropriate moment with the view of bringing about a speedy conclusion of the conflict. (Applause.)

"The results of the exchange of views which has so far taken place justify the hope that these endeavours will be crowned by success, and that it will be possible to continue to preserve for the monarchy the blessings of peace. (Applause.)

"With regard to certain interpellations which express far-reaching desires as to influencing the Imperial and Royal Government to preserve peace in any circumstances, I can only emphasise once more the fact that our Foreign Office most certainly pursues no aggressive aims of any kind.

"I must, however, add, and this observation is naturally of a general nature and not intended to apply to any particular situation, that the principle of the maintenance of peace in all circumstances and at any cost cannot form the basis of policy of any European Great Power which (however peaceful its intentions may be) is devoted in a legitimate manner to the protection of its just interests.

"As regards the interpellations as to rumours of alleged mobilisation measures in this country, I am in a position to state, after a consultation with the competent military authorities, that up to the present not even a reinforcement of the peace footing of our troops has been ordered, much less any more extensive measures of the character of a mobilisation."

A Cabinet Council of the common Ministers met yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock and continued its deliberations until 4 this morning. It is long since so lengthy a sitting has occurred; even the recent important discussion by the Cabinet of the military demands closed at an earlier hour. The announcement that the topic of discussion was exclusively the Bosnian railways has been received with some scepticism.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[46031] No. 885.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 551.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, October 30, 1912.*

MILITARY attachés were sent up towards front to-day.

[46056] No. 886.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 552.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 30, 1912.*

I HAVE seen Grand Vizier this evening. He states that yesterday two engagements were fought in which Turks were successful—one at Viza and one near Adrianople.

His Highness states that Turkey will at any moment be prepared to treat with Great Powers, but not with Balkan States, regarding peace, and only on the lines laid down by former, namely, territorial *status quo* in European Turkey and integrity of Ottoman Empire.

[46055] No. 887.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 30, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 544 of 29th October.

Greek troops will advance on Salonica as fast as possible in the hope of preventing disorders.

Arrangements are being already made to remove mines as soon as town and forts are occupied.

[46162] No. 888.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, October 30, 1912.*

ON his return from his mission to St. Petersburgh (see my telegram No. 79), the Minister of the Interior informed the Prime Minister that he had received from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the explicit assurance that, whatever extension of territory the allies might claim as the result of their victory, Austria-Hungary would abstain from interference. At the date when this interview took place, the battles of Kirk Kilisse and Kumanovo had not yet been decided. M. Sazonof also assured him that the influence of the Russian Government would be exerted to prevent any infraction of international law on the part of he naval forces of Turkey in the Black Sea.

The Bulgarian Minister of the Interior did not have an interview with the Emperor, owing to the indisposition of the Czarevitch.

[46169] No. 889.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 31, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 14 of 29th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he hears from Paris and Vienna that the King's speech to the Cabinet of 27th October has caused anxiety there. His Excellency does not know why.

He says that speech should be read in connection with decision not to mobilise, and that it was intended to show that that decision was not due to weakness.

[46170] No. 890.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, October 31, 1912.*

BERLIN telegram No. 136 of 30th October.

King told Sir P. Sanderson, who was received in audience yesterday, that if Bulgaria were to obtain any large accession of territory this would be a menace to Roumania which she would have to take measures to counteract.

With the Dobrudscha frontier as fixed by the Treaty of Berlin, Roumania would be at the mercy of a stronger Bulgaria, and, as reported in my despatch No. 82 of yesterday, the rectification of this frontier is regarded by this country as necessary in the event of Bulgarian aggrandisement. I am, moreover, disposed to think that any demands from Roumania on this head would include possession of Silistria.

I have not, however, seen so far any indication pointing to existence of such an arrangement with Bulgaria as that indicated from Berlin. King said to Sir P. Sanderson yesterday that Bulgarians were like the Japanese—very secretive—and that it was difficult to know their intentions.

[46057] No. 891.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 31, 1912.*

BALKANS.

I have communicated substance of your telegram No. 312 of to-day to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency has also disquieting news from Salonica, but says that they have no ships to send. Loreley is, however, there, having been sent at the request of the Ottoman Government to bring the ex-Sultan to Constantinople.

His Excellency thinks that time for mediation is rapidly approaching, and that after the conclusion of the battle now in progress Ottoman Government will be ready, at all events with some persuasion, to demand it. Powers could then propose armistice during which the latter could sound Balkan States separately as to their demands.

His Excellency hoped that conference may be avoided or deferred as long as possible, as the victorious States could scarcely be excluded, and he disliked the idea of their four solid votes until at least all the Great Powers had decided amongst themselves what was best to be done.

Speaking of the attitude of Austria-Hungary, his Excellency said that it was at present all that could be desired. Austro-Hungarian Government would not, he was sure, object to some reasonable territorial advantage for Servia as long as the latter showed friendly spirit in commercial and other matters. I asked his Excellency what were views of Austro-Hungarian Government respecting Servians and sanjak. He replied that they would sooner have them there than on the Adriatic.

[46176] No. 892.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, October 31, 1912.*

BALKANS.

My French colleague communicated to Imperial Government this morning declaration of disinterestedness proposed to the Great Powers by the French Government in view of mediation.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs promised answer to-morrow or next day.

[46149] No. 893.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 555.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 31, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 892 of 30th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to authorities at Salonica advising them of arrival of one or two British ships, and instructing local military authorities to render necessary assistance, especially in the matter of mines.

As the German Embassy stationnaire has just visited and returned from Salonica without accident, presumably danger from mines is not to be apprehended.

As mission of "Hampshire" is to afford protection for British subjects, who are not numerous at Salonica, I suppose that she will leave the moment that object is attained, so as to avoid any appearance of unnecessary intervention.

Should the town be occupied by Balkan forces, latter would presumably be responsible for maintenance of order.

[46161] No. 894.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 556.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 31, 1912.*

TELEGRAM No. 72 of 30th October from Cairo.

Khedive did not mention question of neutrality to me when I saw him on 27th October.

Nor has question, as far as I am aware, been mooted in local circles here.

[46171] No. 895.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 557.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October 31, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegrams Nos. 104 and 106 of 28th and 29th October.

Latest information regarding Turkish intentions points to a forward movement north-west from direction of Vize, and a report from Nazim Pasha, dated 29th October, states that advance has been successful on the right to Chongara.

Portions of Turkish reinforcements have landed on the Black Sea coast to co-operate with the main forces, but no separate movement on Black Sea coast.

There seems no present idea of large army now assembled being forced to retire on Tchatalja position, or of their intending to do so.

Successful sortie from Adrianople in Marasch direction up to Seraikeui and Kemal.

Turkish head-quarters are now at Tcherkesskeui.

[46177] No. 896.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, October 31, 1912.*

ALL His Majesty's ships except His Majesty's ship "Diana" left Cretan waters to-day.

[46058] No. 897.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 14. Treaty.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, October 31, 1912.*

GREEK Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me officially that a cable-ship of the Eastern Telegraph Company has been found by Greek fleet repairing the cable between Tenedos and Chios, and that, if this occurs again, vessel will be captured for affording assistance to enemy.

[46174] No. 898.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, October 31, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1136 of 30th October: dispatch of ship to Salonica.

Russian Government informed.

[46147] No. 899.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 31, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 104 of 28th October.

Severe fighting has been proceeding at the front. Turks recaptured Lule Burgas from Bulgarian cavalry, but they have now fallen back on Chorlu in confusion. Losses on both sides reported to be heavy.

Servian regular troops and Bulgarian reservists have been passing through regularly day and night for the last three days, the former for the front, the latter to garrison northern portion of captured territory.

[46157] No. 900.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 31, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 31st October.

Battle just reported has been severest in war up to date. Turkish front extended from Lule Burgas to Sarai, which lies about 35 miles east of former place. Battle lasted three days and two nights by moonlight. Reliable details as to number of dead and wounded not yet to hand.

Bulgarian cavalry penetrated as far as Chorlu, retiring afterwards on main body.

[46175] No. 901.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, October 31, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 110 of to-day.

At battle on Sarai front it is estimated here that Turkish army were 160,000 strong and Bulgarians about 90,000.

Bulgarian forces are advancing straight on Tchataldja, where they expect to meet with fierce resistance. If successful, they will march straight into Constantinople. At fight near Kirk Kilisse, reported in my telegram No. 95 of 24th October, the 1st Guards Infantry and 8th regiments were annihilated by Turks.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[45612] No. 902.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 896.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 537 of 28th October.

I told Sir H. Babington Smith that our attitude towards all loans to any belligerent must be that financiers must decide for themselves that whatever they did must be at their own risk.

[46149] No. 903.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 903.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 555: Penultimate paragraph.

Yes, and Admiralty will be asked to issue instructions that commander of "Hampshire" should consult with His Majesty's consul-general on the subject in due course.

[45977] No. 904.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 528.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1912.

THE French Ambassador stated on the 28th October that the Greek representative in Paris had informed M. Poincaré of the appointment of M. Dragoumis as Governor-General of Crete. M. Poincaré had simply taken note, making all reserves.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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